The essential writings of Machiavelli (32 page)

202.
Cato the Censor (234–149
BCE
). Marcus Porcius Cato (95–46
BCE
), Cato the Younger, was the great-grandson of Cato the Censor. He was one of the foremost statesmen fighting to preserve the Roman Republic.

203.
In the early thirteenth century, Saint Francis of Assisi founded the Franciscan Order, and Saint Dominic the Dominican Order.

204.
See note 77 on page 73.

CHAPTER TWO
O
N HOW WISE IT IS AT TIMES TO FEIGN FOOLISHNESS

No man was ever so prudent or thought so wise for an exceptional action as Junius Brutus deserves to be for pretending to be a fool. Livy mentions only one reason that induced Junius Brutus to feign idiocy: to live more securely and maintain his patrimony
²⁰⁵
Yet if one considers the progression of his actions, one might conclude that Junius Brutus did this in order to be less conspicuous and have a better prospect of toppling the king and freeing Rome when the opportunity arose. That this was on his mind becomes apparent from Junius Brutus’s interpretation of the oracle of Apollo, when he pretended to fall down so that he could kiss the earth, believing that by doing this the gods would favor his designs.
²⁰⁶
Later Junius stood over the dead Lucretia in the presence of her father, her husband, and other of her relatives, and was the first to pull the knife from her wound, making those present swear that they would never consent to any king’s reigning over Rome again.
²⁰⁷

Those who are dissatisfied with a prince can learn from Junius’s example. But they must first measure and weigh their own strength, and if they are powerful enough to reveal themselves to their enemy and wage open war, they must follow his course as the least dangerous and most honorable. But if they do not have sufficient power to wage open war they must do their utmost to make their enemy their friend, doing whatever they judge necessary, finding pleasure in everything in which the prince finds pleasure, and taking delight in all the things that they see delight him. Such intimacy will, first of all, enable one to live in security. Without running any danger you can enjoy the prince’s good fortune at his side, and furthermore you will have every opportunity to achieve your ends. It is true some will say that you should not stand so close to a prince that his ruin will drag you down with him, nor at such a distance that you will be unable to capitalize on his ruin. Of course the middle course would be best—that is, if a middle course were possible—but as I believe it to be impossible, I suggest following one of the two methods I have just mentioned, either distancing oneself from the prince or drawing closer to him. He who does otherwise, even if he is a man of notable qualities, will live in constant danger. Nor is it enough for him to proclaim: “I want no honors, no gains, I want to live quietly and without care!” Such excuses are heard, but not believed. Nor can a man of standing choose to step back in such a manner. Even if he is sincere in wishing to live without ambition, nobody would believe him. Consequently, even if he does wish to live in that manner, others will not allow it. It is therefore advisable to play the fool as Junius Brutus did, and one can look quite the fool when one praises, discusses, and does things contrary to one’s nature and way of thinking just to please a prince. As I have spoken of Junius’s wisdom in how he recovered liberty for Rome, I shall now speak of his severity in maintaining it.

205.
Livy writes (Book I, chapter 56): “Lucius Junius Brutus, the son of Tarquinia, the king’s sister, was a young man very different in intelligence from the dullard he pretended to be. For since his uncle had killed the leading men of the state, including his own brother, he decided to leave nothing in his person for the king to fear or in his possessions for him to covet. Safety lay in being an object of scorn.”

206.
According to Livy, King Tarquin had sent his sons Titus and Aruns to consult the oracle at Delphi to interpret a dire omen. Junius Brutus had accompanied them “as a figure of fun.” The king’s sons also asked the oracle who would be the next king of Rome, to which the oracle replied that he who kissed his mother first would be king. Livy writes (Book I, chapter 56): “But Brutus thought the Pythia’s words meant something quite different. Pretending to slip, he fell to the ground and pressed his lips to the earth, the mother of us all.”

207.
Sextus Tarquinius, the king’s son, raped Lucretia, who subsequently called together the men of her family, and, informing them of what had happened, killed herself. Livy describes the scene in Book I, chapter 59.

CHAPTER THREE
O
N HOW, IF ONE WANTS TO MAINTAIN A NEWLY GAINED LIBERTY, ONE MUST KILL THE SONS OF
B
RUTUS

Junius Brutus’s severity was as necessary as it was expedient in maintaining the liberty he had just gained for Rome. His example is most rare in recorded history: a father sitting in judgment over his sons, and not only condemning them to death but also being present at their execution.
²⁰⁸
Those who read about ancient matters will always see that after a state has changed from a republic to a tyranny or from a tyranny to a republic, a memorable action is needed against the enemies of the new state. The ruler who chooses a tyranny and does not kill Brutus, or who chooses a republic and does not kill the sons of Brutus, will not hold power for long. As I have already discussed this at length I will say no more on the subject, except to offer one memorable example from our times and our city of Florence. Piero Soderini believed wrongly that with goodness and patience he could overcome the appetite of the sons of Brutus for returning to power under a new government.
²⁰⁹
Soderini was wise enough to be aware of the need to act, and furthermore Fortune and the ambition of his enemies gave him every opportunity to eliminate them. Yet he never took action, because he believed he could extinguish such evil humors with goodness and patience and by bestowing gifts and rewards on some of his enemies, thus eliminating a part of their enmity. Furthermore, Soderini felt—as he often confided to his friends—that if he had chosen to counter his opponents with open force and had crushed them, he would have had to assume illegal power and sweep aside the laws of equal rights among citizens. Even if Soderini had subsequently not made use of his power tyrannically, his actions would have dismayed the people of Florence to such an extent that after he died they would never again have wanted to elect a Gonfalonier for life, an office that Soderini wanted to build up and perpetuate. In this sense, Soderini’s aspirations were wise and good. And yet one must never let evil progress for the sake of something good when that good can easily be usurped by the evil. While Fortune and life were his, Soderini should have believed that his works would be judged by their result, and it would have been an easy thing for him to persuade everyone that what he had done was for the good of Florence and not for his own advancement. He could have arranged things in such a way that his successor would not have been able to do for the sake of evil what Soderini had done for the sake of good. But he was deceived in his idea of being able to rely on goodness and patience to extinguish the evil humors in his state, not realizing that evil cannot be tamed by time, nor placated by any gift. Consequently, unable to be like Junius Brutus, he lost his state, his rule, and his standing. That it is as difficult to save a free state as to save a kingdom I shall demonstrate in the following chapter.

208.
See Book I, chapter 16 above. Livy (Book II, chapter 5): “The traitors were condemned to death, and what was extraordinary was that the consuls imposed on a father the duty of punishing his own children. The father who should not even have been present at the execution, was made by Fortuna to carry it out.”

209.
In 1502 Piero Soderini had been elected Gonfalonier for life in Florence. Soderini was Machiavelli’s patron. By “the sons of Brutus” Machiavelli means the Medici, who were the former and subsequent rulers of Florence, as Soderini was deposed by them in 1512.

CHAPTER FOUR
O
N HOW A PRINCE CANNOT LIVE SECURELY IN HIS PRINCIPALITY WHILE THOSE WHO WERE DEPRIVED OF IT ARE STILL ALIVE

The death of Tarquinius Priscus, which was brought about by the sons of King Ancus, and the death of Servius Tullius, brought about by Tarquinius Superbus, show how dangerous it is to strip a man of his kingdom and then leave him alive, even if you try to win him over with favors.
²¹⁰
It is clear that Tarquinius Priscus was deceived in believing that, as the kingdom had been given him by the people and confirmed by the Senate, he had gained possession of it lawfully, nor did he believe that the sons of King Ancus would be so resentful that they would not be pleased with what pleased all of Rome. Servius Tullius too was deceived in believing that he could win over the sons of King Tarquinius with favors.
²¹¹
Consequently, in the first case, every prince should be warned that he will never live secure in his principality while those who were stripped of it are still alive. As for the second case, any man of power should be reminded that old injuries cannot be redressed by new benefits,
²¹²
even less so when the new benefits are not as great as the injury had been. Without doubt, Servius Tullius showed little foresight in thinking that the son of King Tarquinius would be content to remain the son-in-law of Servius Tullius, whose king he believed he should have been.

The hunger to rule is so great that it enters the hearts not only of those who might have a claim to rule but also of those who do not, as in the case of Tarquinius Superbus’s wife, who was the daughter of King Servius Tullius. Driven by the passion to rule she forgot all filial piety and drove her husband to take from her father his life and his kingdom: So much more did she value being queen than being the daughter of a king. If, therefore, Tarquinius Priscus and Servius Tullius lost their kingdom by not thinking to secure themselves against those from whom they had usurped it, Tarquinius Superbus lost it by not observing the practices of the former kings.

210.
According to Roman lore, Tarquinius Priscus, the legendary fifth king of Rome, had been the guardian of the sons of King Ancus, the fourth king of Rome, but had assumed the throne after the king died. King Ancus’s sons subsequently had him murdered. The legendary sixth king of Rome, Servius Tullius, was said to have been born a slave in the household of King Tarquinius Priscus. He usurped the throne, but was subsequently murdered by Tarquinius Superbus, the seventh and last king of Rome.

211.
According to Livy (Book I, chapter 46), King Servius Tullius had given his daughters in marriage to Tarquinius Superbus and his brother.

212.
The idea is also echoed in
The Prince
, chapter 7: “For whoever believes that great advancement and new benefits make men forget old injuries is mistaken.”

CHAPTER SIX
O
N CONSPIRACIES

I do not think it appropriate to pass over discussing conspiracies, since they are as dangerous to princes as they are to private citizens who conspire against princes. We see many more princes losing their lives and principalities through conspiracy than through open warfare, because few citizens have the means of waging open war against a prince, while everyone has the means of conspiring. And yet a private citizen can embark on no more rash and dangerous a venture than a conspiracy, because there are difficulties and perils at every stage. As a result, many attempt to conspire, but few attain their desired goal. I shall speak on this matter at some length, not omitting any notable documented conspiracy, so that princes will learn to guard themselves, while private citizens who are resolved to conspire will do so with more caution and perhaps even learn to live content under the princely authority that fate has allotted them. Tacitus’s axiom is golden, that men must honor things of the past and abide by those of the present, and though they might desire good princes they must tolerate those they have regardless of their qualities.
²¹³
Without doubt, whoever does not follow this axiom will risk bringing himself and his state to ruin.

In embarking on this subject we must first consider against whom conspiracies are directed. We will find that they are directed against either one’s state or one’s prince. It is these two I wish to discuss, because in a previous chapter I have already discussed at length conspiracies that seek to hand a state over to an enemy who is besieging it.
²¹⁴
Consequently, in the first part of this chapter I would like to consider conspiracies against a prince, and would like first to examine the many reasons for such conspiracies, of which one, the populace’s hatred of the prince, is far more important than the rest.
²¹⁵
When a prince has inspired widespread dislike in the masses, it is reasonable to assume that there will be some individuals who are more harmed by him than others and who want to avenge themselves. Their desire for vengeance is fanned by the populace’s anger, which the conspirators see all around them. A prince, therefore, must avoid the hatred of the populace, though I will not talk about how he ought to go about doing this, as I have done so elsewhere.
²¹⁶
I will, however, say that if a prince resorts to simple, individual offenses instead of angering the public as a whole, he will encounter less hostility: first, because one rarely finds men who consider the harm done them so grave that they will put themselves in great danger in order to seek vengeance, and second, even if they have the courage and power to do so, they are held back if the prince has inspired the affection of the people.

The injury princes do to citizens is usually against their property, their honor, or their life.
²¹⁷
In the case of injury against life, threats are more dangerous than executions. In fact, threats are extremely dangerous, while executions are not at all: He who is dead cannot think about revenge, while he who remains alive will usually leave such thoughts to the dead. But a man who is threatened by a prince and sees himself compelled either to act or suffer becomes very dangerous for the prince, as I shall discuss in its proper place. After an attack on a man’s life, an attack on his property and honor are the two things that will offend him most. A prince should refrain from these kinds of attack, because he can never strip a man of so much that he will have no knife left for revenge, nor can he dishonor a man to such an extent that he will not have enough spirit left to seek vengeance. When it comes to a man’s assaulted honor, that regarding his womenfolk is foremost in importance, after which public insult takes second place. This was what drove Pausanias to conspire against Philip of Macedon,
²¹⁸
and many others against many princes. In our times, Giulio Bellanti was driven to conspire against Pandolfo, the tyrant of Siena, only after Pandolfo
²¹⁹
had given him one of his daughters as a wife and then taken her away again, as I shall discuss later in this chapter. The main reason the Pazzi conspired against the Medici was the inheritance of Giovanni Borromei, which they had ordered seized.
²²⁰

Another major motive that will lead a citizen to conspire against a prince is the desire to free his state that has been seized by the prince. This motive moved Brutus and Cassius to conspire against Caesar,
²²¹
and has moved many others to conspire against princes such as Phalaris, Dionysius, and others who occupied states.
²²²
Nor, unless he abandons the tyranny, can any tyrant protect himself against such hatred. But as one never finds a tyrant who is prepared to give up his tyranny, one rarely finds a tyrant who comes to a good end. As Juvenal says:

How few of all the boastful men that reign
Descend in peace to Pluto’s dark domain!
²²³

As I have already mentioned, the dangers that conspirators face are great and must be borne at every stage of the conspiracy. A conspirator faces risks while preparing the conspiracy, while carrying it out, and after it has been carried out. A conspirator can be either a single person or many. If it is a single person, one cannot really call it a conspiracy, but rather one man’s firm resolve to kill the prince. Of the three dangers one runs in a conspiracy, the single conspirator avoids the first—the danger during its planning—because prior to carrying out his conspiracy he does not run any risks since other men are not privy to his secret, nor is there a danger of the prince hearing of his plan. The will to conspire can manifest itself in a man of whatever station: great, small, noble, common, a man known to the prince or one completely unknown to him. Everyone has the opportunity to come before the prince, and whoever does so also has the opportunity to give vent to his feelings. Pausanias, whom I have mentioned, killed Philip of Macedon when Philip was going to the temple accompanied by a thousand armed men and walking between his son and his son-in-law. Pausanias was a nobleman and also well known to the king. A poor and wretched Spaniard stabbed King Ferdinand of Spain in the neck: the wound was not fatal, but it proved that the man had the courage and the opportunity to attempt it. A dervish—a Turkish priest—struck at Bayezid, the father of the present sultan, with a scimitar.
²²⁴
He did not wound him, but he too had the courage and the opportunity to do so. I believe there are many valorous men who have the desire to commit such an act, because the desire itself carries neither danger nor punishment. But there are few who would actually carry it out, and of those who do, none can avoid being killed on the spot—and there is no one who wants to go to certain death.

But let us pass over those who act alone and proceed to conspiracies that involve more men. I propose that all conspiracies in recorded history have been undertaken by powerful men or those closest to a prince, because others, unless they are completely mad, cannot conspire. Weak men and those not close to the prince lack any of the prospects or opportunities needed to carry out a conspiracy. First, a weak man has no recourse to individuals who will put their trust in him: No one would do his bidding in the absence of the kind of prospects that make men face great dangers. In consequence, as their conspiracy expands to two or three individuals, they encounter a traitor and come to ruin. And even if they are lucky enough to avoid traitors, they face such difficulty in carrying out their conspiracy (as they do not have easy access to the prince) that they inevitably come to ruin: If powerful conspirators who have access to the prince are overwhelmed by the formidable difficulties I shall discuss, then it is to be expected that those difficulties will be endlessly multiplied for men who are weak. Accordingly, when conspirators are aware that they are weak—since men are not complete fools when it comes to their life and property—they tread carefully and when they have had enough of a prince, they resort to cursing him and wait for others with more strength than they have to avenge them. Even if one comes across a weak conspirator who does attempt to carry out his intention, one is forced to praise his intent, not his prudence.

One therefore sees that conspirators were generally powerful men or men close to the prince, and that many were moved to conspire either by having been subjected to too much harm or accorded too much preference, as was the case in Perennius’s conspiracy against Commodus, Plautianus’s against Severus, and Sejanus’s against Tiberius.
²²⁵
These men had all been given so much wealth, honor, and rank by their emperors that the only thing that seemed lacking to their power was the empire itself. Wanting that, too, they conspired against their emperors, and their conspiracies had the end that their ingratitude deserved. And yet in more recent times such conspiracies have had a better end, as that of Iacopo di Appiano against Piero Gambacorta, the prince of Pisa.
²²⁶
Iacopo, after being been raised, nurtured, and given great standing by the prince, usurped his state. A similar conspiracy of our times was that of Coppola against King Ferdinand of Aragon. Coppola had risen to such power that he felt the only thing lacking was the kingdom itself, and through this desire lost his life.
²²⁷
In fact, if any conspiracy of powerful men against princes seemed destined to succeed it should have been Coppola’s conspiracy, as it was a conspiracy that was led, one could say, by one prince against another with every opportunity of fulfilling his desire. But the lust for power that blinds men also blinds them in carrying out their venture, because if they knew how to execute their evil endeavor with prudence they would be bound to succeed. A prince who wishes to protect himself against conspiracies must therefore be more wary of those to whom he has granted too many benefits than of those whom he has excessively harmed, because the latter lack the means to conspire successfully while the former possess them in abundance. And yet the desire is the same, because the desire for power is as great as or even greater than the desire for revenge. Consequently, a prince must give only so much power to his friends as will leave some space between that power and his principality, always allowing for something more to be desired in between; otherwise it will be quite out of the ordinary if this prince does do not suffer the fate of the princes I have just discussed.

But to return to our subject, I suggest that as conspirators are powerful men who can easily approach the prince, the outcome of their conspiracies and the reasons for their success or failure must be discussed. As I have already stated, there are three points of danger in a conspiracy: before, during, and after. Few conspiracies end well, because it is almost impossible to pass successfully through all three points. To begin with a discussion of the initial dangers, which are the most important, I suggest that one must be quite prudent and have great luck in conducting the conspiracy in order not to be discovered. Conspirators are discovered either when one of the conspirators talks, or if he acts suspiciously. Someone talking comes about when there is a lack of loyalty or prudence in the men with whom you are interacting. A lack of loyalty is not at all unusual, as you can discuss a conspiracy only with the most trusted friends who will face death out of friendship to you, or with men who are extremely dissatisfied with the prince. As for your most trusted friends, you can find one or two, but as the conspiracy grows you cannot find more. Furthermore, their goodwill toward you must be so great that the danger and fear they will encounter will not seem greater. But men are often deceived in their assessment of the friendship someone bears for them. They can never assure themselves of it until it has been put to the test, and in this case testing it is extremely perilous. Even if you have tried that friendship in some other dangerous affair in which your friends proved true, you cannot rely on it, for a conspiracy surpasses by far any other type of danger. If on the other hand you measure faithfulness by the discontent an ally has for the prince, you can be quite deceived, because the instant you take this malcontent into your confidence you provide him with the opportunity to become quite content at your expense.
²²⁸
His hatred will have to be quite great, or your authority even greater, for you to be able to keep him loyal to you.

As a consequence, many conspiracies are discovered and crushed in their very first stages. In fact, it can be considered a miracle when a conspiracy has remained a secret among many men for a long time, as was the conspiracy of Piso against Nero,
²²⁹
and in our times that of the Pazzi against Lorenzo and Giuliano de’ Medici, in which more than fifty men were involved and were discovered only when they were on the point of carrying out their plot.
²³⁰
As for being discovered because of a lack of prudence, this comes about when a conspirator is incautious in what he says and a servant or some third person overhears him, as happened with the sons of Brutus, who, while arranging their conspiracy with the envoys of Tarquinius, were overheard by a servant who denounced them. One can also be discovered when one is careless and irresponsible enough to confide in a woman or boy one loves, as was the case with Dymnus, Philotus’s co-conspirator against Alexander the Great, who revealed the conspiracy to Nicomachos, a boy he loved, who immediately told his brother, Cebalinas, who told Alexander. As for being discovered through suspicious behavior, there is the example of Piso’s conspiracy against Nero, in which Scaevinus, one of the conspirators, the day before he was to assassinate Nero, made a will, ordered his freedman Milichius to sharpen one of his rusty daggers, freed all his slaves and gave them money, and ordered bandages to be made for binding up wounds.
²³¹
When Milichius became aware of the plot through this unusual behavior, he denounced Scaevinus to Nero. Scaevinus was then arrested along with Natalis, another conspirator who had been observed in a long and secretive conversation with him the previous day. When their accounts of this conversation did not agree, a confession was forced out of them, with the result that the conspiracy was uncovered and all the conspirators came to ruin.