The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (50 page)

“Senator,
these individuals were in our program and were subject to some form of enhanced interrogation
. Because of the time involved and the relationship to the information and the fact that I’m not a specialist on that program, I would ask that you allow us to come back to you with some detail.”
2188

The information above is not fully congruent with CIA records. As is detailed in the intelligence chronology in Volume II, the vast majority of the intelligence acquired on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was originally acquired from sources unrelated to the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, and the most accurate information acquired from a CIA detainee was provided prior to the CIA subjecting the detainee to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
2189
As detailed in CIA records, and acknowledged by the CIA in testimony, information from CIA detainees subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques—to include CIA detainees who had clear links to Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti based on a large body of intelligence reporting—provided fabricated, inconsistent, and generally unreliable information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti throughout their detention.
2190

At the May 4, 2011, briefing, a Senator asked, “of the people that you talked about as detainees that were interrogated, which of those were
waterboarded
and
did they provide unique intelligence
in order to make this whole mission possible?”
2191
CIA Director Panetta responded:

“I want to be able to get back to you with specifics, but right now we think there were about
12 detainees that were interviewed,
2192
and about three of them were probably subject to the waterboarding process.
2193
Now what came from those interviews, how important was it, I really do want to stress the fact that we had a lot of streams of intelligence here that kind of tipped us off there, but we had imagery, we had assets on the ground, we had information that came from a number of directions in order to piece this together.
But clearly the tipoff
2194
on the couriers came from those interviews
.”
2195

As previously detailed, the “tipoff” on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002 did not come from the interrogation of CIA detainees and was obtained prior to any CIA detainee reporting. The CIA was already targeting Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and collecting intelligence on at least one phone number and an email address associated with al-Kuwaiti in 2002.
2196
No CIA detainee provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002, and prior to receiving any information from CIA detainees, the CIA possessed a body of intelligence reporting linking Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti to KSM and UBL and to operational targeting of the United States, as well as reporting that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was “one of a few close associates of Usama bin Ladin”
2197
and “traveled frequently” to “meet with Usama bin Ladin.”
2198

The day after the classified briefing, on May 5, 2011, the CIA provided the Committee with a six-page chart entitled, “Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti,” which accompanied a one-page document compiled by the CIA’s CTC, entitled “Background Detainee Information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti.”
2199
In total, the CIA chart identifies 25 “mid-value and high-value detainees” who “discussed Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti’s long-time membership in al-Qa’ida and his historic role as courier for Usama Bin Ladin.” The 25 detainees are divided into two categories. The chart prominently lists 12 detainees—all identified as having been in CIA custody—“who linked Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin,” which the CIA labeled as the most important, “Tier 1” information. The document states that nine of the 12 (9/12: 75 percent) CIA detainees providing “Tier 1” information were subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, and that of those nine detainees, two (2/9: 20 percent) were subjected to the CIA’s waterboard interrogation technique. The chart then includes a list of 13 detainees “who provided general information on Abu Ahmad,” labeled as “Tier 2” information. The CIA document states that four of the 13 (4/13: 30 percent) “Tier 2” detainees were in CIA custody and that all four (4/4: 100 percent) “CIA detainees” were subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
2200

On October 3, 2012, the CIA provided the Committee with a document entitled, “Lessons for the Hunt for Bin Ladin,” completed in September 2012 by the CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence. The CIA Lessons Learned document states, “[i]n sum, 25 detainees provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, his al-Qa’ida membership, and his historic role as a courier for Bin Ladin.” The CIA document then states that 16 of the 25 detainees who reported on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti were in CIA custody, and that “[o]f the 16 held in CIA custody, all but three [13] had given information
after
being subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs),” before noting that “only two (KSM and Abu Zubaydah) had been waterboarded.”
2201

A review of CIA records found that these CIA documents contained inaccurate information and omitted important and material facts.

• The May 5, 2011, CIA chart represents that all 12 detainees (12/12: 100 percent) providing “Tier 1” intelligence—information that “linked Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin”
  2202
  —were detainees in CIA custody.
  A review of CIA records found that the CIA document omitted the fact that five of the 12 listed detainees (5/12: 41 percent) provided intelligence on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to entering CIA custody.
  2203
  In addition, other detainees—not in CIA custody—provided information that “linked Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin,” but were not included in the CIA list. For example, the first detainee-related information identified in CIA records indicating a close relationship between UBL and Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was acquired in July 2002, from a detainee in the custody of a foreign government, Abu Zubair al-Ha’ili (Zubair). According to CIA records, Zubair provided a detailed physical description of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, information on Abu Ahmad’s family, his close connection to KSM, and that “Ahmad al-Kuwaiti: was a one of a few close associates of Usama bin Ladin.”
  2204
  This information would be used to question other detainees, but was omitted in the CIA’s “Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti” chart.
  
• The May 5, 2011, CIA chart also states that nine of the 12 (9/12: 75 percent) “CIA detainees” providing “Tier 1” intelligence were subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
  A review of CIA records found that of the nine detainees the CIA identified as having been subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques and providing “Tier 1” information on links between Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and UBL, five of the 9 (5/9: 55 percent) provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
  2205
  This information was omitted from the CIA document. Of the remaining four detainees who did not provide information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti until after being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, three were not substantially questioned on any topic prior to the CIA’s use of enhanced interrogation techniques.
  2206
  All three provided information the CIA assessed to be fabricated and intentionally misleading.
  2207
  The fourth, Abu Zubaydah, who was detained on March 28, 2002, and subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques in August 2002, to include the waterboard technique, did not provide information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti until August 25, 2005, intelligence that was described by CIA officers at the time as “speculative.”
  2208
  These relevant details were omitted from the CIA documents.
  2209
  
• The May 5, 2011, CIA chart also states that of the 13 detainees “who provided general information on Abu Ahmad,” labeled as “Tier II” information, four of the 13 (4/13: 30 percent) detainees were in CIA custody and that all four (4/4:100 percent) were subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
  2210
  A review of CIA records found the CIA document omitted that two of the four (2/4; 50 percent) “CIA detainees” who were described as subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques provided intelligence on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti
  prior
  to entering CIA custody, and therefore
  prior
  to being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
  2211
  Finally, there were additional detainees in foreign government custody “who provided general information on Abu Ahmad” that were not included in the list of 13 detainees. For example, in January 2002, the CIA received reporting from a detainee in the custody of a foreign government who provided a physical description of a Kuwaiti named Abu Ahmad who attended a terrorist training camp.
  2212
  
• The October 3, 2012, “Lessons for the Hunt for Bin Ladin” document states that “[i]n sum, 25 detainees provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, his al-Qa’ida membership, and his historic role as a courier for Bin Ladin.”
  This is incorrect. As described, additional detainees—not in CIA custody—provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, including 2002 reporting that al-Kuwaiti “was one of a few close associates of Usama bin Ladin.”
  2213
  
• The October 3, 2012, “Lessons for the Hunt for Bin Ladin” document also states that 16 of the 25 (16/25: 65 percent) detainees who reported on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti were in CIA custody.
  This is incorrect. At least seven of the 16 detainees (7/16: 45 percent) that the CIA listed as detainees in CIA custody provided reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to being transferred to CIA custody.
  2214
  
• The October 3, 2012, “Lessons for the Hunt for Bin Ladin” document also states that “[o]f the 16 held in CIA custody, all but three [13] had given information after being subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs).”
  2215
  This is incorrect. Seven of the 13 detainees that the CIA listed as having been subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti
  prior
  to being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
  2216
  Of the remaining six detainees who did not provide information on Abu Ahmad alKuwaiti until
  after
  being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, five were not substantially questioned on any topic prior to the CIA’s use of enhanced interrogation techniques.
  2217
  (Of the five detainees, three provided information the CIA assessed to be fabricated and intentionally misleading.
  2218
  The remaining two provided limited, non-unique, corroborative reporting.
  2219
  ) The sixth, Abu Zubaydah, who was detained on March 28, 2002, and subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques in August 2002, did not provide information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti until August 25, 2005, intelligence that, as noted, was described by CIA officers at the time as “speculative.”
  2220
  
• The October 3, 2012, “Lessons for the Hunt for Bin Ladin” document also states that “only two [detainees] (KSM and Abu Zubaydah) had been waterboarded. Even so, KSM gave false information about Abu Ahmad. . . .”
  2221
  The CIA’s May 5, 2011, Chart, “Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti,” states that Abu Zubaydah and KSM provided “Tier 1” intelligence that “linked Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin.”
  CIA records indicate that both detainees denied any significant connection between al-Kuwaiti and UBL. CIA records further indicate that Abu Zubaydah and KSM, who were both subjected to the CIA’s waterboard interrogation technique, withheld information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti:
  
• Abu Zubaydah: “Abu Ahmad K.” and a phone number associated with Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was found on page 8 of a 27-page address book captured with Abu Zubaydah on March 28, 2002. In July 2003, Abu Zubaydah stated that he was not familiar with the name Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, or the description provided to him by CIA officers. In April 2004, Abu Zubaydah again stated that he did not recognize the name “Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti.”
  2222
  According to a CIA cable, in August 2005, Abu Zubaydah provided information on “an individual whose name he did not know, but who might be identifiable with Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, aka Abu Ahmad al-Pakistani.” According to the cable, Abu Zubaydah speculated that this individual knew UBL and al-Zawahiri, but did not think their relationship would be close. Days later a CIA cable elaborated that Abu Zubaydah had speculated on a family of brothers from Karachi that may have included Abu Ahmad.
  2223
  
• KSM: When KSM was captured on March 1, 2003, an email address associated with Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was found on a laptop believed to be used by KSM. As detailed in this review, KSM first acknowledged Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in May 2003, after being confronted with reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti from a detainee who was not in CIA custody. KSM provided various reports on Abu Ahmad that the CIA described as “pithy.” In August 2005, KSM claimed that al-Kuwaiti was not a courier, and that he had never heard of Abu Ahmad transporting letters for UBL. In May 2007, the CIA reported that the denials of KSM and another detainee, combined with conflicting reporting from other detainees, added to the CIA’s belief that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was a significant figure.
  2224
  

The CIA detainee who provided the most accurate “Tier 1” information linking Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti to UBL, Hassan Ghul, provided the information prior to being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
2225
Hassan Ghul was captured on January ██, 2004, by foreign authorities in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region.
2226
Ghul was reportedly first interrogated by █████, then transferred to U.S. military custody and questioned, and then rendered to CIA custody at DETENTION SITE COBALT on January ██, 2004.
2227
From January ██, 2004, to January ██ 2004, Hassan Ghul was questioned by the CIA at DETENTION SITE COBALT. During this period the CIA disseminated 21 intelligence reports based on Ghul’s reporting.
2228
A CIA officer told the CIA Office of Inspector General that Hassan Ghul “opened up right away and was cooperative from the outset.”
2229
During the January ██, 2004, to January ██, 2004, sessions, Ghul was questioned on the location of UBL. According to a cable, Ghul speculated that “UBL was likely living in Peshawar area,” and that “it was well known that [UBL] was always with Abu Ahmed [al-Kuwaiti].”
2230
Ghul described Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti as UBL’s “closest assistant”
2231
and listed him as one of three individuals likely to be with UBL.
2232
Ghul further speculated that: