The Fall of Carthage (23 page)
CHAPTER 5
The End
A
FTER THE DISASTROUS
defeat at the Aegates Islands, the Carthaginians gave Hamilcar Barca full authority to negotiate a peace with Rome. In fact, Hamilcar, eager to disassociate himself from any admission of defeat, acted through one of his subordinate officers, Gesgo. The consul Catulus' year of office had almost expired and the desire to gain credit for completing such a major war before his successors arrived to steal the glory may well have made him more conciliatory. An initial Roman demand that Hamilcar's Sicilian army should immediately surrender its weapons and hand over for punishment all the Roman and Italian deserters in its ranks was swiftly rejected. The mercenaries would leave the island as an army, their arms and honour both intact.
1
Yet this seems to have been the only concession that the Carthaginians were able to gain, for in other respects the peace terms made it clear that they had been defeated and that Rome was not negotiating with an equal. Peace was declared between Rome and Carthage providing that the following conditions were met:
FTER THE DISASTROUS
defeat at the Aegates Islands, the Carthaginians gave Hamilcar Barca full authority to negotiate a peace with Rome. In fact, Hamilcar, eager to disassociate himself from any admission of defeat, acted through one of his subordinate officers, Gesgo. The consul Catulus' year of office had almost expired and the desire to gain credit for completing such a major war before his successors arrived to steal the glory may well have made him more conciliatory. An initial Roman demand that Hamilcar's Sicilian army should immediately surrender its weapons and hand over for punishment all the Roman and Italian deserters in its ranks was swiftly rejected. The mercenaries would leave the island as an army, their arms and honour both intact.
1
Yet this seems to have been the only concession that the Carthaginians were able to gain, for in other respects the peace terms made it clear that they had been defeated and that Rome was not negotiating with an equal. Peace was declared between Rome and Carthage providing that the following conditions were met:
a
The Carthaginians were to evacuate all of Sicily.
The Carthaginians were to evacuate all of Sicily.
b Neither side was to make war on the other's allies, nor seek to subvert their allegiance by allying with them dire
ctly
or becoming involved in their internal affairs. They were not to recruit soldiers or raise money for the construction of public buildings in the territory of the other.
ctly
or becoming involved in their internal affairs. They were not to recruit soldiers or raise money for the construction of public buildings in the territory of the other.
c
The Carthaginians were to give up all Roman prisoners freely, whilst paying a ransom for their own.
The Carthaginians were to give up all Roman prisoners freely, whilst paying a ransom for their own.
d
The Carthaginians were to pay an indemn
ity to the Roman State of 2,200
Euboean talents over a twenty-year period.
The Carthaginians were to pay an indemn
ity to the Roman State of 2,200
Euboean talents over a twenty-year period.
A Roman consul did not have the authority to conclude a final peace himself, since a treaty could only be ratified by the Roman People voting in the
Comitia Centuriata,
the same assembly which had the power to declare war. Therefore Catulus referred the terms back to Rome for approval. Not uncharacteristically, the Roman People decided that the terms were too lenient and a senatorial commission was sent to Sicily to modify the treaty. The indemnity was increased to 3,200 talents, 1,000 payable immediately and the remainder over ten years, which was perhaps a reflection of the desire for the State to repay the loans made for the construction of Rome's last fleet. The Romans had traditionally expected defeated enemies to contribute to the costs of their war effort.
2
The only other change was the addition of a clause requiring Carthage to evacuate all of the small islands between Sicily and Africa.
3
It is clear that the complete expulsion of the Carthaginians from Sicily had become the Romans' main war aim, whether or not we should follow Polybius and date this ambition to the fall of Agrigentum in 261. The invasion of Africa in 256 had never been intended to establish a permanent Roman presence, but was a means of applying further pressure on the Carthaginians in the hope of forcing their submission. This primary objective had been fully achieved. In addition to this, Punic naval power had been broken and no longer dominated the western Mediterranean, more as a result of the loss of its island bases than the losses in ships which it had suffered, since in time the latter could be replaced. Yet Carthage had lost none of its power in Africa or Spain, and, for the moment, held on to Sardinia. There was no attempt to absorb Carthage into Rome's network of allies in the way that she had come to conclude most of her wars fought in Italy. In part this was a reflection of the reality of the situation. At the end of the twenty-three-year struggle both sides were exhausted and eager to settle. A continuation of the war until one or the other side was destroyed as an independent political entity was simply not feasible. Carthage in its sheer size, territories and economic prosperity was on an utterly different scale to the states of Italy with whom Rome had dealt in the past. In addition the Romans seem to have acknowledged the differences between the Italian Peninsula and lands separated from their own by sea. Sicily was not to be absorbed in the same way as the communities of mainland Italy and was not settled with colonies of citizens. Initially much of the island was administered by Hiero's Syracuse, but at some point a Roman governor, usually a praetor, was appointed to govern the western part of the island, creating Rome's first province, as we would understand the term. It is unclear precisely when this occurred, but it may have been as late as
c.
227, when the number of praetors annually elected was increased to four, quite probably to provide governors for Sicily and Sardinia where permanent Roman garrisons appear to have been established.
4
Unlike the Italian allies, the communities within the Roman province had a different bond to the Roman State, their main obligation being to pay tax, rather than supply soldiers to fight with the Roman army. Grain from Sicily rapidly became a major source of food for Rome itself, and many Romans, especially equestrians, probably became wealthy from its exploitation.
5
c.
227, when the number of praetors annually elected was increased to four, quite probably to provide governors for Sicily and Sardinia where permanent Roman garrisons appear to have been established.
4
Unlike the Italian allies, the communities within the Roman province had a different bond to the Roman State, their main obligation being to pay tax, rather than supply soldiers to fight with the Roman army. Grain from Sicily rapidly became a major source of food for Rome itself, and many Romans, especially equestrians, probably became wealthy from its exploitation.
5
With hindsight it is difficult to see any occasion during the course of the war when the Carthaginians came close to victory. The most serious Roman losses were due to bad weather and not to enemy action. Perhaps in the earliest phases, if they had been able to prevent the Roman expedition from crossing the Straits of Messina or had defeated Claudius' army after it had landed, then they might have dissuaded the Romans from further overseas adventures, at least in the short term, but that in effect would have been to prevent the crisis developing into a war in the first place. Yet it was extremely difficult for squadrons of galleys to block a stretch of water and the Punic forces in Sicily in 264 were utterly inadequate to achieve such a quick victory over a Roman consular army. Apart from the decision to continue the struggle and send a large army to Sicily after Rome's defeat of Syracuse, the Carthaginian war effort was essentially passive, a series of reactions to Roman moves, all intended to protect their position in Sicily.
6
Even when they sought to harass the enemy by raiding the Italian coast, the main objective was to draw Roman forces away from Sicily. On the island itself their strategy followed the traditional Carthaginian pattern of enduring the enemy onslaught and trying to maintain control of as many strongholds as possible, waiting for the enemy to weaken so that eventually the lost ground could be regained. Carthage had been involved in sporadic conflict in Sicily for centuries before the Romans arrived, and if she had never gained full control of the island, neither had she been completely expelled.
6
Even when they sought to harass the enemy by raiding the Italian coast, the main objective was to draw Roman forces away from Sicily. On the island itself their strategy followed the traditional Carthaginian pattern of enduring the enemy onslaught and trying to maintain control of as many strongholds as possible, waiting for the enemy to weaken so that eventually the lost ground could be regained. Carthage had been involved in sporadic conflict in Sicily for centuries before the Romans arrived, and if she had never gained full control of the island, neither had she been completely expelled.
The Romans were not like Pyrrhus, who would abandon his offensive when he failed to gain widespread support from the Greek communities of Sicily, nor was their power as precarious as that of the successive tyrants of Syracuse. Roman persistence was at least the equal of Punic, but was married to an extremely aggressive mode of war-making, applying continuous pressure on the enemy in an effort to force a decision. Throughout the conflict they consistently assumed the offensive, methodically expanding the territory which they controlled in Sicily, continuing to do so even when their armies' morale reached a low ebb after the defeat of Regulus. More importantly they were willing to escalate the conflict in an effort to defeat the enemy, invading Africa and, most of all, deciding to create a fleet and pursue the war at sea in spite of their colossal losses. Rome's huge reserves of manpower made it possible to absorb appalling losses, but this in itself does not explain the willingness with which the population continued to be ready to serve in the war.
The annual replacement of Roman commanders may have meant that they were usually less experienced than their opponents, but it is hard to find clear examples of Zonaras' claim that this was the cause of numerous Roman defeats.
7
All but two of the major battles fought on land and sea were Roman victories and it seems likely that most of their defeats were very small-scale affairs. Hamilcar Barca, whom Polybius considered the ablest commander on either side, displayed his talent in relatively low-level raiding and skirmishing. In one respect the annual arrival of new Roman commanders may have proved an asset, for it ensured that the army and navy were commanded very aggressively, by men hoping to gain distinction in their short term of office. Roman strategy remained continuously aggressive, even if it sometimes lacked consistency. If this produced acts of great boldness or even recklessness, such as the failed surprise attacks on Lipara in 260 and Drepana in 249, it also produced some notable successes, such as Regulus' victory at Adys. On the whole Roman commanders performed fairly well.
7
All but two of the major battles fought on land and sea were Roman victories and it seems likely that most of their defeats were very small-scale affairs. Hamilcar Barca, whom Polybius considered the ablest commander on either side, displayed his talent in relatively low-level raiding and skirmishing. In one respect the annual arrival of new Roman commanders may have proved an asset, for it ensured that the army and navy were commanded very aggressively, by men hoping to gain distinction in their short term of office. Roman strategy remained continuously aggressive, even if it sometimes lacked consistency. If this produced acts of great boldness or even recklessness, such as the failed surprise attacks on Lipara in 260 and Drepana in 249, it also produced some notable successes, such as Regulus' victory at Adys. On the whole Roman commanders performed fairly well.
As the war progressed the number of men holding office for the second time increased, which may have provided more experienced commanders, although in the case of Scipio Asina, consul in 260 and 254, this was experience of defeat and capture. Of the forty-seven consuls elected during the twenty-three years of war - the odd number a result of the death of Quintus Caecidius soon after taking office in 256 and his replacement by Regulus - eleven had held the office before, all but two during the war itself. Two others would go on to second consulships after 241. The proportion of multiple consulships was much the same in the decades before the war and may well be more a reflection of the politics of the day and the dominance of a few aristocratic families than a desire on the part of the electorate to choose experienced commanders during a hard war. A shift in the political balance may explain the slight decline in the number of multiple consulships in the years between the First and Second Punic Wars. Following the disaster at Drepana in 249, the Senate certainly did select a commander on the basis of experience as well as his political influence, when it took the very rare step of appointing a military dictator to take charge of the operations in Sicily. The man chosen was Aulus Atilius Caiat-inus, who had been praetor in 257, and as consul in 258 and 254 had already commanded in two Sicilian campaigns earlier in the conflict.
8
However, the Senate made little use of its power to prorogue a magistrate's
imperium
(the prolonging of the command of those of proven ability), something which became common in the Second Punic War. This was partly due to the more restricted theatre of operations in the First War, but also a reflection of the low casualty rate amongst Roman senior officers compared to the Hannibalic war. The campaigns of the First War involved both consuls serving together more often than had been the case in the past. Disagreements between men of equal rank sharing command of an army were to figure prominently in the explanations for the Roman disasters of the Second War, but there is no trace of this in the earlier conflict, perhaps because there were fewer defeats to excuse. The bickering between Catulus and Falto occurred after their victory and had not apparently been reflected by any difficulties during the actual conduct of the campaign. Both of the major defeats of the war occurred when only one consul was in command and Agrigentum, the only land battie where command was shared, was a clear Roman success. However, pitched land battles were rare during the conflict and it was the subtie manoeuvring in the days before these which offered most opportunity for a divided command to lead to confusion.
8
However, the Senate made little use of its power to prorogue a magistrate's
imperium
(the prolonging of the command of those of proven ability), something which became common in the Second Punic War. This was partly due to the more restricted theatre of operations in the First War, but also a reflection of the low casualty rate amongst Roman senior officers compared to the Hannibalic war. The campaigns of the First War involved both consuls serving together more often than had been the case in the past. Disagreements between men of equal rank sharing command of an army were to figure prominently in the explanations for the Roman disasters of the Second War, but there is no trace of this in the earlier conflict, perhaps because there were fewer defeats to excuse. The bickering between Catulus and Falto occurred after their victory and had not apparently been reflected by any difficulties during the actual conduct of the campaign. Both of the major defeats of the war occurred when only one consul was in command and Agrigentum, the only land battie where command was shared, was a clear Roman success. However, pitched land battles were rare during the conflict and it was the subtie manoeuvring in the days before these which offered most opportunity for a divided command to lead to confusion.
Carthaginian commanders may have been more 'professional' than their Roman counterparts, and certainly remained in their posts for much longer periods, but few would have had much experience of commanding such large forces as were frequently employed during the war. This was especially true of the admirals appointed to control the operations of the unprecedentedly large fleets which were formed on several occasions. Their inexperience of command at this level added to the already major practical difficulties in co-ordinating the movements of hundreds of oared warships and was perhaps another factor in denying the Carthaginian navy the advantages it ought to have derived from the superior skill of its crews. Several Punic generals were crucified in the aftermath of military failures during the war, usually, it seems, by order of their own immediate subordinates. Yet other defeated leaders escaped punishment and went on to hold further commands which suggests that political influence as much as actual responsibility determined their fate.
9
The Romans were considerably more lenient towards their magistrates who had presided over disasters, awarding triumphs to successive admirals who had lost most of their fleets to bad weather. Only Claudius was prosecuted on the charge of
perduellio
(in a sense 'bringing the state into disrepute') for his behaviour at Drepana, but narrowly escaped condemnation and was instead found guilty of a lesser charge and fined.
10
However, the subsequent arraignment of his sister suggests that the family was perceived to be politically vulnerable in the years immediately afterwards.
9
The Romans were considerably more lenient towards their magistrates who had presided over disasters, awarding triumphs to successive admirals who had lost most of their fleets to bad weather. Only Claudius was prosecuted on the charge of
perduellio
(in a sense 'bringing the state into disrepute') for his behaviour at Drepana, but narrowly escaped condemnation and was instead found guilty of a lesser charge and fined.
10
However, the subsequent arraignment of his sister suggests that the family was perceived to be politically vulnerable in the years immediately afterwards.
The Mercenary War
Within months of the end of the war, Carthage was plunged into a conflict which, if shorter than the struggle with Rome, seemed to pose a far greater threat to her very existence. It took over three years to suppress the rebellion of former mercenaries and African subjects, who for this time ravaged the territory up to the walls of Carthage itself. It was a bitter campaign, punctuated by acts of extreme barbarity on both sides. It was also completely unnecessary, if the Punic authorities had not consistently mishandled all their dealings with Hamilcar's veterans from the Sicilian campaign.
11
11
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