The Grand Alliance (29 page)

7. It is, of course, of first importance that neither the
French nor their masters should be made aware that
we might take the drastic action mentioned in
paragraph 6.

Urgent as was the matter, I would not take action till I knew what the President felt and wished.

Prime Minister to First

3 April 41

Lord

No attack should be made upon the Dunkerque
unless or until an answer is received from President
Roosevelt which expresses no objection. Absence of
any reference to the topic in his answer may be taken
as consent.

2. On this reply being received, the First Lord
should, if possible, consult the Lord Privy Seal in my
absence, and decide.

3. Personally, my bias is strongly in favour of making
the attack. Alas, we cannot be sure of success.

Perhaps it is ten to one against a successful attack on a
ship properly escorted by destroyers.

4. The reaction on Vichy would not, in my opinion,
be serious. They would know they were found out
doing a pro-Hun trick. So far as the French people are
concerned, nothing would be easier than by repeated
broadcasts to explain that this ship was being delivered
over in a helpless condition into the German power, as
in the event of a German descent she could not get
away from the dock at Toulon like the mobile units of
the French Fleet.

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The next days we learned from the President that there would be at least a pause, because the
Dunkerque
would not be leaving Oran within the next ten days. On April 6 he told us that Mr. Matthews, the American Counsellor at Vichy, had asked Marshal Pétain for an urgent appointment. This was granted, but as soon as Matthews told Pétain that he wished to discuss the
Dunkerque
the Marshal, who was obviously not informed upon the situation, sent for Darlan. Darlan arrived and said that, of course, this information came from the English, and complained that they wanted theirs to be the only fleet in the Mediterranean. He admitted that he was bringing the battleship to Toulon because he could not have it repaired at Oran, and anyway he was not going to leave it there. The Marshal and he had pledged their word of honour that French ships would not fall into German hands, and he repeated this assurance. The
Dunkerque
would not be moved immediately, and would not be ready for ten days or more. The American Embassy at Vichy believed that this was true, and thought that even if the ship were brought to Toulon she could not be put into service before the end of August. Darlan had then made a series of anti-British statements, and the Marshal had promised Mr. Matthews a formal reply. The President said that Pétain apparently grasped the written word better than he trusted his memory, and might upon closer study give us the promise for which we asked.

I expressed my thanks and continuing concern.

Former Naval Person

6 April 41

to President Roosevelt

Most grateful for your spirited intervention about
Dunkerque. It is quite true that Toulon could not repair
her for from three to six months, but why do we want
that hanging over our head anyway? Darlan’s honour
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about her never falling into German hands is rooted in
dishonour. A ship in dry dock or under heavy repair
could not possibly get away before the Germans could
lay hold of Toulon. Their officers and agents are on the
spot all the time, and remember how easy we found it
to cop the French ships at Portsmouth and Plymouth.

We ought to stick to our settled policy of resisting all
transfers of French ships from African to German-controlled or potentially German-controlled French
ports, and encourage all movement the other way. If
Darlan gets Dunkerque to Toulon, why should he not
ask for Jean Bart from Casablanca or Richelieu from
Dakar? Therefore, I urge strong and stern continuance
of utmost pressure you can exert. Evidently this is most
powerful, as we have certain knowledge that they were
to sail morning fourth and all preparations made. Pétain
does not know half what this dirty Darlan does. It would
be far better if your pressure deterred Darlan, as it has
already, than that we should have to take rough action,
with all its dangers.

2. Question is whether timely publicity might not help
deter. Do you mind if I say something like this on
Wednesday in Commons: “There was always the risk
that Darlan might bring Dunkerque from Oran to Toulon
in order to prepare her for war purposes. Such an act
would affect the balances of naval power throughout
the world, and would affect American interests besides
our own. Representations have been made to Marshal
Pétain by the United States Government which should
have shown Vichy Government how undesirable this
step would be from the point of view of French
interests. His Majesty’s Government would certainly be
bound to regard it as a menacing act done at Hitler’s
instigation and as a step in Admiral Darlan’s schemes
for gaining personal control of France as the Germans’

trusted agent. In these circumstances His Majesty’s
Government would hold themselves free to take any
action which was suitable against this ship, either in
passage or while under repair in Toulon Harbour. They
would greatly regret if such a situation arose, as they
have no wish or policy towards France other than her
liberation from the German yoke and the maintenance
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of the integrity of the French Empire.” Please let me
know what you think of this, or whether you can get the
matter settled behind the scenes.

On April 9 I used these words to the House of Commons, and the
Dunkerque
incident was finally settled by the submission of the Vichy Government to President Roosevelt’s pressure.

President Roosevelt

11 April 41

to

Former

Naval

Person

I have received the following [note] from Vichy,
dated April 8:

“By a memorandum handed to Marshal Pétain on
April 4, the American Chargé d’Affaires called attention
to a report according to which the French Government,

‘authorised by the Wiesbaden Armistice Commission,’

was preparing to transfer the Dunkerque from Oran to
Toulon, at the very moment when the Government of
the United States was expressing its interest in an
opposite movement of naval forces. ‘Should such a
transfer take place,’ adds the memorandum, ‘the
Government of the United States could no longer
envisage the continuation of the policy which it desired
to pursue for the supplying, as far as possible, of its
indispensable aid to unoccupied France, to say nothing
of the other acts of co-operation envisaged.’

“The Marshal’s Government loyally admits without
any embarrassment that it had in fact intended to have
the Dunkerque made ready for transfer to Toulon in the
near future. But this measure had been envisaged with
full sovereignty, without any foreign pressure whatsoever, and solely for technical reasons.

“The Government of the United States is fully aware
that the Dunkerque was severely damaged in the
month of July, 1940, as the result of an odious assault
in which numerous Frenchmen were killed.

“The ship is today in condition to move; but its final
repairs require a stay in dry dock, which can only be
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made in Toulon, the only arsenal of either North Africa
or the unoccupied zone able to accommodate it. This is
the sole reason why the transfer of the Dunkerque was
envisaged and remains necessary. Nevertheless, in
view of the political significance which the Government
of the United States seems disposed to attach to this
transfer, the French Government agrees to delay the
preparation of the ship until the conclusion of an
agreement on this subject. It desires thus to show the
Federal Government its will to pursue loyally, for its
part, as far as its means will permit, the policy undertaken with a view to assuring the supplying of French
Africa and the unoccupied zone.

“But by postponing putting into final shape one of its
most precious war vessels the French Government is
making a heavy sacrifice of self-respect and interest
which affects its possibilities of defending its Empire as
well as its means of protecting French maritime traffic.

“The French Government thus expects the American
Government to use its good offices in London in order
to obtain from the British Government the guarantee
that as long as the Dunkerque remains in North Africa
no further capture will be exercised against our legitimate commercial traffic between the French colonies,
French Africa, and the unoccupied zone. It is evident in
fact that a country as threatened with famine as France
is cannot be asked to renounce the utilisation of all its
means of defence if the commercial maritime traffic for
the protection of which guarantees have been offered
continues to be pursued and attacked.”

Of course no such guarantee was given by us, and the powerful intervention of President Roosevelt at this time enabled our relations with Vichy France to become somewhat less hostile.

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8

The Battle of the Atlantic: 1941

The American Intervention

Armed Aid from the United States — Secret Staff
Discussions in Washington — Development of
American Naval Bases — The U-boats Move
Westward — Importance of Iceland — The Halifax
Route — Growth of the Royal Canadian Navy —

Advanced Escort Base at St. John’s, Newfoundland — Losses Continue to Mount — More Than
Eight Hundred Thousand Tons Sunk in Three
Months — Further American Aid — Extension of
the Security Zone, April
11
— The Sea Frontier of
the United States — The Azores — My Telegram
of April
24
— Admiralty Talks with Admiral Ghormley — President Roosevelt Declares an Un limited
National Emergency, May
21
— Hitler’s Dread of
War with the United States — U-Boat Difficulties

— A Dangerous Combination Disrupted — We
Begin to Gain the Upper Hand, June — Our Need
for More and Faster Escorts — And Long-Range
Aircraft — And Good Radar — Catapulting of
Fighters Against the Focke-Wulf — Publication of
the Weekly Sinkings Discontinued — Achievements

of

Our

Combined

Headquarters

at

Liverpool — The United States Occupy Iceland,
July
1
— The Threat from Brest — The Unified
Direction of the War Machine — Our Losses and
Intense Efforts — Appointment of Lord Leathers
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— Mr. Lewis Douglas — Improvement in Clearance of Goods from Our Ports.

I
MPORTANT CHANGES now took place in the U-boat war.

The elimination of the three German “aces” in March and the improvement in our defence measures had their effect on U-boat tactics. Finding the western approaches too hot, they moved farther west into waters where, since the Southern Irish ports were denied us, only a few of our flotilla escorts could reach them and where air protection was impossible. From our bases in the United Kingdom our escorts could only provide effective protection to our convoys over about a quarter of the route to Halifax. Early in April a wolf-pack struck a convoy in longitude 28° West before the escort had joined it. In a protracted action ten ships were sunk out of a total of twenty-two, one U-boat also being destroyed. Somehow we had to contrive to extend our reach or our days would be numbered.