The Grand Alliance (149 page)

How many bombs have been thrown within a
thousand yards of the Central War Room? I do not
myself agree that no serious attempt has been made,
but we should certainly be prepared for a new assault
with two thousand- and even five thousand-pound
bombs.

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More speed and energy should be put into covering
G.H.Q.

Prime Minister to Minister of

16.II.41.

Economic Warfare (Minister

of Information to see.)

I agree about co-ordinated leaflets [for propaganda
in France and Belgium], but all depends upon an
intimate liaison between you and the Ministry of Information on the one hand and de Gaulle on the other. We
must not tie de Gaulle up too tightly. We have never
received the slightest good treatment or even courtesy
from Vichy, and the Free French movement remains
our dominant policy. I am sure if you consult with de
Gaulle or his people all will be satisfactory. I think he is
much the best Frenchman now in the arena, and I want
him taken care of as much as possible.

(Action this day.) Prime

17.II.41.

Minister to Secretary of State
for War and V.C.I.G.S.

I do not think it is desirable to move this division [to
Northern Ireland], especially in view of the possibilities
of our sending the 50th away.

2. Meanwhile, plans should be worked out to
procure the necessary acceleration should a move
become indispensable. These plans should include: (a)
A reconsideration of the Admiralty objections to using
the Mersey as well as the Clyde. Are there no smaller
ports from which embarkation could be made? (b)
Would it not be possible to arrange the move on the
basis of a precautionary period of four days in which
additional M.T. ships could be assembled? (c) The
objections about moving part of the vehicles deserve
further study. For instance, the troops might have
issued to them an additional quantity of transport while
in England to break it in, and then either this or the old
could be sent to Ireland. I cannot believe that there is
no floating reserve of transport capable of providing for
such a small need as this. A little combing-out and
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tightening-up of the Mechanical Transport depots,
Slough, etc., would certainly yield what is required.

3. We must not be content with anything less than a
saving of five days out of the eleven during which the
division will be out of action on both sides of the Channel. This period must be shortened to six days, but a
reasonable precautionary notice might be expected.

Prime Minister to Secretary of
17.II.41.

State for War

I deeply regret the whole story of this fine body of
men [the Cavalry Division in Palestine], and that the
War Office can devise nothing better than to bring them
all home in June to begin a training which will keep
them so long out of effective action.

What exactly does the C.I.G.S. mean by “late
autumn”?

Meanwhile, the division will have to render whatever
service is necessary in guarding the Suez Canal,
maintaining order, etc., or, if necessary, escorting
prisoners, so as to liberate British battalions for active
service.

The 1st Cavalry Division was redesignated 10th
Armoured Division on July 23, 1941, but it did not
appear in the field for a long time. Its tanks were taken
from it during the spring of 1942 to replace the battle
losses of the 1st and 7th Armoured Divisions. In
August, 1942, its Headquarters and one brigade (8th)
went up to the front and took part in the battle of Alam
Haifa. The other brigade (9th) came up later and was
attached to the New Zealand Division, taking part in the
Alamein battle.

Prime Minister to General

17.II.41.

Ismay

What are the arrangements in British Columbia for
dealing with the Japanese colony there should Japan
attack? The matter is of course for the Canadian
Government, but it would be interesting to know
whether adequate forces are available in that part of
the Dominion. About thirty years ago, when there were
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anti-Japanese riots, the Japanese showed themselves
so strong and so well organised as to be able to take
complete control.

Prime Minister to Foreign

17 II.41.

Office

I regard these developments [about appointment of
Admiral Darlart as successor to Marshal Pétain] with
misgiving and distrust. We have received nothing but ill-treatment from Vichy. It would have been better to have
had Laval, from our point of view, than Darlan, who is. a
dangerous, bitter, ambitious man, without the odium
which attaches to Laval. I think it is important at the
moment to be stiff with these people, and to assert the
blockade whenever our ships are available. In the
meantime an end should be put to the cold-shouldering
of General de Gaulle and the Free French movement,
who are the only people who have done anything for
us, and to whom we have made very solemn engagements. The emphasis should be somewhat shifted.

Please also see in this connection my telegram to
the President.

Prime Minister to Sir

17.II.41.

Alexander Cadogan

Please draw attention again to Mr. Eden’s injunction
against the length of telegrams sent to the Foreign
Office by their representative abroad.

The zeal and efficiency of a diplomatic representative is measured by the quality and not by the quantity
of the information he supplies, He is expected to do a
good deal of filtering for himself, and not simply to pour
out upon us over these congested wires all the contra-dictory gossip which he hears. So much is sent that no
true picture can be obtained. One cannot see the wood
for the trees. There is no harm in sending “background”

on by bag.

Prime Minister to C.O.S.

17.II.41.

Committee, Secretary of

State for War, and V.C.I.G.S.

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The term “division” must not become a stumbling-block. A division is a tactical unit of all arms for use in
its integrity against the enemy. Divisions are joined
together to form corps, armies, and groups of armies,
with appropriate troops for the larger formations. These
characteristics do not arise where there is no prospect
of using a division in its integrity, or as a part of a larger
formation. Although for administrative purposes a
divisional command may be bestowed upon a number
of troops equal to a division, who have special duties
assigned to them, this should not mislead us.

2. We speak, for instance, of a “division” in Iceland,
but it would be absurd to treat this division as similar to
those which would operate against the Germans. We
now know what this division has got to do, and how it is
distributed. It is divided into the garrisons of several
posts at landing-places in a considerable country, and
no doubt should have a number of mobile columns
which can rapidly proceed to any threatened spot. Its
artillery and extra divisional troops and lines of communication services should be organised and accounted
for on a scale suited to the actual task of these troops
in Iceland. It should properly be called “the Iceland
Force,” and would in no way resemble the conventional
establishment of a division. It might want more of one
thing and less of another.

3. The African Colonial divisions ought not surely to
be called divisions at all. No one contemplates them
standing in the line against a European army. They
comprise a large body of West and East African
riflemen organised in battalions, and here and there,
largely for administrative purposes, in brigades. We can
now expect that the Italians will in a few months be
liquidated in Northeast Africa. What enemy then will
oppose these three African Colonial divisions? Anyone
who knows these vast countries can see that these
African “divisions” will be distributed in small posts and
garrisons, with a number of mobile columns comprising
armoured cars, etc. The idea of their being supplied
with divisional and corps artillery, together with a share
of the lines of communication troops on the British
scale, is not sensible. They cannot be used so far north
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as Libya on account of the cold. We cannot contemplate holding down Abyssinia once it has been “liberated.” Indeed, one imagines the whole of Northeast Africa
returning very rapidly to peacetime conditions. Therefore, I cannot accept these three African Colonial
divisions as such. They are, indeed, only miscellaneous
units of the African Defence Force.

Prime Minister to Minister of

18.II.41.

Transport

I am shocked to learn that those who had to take the
decision to unload or divert the New Toronto were
ignorant of the cargo which she carried. I always keep
check myself personally of the approaching ships which
are carrying large consignments of munitions. Do you
not get these lists in good time, and do you not yourself
personally watch over the fate of these vitally important
cargoes? If not, please make arrangements to do so,
and report to me when these arrangements are made
and what they are.

Prime Minister to V.C.I.G.S.

17.II.41.

and Director of Military

Operations

General Wavell has thirty-one British Regular
battalions, of which, as far as I can make out, only
about fifteen are incorporated in divisional formations.

Pray correct me if I am wrong. It is indeed astonishing
that he should be put to these straits to find a few
battalions for Crete and Malta. If the West African
Brigade were transferred from Kenya to Freetown, two
British battalions now degenerating there could come
forward to the Nile Army.

The use of three battalions to escort prisoners to
India, the whole Yeomanry and Regular Cavalry
Division unemployed in Palestine, large numbers of
Australian troops for which we are told there is no
equipment on the Regular scale of establishment, the
Polish Brigade, the drafts awaiting incorporation in units
which have not yet suffered any casualties – all these

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are large resources if ingeniously and economically
used.

Are there any British battalions in East Africa?

Please give me your aid in the study of these
aspects.

Prime Minister to Minister of

20.II.41.