The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (94 page)

1365.
On September 17, 2007, President Bush nominated Judge Michael Mukasey to be Attorney General of the United States. In October 2007, at his confirmation hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Mukasey declined to say whether he believed waterboarding as an interrogation technique was unlawful. On October 30, 2007, Mukasey responded to written questions from the Senate Judiciary Committee on the issue of waterboarding, stating: “As described in your letter, these techniques seem over the line or, on a personal basis, repugnant to me, and would probably seem the same to many Americans. But hypotheticals are different from real life, and in any legal opinion the actual facts and circumstances are critical.” (See October 30, 2007, Letter from Michael B. Mukasey, to Senators Patrick J. Leahy, Edward M. Kennedy, Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Herb Kohl, Dianne Feinstein, Russell D. Feingold, Charles E. Schumer, Richard J. Durbin, Benjamin L. Cardin, and Sheldon Whitehouse.) On November 6, 2007, days prior to a Senate vote to confirm Mukasey, the CIA provided a set of talking points to the CIA director for use with the President in a meeting about the CIA’s use of the waterboard interrogation technique. See document entitled, “DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007,” dated November 6, 2007, with the notation the document was “sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting.”

1366.
Italics added. See document entitled, “DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007,” dated November 6, 2007, with the notation the document was “sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting.”

1367.
Italics added. CIA briefing for Vice President Cheney, dated March 4, 2005, entitled, “Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program.”

1368.
See list of CIA prepared briefings and memoranda from 2003 through 2009 with representations on the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques referenced in this summary and described in detail in Volume II.

1369.
█████ 45028 ███████ and DIRECTOR ███ ████████. The CIA’s June 2013 Response concedes that the CIA “mischaracterized the impact of the reporting [the CIA] acquired from detainees on the Karachi plots,” and acknowledges that the Karachi plotting was “thwarted by the arrest of the operatives and the interdiction of explosives by [Pakistani authorities].” The CIA does not dispute that Pakistani authorities arrested Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash independently, and that information from the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program played no role in the arrests. The CIA’s June 2013 Response states, however, that CIA detainee reporting “revealed ongoing attack plotting against the US official presence in Karachi that prompted the Consulate to take further steps to protect its officers.” This statement is incongruent with CIA records. In response to the reporting cited by the CIA, CIA personnel in Karachi wrote: “[w]hile reporting from both [al-Baluchi and bin Attash] was chilling- [CIA officers] had become aware of most of this reporting either through previous information or through interviews of al-Baluchi and [Khallad bin] Attash prior to their transfer out of Karachi.” The CIA personnel in Karachi further reassured addressees that, in December 2002, the U.S. Consulate in Karachi took increased steps to protect U.S. Consulate personnel. See Volume II for additional information.

1370.
For detailed information, see Volume II.

1371.
ALEC ███ (032142Z OCT 02).

1372.
██████ 12535 (050557Z OCT 02); █████ 11050 (101207Z OCT 02); █████.

1373.
ALEC ███ (0302054Z OCT 02).
See also
CIA paper dated January 11, 2002, entitled, “Threat Threads: Most 11 September Plotters Still Under the Radar.”

1374.
ALEC ███ (0302054Z OCT 02).
See also
CIA paper dated January 11, 2002, entitled, “Threat Threads: Most 11 September Plotters Still Under the Radar.”

1375.
██████ 45028 ████. CIA records indicate the interdiction was the result of criminal leads and was unrelated to any reporting from CIA detainees. ██████████████████████████████████████████. See DIRECTOR █████.

1376.
█████ 45028 █████; DIRECTOR ██ ██████. The ClA’s June 2013 Response maintains that KSM’s reporting on the thwarted “perfume letter” plotting was separate from the “plots disrupted with the arrest and interrogation of Ammar and Khallad.” Because CIA records did not make this distinction, and the fact that the operations, to at least some extent, shared targets, operatives, and the same set of explosives, the operations are linked in this Study.

1377.
██████ 45028 ███████; DIRECTOR ██ █████.

1378.
Given the threat to U.S. interests, CIA officers sought to participate in the interrogations. A May 2, 2003, CIA cable (See ████ 14291) states that, because of Ammar al-Baluchi’s “strong reticence towards the U.S.,” CIA officers were observing the foreign government interrogations of Ammar al-Baluchi via video feed. The cable notes that a foreign government officer who had developed rapport with Ammar al-Baluchi was conducting all the questioning and obtaining intelligence from Ammar al-Baluchi on the plotting against U.S. interests in Pakistan, as well as other matters.

1379.
The CIA’s June 2013 Response claims that “Ammar and Khallad provided new information on other attack plans in Karachi after entering CIA custody and undergoing enhanced interrogation techniques,” and that “[d]uring his first interrogation in CIA custody and after enhanced techniques commenced, [Ammar] revealed that the plan was to use a motorcycle bomb and a car bomb in a single, coordinated attack at the end of May or early June, and he pointed to the location on the Consulate’s perimeter wall where the attack would occur.” The information in the CIA’s June 2013 Response is inaccurate. Ammar al-Baluchi provided the referenced information while in foreign government custody, prior to entering CIA custody and being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. Given the threat to U.S. interests, CIA officers sought to participate in the interrogations. A May 2, 2003, CIA cable (█████ 14291) states that, because of Ammar al-Baluchi’s “strong reticence towards the U.S.,” CIA officers were observing the foreign government interrogations of Ammar al-Baluchi via video feed. The cable notes that a foreign government officer who had developed rapport with Ammar al-Baluchi was conducting all the questioning and obtaining intelligence from Ammar al-Baluchi. This included information about the motorcycle-car bomb plotting against the U.S. Consulate, as well as information on plans to potentially target Westerners in a specific housing area in Karachi. According to the information obtained, surveillance by the plotters “had confirmed a U.S. presence significant enough to warrant such an attack.” Ammar al-Baluchi further stated that he had considered carjacking a U.S. Consulate vehicle and loading it with explosives to target the Consulate, and elaborated on the initial idea to attack the U.S. Consulate with a helicopter, stating that he did not follow through with this idea because he believed it would take too long to train an operative for that type of attack (see █████ 14291, May 2, 2003). Later, the foreign government officer described Ammar al-Baluchi as “more chatty” than Khallad bin Attash, and detailed how, while in foreign government custody Ammar al-Baluchi “acknowledged plans to attack U.S. Consulate officials at the airport, the Consul General’s Residence and the Consulate itself.” The foreign government officer explained that “both the Consulate and the CG’s residence” required a “tiered attack of successive car bombs which would breach the perimeter” of the targets. The foreign government officer also stated that, based on Ammar al-Baluchi’s comments on his casing efforts, it was inferred that Ammar al-Baluchi had sought totarget Americans at their residences in specific areas of Karachi. See ████ 19647 ████ APR 04).

1380.
█████ 14282 ███████. Records indicate that Khallad bin Attash was less cooperative (Ammar al-Baluchi was described as “more chatty”), but nonetheless provided information in foreign government custody on the surveillance he conducted against United States government vehicles in Karachi, among other information.

1381.
█████ 45028 (███ APR 03); DIRECTOR ███████ APR 03); █████ 14291 (May 2, 2003); █████ 19647 (████ APR 04). CIA records indicate that Ammar al-Baluchi was providing significant information to the foreign government officer conducting the questioning who had developed rapport with Ammar al-Baluchi.

1382.
[REDACTED] 38325 ███████; [REDACTED] 38389 ███████.

1383.
DIRECTOR ██ (███ MAY 03); DIRECTOR ██ (███ MAY 03).

1384.
DIRECTOR ██ (███ MAY 03); DIRECTOR ██ (███ MAY 03). DIRECTOR ███ noted that Khallad bin Attash indicated that they had identified one suicide operative so far.

1385.
See CIA speech validation efforts for the President’s September 6, 2006, speech acknowledging the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program. In the speech. President Bush stated that “Terrorists held in CIA custody . . . helped stop a planned attack on the U.S. consulate in Karachi using car bombs and motorcycle bombs.”
See also
, among other documents, the June 2005 CIA Intelligence Assessment entitled, “Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al-Qa’ida.” CIA records indicate this document was provided to White House officials on June 1, 2005. A slightly modified version of this Intelligence Assessment was broadly disseminated within the Intelligence Community on June 3, 2005. On March 31, 2009, former Vice President Cheney requested the declassification of this Intelligence Assessment, which was publicly released with redactions on August 24, 2009. The assessment represents that “detainee reporting” resulted in the “[r]evealing of the Karachi Plots,” stating: “When confronted with information provided by Ammar al-Baluchi, Khallad admitted during debriefings that al-Qa’ida was planning to attack the US Consulate in Karachi, Westerners at the Karachi Airport, and Western housing areas.” The footnote for this claim cites the May █, 2003, disseminated intelligence report detailing the admission made by Khallad bin Attash while being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques (███████) as its source.

1386.
████ 14510 ███████. This cable also stated, “As noted in several previous cables, in December 2002 ███ Consulate became aware of the threat to Consulate officials.”

1387.
████ 14510 ███████.

1388.
Italics added. See document entitled, “DCIA Talking Points; Waterboard 06 November 2007,” dated November 6, 2007, with the notation the document was “sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting.”

1389.
████ 11448 (301141Z APR 03); ████ 11454 (301710Z APR 03). As described in detail in the intelligence chronology in Volume II, KSM was rendered to CIA custody on March █, 2003, and was immediately subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. On March 5, 2003, he was “confronted” with the “perfume letter,” at which point he discussed the letter and its recipient, Hamza al-Zubayr. KSM had not yet been subjected to the waterboard. As described, Hamza al-Zubayr was killed in a September 2002 raid against al-Qa’ida-related safe houses. KSM stated that Khallad bin Attash had been responsible for obtaining operatives for the Hamza al-Zubayr operation. At the time KSM provided this information, a separate cable stated that KSM “continued to deny that he has any [knowledge of] ongoing operations.” See [REDACTED] 34513 (052246Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR ███ (062312Z MAR 02); [REDACTED] 34575 (061929Z MAR 03); █████ 34566 (061646Z MAR 03); █████████34575█████; █████████ 34513 (052246Z MAR03).

1390.
ALEC ██ (022012Z MAY 03).

1391.
████ 3425 (050726Z SEP 06); ███ 1242 (050748Z SEP 06); ███████ 2214 (050539Z SEP 06).

1392.
See Second Wave / Al-Ghuraba Group intelligence chronology in Volume II, including, among other documents, DIRECTOR ███ (20211Z JUN 03) and cable note on “Draft Intel: KSM Details his Thinking on and Efforts to Target California,” included as an attachment to an email from ██████ to a distribution list for CIA OTA in the Directorate of Intelligence, dated June 30, 2003, at 06:25 PM.

1393.
See intelligence chronology in Volume II for detailed information.
See also
statements by United States government officials, such as a February 9, 2006, White House briefing on “the West Coast Terrorist Plot by Frances Fragos Townsend, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism.” At this briefing the White House emphasized how “collaboration with our international partners” had “disrupted terrorist networks around the world and serious al-Qaeda plots.” Using the “West Coast” plot as an example, Townsend stated that: “Khalid Shaykh Mohammed was the individual who led this effort . . . The cell leader was arrested in February of 2002, and as we begin—at that point, the other members of the cell believed that the West Coast plot had been cancelled [and] was not going forward . . . the lead guy is arrested, which disrupts it in February of ‘02.” When asked about whether this plotting could be accurately described as a disruption given the belief by some that “it never got far enough to be disrupted,” Townsend stated, “there is no question in my mind that this is a disruption.”
See also
May 23, 2007, White House Press Release, entitled, “Fact Sheet: Keeping America Safe From Attack,” which states, “We Also Broke Up Other Post-9/11 Aviation Plots. In 2002, we broke up a plot by KSM to hijack an airplane and fly it into the tallest building on the West Coast.” As described in the Study, KSM was not detained until March 1, 2003. The CIA’s June 2013 Response acknowledges that “[t]he Study correctly points out that we erred when we represented that we ‘learned’ of the Second Wave plotting from KSM and ‘learned’ of the operational cell comprised of students from Hambali.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response describes the inaccurate representation as “imprecision” by the CIA, but nonetheless states that the CIA “continue(s) to assess this was a good example of the importance of intelligence derived from the detainee program”; and contends—for the first time—that Hambali’s capture “was a critical factor in the disruption of al-Qa’ida’s plan to conduct a ‘Second Wave’ attack.” As described throughout the Committee Study, in its efforts to obtain legal authorization and policy approval for the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, the CIA represented that the intelligence referenced was obtained “as a result” of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques (not the “detainee program”), and that the information obtained was unique and otherwise unavailable. As detailed in this summary and in Volume II, the capture of Hambali was unrelated to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.