The essential writings of Machiavelli (29 page)

164.
Livy (Book X, chapter 31) writes: “I will not now recount the destruction of all those years that overtook both peoples, and the troubles they endured, and yet all this was powerless to break the resolution or the spirit of the Samnites.”

165.
Livy in Book XXIII, chapters 41 and 42, describes these incidents and their speech to Hannibal, which begins: “We fought the Romans for a century without aid from a foreign general or army.”

CHAPTER THREE
O
N HOW
R
OME BECAME A GREAT STATE, DESTROYING THE STATES THAT SURROUNDED IT, AND HOW IT TOOK FOREIGNERS INTO ITS RANKS

“All the while Rome grows on the ruins of Alba.”
¹⁶⁶
Those who intend their city to become a great empire must endeavor to fill it with inhabitants, because without an abundance of men it will never become a great city. This can be done in two ways: through love or through force. If it is through love, one must keep the roads open for foreigners who aspire to come live in one’s city, everyone living there willingly. If it is through force, one will destroy the neighboring cities and send their inhabitants to live in one’s own city. Rome followed this practice so diligently that by the time of their sixth king, Rome had eighty thousand men capable of bearing arms. The Romans wanted to adopt the ways of the good farmer who will prune the first branches that a tree sprouts so that it will grow well and produce ripe fruit, and so that the power remaining in the roots can with time make it grow more lushly and bear more fruit. The examples of Sparta and Athens demonstrate that this way of enlarging a state and creating an empire is effective: These two states had powerful armies and the best laws, and yet they did not reach the greatness of the Roman Empire, even if by comparison Rome seemed unruly and disorganized. No other reason for Rome’s greatness can be put forward than the one I have already suggested: Rome had enlarged the body of its state in both these ways and was able to arm eighty thousand men, while Sparta and Athens never surpassed twenty thousand each. This was not the result of Rome’s having a more advantageous location, only that it had a different way of proceeding. Lycurgus, the founder of the Spartan state, believed that nothing would corrupt his laws more than introducing new inhabitants into Sparta, and consequently did his utmost to prevent foreigners mixing with Spartans. Not only did he forbid intermarriage, citizenship, and other interaction that brings people together, but he decreed that only money made of leather could be used in his state. He did this in order to discourage merchants from coming to Sparta with goods or crafts. The result was that the city could never grow in inhabitants. And as all of our actions imitate nature, it is neither possible nor natural that a delicate trunk will be able to sustain heavy branches. Therefore a small republic cannot occupy cities and kingdoms that are more effective or bigger than it is, and if it does, it will meet the same fate as a tree whose branches are larger than its trunk: holding them up with difficulty, the trunk will break in the slightest breeze. This was the case of Sparta, which successfully occupied all the city-states in Greece. And yet the moment Thebes rebelled, all the other cities followed suit and the trunk remained alone and without branches. This could not happen to Rome, as its trunk was so thick that it could support branches of any size. This and other ways of proceeding that I shall describe are what made Rome powerful and great. Livy demonstrated this in his well-chosen phrase: “All the while Rome grows on the ruins of Alba.”

166.
Machiavelli quotes Livy (Book I, chapter 30) in Latin:
Crescit interea Roma Albae ruinis
.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN
O
N HOW ONE RISES FROM LOW TO HIGH ESTATE THROUGH DECEPTION MORE THAN THROUGH FORCE

I consider it true that men of low fortune rarely if ever reach high rank without using either force or deception, though such rank can also be reached by gift or heredity. I also believe that force alone is never enough, though deception alone can be. Anyone who reads about the lives of Philip of Macedon, Agathocles of Sicily
¹⁶⁷
and many other such men will see that those of the lowest or at least limited fortune have gained kingdoms or great empires through deception. Xenophon in his life of Cyrus also demonstrates the necessity of deception.
¹⁶⁸
If one considers Cyrus’s first expedition against the king of Armenia, one will see that it is marked by deception, and that Cyrus occupied that kingdom through trickery, not force.
¹⁶⁹
One can only conclude that a prince who aspires to great deeds must learn to deceive. Cyrus also deceived his maternal uncle Cyaxares, the king of the Medes, in many ways, and Xenophon demonstrates how Cyrus would not have been able to achieve the greatness that he did without this deception.

Nor do I believe that any man of low fortune who attained great power managed to do so through sincerity and open force, but only through deception. Giovanni Galeazzo’s seizing power and control of Lombardy from his uncle, Messer Bernabò, is another example.
¹⁷⁰
And what a prince is compelled to do as he begins to expand his state, a republic must also do until it has become powerful enough to use force alone. Rome prevailed because by choice or chance it always used any means necessary to achieve greatness. As Rome began to expand, it could not have resorted to greater deception than it used in acquiring allies, which I have described above, because through these alliances it made these allies its slaves, which was the fate of the Latins and the other peoples surrounding Rome. First Rome used these peoples’ armies to subjugate the peoples living adjacent to their territories and strengthen Rome’s standing and prestige, and then, having subjugated them, Rome grew to such an extent that it could vanquish anyone. And all the while, the Latins did not realize they had become slaves until they saw the Samnites twice defeated and forced into a treaty
¹⁷¹
Through this victory, the Romans increased their standing with distant princes, who now encountered Rome’s prestige though not Rome’s armies. But this victory also generated envy and suspicion among those who did encounter and experience Rome’s armies, among them the Latins. This envy and fear were so great that not only the Latins, but also their colonies in Latium, along with the Campanians, who had only recently been defended by the Romans, all conspired against Rome. The Latins started the war, as I have already mentioned, in the way most wars are started: They did not attack the Romans, but defended the Sidicini against the Samnites, who were fighting with the sanction of the Romans. Livy shows us that the Latins attacked once they became aware of the Roman deception. He has Annius Setinus say: “For under the semblance of a treaty between equals we have already been enslaved.”
¹⁷²
So it is clear that in their initial expansions the Romans were ready enough to resort to deception, which has always been necessary for those wanting to reach sublime heights from small beginnings. This deception is less deserving of vituperation the more it is concealed, as was the deception of the Romans.

167.
Machiavelli also refers to Philip of Macedon (360–336
BCE
) and Agathocles (361—289
BCE
) in
The Prince
. In chapter 12: “The Thebans had made Philip of Macedon their general after the death of Epaminondas, but once Philip was victorious in battle he took away the Thebans’ liberty.” And in chapter 8: “One morning Agathocles called together the people and the senate of Syracuse as if to discuss important issues concerning the republic, and then at a signal to his soldiers had them kill all the senators and the richest men of the city.” (See also note 30 in
The Prince.
)

168.
Machiavelli is referring to Xenophon’s
Cyropaedia:
In Book I, chapter 6, young Cyrus asks his father how one overcomes the enemy in battle, to which the father answers: “My son, this is not a simple question you are asking. He who intends to do this must be a plotter, cunning, deceitful, a cheat, a thief, and rapacious, and outdo his enemy in everything.”

169.
Xenophon in
Cyropaedia
, Book II, chapter 4, has Cyrus explain his tactics of organizing hunting expeditions with his men near the borders of Armenia. When the day comes for him to invade, his presence with a large force of men will not arouse the suspicions of the Armenians.

170.
Gian Galeazzo Visconti (1351–1402), ruler of Pavia, seized Milan and other territories of Lombardy from his uncle after imprisoning and executing him.

171.
Livy describes these incidents in Book VII, chapters 33, 36, and 37.

172.
Machiavelli is quoting Livy, Book VIII, chapter 4, in Latin:
Nam si etiam nunc sub umbra foederis aequi servitutem pati possumus
.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN
W
EAK STATES HAVE ALWAYS WAVERED IN THEIR DELIBERATIONS, AND SLOW DELIBERATIONS ARE ALWAYS HARMFUL

If one considers the beginning of the war between the Latins and the Romans, one can see how important it is in an assembly to keep to the matter at hand and not waver or be uncertain about the issue. This became apparent in the assembly the Latins called together when they considered breaking their alliance with Rome.
¹⁷³
The Romans sensed the ill humor that had arisen among the Latin people, and to evaluate the matter and see if they could be won back without Rome’s having to resort to arms, requested that they send eight citizens to Rome to consult with them.
¹⁷⁴
The Latins, aware that they had done many things against the will of the Romans, called together an assembly to decide who should go to Rome and what they should say. During the debate, Annius, their praetor, spoke these words: “I think it would be more vital to our interests if you were to give greater consideration to what we should do rather than what we should say. Once a decision has been reached it will be easy enough to accommodate our words to the situation.”
¹⁷⁵
This statement must be heeded by every prince and republic, because words cannot be accommodated to the ambiguity and uncertainty of what one might wish to do. But once a decision has been reached and what is to be done determined, it is easy enough to find words. I have noted Annius’s statement all the more willingly as I have often seen the harmful effect of such ambiguity on public actions, with damage and shame to our republic of Florence as the outcome. And it will always be the case that in doubtful decisions calling for courage, when it is weak men who gather to deliberate, there will be wavering.

Slow and ponderous deliberations are no less harmful than ambiguous ones, particularly those that need to be made to help an ally, because slowness helps no one and only hurts you. Such deliberations are the result of weakness of spirit and lack of strength, or the result of a malignity among those who are deliberating and who hamper and impede decisions out of their desire to ruin the state or fulfill some other aspiration. Good citizens, even when they see the public’s enthusiasm turning to a bad choice, will never impede deliberations, particularly not when time is pressing. Hieronymus, the tyrant of Syracuse, died while war was raging between the Carthaginians and the Romans, and the Syracusans debated whether they should form an alliance with Rome or with Carthage.
¹⁷⁶
The vehemence of the opposing factions was so great that the matter remained unsettled, and no resolution was reached until Apollonides, one of Syracuse’s foremost citizens, in a speech filled with prudence, pointed out that neither those who argued for holding to Rome nor those who argued for Carthage should be spurned. It was vital, he argued, to overcome the wavering and slowness at reaching a decision, because such ambiguity would lead to the ruin of the state. Once a decision was reached, regardless of what it might be, one could hope for some good. Livy could not have demonstrated more effectively in this passage the damage indecision brings with it.

He shows this again in the case of the Latins: After they had asked the Lavinians for help against the Romans, the Lavinians dragged out the deliberations for such a long time that when they were finally marching out the city gates to come to the Latins’ aid, they were greeted by the news that the Latins had been defeated. Milionius, their praetor, said: “These few steps we have marched will cost us much with the Roman people.”
¹⁷⁷
The Lavinians should have decided swiftly either to help or not to help the Latins. By not helping them, the Lavinians would not have angered the Romans, and by helping the Latins—had their help been in time—they might with their combined forces have defeated the Romans. Since the Lavinians wavered, they were bound to lose either way, as proved to be the case.

Had the Florentines heeded Livy’s text, they would not have had to face so much trouble from the French when King Louis XII marched on Italy against Duke Ludovico of Milan. As he prepared his campaign, Louis sought an alliance with the Florentines. The Florentine emissaries at his court agreed that Florence would remain neutral, and that should he march on Italy he would leave their government intact and take them under his protection. With everything agreed upon, he gave Florence a month to ratify this agreement. But the ratification was delayed by those who, through lack of prudence, favored Duke Ludovico’s cause, until Louis was on the brink of victory, at which point Louis turned down the ratification that the Florentines hastily offered him. He was aware that they were not pledging their friendship voluntarily but out of necessity. Florence now had to pay him a very large sum of money and its government almost fell, as on another occasion it did in fact fall for a similar reason.
¹⁷⁸
This wavering deliberation was all the more blameworthy because it was of no use to Duke Ludovico either, who, had he been victorious, would have shown a good deal more hostility toward the Florentines than did Louis XII. I have discussed the harm that comes to republics that have this weakness in a previous chapter,
¹⁷⁹
but I took the opportunity to do so again here with a new example, as it seems to me a most vital matter for all republics such as Florence to take note of.

173.
Rome had entered into an uneasy alliance with the Latin League, a confederation of Latin tribes living in the vicinity of Rome, in 493
BCE
. Tensions rose over the next century as Rome’s power grew and the power of the Latin League diminished.

174.
Livy writes in Book VIII, chapter 3: “Though the collapse of the Latin alliance was no longer in any doubt, the Romans, as if they cared for the Samnites and not for themselves, summoned ten Latin chiefs to Rome to inform them of their wishes.”

175.
Machiavelli quotes a slightly altered passage from Livy, Book VIII, chapter 4, in Latin:
Ad summam rerum nostrarum pertinere arbitror ut cogitetis magis quid agendum nobis quam quid lo-quendum sit. Facile erit, explicate consiliis, accommodare rebus verba
. (Machiavelli has added to Livy’s text the words
ut cogitetis magis
(“if you were to give greater consideration”).

176.
Machiavelli closely follows Livy’s text from Book XXIV, chapter 28.

177.
Machiavelli translates Milionius’s statement directly from Livy (Book VIII, chapter 11).

178.
Machiavelli is referring to the Battle of Ravenna in 1512.

179.
See Book I, chapter 38 above, titled “On How Weak States Are Indecisive and Cannot Reach Decisions, and How When They Do It Is Usually Because They Have Been Forced to, Not Because They Have Chosen to Do So.”