The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (10 page)

After the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques ended, CIA personnel at the detention site concluded that Abu Zubaydah had been truthful and that he did not possess any new terrorist threat information.
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As noted, CIA records indicate that Abu Zubaydah never provided the information for which the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques were justified and approved: information on the next terrorist attack and operatives in the United States. Furthermore, as compared to the period prior to August 2002, the quantity and type of intelligence produced by Abu Zubaydah remained largely unchanged during and after the August 2002 use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
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Nonetheless, CIA Headquarters informed the National Security Council that the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques used against Abu Zubaydah were effective and were “producing meaningful results.”
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A cable from DETENTION SITE GREEN, which CIA records indicate was authored by SWIGERT and DUNBAR, also viewed the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah as a success. The cable recommended that “the aggressive phase at [DETENTION SITE GREEN] should be used as a template for future interrogation of high value captives,”
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not because the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques produced useful information, but rather because their use confirmed that Abu Zubaydah did not possess the intelligence that CIA Headquarters had assessed Abu Zubaydah to have. The cable from the detention site stated:

“Our goal was to reach the stage where we have broken any will or ability of subject to resist or deny providing us information (intelligence) to which he had access. We additionally sought to bring subject to the point that we confidently assess that he does not/not possess undisclosed threat information, or intelligence that could prevent a terrorist event.”
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The cable further recommended that psychologists—a likely reference to contractors SWIGERT and DUNBAR—“familiar with interrogation, exploitation and resistance to interrogation should shape compliance of high value captives prior to debriefing by substantive experts.”
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From Abu Zubaydah’s capture on March 28, 2002, to his transfer to Department of Defense custody on September 5, 2006, information provided by Abu Zubaydah resulted in 766 disseminated intelligence reports.
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According to CIA documents, Abu Zubaydah provided information on “al-Qa’ida activities, plans, capabilities, and relationships,” in addition to information on “its leadership structure, including personalities, decision-making processes, training, and tactics.”
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As noted, this type of information was provided by Abu Zubaydah before, during, and after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. At no time during or after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques did Abu Zubaydah provide information about operatives in, or future attacks against, the United States.
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10. A CIA Presidential Daily Brief Provides Inaccurate Information on the Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah

Although CIA personnel at DETENTION SITE GREEN agreed that Abu Zubaydah was compliant and cooperative, personnel at CIA Headquarters prepared a Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) in October 2002 that, according to a cable, “accurately reflect[ed] the collective HQS view of the information provided [by Abu Zubaydah] to date.”
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The October 2002 PDB stated Abu Zubaydah was still withholding “significant threat information,” including information on operatives in the United States, and that Abu “Zubaydah resisted providing useful information until becoming more cooperative in early August, probably in the hope of improving his living conditions.”
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The PDB made no reference to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques or the counter-assessment from the detention site interrogation team indicating that Abu Zubaydah was cooperative and not withholding information.
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CIA documents identified the “key intelligence” acquired from Abu Zubaydah as information related to suspected terrorists Jose Padilla and Binyam Mohammad, information on English-speaking al-Qa’ida member Jaffar al-Tayyar, and information identifying KSM as the mastermind of the September 11, 2001, attacks who used the alias “Mukhtar.”
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All of this information was acquired by FBI special agents shortly after Abu Zubaydah’s capture.
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The CIA has consistently represented that Abu Zubaydah stated that the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques were necessary to gain his cooperation. For example, the CIA informed the OLC that:

“As Zubaydah himself explained with respect to enhanced techniques, ‘brothers who are captured and interrogated are permitted by Allah to provide information when they believe they have ‘reached the limit of their ability to withhold it’ in the face of psychological and physical hardships.”
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As is described in greater detail in the full Committee Study, CIA records do not support the CIA representation that Abu Zubaydah made these statements.
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CIA records indicate that Abu Zubaydah maintained that he always intended to talk and never believed he could withhold information from interrogators.
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In February 2003, Abu Zubaydah told a CIA psychologist that he believed prior to his capture that every captured “brother” would talk in detention and that he told individuals at a terrorist training camp that “brothers should be able to expect that the organization will make adjustments to protect people and plans when someone with knowledge is captured.”
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11. The CIA Does Not Brief the Committee on the Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah

In contrast to relatively open communications that the CIA had with the Committee following the issuance of the September 17, 2001, MON, the CIA significantly limited its communications with the Committee on its detention and interrogation activities after Abu Zubaydah’s capture on March 28, 2002.
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In responses to three different sets of Committee Questions for the Record addressed to the CIA regarding the MON authorities in the spring and summer of 2002, the CIA provided no indication that the CIA had established DETENTION SITE GREEN, or was using, or considering using, coercive interrogation techniques.
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On September 27, 2002, CIA officials provided a briefing on Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation only to Committee Chairman Bob Graham, Vice Chairman Richard Shelby, and their staff directors. After this briefing Chairman Graham made multiple and specific requests for additional information on the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program. Internal CIA emails include discussion of how the CIA could “get . . . off the hook on the cheap” regarding Chairman Graham’s requests for additional information.
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In the end, CIA officials simply did not respond to Graham’s requests prior to his departure from the Committee in January 2003.

C. Interrogation in Country ██ and the January 2003 Guidelines

1. The CIA Establishes DETENTION SITE COBALT, Places Inexperienced First-Tour Officer in Charge

Plans for a specialized CIA detention facility Country ██ began in April 2002, with the intention that it would be “totally under [█████████]/Station Control.”
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On June 6, 2002, CIA Headquarters approved more than $200,000 for the construction of the facility, identified in this summary as “DETENTION SITE COBALT.”
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In a 2003 interview with the CIA Office of Inspector General, Associate Deputy Director for Operations ██████████ described his views of this facility and “stated that [DETENTION SITE COBALT] was opened because there needed to be a detention site in [Country
██
] for those detainees enroute
█████████
to [DETENTION SITE GREEN]. It was not a place for the use of EITs.”
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DETENTION SITE COBALT, constructed with CIA funding, opened in Country ██ in September 2002.
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According to CIA records, the windows at DETENTION SITE COBALT were blacked out and detainees were kept in total darkness. The █████████ guards monitored detainees using headlamps and loud music was played constantly in the facility. While in their cells, detainees were shackled to the wall and given buckets for human waste. Four of the twenty cells at the facility included a bar across the top of the cell.
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Later reports describe detainees being shackled to the bar with their hands above their heads, forcing them to stand, and therefore not allowing the detainees to sleep.
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The CIA officer in charge of DETENTION SITE COBALT, ██████████████ [CIA OFFICER 1], was a junior officer on his first overseas assignment with no previous experience or training in handling prisoners or conducting interrogations.
███████
[CIA OFFICER 1] was the DETENTION SITE COBALT manager during the period in which a CIA detainee died and numerous CIA detainees were subjected to unapproved coercive interrogation techniques.
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A review of CIA records found that prior to
███████
[CIA OFFICER 1’s] deployment and assignment as the CIA’s DETENTION SITE COBALT manager, other CIA officers recommended ███████ [CIA OFFICER 1] not have continued access to classified information due to a “lack of honesty, judgment, and maturity.”
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According to records, “the chief of CTC told [
███████
[CIA OFFICER 1]] that he would not want [him] in his overseas station.”
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A supervising officer assessed that ███████ [CIA OFFICER 1]:

“has issues with judgment and maturity, [and his] potential behavior in the field is also worrisome. [The officer] further advised that [
███████
[CIA OFFICER 1]] was only put into processing for an overseas position so that someone would evaluate all of the evidence of this situation all together. [The officer further noted that [
███████
[CIA OFFICER 1]] might not listen to his chief of station when in the field.”
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2. CIA Records Lack Information on CIA Detainees and Details of Interrogations in Country ██

Detainees held in Country ██ were detained under the authority of the MON; however, CIA officers conducted no written assessment of whether these detainees “pose[d] a continuing, serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests or . . . [we]re planning terrorist activities.” The CIA maintained such poor records of its detainees in Country ██ during this period that the CIA remains unable to determine the number and identity of the individuals it detained. The full details of the CIA interrogations there remain largely unknown, as DETENTION SITE COBALT was later found to have not reported multiple uses of sleep deprivation, required standing, loud music, sensory deprivation, extended isolation, reduced quantity and quality of food, nudity, and “rough treatment” of CIA detainees.
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3. CIA Headquarters Recommends That Untrained Interrogators in Country ██ Use the CIA’s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques on Ridha al-Najjar

Ridha al-Najjar was the first CIA detainee to be held at DETENTION SITE COBALT. Al-Najjar, along with Hassan Muhammad Abu Bakr and number of other individuals, was arrested in Karachi, Pakistan, after raids conducted ████ by ████████ Pakistan ████ in late May 2002.
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Al-Najjar was identified by the CIA as a former bodyguard for Usama bin Laden,
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and was rendered with Abu Bakr to CIA custody at a Country ██ ███████ detention facility on June █, 2002.
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Ridha al-Najjar was transferred to DETENTION SITE COBALT on September █, 2002.
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While the CIA was describing to the Department of Justice why it needed to use the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah, a parallel internal discussion at the CIA was taking place regarding Ridha al-Najjar. An ALEC Station cable from a CTC officer stated that, on June 27, 2002:

“ALEC/HQS held a strategy session regarding the interrogation of high priority ███████ detainee Ridha Ahmed al-Najjar in [Country ██]. The goal of the session was to review the progress of the interrogation to date and to devise a general plan as to how best to proceed once the new [Country
██
█████
] detention/debriefing facility [i.e., DETENTION SITE COBALT] is completed.”
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The meeting participants included individuals who were also involved in discussions related to Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation, including deputy chief of ALEC Station,
█████████████
,
███████
CTC Legal
█████████████
, and the chief of the
███████████████████████████████████████
.
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A cable followed on July 16, 2002, to the CIA Station in Country ██ suggesting possible interrogation techniques to use against Ridha al-Najjar, including:

• utilizing “Najjar’s fear for the well-being of his family to our benefit,” with the cable explicitly stating that interrogators could not “threaten his family with imminent death”;
  
• using “vague threats” to create a “mind virus” that would cause alNajjar to believe that his situation would continue to get worse until he cooperated;
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• manipulating Ridha al-Najjar’s environment using a hood, restraints, and music; and
  
• employing sleep deprivation through the use of round-the-clock interrogations.
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The cable went on to note that the “possibility that [al-Najjar] may have current threat or lead information demands that we keep up the pressure on him.”
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With the exception of a brief mention of “diminished returns from the most recent interviews of al-Najjar,” and references to the detainee’s complaints about physical ailments, the cable offers no evidence al-Najjar was actively resisting CIA interrogators.
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