The Grand Alliance (108 page)

Meanwhile I thought it worth while, with the knowledge and agreement of the Soviet Government, to make a final and personal appeal to the Finnish leader, Field-Marshal Mannerheim.

Prime

Minister

to

29 Nov. 41

Field-Marshal

Mannerheim

I am deeply grieved at what I see coming, namely,
that we shall be forced in a few days out of loyalty to
our ally Russia to declare war upon Finland. If we do
this, we shall make war also as opportunity serves.

Surely your troops have advanced far enough for
security during the war and could now halt and give
leave. It is not necessary to make any public declaration, but simply leave off fighting and cease military
operations, for which the severe winter affords every
reason, and make a de facto exit from the war. I wish I
could convince Your Excellency that we are going to
beat the Nazis. I feel far more confident than in 1917 or
1918. It would be most painful to the many friends of
your country in England if Finland found herself in the
dock with the guilty and defeated Nazis. My recollec-tions of our pleasant talks and correspondence about
the last war lead me to send this purely personal and
private message for your consideration before it is too
late.

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On December 2 I received Field-Marshal Mannerheim’s answer.

Field-Marshal

2 Dec. 41

Mannerheim to Prime

Minister Churchill

I had yesterday the honour to receive through the
intermediary of the American Minister at Helsinki your
letter of November 29, 1941, and I thank you for your
courtesy in sending me this private message. I am sure
you will realise that it is impossible for me to cease my
present military operations before my troops have
reached positions which in my opinion would give us
the security required. I would regret if these operations,
carried out in order to safeguard Finland, would bring
my country into a conflict with England, and I will be
deeply grieved if you will consider yourself forced to
declare war upon Finland. It was very kind of you to
send me a personal message in these trying days, and
I have fully appreciated it.

This reply made it clear that Finland was not prepared to withdraw her troops to her 1939 frontiers, and the British Government therefore went ahead with the arrangements to declare war. Similar action followed in regard to Rumania and Hungary.

It was against such a background that preparations were made for Mr. Eden’s mission to Moscow. He was to be accompanied by General Nye, Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff. A general review of the war in both its military and general aspects was to be undertaken in these talks in Moscow, and if possible the alliance was to be put on a formal and written treaty basis.

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On December 6 I drew up a general directive for the Foreign Secretary, reviewing certain aspects of the military situation as seen from our side. The battle in the Desert, which will presently be described, was already at its height.

Prime

Minister

to

5 Dec. 41

Foreign Secretary

The prolongation of the battle in Libya, which is
drawing in so many Axis resources, will probably
require the use both of the 50th and 18th British Divisions, which we had hoped might be available for the
defence of the Caucasus or for action on the Russian
front. In the near future therefore these divisions cannot
be considered available. The best form which our aid
can take (apart from supplies) is the placing of a strong
component of the air force, say ten squadrons, on the
southern flank of the Russian armies, where, among
other things, they can help protect the Russian naval
bases on the Black Sea. These squadrons will be
withdrawn from the Libyan battle at the earliest moment
when success has been gained. The movement of their
ground personnel and stores will not unduly choke the
Trans-Persian communications, as would be the case if
infantry divisions were sent. The High Command in the
Middle East has been ordered to make plans for this
movement, the completion of which will of course
depend upon the facilities afforded for detailed reconnaissance.

2. The attitude of Turkey becomes increasingly
important, both to Russia and to Great Britain. The
Turkish army of fifty divisions requires air support. We
have promised a minimum of four and a maximum of
twelve fighter squadrons to Turkey in the event of
Turkey being attacked. In this event we might require to
withdraw some of the squadrons proposed to be sent
into action on the Russian southern front. The best use
of our aircraft on both shores of the Black Sea and the
types to be employed require to be decided according

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to circumstances by consultation between the British
and Russian Governments and Staffs.

During these interchanges the urgency of the military crisis on the Russian front had diminished. Hitler had determined on one more great effort, and on November 13 he issued orders for an “autumn campaign” to take Moscow before the end of the year. The plan was opposed by Bock and Guderian, who suggested that the armies should dig in for the winter. They were overruled. Some small progress was made on the flanks during the latter part of November, but the main attack in the centre, launched on December 4, broke down completely, not only on account of the stubborn resistance of the garrison and of the inhabitants, but also because of the extreme cold which had now set in.

Automatic weapons failed to function; aircraft and tank motors could not be started. With inadequate winter clothing the German soldiers were half-frozen.

Like the supreme military genius who had trod this road a century before him, Hitler now discovered what Russian winter meant. He bowed to inexorable facts. Instructions were given for the troops to withdraw to a better line in rear, though they were to resist any Russian attacks in the meanwhile. These attacks were not lacking. For the rest of the year they were continuous, and the German armour both north and south of Moscow was forced back until by December 31 the front was stabilised on a line running north and south sixty miles from the city, from which they had already been within twenty miles. In the North the Germans had had no better fortune. Leningrad indeed had been completely cut off, and was closely invested in the south by the Germans and in the north by the Finns. But all

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assaults had been repulsed. There was more to show in the South. Rundstedt had once reached Rostov and rounded the corner to the Caucasus. Here he had overreached himself and was beaten back forty miles. Nevertheless, he had advanced five hundred miles. The southern industrial area of Russia and the rich wheatlands of the Ukraine were behind him. Only in the Crimea were there still Russians to dislodge or destroy.

Thus, in the six months’ campaign the Germans had achieved formidable results and had inflicted losses on their enemy which no other nation could have survived. But the three main objectives which they had sought, Moscow, Leningrad, the lower Don, were still firmly in Russian hands.

The Caucasus, the Volga, and Archangel were still far away. The Russian Army, far from being beaten, was fighting better than ever, and would certainly grow in strength in the coming year. The winter had fallen. The long war was certain.

All the anti-Nazi nations, great and small, rejoiced to see the first failure of a German Blitzkrieg. The threat of invasion to our Island was removed so long as the German armies were engaged in a life-and-death struggle in the East. How long that struggle might last no one could tell.

Hitler at least was still confident of the future. The many arguments he had had with his generals during the autumn, and their failure to satisfy his far-reaching intentions, led to the removal of the Commander-in-Chief, Brauchitsch.

Rundstedt went too. Henceforward Hitler took personal command of the armies in the East, confident in his generalship, and with high hopes of an early Russian collapse in 1942.

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Our discussions with the Soviets, which seemed in their later stages to be progressing favourably, have anticipated the launching by General Auchinleck of his offensive in the Desert which has next to be described. Both discussions and offensive were alike relegated to a different plane by the Japanese attack upon the United States at Pearl Harbour on December 7. We shall return to them in due course amid a vastly different grouping of world forces.

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9

The Path Ahead

British Plans for the Autumn of
1941
— Hope of a
Decisive Victory in the Western Desert
—
The
Only Possible “Second Front”
—
Lord Louis
Mountbatten Succeeds Sir Roger Keyes —

Auchinleck Demands a Further Delay — Mr.

Attlee’s Visit to Washington
—
My Letter to the
President of October
20
—
A
n Exposition of My
War Thought
—
Suggestions for American Troops
in Northern Ireland
—
Profound Effects of Gaining
a Desert Victory
—
Tank-Landing Craft Indispensable for a Landing in Europe
—
My Telegram of
October
25
to Minister of State, Middle East —