The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (7 page)

Zubaydah told the FBI officers that “Mukhtar” trained the 9/11 hijackers and also provided additional information on KSM’s background, to include that KSM spoke fluent English, was approximately 34 years old, and was responsible for al-Qa’ida operations outside of Afghanistan.
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Subsequent representations on the success of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program consistently describe Abu Zubaydah’s identification of KSM’s role in the September 11, 2001, attacks, as well as his identification of KSM’s alias (“Mukhtar”), as being “important” and “vital” information.
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A review of CIA records found that this information was corroborative of information already in CIA databases.
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5. While Abu Zubaydah is Hospitalized, CIA Headquarters Discusses the Use of Coercive Interrogation Techniques Against Abu Zubaydah

While Abu Zubaydah was still hospitalized, personnel at CIA Headquarters began discussing how CIA officers would interrogate Abu Zubaydah upon his return to DETENTION SITE GREEN. The initial CIA interrogation proposal recommended that the interrogators engage with Abu Zubaydah to get him to provide information, and suggested that a “hard approach,” involving foreign government personnel, be taken “only as a last resort.”
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At a meeting about this proposal,
████████
CTC Legal,
██████████████
, recommended that a psychologist working on contract in the CIA’s Office of Technical Services (OTS), Grayson SWIGERT, be used by CTC to “provide real-time recommendations to overcome Abu Zubaydah’s resistance to interrogation.”
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SWIGERT had come to
████████
’s attention through
███████████
, who worked in OTS. Shortly thereafter, CIA Headquarters formally proposed that Abu Zubaydah be kept in an all-white room that was lit 24 hours a day, that Abu Zubaydah not be provided any amenities, that his sleep be disrupted, that loud noise be constantly fed into his cell, and that only a small number of people interact with him. CIA records indicate that these proposals were based on the idea that such conditions would lead Abu Zubaydah to develop a sense of “learned helplessness.”
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CIA Headquarters then sent an interrogation team to Country ██, including SWIGERT, whose initial role was to consult on the psychological aspects of the interrogation.
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DCI Tenet was provided an update on the Abu Zubaydah interrogation plans on April 12, 2002. The update stated that the CIA team was preparing for Abu Zubaydah’s transfer back to DETENTION SITEGREEN, and noted the CIA interrogation team intended to “set the stage” and increase control over Abu Zubaydah.
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The update stated:

“Our [CIA] lead interrogator will require Abu Zubaydah to reveal the most sensitive secret he knows we are seeking; if he dissembles or diverts the conversation, the interview will stop and resume at a later time . . . In accordance with the strategy, and with concurrence from FBI Headquarters, the two on-site FBI agents will no longer directly participate in the interview/debriefing sessions.”
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The FBI special agents questioning Abu Zubaydah at the hospital objected to the CIA’s plans. In a message to FBI Headquarters, an FBI special agent wrote that the CIA psychologists had acquired “tremendous influence.”
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The message further stated:

“AZ’s health has improved over the last two days and Agency [CIA] is ready to move [Abu Zubaydah] out of the hospital and back to ████████ on ████ in an elaborate plan to change AZ’s environment. Agency [CIA] advised this day that they will be immediately changing tactics in all future AZ interviews by having only there [
sic
] [CIA officer] interact with AZ (there will be no FBI presence in interview room). This change contradicts all conversations had to date . . . They believe AZ is offering, ‘throw away information’ and holding back from providing threat information (It should be note [
sic
] that we have obtained critical information regarding AZ thus far and have now got him speaking about threat information, albeit from his hospital bed and not [an] appropriate interview environment for full follow-up (due to his health). Suddenly the psychiatric team here wants AZ to only interact with their [CIA officer, and the CIA sees this] as being the best way to get the threat information . . . We offered several compromise solutions . . . all suggestions were immediately declined without further discussion . . . This again is quite odd as all information obtained from AZ has come from FBI lead interviewers and questioning . . . I have spent an un-calculable amount of hours at [Abu Zubaydah’s] bedside assisting with medical help, holding his hand and comforting him through various medical procedures, even assisting him in going [to] the bathroom . . . We have built tremendous report [
sic
] with AZ and now that we are on the eve of ‘regular’ interviews to get threat information, we have been ‘written out’ of future interviews.”
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6. New CIA Interrogation Plan Focuses on Abu Zubaydah’s “Most Important Secret”; FBI Temporarily Barred from the Questioning of Abu Zubaydah; Abu Zubaydah then Placed in Isolation for 47 Days Without Questioning

On April 13, 2002, while Abu Zubaydah was still at the hospital, the CIA implemented the “new interrogation program.”
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This initial meeting was held with just one interrogator in the room and lasted 11 minutes. A cable stated that the CIA interrogator was coached by the “psychological team.”
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The CIA interrogator advised Abu Zubaydah that he (Abu Zubaydah) “had a most important secret that [the interrogator] needed to know.” According to the cable, Abu Zubaydah “amazingly” nodded in agreement about the secret, but “did not divulge any information, as [the interrogation team] expected.”
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A cable further explained that Abu Zubaydah indicated that he understood that the key question was about “impending future terrorist plans against the United States,”
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and that the CIA officer told Abu Zubaydah to signal for him “when he decides to discuss that ‘one key item he knows he is keeping from the [interrogator].’ ”
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The FBI officers provided a similar account to FBI Headquarters, adding that: “We spent the rest of the day in the adjoining room with [the CIA officer] and one of the psychiatrists [REDACTED] waiting for [Abu Zubaydah] to signal he was ready to talk. [Abu Zubaydah] apparently went to sleep . . . they did not approach [Abu Zubaydah] the rest of the day.”
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In their communications with FBI Headquarters, the FBI officers wrote that they explained their rapport-building approaches to the CIA interrogation team and “tried to explain that we have used this approach before on other Al-Qaeda members with much success (al-Owhali,
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KKM, Jandal, Badawi etc.). We tried to politely suggest that valuable time was passing where we could attempt to solicit threat information . . .”
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On April 15, 2002, per a scripted plan, the same CIA interrogator delivered what a CIA cable described as “the pre-move message” to Abu Zubaydah; that “time is running out,” that his situation had changed, and that the interrogator was disappointed that Abu Zubaydah did not signal “to discuss the one thing he was hiding.”
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Abu Zubaydah was sedated and moved from the hospital to DETENTION SITE GREEN. When Abu Zubaydah awoke at 11:00 PM, four hours after his arrival, he was described as surprised and disturbed by his new situation. An April 16, 2002, cable states the “objective is to ensure that [Abu Zubaydah] is at his most vulnerable state.”
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A cable described Abu Zubaydah’s cell as white with no natural lighting or windows, but with four halogen lights pointed into the cell.
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An air conditioner was also in the room. A white curtain separated the interrogation room from the cell. The interrogation cell had three padlocks. Abu Zubaydah was also provided with one of two chairs that were rotated based on his level of cooperation (one described as more comfortable than the other). Security officers wore all black uniforms, including boots, gloves, balaclavas, and goggles to keep Abu Zubaydah from identifying the officers, as well as to prevent Abu Zubaydah “from seeing the security guards as individuals who he may attempt to establish a relationship or dialogue with.”
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The security officers communicated by hand signals when they were with Abu Zubaydah and used hand-cuffs and leg shackles to maintain control. In addition, either loud rock music was played or noise generators were used to enhance Abu Zubaydah’s “sense of hopelessness.”
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Abu Zubaydah was typically kept naked and sleep deprived.
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An April 16, 2002, cable explained that the interrogation strategy had shifted since Abu Zubaydah’s medical condition prevented “total isolation as originally planned.” According to the cable, a 24-hour interrogation strategy was now “deemed to be the best approach” for acquiring information. As a result, the FBI officers were once again allowed to question Abu Zubaydah.
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On April 17, 2002, an FBI officer met with Abu Zubaydah for six hours.
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FBI records state that Abu Zubaydah had “not seen the interviewing (FBI) agent” since April 11, 2002, but that Abu Zubaydah greeted the agent by name.
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During the questioning Abu Zubaydah denied any knowledge related to specific targets for a pending attack and “advised that many of the brothers on the front lines (nfi) [no further information] talked about all types of attacks against America but that for the most part this was usually just talk and that [the United States] should not be concerned about this type of talk,”
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Abu Zubaydah provided information on al-Qa’ida, KSM, his past travel to the United States, as well as general information on extremists in Pakistan.
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Abu Zubaydah continued to provide information to interrogators throughout April 2002, but not information on pending attacks against the United States. On the evening of April 20, 2002, Abu Zubaydah told the FBI officers about two men who approached him with a plan to detonate a uranium-based explosive device in the United States. Abu Zubaydah stated he did not believe the plan was viable and did not know the names of the two individuals, but provided physical descriptions of the pair.
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This information was acquired after Abu Zubaydah was confronted with emails indicating that he had sent the two individuals to KSM.
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The CIA would later represent that this information was acquired “as a result” of the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, and that the information acquired resulted in the thwarting of the “Dirty Bomb Plot” and the capture of Jose Padilla.
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However, the chief of the Abu Zubaydah Task Force stated that “AZ’s info alone would never have allowed us to find them,” while another CIA officer stated that the CIA was already “alert” to the threat posed by Jose Padilla, and that the CIA’s “suspicion” was only “enhanced during the debriefings of Abu Zubaydah.”
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Additional information on the “Dirty Bomb Plot” and the capture of Jose Padilla is provided later in this summary.

During the month of April 2002, which included a period during which Abu Zubaydah was hospitalized, on life support, and unable to speak, the CIA disseminated 39 intelligence reports based on his interrogations.
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At the end of April 2002, the DETENTION SITE GREEN interrogation team provided CIA Headquarters with three interrogation strategies. CIA Headquarters chose the most coercive interrogation option, which was proposed and supported by CIA contractor SWIGERT.
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This coercive interrogation option—which included sensory deprivation—was again opposed by the FBI special agents at the detention site.
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The interrogation proposal was to engage in “only a single-minded, consistent, totally focused questioning of current threat information.”
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Once implemented, this approach failed to produce the information CIA Headquarters believed Abu Zubaydah possessed: threats to the United States and information about al-Qa’ida operatives located in the United States. Nonetheless, Abu Zubaydah continued to provide other intelligence. In May 2002, the CIA disseminated 56 intelligence reports based on the interrogations.
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In early June 2002, the CIA interrogation team recommended that Abu Zubaydah spend several weeks in isolation while the interrogation team members departed the facility “as a means of keeping [Abu Zubaydah] off-balance and to allow the team needed time off for a break and to attend to personal matters
███████
,” as well as to discuss “the endgame” of Abu Zubaydah ██████ with officers from CIA Headquarters.
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As a result, from June 18, 2002, through August 4, 2002, Abu Zubaydah spent 47 days in isolation without being asked any questions. Despite the fact that Abu Zubaydah was in isolation for nearly half of the month, the CIA disseminated 37 intelligence reports based on the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah in June 2002.
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The CIA would later represent publicly—as well as in classified settings—that during the use of “established US Government interrogation techniques,” Abu Zubaydah “stopped all cooperation” in June 2002, requiring the development of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
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CIA records do not support this assertion.

Prior to Abu Zubaydah’s 47-day isolation period, Abu Zubaydah provided information on al-Qa’ida activities, plans, capabilities, and relationships, in addition to information on its leadership structure, including personalities, decision-making processes, training, and tactics.
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As described in more detail in the full Committee Study, Abu Zubaydah’s inability to provide information on the next attack in the United States and operatives in the United States served as the basis for CIA representations that Abu Zubaydah was “uncooperative,” as well as for the CIA’s determination that Abu Zubaydah required the use of what would later be known as the CIA’s “enhanced interrogation techniques” to become “compliant” and reveal the information the CIA believed he was withholding. Abu Zubaydah never provided this information, and CIA officers later concluded this was information Abu Zubaydah did not possess.
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