The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (5 page)

Lack of access to adequate medical care for detainees in countries hosting the CIA’s detention facilities caused recurring problems. The refusal of one host country to admit a severely ill detainee into a local hospital due to security concerns contributed to the closing of the CIA’s detention facility in that country. The U.S. Department of Defense also declined to provide medical care to detainees upon CIA request.

In mid-2003, a statement by the president for the United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture and a public statement by the White House that prisoners in U.S. custody are treated “humanely” caused the CIA to question whether there was continued policy support for the program and seek reauthorization from the White House. In mid-2004, the CIA temporarily suspended the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques after the CIA inspector general recommended that the CIA seek an updated legal opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel. In early 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court decision to grant certiorari in the case of
Rasul v. Bush
prompted the CIA to move detainees out of a CIA detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In late 2005 and in 2006, the Detainee Treatment Act and then the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
caused the CIA to again temporarily suspend the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques.

By 2006, press disclosures, the unwillingness of other countries to host existing or new detention sites, and legal and oversight concerns had largely ended the CIA’s ability to operate clandestine detention facilities.

After detaining at least 113 individuals through 2004, the CIA brought only six additional detainees into its custody: four in 2005, one in 2006, and one in 2007. By March 2006, the program was operating in only one country. The CIA last used its enhanced interrogation techniques on November 8, 2007. The CIA did not hold any detainees after April 2008.

#20: The CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program damaged the United States’ standing in the world, and resulted in other significant monetary and non-monetary costs.

The CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program created tensions with U.S. partners and allies, leading to formal
demarches
to the United States, and damaging and complicating bilateral intelligence relationships.

In one example, in June 2004, the secretary of state ordered the U.S. ambassador in Country ██ to deliver a
demarche
to Country ██, “in essence demanding [Country ██ Government] provide full access to all [Country ██
██████████
] detainees” to the International Committee of the Red Cross. At the time, however, the detainees Country ██ was holding included detainees being held in secret at the CIA’s behest.
45

More broadly, the program caused immeasurable damage to the United States’ public standing, as well as to the United States’ longstanding global leadership on human rights in general and the prevention of torture in particular.

CIA records indicate that the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program cost well over $300 million in non-personnel costs. This included funding for the CIA to construct and maintain detention facilities, including two facilities costing nearly $██ million that were never used, in part due to host country political concerns.

To encourage governments to clandestinely host CIA detention sites, or to increase support for existing sites, the CIA provided millions of dollars in cash payments to foreign government officials. CIA Headquarters encouraged CIA Stations to construct “wish lists” of proposed financial assistance to ████████████████████ [entities of foreign governments], and to “think big” in terms of that assistance.
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On December 11, 2007, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (“the Committee”) initiated a review of the destruction of videotapes related to the interrogations of CIA detainees Abu Zubaydah and ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri after receiving a briefing that day on the matter by CIA Director Michael Hayden. At that briefing, Director Hayden stated that contemporaneous CIA operational cables were “a more than adequate representation of the tapes,” and he agreed to provide the Committee with limited access to these cables at CIA Headquarters.

On February 11, 2009, after the Committee was presented with a staff-prepared summary of the operational cables detailing the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah and al-Nashiri, the Committee began considering a broader review of the CIA’s detention and interrogation practices. On March 5, 2009, in a vote of 14 to 1, the Committee approved Terms of Reference for a study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program.
1

The
Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program
is a lengthy, highly detailed report exceeding 6,700 pages, including approximately 38,000 footnotes. It is divided into three volumes:

1. History and Operation of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program.
   This volume is divided chronologically into sections addressing the establishment, development, and evolution of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program. It includes an addendum on
   CIA Clandestine Deten-tion Sites and the Arrangements Made with Foreign Entities in Relation to the CIA’s Detention and In-terrogation Program
   .
   
2. Intelligence Acquired and CIA Representations on the Effectiveness of the CIA’s Enhanced Inter-rogation Techniques.
   This volume addresses the intelligence the CIA attributed to CIA detainees and the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation tech-niques, specifically focusing on CIA representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced in-terrogation techniques, as well as how the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program was operated and managed. It includes sections on CIA represen-tations to the media, the Department of Justice, and the Congress.
   
3. Detention and Interrogation of CIA Detainees.
   This volume addresses the detention and interrogation of 119 CIA detainees, from the program’s authori-zation on September 17, 2001, to its official end on January 22, 2009, to include information on their capture, detention, interrogation, and conditions of confinement. It also includes extensive information on the CIA’s management, oversight, and day-to-day operation of its Detention and Interrogation Program.
   

On December 13, 2012, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence approved the
Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program
(“Committee Study”) by a bipartisan vote of 9–6. The Committee Study included 20 findings and conclusions. The Committee requested that specific executive branch agencies review and provide comment on the Committee Study prior to Committee action to seek declassification and public release of the Committee Study. On June 27, 2013, the CIA provided a written response, which was followed by a series of meetings between the CIA and the Committee that concluded in September 2013. Following these meetings and the receipt of Minority views, the Committee revised the findings and conclusions and updated the Committee Study. On April 3, 2014, by a bipartisan vote of 11–3, the Committee agreed to send the revised findings and conclusions, and the updated Executive Summary of the Committee Study, to the President for declassification and public release.

The Committee’s Study is the most comprehensive review ever conducted of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program. The CIA has informed the Committee that it has provided the Committee with all CIA records related to the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program.
2
The document production phase lasted more than three years, produced more than six million pages of material, and was completed in July 2012. The Committee Study is based primarily on a review of these documents,
3
which include CIA operational cables, reports, memoranda, intelligence products, and numerous interviews conducted of CIA personnel by various entities within the CIA, in particular the CIA’s Office of Inspector General and the CIA’s Oral History Program, as well as internal email
4
and other communications.
5

The Executive Summary is divided into two parts. The first describes the establishment, development, operation, and evolution of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program. The second part provides information on the effectiveness of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, to include information acquired from CIA detainees, before, during, and after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques; as well as CIA representations on the effectiveness and operation of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program to the media, the Department of Justice, and the Congress. The Executive Summary does not include a description of the detention and interrogations of all 119 known CIA detainees. Details on each of these detainees are included in Volume III.

Throughout this summary and the entire report, non-supervisory CIA personnel have been listed by pseudonym. The pseudonyms for these officers are used throughout the report. To distinguish CIA officers in pseudonym from those in true name, pseudonyms in this report are denoted by last names in upper case letters. Additionally, the CIA requested that the names of countries that hosted CIA detention sites, or with which the CIA negotiated the hosting of sites, as well as information directly or indirectly identifying such countries, be redacted from the classified version provided to Committee members. The report therefore lists these countries by letter. The report uses the same designations consistently, so “Country J,” for example, refers to the same country throughout the Committee Study. Further, the CIA requested that the Committee replace the original code names for CIA detention sites with new identifiers.
6

A. September 17, 2001, Memorandum of Notification (MON) Authorizes the CIA to Capture and Detain a Specific Category of Individuals

1. After Considering Various Clandestine Detention Locations, the CIA Determines That a U.S. Military Base Is the “Best Option”: the CIA Delegates “Blanket” Detention Approvals to CIA Officers in █████████

On September 17, 2001, six days after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush signed a covert action Memorandum of Notification (MON) to authorize the director of central intelligence (DCI) to “undertake operations designed to capture and detain persons who pose a continuing, serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests or who are planning terrorist activities.”
7
Although the CIA had previously been provided limited authorities to detain specific, named individuals pending the issuance of formal criminal charges, the MON provided unprecedented authorities, granting the CIA significant discretion in determining whom to detain, the factual basis for the detention, and the length of the detention.
8
The MON made no reference to interrogations or interrogation techniques.
9

On September 14, 2001, three days before the issuance of the MON, the chief of operations of the CIA’s █████████ based on an urgent requirement from the chief of the Counterterrorism Center (CTC), sent an email to CIA Stations in ████ seeking input on appropriate locations for potential CIA detention facilities.
10
Over the course of the next month, CIA officers considered at least four countries in
████
and one in
███████
as possible hosts for detention facilities and
█████
at least three proposed site locations.
11

On September 26, 2001, senior CTC personnel met to discuss the capture and detain authorities in the MON. On September 28, 2001,
███████
CTC Legal,
███████████
, sent an email describing the meeting and a number of policy decisions. The email stated that covert facilities would be operated “in a manner consistent with, but not pursuant to, the formal provision of appropriately comparable Federal instructions for the operation of prison facilities and the incarceration of inmates held under the maximum lawful security mechanisms.”
██████
’s email recognized the CIA’s lack of experience in running detention facilities, and stated that the CIA would consider acquiring cleared personnel from the Department of Defense or the Bureau of Prisons with specialized expertise to assist the CIA in operating the facilities.
12
On September 27, 2001, CIA Headquarters informed CIA Stations that any future CIA detention facility would have to meet “U.S. POW Standards.”
13

In early November 2001, CIA Headquarters further determined that any future CIA detention facility would have to meet U.S. prison standards and that CIA detention and interrogation operations should be tailored to “meet the requirements of U.S. law and the federal rules of criminal procedure,” adding that “[s]pecific methods of interrogation w[ould] be permissible so long as they generally comport with commonly accepted practices deemed lawful by U.S. courts.”
14
The CIA’s search for detention site locations was then put on hold and an internal memorandum from senior CIA officials explained that detention at a U.S. military base outside of the United States was the “best option.”
15
The memorandum thus urged the DCI to “[p]ress the DOD and the US military, at highest levels, to have the US Military agree to host a long-term facility, and have them identify an agreeable location,” specifically requesting that the DCI “[s]eek to have the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay designated as a long-term detention facility.”
16

Addressing the risks associated with the CIA maintaining a detention facility, the CIA memorandum warned that “[a]s captured terrorists may be held days, months, or years, the likelihood of exposure will grow over time,” and that “[m]edia exposure could inflame public opinion against a host government and the U.S., thereby threatening the continued operation of the facility.” The memorandum also anticipated that, “[i]n a foreign country, close cooperation with the host government will entail intensive negotiations.”
17
The CIA memorandum warned that “any foreign country poses uncontrollable risks that could create incidents, vulnerability to the security of the facility, bilateral problems, and uncertainty over maintaining the facility.”
18
The memorandum recommended the establishment of a “short-term” facility in which the CIA’s role would be limited to “oversight, funding and responsibility.” The CIA would “contract out all other requirements to other US Government organizations, commercial companies, and, as appropriate, foreign governments.”
19

On October 8, 2001, DCI George Tenet delegated the management and oversight of the capture and detention authorities provided by the MON to the CIA’s deputy director for operations (DDO), James Pavitt, and the CIA’s chief of the Counterterrorism Center, Cofer Black.
20
The DCI also directed that all requests and approvals for capture and detention be documented in writing. On December 17, 2001, however, the DDO rescinded these requirements and issued via a CIA cable “blanket approval” for CIA officers in ███████ to “determine [who poses] the requisite ‘continuing serious threat of violence or death to US persons and interests or who are planning terrorist activities.’ ”
21
By March 2002, CIA Headquarters had expanded the authority beyond the language of the MON and instructed CIA personnel that it would be appropriate to detain individuals who might not be high-value targets in their own right, but could provide information on high-value targets.
22

On April 7, 2003, ████████ CTC Legal, ███████████ sent a cable to CIA Stations and Bases stating that “at this stage in the war [we] believe there is sufficient opportunity in advance to document the key aspects of many, if not most, of our capture and detain operations.
23
████████’s cable also provided guidance as to who could be detained under the MON, stating:

“there must be an articulable basis on which to conclude that the actions of a specific person whom we propose to capture and/or detain pose a ‘continuing serious threat’ of violence or death to U.S. persons or interests or that the person is planning a terrorist activity.

“. . . We are not permitted to detain someone merely upon a suspicion that he or she has valuable information about terrorists or planned acts of terrorism . . . Similarly, the mere membership in a particular group, or the mere existence of a particular familial tie, does not necessarily connote that the threshold of ‘continuing, serious threat’ has been satisfied.”
24

2. The CIA Holds at Least 21 More Detainees Than It Has Represented; At Least 26 CIA Detainees Wrongly Detained

While the CIA has represented in public and classified settings that it detained “fewer than one hundred” individuals,
25
the Committee’s review of CIA records indicates that the total number of CIA detainees was at least 119.
26
Internal CIA documents indicate that inadequate record keeping made it impossible for the CIA to determine how many individuals it had detained. In December 2003, a CIA Station overseeing CIA detention operations in Country ██ informed CIA Headquarters that it had made the “unsettling discovery” that the CIA was “holding a number of detainees about whom” it knew “very little.”
27
Nearly five years later, in late 2008, the CIA attempted to determine how many individuals the CIA had detained. At the completion of the review, CIA leaders, including CIA Director Michael Hayden, were informed that the review found that the CIA had detained at least 112 individuals, and possibly more.
28
According to an email summarizing the meeting, CIA Director Hayden instructed a CIA officer to devise a way to keep the number of CIA detainees at the same number the CIA had previously briefed to Congress. The email, which the briefer sent only to himself, stated:

“I briefed the additional CIA detainees that could be included in RDI
29
numbers. DCIA instructed me to keep the detainee number at 98—pick whatever date i [
sic
] needed to make that happen but the number is 98.”
30

While the CIA acknowledged to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) in February 2006 that it had wrongly detained five individuals throughout the course of its detention program,
31
a review of CIA records indicates that at least 21 additional individuals, or a total of 26 of the 119 (22 percent) CIA detainees identified in this Study, did not meet the MON standard for detention.
32
This is a conservative calculation and includes only CIA detainees whom the CIA itself determined did not meet the standard for detention. It does not include individuals about whom there was internal disagreement within the CIA over whether the detainee met the standard or not, or the numerous detainees who, following their detention and interrogation, were found not to “pose a continuing threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests” or to be “planning terrorist activities” as required by the September 17, 2001, MON.
33
With one known exception, there are no CIA records to indicate that the CIA held personnel accountable for the detention of individuals the CIA itself determined were wrongfully detained.
34

On at least four occasions, the CIA used host country detention sites in Country ██ to detain individuals on behalf of the CIA who did not meet the MON standard for capture and detention. ALEC Station officers at CIA Headquarters explicitly acknowledged that these detainees did not meet the MON standard for detention, and recommended placing the individuals in host country detention facilities because they did not meet the standard. The host country had no independent reason to detain these individuals and held them solely at the behest of the CIA.
35

B. The Detention of Abu Zubaydah and the Development and Authorization of the CIA’s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

1. Past Experience Led the CIA to Assess that Coercive Interrogation Techniques Were ‘‘Counterproductive” and “Ineffective”; After Issuance of the MON, CIA Attorneys Research Possible Legal Defense for Using Techniques Considered Torture; the CIA Conducts No Research on Effective Interrogations, Relies on Contractors with No Relevant Experience

At the time of the issuance of the September 17, 2001, MON—which, as noted, did not reference interrogation techniques—the CIA had in place long-standing formal standards for conducting interrogations. The CIA had shared these standards with the Committee. In January 1989, the CIA informed the Committee that “inhumane physical or psychological techniques are counterproductive because they do not produce intelligence and will probably result in false answers.”
36
Testimony of the CIA deputy director of operations in 1988 denounced coercive interrogation techniques, stating, “[p]hysical abuse or other degrading treatment was rejected not only because it is wrong, but because it has historically proven to be ineffective.”
37
By October 2001, CIA policy was to comply with the Department of the Army Field Manual “Intelligence Interrogation.”
38
A CIA Directorate of Operations Handbook from October 2001 states that the CIA does not engage in “human rights violations,” which it defined as: “Torture, cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment, or prolonged detention without charges or trial.” The handbook further stated that “[i]t is CIA policy to neither participate directly in nor encourage interrogation which involves the use of force, mental or physical torture, extremely demeaning indignities or exposure to inhumane treatment of any kind as an aid to interrogation.”
39

The CIA did, however, have historical experience using coercive forms of interrogation. In 1963, the CIA produced the KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation Manual, intended as a manual for Cold War interrogations, which included the “principal coercive techniques of interrogation: arrest, detention, deprivation of sensory stimuli through solitary confinement or similar methods, threats and fear, debility, pain, heightened suggestibility and hypnosis, narcosis and induced regression.”
40
In 1978, DCI Stansfield Turner asked former CIA officer John Limond Hart to investigate the CIA interrogation of Soviet KGB officer Yuri Nosenko
41
using the KUBARK methods—to include sensory deprivation techniques and forced standing.
42
In Hart’s testimony before the House Select Committee on Assassinations on September 15, 1978, he noted that in his 31 years of government service:

“It has never fallen to my lot to be involved with any experience as unpleasant in every possible way as, first, the investigation of this case, and, second, the necessity of lecturing upon it and testifying. To me it is an abomination, and I am happy to say that . . . it is not in my memory typical of what my colleagues and I did in the agency during the time I was connected with it.”
43

Notwithstanding the Hart investigation findings, just five years later, in 1983, a CIA officer incorporated significant portions of the KUBARK manual into the Human Resource Exploitation (HRE) Training Manual, which the same officer used to provide interrogation training in Latin America in the early 1980s, and which was used to provide interrogation training to the ███████████████████ in 198█.
44
CIA officer ████████ was involved in the HRE training and conducted interrogations. The CIA inspector general later recommended that he be orally admonished for inappropriate use of interrogation techniques.
45
In the fall of 2002, ██████ became the CIA’s chief of interrogations in the CIA’s Renditions Group,
46
the officer in charge of CIA interrogations.
47