The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (47 page)

“Results:
CIA’s use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of critical intelligence on al-Qa’ida. We believe that intelligence acquired from these interrogations has been a key reason why al-Qa’ida has failed to launch a spectacular attack in the West since 11 September 2001. Key intelligence collected from HVD interrogations
after
applying interrogation techniques:
2025
. . .
Jafaar al-Tavvar:
Tayyar is an al-Qa’ida operative who was conducting casing in the US for KSM prior to 9/11, according to KSM and other HVDs. KSM confirmed that he recruited Tayyar—who is still at large—to conduct a major operation against US interests. KSM described Tayyar as the next Muhammad Atta. Tayyar’s family is in Florida and we have identified many of his extremist contacts. Acting on this information, the FBI quickly publicized Tayyar’s true name and aggressively followed up with his family and friends in the United States, causing Tayyar to flee the United States.
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and we are actively pursuing his capture.
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.
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Prior to receiving information from the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, the U.S. Intelligence Community was interested in Adnan el-Shukrijumah. According to CIA and open source records, the FBI interviewed the parents of Adnan el-Shukrijumah several times between September 2001 and October 2002 concerning their son and his suspected contact with a known extremist. The family provided no significant information on their son, except to alert the FBI that he had departed the United States circa May 2001.
2028

CIA representations that Jaffar al-Tayyar fled the United States in 2003 in response to an investigation prompted by reporting from KSM were incongruent with CIA records at the time of the representations, which indicated that al-Tayyar had already relocated to Pakistan. In March 2003, when Jose Padilla identified Jaffar al-Tayyar as Adnan al-Shukrijumah, he stated that he had last seen al-Tayyar at a KSM safehouse in Karachi, Pakistan, in March 2002.
2029
Other reporting indicated al-Tayyar’s presence in Pakistan in 2002 and 2003, as well. For example, KSM consistently reported that al-Tayyar was not in the United States and noted during a 2004 interrogation that al-Tayyar “would not return to the United States because his name was known to U.S. authorities.”
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Further,
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.
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On May 20, 2002, prior to the initiation of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques—and while being questioned by FBI special agents—CIA detainee Abu Zubaydah provided information on “Abu Jafar al-Tayer” in the context of discussing associates of KSM. Abu Zubaydah provided a detailed description of “Abu Jafar al-Tayer” and stated that he was an English speaker who had studied in the United States. Abu Zubaydah stated that he first met “Abu Jafar al-Tayer” in Birmal, Afghanistan, circa January 2002, and that “Abu Jafar al-Tayer” was at that time seeking to travel to Pakistan. Abu Zubaydah repeated that “Abu Jafar al-Tayer” spoke “very good English” and was “short and stocky with black hair and dark skin.”
2032
Abu Zubaydah did not provide significant additional information on Abu Jaffar al-Tayyar after the CIA used its enhanced interrogation techniques against him in August 2002.
2033

On September 11, 2002, Ramzi bin al-Shibh was captured in Karachi, Pakistan.
2034
During the capture operation, a letter referencing Jaffar al-Tayyar was seized. According to a translation of the letter, it stated “tell an unidentified pilot named Ja’far that he should be ready for travel.”
2035
Shortly after his capture, bin al-Shibh was rendered to foreign government custody.
2036
In November 2002, while still in foreign government custody, bin al-Shibh was questioned on “Ja’far the Pilot” and provided a physical description of “Ja’far.”
2037

On March 1, 2003, KSM was captured. A notebook associated with KSM retrieved during the capture operation included the name “Jafar al-TAYYAR.”
2038
After his capture, KSM was rendered to CIA custody, and immediately subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
2039

On March 7, 2003, CIA Headquarters sent information on Jaffar al-Tayyar to the CIA’s DETENTION SITE BLUE, where KSM was located, for use in the interrogation of KSM.
2040
The documents included the following:

• a “targeting study” on Jaffar al-Tayyar completed by the CIA in January 2003;
  2041
  
• a letter from KSM to bin al-Shibh referencing “Jafar the Pilot” and indicating that “Jafar” “ought to prepare himself to smuggle himself from Mexico into an unspecified country;
  
• a letter from Jaffar al-Tayyar to Ramzi bin al-Shibh asking for clarification of KSM’s letter; and
  
• additional background and reporting information on Jaffar al-Tayyar.
  2042
  

The requirements cable from CIA Headquarters to the detention site included numerous specific questions, relying on the information already known about Jaffar al-Tayyar.
2043

According to CIA records, on March 9, 2003—while KSM was being interrogated using the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, but before he was subjected to the waterboard interrogation technique—the CIA interrogation team used two letters referencing al-Tayyar as the “interrogation vehicle” to elicit information from KSM on Jaffar al-Tayyar.
2044
CIA cables state that KSM did not provide—and claimed not to know—Jaffar al-Tayyar’s true name. However, KSM stated that Jaffar al-Tayyar’s father lived in Florida and was named “Shukri Sherdil.”
2045
This information was not accurate. Open source reporting indicates that Jaffar al-Tayyar’s father’s true name was “Gulshair El Shukrijumah.”
2046

Over the course of the next two weeks, during the period when KSM was being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques—including the waterboard—KSM referred to Jaffar al-Tayyar as being engaged in multiple terrorist operations. As a result, the CIA’s detention site began describing Jaffar as the “all-purpose” al-Tayyar whom KSM had “woven . . . into practically every story, each time with a different role.”
2047
CIA records confirm that KSM made numerous statements about Jaffar al-Tayyar’s terrorist plotting that were deemed not to be credible by CIA personnel,
2048
including, but not limited to, statements that:

• al-Tayyar was engaged in terrorist plotting with Jose Padilla;
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• al-Tayyar was engaged in terrorist plots against Heathrow Airport;
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• al-Tayyar was involved in terrorist plotting with Majid Khan;
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  and
  
• al-Tayyar was engaged in an assassination plot against former President Jimmy Carter.
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On March 12, 2003, when KSM was confronted with a page in his notebook about al-Tayyar, KSM stated that he “considered al-Tayyar to be the ‘next ‘emir’ for an attack against the US, in the same role that Muhammad Atta had for 11 September.”
2053
On March 16, 2003, KSM stated that the only comparison between Atta and al-Tayyar was their education and experience in the West.
2054

An email exchange the afternoon of March 18, 2003, between CIA personnel expressed the views of interrogators and officers at CIA Headquarters with regard to KSM and Jaffar al-Tayyar. The email from KSM debriefer ███████████████████ stated:

“we’ve finally gotten [KSM] to admit that al-Tayyar is meant for a plan in the US, but I’m still not sure he’s fessing up as to what Jafar’s role/plan really is. Today he’s working with Majid Khan, yesterday the London crowd, the day before Padilla - you get the point. Anyway, I’m still worried he might be misdirecting us on Jafar.”
2055

An officer from CIA Headquarters responded, “I agree . . . KSM is yanking our chain about Jafar . . . really trying hard to throw us off course . . . suggesting whatever Jafar really is up to must be baaaad [
sic
].” The officer noted that “[a]nother big hole is Jafar’s true name,” and relayed that KSM’s use of “another Abu name . . . Abu Arif . . . doesn’t get us far.”
2056
When KSM was confronted with the reporting he had provided on Jaffar al-Tayyar, KSM claimed that he had been forced to lie about al-Tayyar because of the pressure he was under from his CIA interrogators, who had been subjecting KSM to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques since his rendition to CIA custody.
2057

Additional CIA records from this period indicate that, while KSM claimed not to know Jaffar al-Tayyar’s true name, KSM suggested that Jose Padilla, then in U.S. military custody, would know his name. According to CIA records, the “FBI began participating in the military debriefings [of Jose Padilla] in March 2003, after KSM reported Padilla might know the true name of a US-bound al-Qa’ida operative known at the time only as Jaffar al-Tayyar. Padilla confirmed Jaffar al-Tayyar’s true name as Adnan El Shukrijumah.”
2058

In March 2003, a senior CTC officer noted differences between KSM’s reporting and reporting from Ramzi binal-Shibh.
2059
In April 2003, an Intelligence Community assessment concluded, based on comments from other detainees—including those not in CIA custody—that “[i]t seemed obvious that KSM was lying with regard to Jaffar al-Tayyar.”
2060
In July 2003, after Ammar al-Baluchi stated that Jaffaral-Tayyar was not suited to be an operative and was “not doing much of anything,” the deputy chairman of the Community Counterterrorism Board warned:

“If [KSM] has pulled off focusing us on a person who is actually no threat, it would mean that our interrogation techniques have not/not broken down his resistance to any appreciable extent—and that we will have to doubt even more strongly anything he says.”
2061

In December 2005, an NCTC Red Team report, entitled “Ja’far al-Tayyar: An Unlikely Al-Qa’ida Operational Threat,” highlighted the possibility that the information provided by KSM on al-Tayyar’s capabilities and terrorist plotting was simply “deception.” The report described a large body of other detainee reporting—from Abu Faraj al-Libi, Abu Talha al-Pakistani, ‘Abd al-Rahim Ghulam Rabbani, and Ammar al-Baluchi—consisting of largely dismissive statements about Jaffar al-Tayyar’s capabilities and role in al-Qa’ida.
2062

10. The Identification and Arrest of Saleh al-Marri

The CIA represented to the CIA Office of Inspector General that as a result of the lawful use of EITs,”
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KSM “provided information that helped lead to the arrests of terrorists including . . . Saleh Almari, a sleeper operative in New York.”
2064
This information was included in the final version of the OIG’s May 2004 Special Review under the heading, “Effectiveness.”
2065
This CIA representation is inaccurate. KSM was captured on March 1, 2003.
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Saleh al-Marri was arrested in December 2001.
2067

The inaccurate statements about al-Marri to the OIG began with the July 16, 2003, OIG interview of Deputy Chief of ALEC Station █████████,
2068
and were repeated in DDO Pavitt’s formal response to the draft OIG Special Review.
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The inaccurate statements were then included in the final May 2004 Special Review.
2070
The “Effectiveness” section of the Special Review was used repeatedly as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, including in CIA representations to the Department of Justice. The passage in the OIG Special Review that includes the inaccurate CIA representation that KSM provided information helping to lead to the arrest of al-Marri was referenced in the May 30, 2005, OLC memorandum analyzing the legality of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
2071
The portion of the Special Review discussing al-Marri has been declassified, as has the OLC memorandum.
2072

The CIA also represented, in Pavitt’s formal response to the OIG, that prior to reporting from KSM, the CIA possessed “no concrete information” on al-Marri.
2073
This representation is incongruent with CIA records. CIA records indicate that prior to the CIA’s detention of KSM, the CIA possessed significant information on al-Marri, who was arrested after making attempts to contact a telephone number associated with al-Qa’ida member and suspected 9/11 facilitator, Mustafa al-Hawsawi.
2074
CIA records indicate that al-Marri had suspicious information on his computer upon his arrest,
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that al-Marri’s brother had travelled to Afghanistan in 2001 to join in jihad against the United States,
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and that al-Marri was directly associated with KSM, as well as with al-Hawsawi.
2077

The FBI also had extensive records on al-Marri. On March 26, 2002, a year before any reporting from KSM, the FBI provided the Committee with biographical and derogatory information on al-Marri, including al-Marri’s links to Mustafa al-Hawsawi, suspicious information found on al-Marri’s computer, and al-Marri’s connections to other extremists.
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11. The Collection of Critical Tactical Intelligence on Shkai, Pakistan