The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush (18 page)

BOOK: The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush
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The venerable politics/administration dichotomy shares culpability for gridlock because its insistence on a wall of separation between policymaking political overlords and careerist spear-carriers continues to limit the contribution of just those individuals who "know how to put their hands on the right switches." Because careerists are not always able or willing to dance to the tune of those who mandate policy without having responsibility for its implementation, the dichotomy, while honored more in articulation than in action, also encourages the bureaucrat bashing that both disheartens careerists and lowers respect for the public service.
The administrative state, led by the administrative presidency, rounds out this troika of gridlock as it aspires to set in concrete the theories of the politics-administration dichotomy. In pursuing tight control of the executive branch agencies through politicization and centralization, the administrative state instead creates less control, more confusion, and ineffective government. Presidents are motivated to rely on the administrative state when they have a weak hand vis-à-vis the bureaucracy, a shaky mandate, or a strong vision they want to promote in a hurry. Yet, imprudent exercise of the tools of the administrative strategy can cause shipwreck rather than smooth sailing, as Richard Nixon, in particular, discovered. The following chapter explores in some detail the use of persons and the federal bureaucracy in the administrative strategy.
 
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3
Politicization and Depoliticization in the Nation's Pressure Cooker: Using the Bureaucracy to Secure the President's Agenda
Presidents have engaged in various strategies to gain control of the bureaucracy. The most popular are politicization, which involves use of appointees to exercise a heavy hand in the agencies, depoliticization, in which agency heads exert more independence from direct White House oversight, and centralization, which concentrates power in the Executive Office of the President (EOP) at the expense of the cabinet secretaries. The advantages and disadvantages of these strategies are the subject of this chapter.
Politicization: Presidentializing the Bureaucracy
Presidentializing the bureaucracy, or politicization, is a strategy for increasing presidential control of the executive branch through use of appointees as surrogates to implement policy goals. It can also involve increasing the number, power, and infiltration of appointees, especially in the lower levels of the bureaucracy, and increasing White House control and direction of the agencies.
Politicization is viewed differently by the two camps of executives, political and career. As one careerist explained the PAS perspective, "Political appointees want change, and they want it now. They've only got eighteen months or so and they want it to happen on their watch." They think politicization is the way to accomplish it.
 
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Partisans of political leadership (and these almost always include the incumbent set of leaders) are doers, not doubters. They want tools, not obstacles. To the extent that doubts exist about the willingness of career administrators to carry out faithfully the policy directions of the political leadership, career administrators are viewed by political actors as impediments rather than implements. Partisans of politics, consequently, typically look to enhance procedures for control and supervision of the permanent administrative apparatus and, when deemed necessary, to politicize it. (Aberbach and Rockman 1988, 606)
Partisans of political leadership often use the concept and language of mandate, with the logic that presidential election confers automatic rights of sole determination of policy direction. This rationale is favored by theorists such as Nathan, Lowi, Rosen, Lynch, and Moe. Increasingly, those advocating strong presidential control want complete command of civil servants, as well. ''As ex-White House aide (and not just coincidentally also ex-convict) John Ehrlichman so starkly put it . . . : 'When we say jump, the answer should be, how high?"' (Aberbach and Rockman 1988, 607).
Others, however, point to this nation's system of divided authority, checks and balances, in which other entities, such as the Congress and the judiciary, press legitimate claims to authority. They see a similar role for the career bureaucracy.
Partisans of the career or administrative perspective believe that a professional bureaucracy is necessary to achieve its goal of effective government. "Partisans of the career administration, on the other hand, view it as the ballast that maintains the ship of state in unsteady seas. Its resistor-like qualities to the super-charged enthusiasm of new political leaders are seen as a virtue, not a vicea deterrent, in fact, to longer-run damage inflicted by political leaders on themselves as well as on the organizational fabric of government" (ibid., 606). Charges of career sabotage of changes in policy direction are not substantiated when good management practices are followed. In fact,
good management, as reflected in open channels of communication, willingness to listen to advice, clear articulation of goals, and mutual respect . . . may also constitute good politics for department secretaries or their assistant secretaries. No evidence shows that good management is incompatible with effective politics unless the imposition of stringent command procedures is regarded as an integral part of a presidential administration's political style. The anti-bureaucratic styles of recent ad-
 
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ministrations suggest that this symbolic component has become at least as important as achieving results. (Ibid., 609)
While politicization and centralization strategies have their place in the political landscape, their exact placement is a question of degree. Carried to extremes, they are schemes for sole presidential rule and are ultimately destructive to the effectiveness of the career bureaucracy on which government management turns. "The issue is not whether responsiveness should be promoted, but rather how reflexively and to whom." Attempts at presidential aggrandizement through politicization will only "rob government of its capability for reality testing, and it is without doubt a model for demoralization of the career service" (ibid., 609).
Furthermore, presidents and political administrators need career administrators to apply the brakes on occasion. Said one PAS:
One of the major functions . . . of the permanent apparatus is to serve presidents by helping them avoid stupid mistakes that threaten their political viability. The urge to command and to centralize often fails to recognize that political impulses should be subjected to tests of sobriety. Though there are a good many reasons to argue on behalf of the basic idea of "neutral competence" and against the politicization of all executive organizations, the most fundamental one that a president ought to consider is the avoidance of error and illegality that have wracked recent presidencies. (Ibid., 610)
Or, as he succinctly put it, "We do some stupid things. Trust the judgment of careerists in substantive issues . . . their program identification is very high but not partisan."
While some would argue that politicization of the federal bureaucracy is in the president's interest or in the public interest, neither rationale is likely to be true and, in fact, attempts at politicization invite retaliation by the Congress.
Nixon's fall from power was paved by the Watergate break-in, but it had as much to do with abuses of the executive as anything else. Even had Watergate not occurred, but with Congress remaining in the hands of the Democratic opposition, it is hard to imagine that the congressional hand would have been stayed for long. The revelations of 1986-87 involving the White House-NSC operation of arms shipments to Iran and laundered funds to the Nicaraguan contras also threatens to erode fatally the polit-

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