The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush (14 page)

BOOK: The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush
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worked to create a bureaucracy far more conservative than that of the late 1960s and early 1970s. This helped to reduce further internal agency tension by creating a bureaucracy predisposed to be in tune with a conservative administration (ibid., 696).
As Aberbach observed,
Reagan left Bush a bureaucracy that was at least somewhat more Republican and noticeably more conservative than had probably been the case in recent history . . . And [as noted above] he left a record that indicated how to structure the appointments process to find and place committed conservatives in appointive positions and how to use the new civil service law to influence the positioning of key top civil servants. (Aberbach 1991, 231-32)
Reagan's approach to the Democratic Congress was marked by adversarial stridency from the beginning.
Congress was largely viewed as an obstacle to be got around rather than as a partner in government. To help in overcoming congressional opposition to his policies, Reagan was able to use his prestige with the American public to influence the actions of those he dealt with "inside the Beltway." But he often went further and appealed directly to the American people to show their support for his policies by lobbying their representatives on his behalf. In competition with Congress, this strategy of "going public," made the best possible use of the president's own gifts. (King and Alston 1991, 275)
Reagan enlarged the role of the institutional presidency, keeping it center stage in American political consciousness. In doing so, he moved beyond traditional conservative notions of a presidency that merely responds to overtures from the Congress or other entities. He instead embraced the style, if not the content, of the activist presidency of FDR, even to the point of evoking FDR's memory in his speeches. As it was observed, Reagan adopted the approach of Wilson and Roosevelt in order to pursue the objectives of Coolidge and Harding (Salamon and Lund 1985, 22).
Some found positive elements in Reagan's administrative presidency:
it has created an elaborate new system for tracking budgetary decisionmaking in Congress so that the administration can participate in the process more effectively. It has also extended the procedures for Execu-
 
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tive Office scrutiny of regulations begun under presidents Gerald R. Ford and Jimmy Carter, and it has taken steps to strengthen financial controls in the executive branch. It has also furthered the review of federal credit activities and accelerated the move to establish a regular credit budget. In addition, its "Cabinet Councils" have improved internal executive branch communication. Beyond that, the administration has given greater salience to the potential role that both private-sector institutions and state and local governments can play in dealing with public problems. (Ibid., 23)
However, as with Nixon, these advances came at a price.
Political Costs of Reagan's Administrative Strategy
There are strengths to the Reagan approach to political appointments: "loyalty to the president, a clearance process that touches all bases, and clear White House control of appointments in the administration." However, there are weaknesses as well, related to
slowness due to the elaborate clearance procedures, the narrowness of the pool of potential candidates (due to ideological criteria and bias against previous experience), and the large volume that must be handled by the White House personnel office since clearances extended to the lowest levels. (Pfiffner 1987a, 73-74)
Other factors slowed the Reagan appointment process, as well. Primary energy went to the legislative strategy group that was successfully moving the economic policy program through the Congress. "The disclosure requirements of the 1978 Ethics Act had to be applied for the first time [and] the Presidential Personnel Office was deficient in staff and operations" (Newland 1983, 4).
Pressure from the Republican right wing also slowed the Reagan screening and appointment process, as mentioned. It charged that many of the candidates had not supported Reagan soon enough and were "retreads" from previous Republican administrations (Pfiffner 1987a, 73).
The ideological battles over appointments and the elaborate clearance procedures resulted in significant delays in staffing the administration. Despite claims that the administration was making major appointments faster than Presidents Carter or Kennedy, the
National Journal
reported that after 10 weeks Reagan had submitted to the Senate 95, as compared to Carter's 142 nominations.
Time
calculated that, as of the first week in May, of the top 400 officials, only 55 percent had been announced, 35 per-

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