The essential writings of Machiavelli (13 page)

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR
O
F REASONS WHY
I
TALIAN PRINCES HAVE LOST THEIR STATES

If the strategies I have mentioned above are carefully followed, a new prince will seem like an old, established prince. He will be more stable and secure in his state than if he had developed within it, because the actions of a new prince are more closely observed than those of a hereditary prince. If these actions are seen to be skillful, they will sooner attract and bind men to the new prince than an old bloodline would, because men are more inspired by things of the present than things of the past. If men see good in the present, they are content and do not yearn for anything else. In effect, they will stand by this prince in every way, as long as he is not otherwise lacking. He will have twice the glory, having established a new principality and having strengthened it with good laws, arms, allies, and good examples, just as a prince who is born a prince will have twice the shame if he loses his principality through lack of prudence.

If one considers the rulers of our time in Italy who have lost their states—such as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and others—one can discern a common military weakness, as I have already discussed at length. One will also observe that some of these rulers had the populace against them, and that others had the populace on their side but did not know how to protect themselves against the nobles. States that are powerful enough to send an army into battle can be lost only through such defects.

Philip of Macedon (not Alexander the Great’s father, but the king who was defeated by Titus Quintus)
⁹²
did not have much power compared to the might of the Romans and Greeks who were attacking him. And yet, being a military man who knew how to inspire the populace and secure himself against his nobles, he managed to sustain a war against the Greeks and Romans for many years, and though he finally had to give up a few cities, he nevertheless kept his kingdom.

Therefore our Italian princes who were established in their principalities for many years and then lost them should blame their indolence and not Fortune. In times of peace they did not think that things might change (it is a common fault not to anticipate storms when the sea is calm), and with the advent of adversity our princes thought of escape, not defense. They hoped that the populace, angered by the victors’ offensive ways, would call them back. Such a strategy might be good when others are lacking, but it is a mistake to prefer this remedy over others, because you should never let yourself fall in the hope that someone will be there to help you up. Either you will not be helped up, or, if you are, your continuing safety will be in question, because your defense was not sparked by you but by your cowardice, and defenses are secure and lasting only if they are sparked by your skill.

92.
Philip V of Macedon (d. 179
BCE
).

CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE
O
N THE EXTENT TO WHICH
F
ORTUNE WIELDS POWER IN THE AFFAIRS OF MEN, AND ON HOW THIS IS TO BE RESISTED

I am not unaware that many believe that the things of this world are governed to such an extent by Fortune and God that men, with all their foresight, cannot change them; that in fact there is no improving them. Those who believe this deem that they need not toil and sweat, but can let themselves be governed by Fortune. This opinion has been more prevalent in our time because of the great upheavals that we have witnessed and witness every day, and which are beyond anything we could have foreseen, and there have been times when even I have to some extent inclined to this opinion. Nevertheless, Fortune seems to be the arbiter of half our actions, but she does leave us the other half, or almost the other half, in order that our free will may prevail. I would compare Fortune to one of those violent torrents that flood the plains, destroying trees and buildings, hurling earth from one place to another. Everyone flees this torrent, everyone yields to its force without being able to stand up to it. As this is the torrent’s nature, man should not neglect to prepare himself with dikes and dams in times of calm, so that when the torrent rises it will gush into a channel, its force neither so harmful nor so unbridled. The same is true with Fortune, who unleashes her force in places where man has not taken skillful precautions to resist her, and so channels her force to where she knows there are no dikes or dams to hold her back. If you consider Italy, which has been the scene of so many changes and has set so many changes in motion, you will find that it is a field without dikes or dams. Had Italy been protected with the appropriate skill, as Germany, Spain, and France were, this flood either would not have caused the great changes it did or would not have come at all.

So much for opposing Fortune in general terms. To limit myself more to particulars, I would like to remark that one can see a prince prospering one day and coming to ruin the next without having changed his nature or conduct in any way. I believe this is due, first and foremost, to the causes that I have already discussed at some length, namely, that the prince who relies entirely on Fortune will fall when Fortune changes. In my view, he who conforms his course of action to the quality of the times will fare well, and conversely he whose course of action clashes with the times will fare badly. One sees that men will proceed in different ways as they strive toward the common goal of wealth and glory: Some will proceed cautiously, others recklessly; some with force, others with guile; some with patience, others rashly. And in each of these ways one can prevail. If we take two cautious men, one might attain his goal and the other not; similarly, two men might succeed through entirely different courses of action, one through caution, the other through recklessness. The reason for this is the nature of the times that either conforms to or conflicts with their courses of action. Hence two men operating differently can obtain the same result, while when two men operate in the same way, one might achieve his goal, the other not. This also depends on the turning of Fortune’s wheel from good to bad, because if a man acts with caution and patience and the wheel turns in a way that favors his course of action, he will flourish; but should the wheel turn again, he will be ruined if he does not change his manner of proceeding. One cannot find a man prudent enough to be capable of adapting to these changes, because man cannot deviate from that to which nature inclines him. Moreover, if he has always prospered by walking down a certain path, it will be difficult to persuade him to leave it. Consequently, when the time comes for a cautious man to act impetuously, he will not be able to do so, and will come to ruin. Even if he could adapt his nature to the times and circumstances, his Fortune would not change.

Pope Julius II acted impetuously in everything he undertook, and he found both the times and the circumstances in such agreement with this course of action that he always succeeded. Consider the first campaign that he launched against Bologna in the days when Giovanni Bentivoglio was still alive.
⁹³
The Venetians were not pleased, nor was the King of Spain, and as for France, Julius was still in the midst of negotiations with them over this campaign. And yet Julius, wild and impetuous as he was, set out right away, heading the campaign himself. This move stopped the Venetians and Spaniards in their tracks: the former out of fear, the latter because of their desire to regain the entire Kingdom of Naples, while the King of France found himself drawn in despite himself. Seeing that Julius had already made his move, and wanting to ally himself with Julius in order to weaken the Venetians, the French king judged it impossible to refuse him troops without openly offending him. Hence, by his impetuous move, Julius achieved what no other pontiff could have achieved with all the prudence in the world. Had he waited for all the negotiations to be completed and everything arranged before setting out from Rome, as any other pontiff would have done, he would never have succeeded, because by then the King of France would have discovered a thousand excuses and the others a thousand doubts. I will not touch on Pope Julius’s other actions, which have all been of the same kind and have all been successful. Moreover, the shortness of his life did not allow him to experience reverses, because if times had changed so as to compel him to act with caution, he would have come to ruin, for he could never have deviated from the way nature inclined him.

Therefore, I conclude that when Fortune changes and men rigidly continue in their ways, they will flourish so long as Fortune and their ways are in accord, but they will come to ruin the moment these are in discord. In my view, however, it is better to be impetuous than cautious, because Fortune is a woman, and if you wish to dominate her you must beat and batter her. It is clear that she will let herself be won by men who are impetuous rather than by those who step cautiously. Therefore, like a woman, she is more partial to young men, because they are less cautious, wilder, and command her with greater audacity.

93.
Giovanni Bentivoglio (1443–1508) had been Gonfalonier of Bologna until Pope Paolo II made him chief senator for life in 1466. He was expelled from Bologna in 1506 by Pope Julius II.

CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX
A
N EXHORTATION TO FREE
I
TALY FROM THE BARBARIANS

I have given much thought to all the matters I have discussed until now, and have asked myself whether the time is ripe for Italy to greet a new prince, to offer to a prudent and skillful man the prospect of forging a government that would bring him honor and benefit all Italy. So many things have come together that are favorable to a new prince that I believe there has never been a more auspicious time. As I have already said, the people of Israel had to be slaves in Egypt so that the qualities of Moses would come to the fore, and for the Medes to oppress the Persians for the greatness of Cyrus to become apparent, and for the Athenians to be dispersed so that Theseus could demonstrate his skill. In the same way, that we may see the prowess of an Italian prince, it has been necessary for Italy to be reduced to the state it is in at present: more enslaved than the Jews, more in bondage than the Persians, more dispersed than the Athenians, without a leader, without order, beaten, plundered, flayed, overrun, exposed to all manner of adversity.

We have had occasional glimmers of hope that led us to believe that a certain man might have been ordained by God to bring redemption to Italy, but then we saw him rejected by Fortune at the pinnacle of his success.
⁹⁴
And so Italy has lain prostrate, waiting for a savior who would heal her wounds and put an end to the plundering of Lombardy and the taxation of Naples and Tuscany a savior who would cure her sores that have been festering for so long. How she prays to God to send someone to save her from the barbaric cruelty and violence! How ardent and eager she is to follow a banner, if only there were someone who would raise it high. Italy has one hope, and that hope is Your illustrious House with its Fortune and prowess, a House of which You are now the prince favored by God and Church!
⁹⁵
Saving Italy would not be an insurmountable task if You kept before Your eyes the examples of Moses, Cyrus, and Theseus. Though they were extraordinary men, they were mere mortals, and they had less favorable prospects than those that Italy offers. Their campaigns were not more righteous, nor was their lot easier, nor did God look upon them with more benevolence than He looks upon You. There is great justice in our enterprise: “The only war that is just is one that is compulsory, and weapons righteous when there is no hope but in weapons.”
⁹⁶
[Iustum enim est bellum quibus necessarium, et pia arma ubi nulla nisi in armis spes est]
Circumstances are most favorable, and there cannot be great difficulty where circumstances are so favorable, as long as the House of Medici follows the models I have put forward. And we have seen extraordinary and unprecedented signs from God: the sea parting, a cloud showing the way, water pouring from a stone, manna raining from heaven. Everything has concurred for Your greatness. You must do the rest, for God does not want to do everything, lest he take from us our free will and that part of the glory that belongs to us.

One need not marvel that none of the Italians I have mentioned has been able to achieve what one hopes Your illustrious House will achieve. If it seems that our military prowess has been exhausted in so many upheavals and so many campaigns of war here in Italy, this is because Italy’s old military institutions were not good and because there was nobody who was able to foster new ones. Nothing brings so much honor to a man who emerges as a new prince as the new laws and new institutions he creates, and when these have a sound foundation and greatness, they bring him esteem and admiration. Here in Italy there is ample matter that one can form: There is great spirit in the populace, even if it has been lacking in the leaders. Consider our duels and skirmishes, and you will see how the Italian is superior in strength, skill, and ingenuity. But when it comes to armies, the Italians have not shown themselves in the best light. All this goes back to the weakness of our commanders, because the finest among them are not followed, as every commander wants to go his own way. Until now there has been no one who has distinguished himself enough in skill or Fortune for the others to cede to him. The result has been that in the wars fought over the past twenty years, all the armies made up entirely of Italians have fared badly: the battles at Taro, Alexandria, Capua, Genoa, Vailà, Bologna, and Mestri all bear witness to this.

If Your illustrious House wishes to follow the excellent Moses, Cyrus, and Theseus who redeemed their lands, it will be vital above all else, as a true foundation of every campaign, to furnish yourself with an army of your own men. You will not find soldiers who are better, more faithful, or more true. Every man among them will be good, and all together they will become even better once they are commanded by their own prince and are honored and treated well by him. It is necessary, therefore, to create such an army, so one can defend oneself with Italian prowess from a foreign enemy. Even though the Swiss and the Spanish infantries are considered formidable, they both have shortcomings, which is why an army that is structured differently could not only match them on the field but be confident of defeating them. This is because the Spanish cannot stand up to a cavalry, and the Swiss to an infantry that is as fierce in battle as they are. Experience has shown and will show again that the Spaniards cannot stand up to the French cavalry, and the Swiss cannot stand up to a Spanish infantry, and though there is no actual proof of the latter, some evidence of it was seen in the Battle of Ravenna, when the Spanish infantry came face to face with the German battalions, which are set up along the same lines as the Swiss. In this battle, the Spaniards with their agility and their bucklers had cut through the German pikes and were primed to destroy the Germans, who were caught completely unawares. Had the cavalry not come to their rescue, the Germans would all have been killed. Hence, if one knows the weakness in the Spanish and Swiss infantries, one should create a new infantry that can resist the cavalry and not be intimidated by other infantries. This will be made possible by the type of arms furnished to the new infantry and a change in its disposition. It is these things which, newly organized, will bring prestige and greatness to a new prince.

This opportunity must be grasped. Italy, after so many years, must welcome its liberator. The love with which these lands that have suffered a flood of foreign armies will receive him will be boundless, as will be their thirst for vengeance, their iron loyalty, their devotion and tears. All doors will be flung open. What populace would not embrace such a leader? What envy would oppose him, what Italian withhold respect? For all here abhor the barbarian dominion. Your illustrious House must seize this matter with the kind of spirit and hope in which righteous tasks are seized, so that Italy shall be ennobled beneath its banners and under its auspices the words of Petrarch will come true:

Prowess shall take up arms
Against brutality, and the battle will be swift;
For ancient Roman bravery
Is not yet dead in Italian hearts.
⁹⁷

94.
Almost certainly a reference to Cesare Borgia.

95.
The House of Medici.

96.
A slightly altered quotation from Livy, Book IX, chapter 1:
Iustum est bellum, Samnites, quibus necessarium, et pia arma, quibus nulla nisi in armis relinquitur spes
. [A war is just, Samnites, when it is compulsory, and weapons righteous when there is no hope except in weapons.]

97.
Virtù contro a furore/Prenderà l’arme, e fia el combatter corto;/Ché l’antico valore/Nell’italici cor non è ancor morto
.