The essential writings of Machiavelli (27 page)

CHAPTER FIFTY-EIGHT
O
N HOW THE POPULACE IS WISER AND MORE CONSTANT THAN THE PRINCE

Nothing is more erratic and unstable than the populace, Livy and all the historians maintain, because often in the historians’ narrations one sees the multitude condemning a man to death and afterward fervently wishing him back. This was the case with the Roman populace, which condemned Manlius Capitolinus to death and then lamented him. In Livy’s words: “Soon enough, after he no longer presented a threat, the populace began to long for him.”
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And elsewhere, when Livy describes the incidents in Syracuse after the death of Hieronymus, Hiero’s grandson, he says: “That is the nature of the multitude: It will either serve humbly or dominate arrogantly”
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I do not know if in upholding an idea which, as I have said, is contrary to the opinion of so many historians, I will be entering a terrain that is so difficult that I shall either have to abandon it with shame or follow it and draw censure upon myself. And yet I do not judge it wrong, nor have I ever done so, to defend an opinion with reasoning, and not with power or force.

I propose that all men—and princes more than anyone else—can be accused of the defect of which historians accuse the populace. In fact, any ruler who is not held in check by laws is apt to make the same errors as an unruly multitude. This is quite evident, because there are and have been many princes, and yet only a few of them good and wise. I am referring here to princes who have managed to break the constraints that might have held them in check. The kings of Egypt, when that land was governed by law in ancient times, were an exception, as were the kings of Sparta and also today’s kings of France, a kingdom better controlled by its laws than any other that we know of in our era. The kings who exist under such constitutions need not be grouped together with those whose natures must be considered separately to see if each is unchecked like the populace. To do so one would have to compare these kings to a populace that is equally kept in check by the laws. And one will find in these kings too the same goodness one sees in the populace, as the populace neither arrogantly dominate nor humbly serve. This was the case with the Roman populace, which, while the republic remained uncorrupted, never served humbly nor dominated arrogantly. In fact, the Roman populace, with their own institutions and magistrates, bore their ranks with honor, and when it became necessary to rise up against a powerful man, the populace did so, as in the cases of Manlius, the Decemvirs, and others who strove to oppress them. And when, for the safety of the public, it was necessary to obey a dictator or the consuls, the Roman populace did so. It is not surprising if the populace lamented Manlius Capitolinus after they had condemned him to death, because they longed for his valor, which was such that the memory of it evoked sympathy in all. Manlius’s valor would have had the same effect on a prince, because it is the verdict of all historians that valor is praised and admired even in one’s enemies. And yet if Manlius could have been resurrected by all that fervent longing, the Roman populace would have passed the same sentence on him as they did when they dragged him from prison and condemned him to death. Nevertheless, we also see princes who were considered wise and still put a man to death and then lamented him, as Alexander the Great had done with Cleitus and other friends, or as Herod had done with Mariamne.
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But Livy in talking about the nature of the populace, is not talking about a populace restrained by laws, as in Rome, but about a populace not held in check, as was that of Syracuse, where the populace made all the errors usually made by infuriated men not restrained by laws, as was the case with Alexander the Great and Herod. Yet the nature of the populace should not be blamed more than the nature of princes, because both tend to err equally when they can err without fear. There are enough examples of this besides the ones I have just cited, both among the Roman emperors and among other tyrants and princes, who behaved more inconsistently and erratically than any populace ever has.

I therefore disagree with the common opinion that a populace in power is unstable, changeable, and ungrateful, and maintain that a populace can be as guilty of this as an individual prince. If one were to accuse both populace and prince of these shortcomings, one would probably be right. But it would be deceiving oneself to accuse the populace and not the prince: because a well-regulated populace that is in power will be stable, prudent, and grateful, just like a prince, or even better than a prince, even if that prince is considered particularly wise. The prince, on the other hand, unchecked by laws, will be more ungrateful, unstable, and imprudent than a populace. The instability of his conduct does not arise from his having a different nature, because all men have the same nature. If there is a greater amount of good, it lies with the populace, because the populace will more or less keep to the laws by which it lives. If we consider the Roman populace, we will see that for four hundred years the people were hostile to the very name of king and championed the glory of the city’s common good, and there are a great number of examples that testify to this. If someone were to point out the ingratitude of the Roman populace toward Scipio, I would respond with the same argument I have already made at length concerning this matter, where the people showed themselves less ungrateful than the princes.
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But in matters of prudence and stability, I propose that a populace is more prudent, more stable, and has better judgment than a prince. It is not without reason that the voice of the people has been compared to the voice of God. One sees public opinion making surprising prognostications, so that it seems that the populace, as if by some hidden skill, can foresee their good and bad fortune. As for judging things, it is rare that a populace hearing two orators of equal skill arguing for opposing sides will not understand the truth it is hearing and choose the better side. And if the people err in matters of action that are bold or appear to be useful, as I have already discussed, a prince will often be misled by his own passions, which are more numerous than those of the populace.

We also see that in the appointment of magistrates the populace will make far better choices than a prince, nor can one ever persuade a populace that it is good to elect a wicked man with corrupt ways to public office. This is something a prince can easily be persuaded to do in a thousand ways. We also see that when a populace begin to detest something, they can do so for many centuries. This does not happen with princes. In both these matters I would like the Roman populace to suffice as example: In so many elections of consuls and tribunes over the centuries, they did not make four choices that they had cause to repent. And the populace had, as I have said, so much hatred for the name of king that no citizen, however meritorious, who aspired to that name could avoid the deserved punishment. We also see that states ruled by the populace are able to expand their territories quite remarkably in the shortest period, much more so than states that have always been under a prince. Rome proved to be such a state after the expulsion of its king, as was Athens after it freed itself from Pisistratus. This can mean only that a government of the populace is better than that of a prince. Nor do I want all that Livy says in the passage I have cited, or in any other, to be set against my argument, because if we compare all the disorder caused by the populace with all the disorder caused by princes, and all the glories of the populace with all those of princes, we will see that the populace is far superior in goodness and glory. And if princes are superior to the populace in establishing laws, creating civic orders, and organizing statutes and new institutions, the populace has been so much superior in maintaining institutions in an orderly way, that without doubt they add to the glory of those who established them.

Finally, in conclusion, I propose that the states of princes have endured for a long time, as have republics, and that both the one and the other have had to be regulated by laws: A prince who can do as he pleases will prove himself mad, just as a populace who can do as they please will prove themselves unwise. Therefore, if one looks at a prince and a populace who are bound by laws, one will see that there is more skill in the populace than in the prince. If one looks at a prince and a populace who are not bound by laws, one will see fewer mistakes in the populace than in the prince, and these will be less serious and easier to resolve. A good man can speak to an unruly and riotous multitude and easily set it on the right path, but there is no one who can speak to an evil prince, nor is there any other remedy than the blade of a knife. From which one can assess the gravity of the populace’s or the prince’s disorder: To cure that of the populace one needs only words, while to cure that of the prince requires a blade—and here one can only conclude that where one needs a more incisive cure, there are greater ills.

When the people are completely unchecked by laws, their foolish acts are not feared, nor is one afraid of any present evil, but rather of the evil that might arise, since so much confusion can bring forth a tyrant. But with evil princes the opposite happens: One fears the present evil and has hope for the future, since men persuade themselves that the prince’s evil life can give rise to liberty. Hence you can see the difference between the one and the other as a difference between the things that are and the things that will be. The cruelty of the populace is directed against those who the populace fears will seize public property, while the cruelty of the prince is directed against those he fears will take his property. But the bad opinion one has of the populace arises because, even while it is in power, everyone will speak badly about it quite openly, without fear of reprisal, while of princes one always speaks with a thousand fears and a thousand cautions.

144.
Machiavelli is quoting Livy (Book VI, chapter 20) in Latin:
Populum brevi, posteaquam ab eo periculum nullum erat, desiderium eius tenuit
.

145.
Machiavelli is quoting Livy (Book XXIV, chapter 25) in Latin:
Haec natura multitudinis est: aut humiliter servit, aut superbe dominatur.

146.
In a drunken fit, Alexander the Great killed Cleitus, one of his foremost commanders, after which he was inconsolable. King Herod had his wife Mariamne put to death in a fit of jealousy.

147.
See chapter 29 above, titled “On Who Is More Ungrateful, a Populace or a Prince,” and also chapter 30.

BOOK II
P
REFACE

Men praise the old times and find fault with the present, though not always with justification. They so admire things of the past that they esteem not only what they have come to know through accounts that historians have left us, but also the times that they as old men remember from their youth. When their opinion is flawed—as it is more often than not—I feel certain that this happens for a number of reasons. The first reason, in my view, is that no one knows the whole truth about the past, since in most cases incidents that would have brought disgrace upon earlier times have been concealed, while glorious incidents are rendered fully and are described as having been quite magnificent. This is because most historians bow to the fortunes of conquerors, and in order to make their victories glorious they aggrandize not only what the conquerors have skillfully achieved but also the exploits of the enemy, so that anyone born later, either in the land that was victorious or the land that was defeated, has reason to marvel at those men and those times and is compelled to admire and praise them.

Furthermore, men hate either from fear or from envy. Consequently, two most compelling reasons for hating things of the past are eliminated: Things of the past cannot harm you, nor is there any cause to envy them. Yet the opposite is true of things you can see, or in which you are involved. As these things are not in any way hidden from you, you can understand them fully and can discern precisely what you like as well as many things you dislike. As a result, you judge these things inferior to those of the past, even if in fact the things of the present deserve far more fame and glory. I do not mean matters concerning the arts, which are so brilliantly clear that time cannot diminish their glory or give them more glory than they deserve, but matters connected to life and customs, in which one cannot see such clear testimony.

I would like to point out, however, that though men tend to praise the past and find fault with the present, they are not always wrong to do so. Sometimes it is necessary for us to arrive at such a judgment, as human affairs are always in motion and will consequently either rise or fall. We see a city or country founded with a vital political order by an excellent man, and see it continue to develop toward the better, for a time, through the skill of its founder. Anyone who is born in such a land and praises ancient more than modern times is deceiving himself, which is caused by the issues that I pointed out above. But men born later in that city or country, during the period of its decline, do not deceive themselves.

As I contemplate how these things develop, I judge the world as having always been in the same condition: that there has always been as much good as evil, with the good and evil varying from country to country. We can see this from what we know of ancient kingdoms that differed from one another because of the variety of their customs, while the world remained the same. The only thing different in those times was that the world initially channeled all its resourcefulness first into Assyria, then into the land of the Medes, and then Persia, until it reached Italy and Rome. After imperial Rome, no empire has lasted, nor has there been a single place where the world has channeled all its resourcefulness, and yet this resourcefulness can be seen scattered among many nations where men lived worthily. This was true of the kingdom of the Franks, the Turks, the Mamluk sultans of Egypt, and today the peoples of Germany, and before them in the Saracen sect that accomplished such great feats and occupied so much of the world that it destroyed the Eastern Roman Empire.
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Thus, after the Romans came to ruin, this resourcefulness continued in all these countries and sects, and still exists in some of them, where it is cherished and much prized. Whoever is born in these lands and praises the past more than the present may be deceiving himself. But whoever is born in Italy or Greece and has not joined the foreign invaders (if he is Italian) or turned Turk (if he is Greek) has reason to blame his own times and praise the past. The past could boast of much that was admirable, while the present has nothing that can raise it out of the greatest misery, infamy, and shame, with no observance of religion, laws, or military traditions, and stained by every kind of filth. These vices are all the more detestable when they are found in men who sit as judges, command others, and strive to be honored.

But to return to our argument: If the judgment of men is distorted in assessing whether the present or the past is superior, it is because men cannot know the past as well as they know the present, owing to the passage of time. Old men, too, should not let their judgment be distorted when they compare the days of their youth with those of their old age, even though they have in fact seen and experienced both. Such a comparison would be sound if a man’s judgment and desires were the same throughout his life, but as these vary, even if the times do not, the times cannot appear the same to a man when in old age he has different desires, pleasures, and considerations than he did in his youth. As men grow old, they lose strength but gain in judgment and prudence, so it is unavoidable that what appeared bearable and good when they were young later becomes unbearable and bad. In this they ought to blame their judgment, but instead they blame the times. Furthermore, human appetites are insatiable because nature gives us the ability and the will to desire everything, while Fortune gives us the ability to acquire only little. The result is continuous discontent in the minds of men, and dissatisfaction with the things that they possess. This leads them to blame the present, praise the past, and long for the future, even though they have no reasonable grounds for doing so.

Consequently, if in these
Discourses
I praise the times of ancient Rome too highly and find fault with our times, I do not know whether I deserve to be numbered among those who deceive themselves. Without doubt, if the worthiness that held sway then and the vice that holds sway now were not clearer than the sun, I would speak more cautiously for fear of being duped in the same way as those I have just blamed. But as the matter is so clear to whoever considers it, I shall be bold and say openly what I understand of past and present times, so that the minds of the young who will read my work can avoid the mistakes of our times and be prepared to imitate ancient times whenever Fortune gives them the opportunity. For it is the duty of a good man to teach others the goodness that, because of Fortune and the malignity of the times, he himself has not been able to achieve; among the many who are capable of good actions, those more favored by heaven might be able to accomplish them. In the previous book I spoke of the Romans’ decisions concerning the internal affairs of their city; in this book I shall speak of the decisions that the people of Rome made concerning the expansion of their empire.

148.
Saracen sect: the Muslim Ottoman Turks who invaded and ultimately destroyed the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire.