The Burden of Power: Countdown to Iraq - The Alastair Campbell Diaries (90 page)

He then started to press on the Middle East and said that if Bush would commit to publishing the road map, that would be a big breakthrough. We needed a fresh UNSCR on the humanitarian situation post conflict. Nobody doubts us on the tough side of things, but it’s Middle East, humanitarian, democracy in Iraq, that people here want to hear about. TB spelled out the symbolism in the road map. Bush didn’t quite get it but was willing to do it. He said if you took a poll here they’d think the road map was a local atlas. He said he had never shaken hands with [Palestinian leader Yasser] Arafat and he was never going to kiss him either. But TB really pressed on him and he got it by the end. Bush said we had to watch out for the French, that they would be worried they had got themselves in a ridiculous position.

I then had a long call with Dan Bartlett, who said there was some talk of a Bush/TB/Aznar meeting on neutral territory at the weekend to show continuing commitment to diplomacy. TB was now worried that the French would put down their own resolution aimed at getting support for delay and forcing the Americans to veto it. We were now in a position of not having a second resolution put to a vote at the UN, but then having a vote in the Commons for military [action] without a second resolution on the grounds everyone knows the French would veto it. I was very frank with Dan, said that the chief American voices had been doing us real damage. Hilary Armstrong came in for a chat. She was very stoic about it all and said it was going to be difficult.

Greenstock put down the six tests at the UN at 2am. Before anyone had even had time properly to discuss them, de Villepin rejected them, allowing us to go to an aggressive position re French intransigence and their ‘whatever the circumstances’. We needed to keep going on the tests through the day. We also wanted it that Blix wanted the TV address rather than us. I had a brief chat with IDS before he saw TB for a Privy Council talk re where we were. I just could not imagine him in there as PM. Jack and JP had both spoken to Robin and were clear he was going to quit if we didn’t get a second resolution. It was
a matter of when, not if, now. TB was due to see Robin and Clare before Cabinet and JP emphasised how important it was to make clear today was not the final Cabinet before any action, that there would be another one if the UN process collapsed. The political argument we needed now was that the French had made it more not less likely that there would be conflict. This was the way some of our MPs could come back. The other thing all of us were pushing on our US counterparts was the importance of publication of the road map. Dan and I had taken to calling it ‘the Detroit A to Z’ as a way of me trying to get them to understand why it mattered so much to us. Jack agreed to go out and do clips on the French.

Cabinet was delayed while TB saw Robin and Clare. When he came in he said ‘Good morning,’ and they all – or almost all – did a schoolkids-type ‘Good morning’ back which at least lowered the temperature a bit. TB talked through Iraq. Gareth Williams [Leader of the House of Lords] said there would be a debate on the legality. Clare said the AG should come to that. TB said of course he would. He said that the French had exposed fully how intransigent they were. Chirac’s ‘whatever the circumstances’ was a mistake, and the wrong approach, and people were angry about it. They had also now rejected the basis of the tests we were proposing without any discussion or consideration. He felt Chirac’s desire for a ‘bipolar world’ was leading him to turn away from discussion of any kind on this. He promised another discussion before a vote. Jack reported on UN activity. Clare chipped in ‘Why can’t the US give more time?’ GB came in very strongly later on, on the French in particular.

RC said we should not ‘burn our bridges’ with the French, made clear that though there may be a legal base for action, there was no political case without a second resolution and we must keep working for it. He spoke very deliberately, as though he had rehearsed and of course everyone was listening for tone as well as content. It was a very clear marker that he would quit if there was action without a second resolution. He felt that without it we did not have the moral, diplomatic or humanitarian cover. Clare was even heavier, said we needed the road map published, lambasted the ‘megaphone diplomacy’ but as ever gave the impression it was just us and the Americans who engaged in it. She said the world community was split because the Americans were rushing. We should not be attacking the French but coming up with a different kind of process. ‘If we can get the road map, we can get the world reunited behind it.’ She was calmer by the end and my sense was RC would definitely quit, but she might stay.

I did a secure call with Dan. They were still keen on another meeting. Bush was prepared to come to London. I said I was not sure that was the right thing to do. The best thing you guys can do for us is publish the road map. I mentioned the idea of the Bush visit to TB. He was tempted but finally agreed GWB on UK soil in the run-up to the vote was not what we needed. The satirists would have a field day, ‘I’ve come over here so that Tony and I could hold joint prayer sessions with your troubled backbenchers, so they can see the light. I like Tony so much because he is so much not a socialist,’ etc. Definitely not what we needed right now.

TB was sure the French had something else tricky lined up. I did a note for TB post the chat with Dan, emphasising the need to keep driving a hard bargain from the position we were in. We agreed a plan – road map Friday, maybe visit Saturday. Talks expected to collapse Monday. Tuesday vote. Action begins immediately after the vote, then war declared, though no bombing yet. Then bombing and the POTUS [President of the United States] call. I went over to SIS to go over a few things, and what they could do to help once we got going. They were focused on the need to make sure the MoD documented properly all the atrocities, WMD, torture incidents etc. They were a pretty impressive bunch. We went over a lot of the obvious stuff, but once the discussion got going, I felt they got far better than other parts of the government machine the importance of dominating the media battle and also the need to stay robust whatever else was going on.

He was due to speak to Bush. Bush said that they could do the road map, give it to the Israelis and Palestinians once Abu Mazen [about to take over as Palestinian Prime Minister] accepts the position. TB said that could make a big difference, anything up to fifty votes. ‘It’ll cost me 50,000,’ said Bush. TB said he had just seen a group of ‘wobbly MPs’ who were all clear the road map would help. There was a totemic significance to this. TB said it might also help him hang on to a couple of Cabinet ministers. GWB suggested he might be better off without them. He clearly could not fathom why the road map mattered so much. He had been reluctant because of Arafat. He then said ‘Tell Alastair, like I’m telling my boys, that I don’t want to read a word about this until I’ve said it. It is in our interests that I come out and say this, and it’s clear I mean it.’ TB said the French thought they had lost the initiative and were getting worried. He felt we had to keep in very close touch with Mexico and Chile over the weekend. He was worried the French would come up with a counter-proposal and win them over. Bush referred to the discussions Dan
and I had been having. ‘I guess me coming to London might create a stir.’

They kept going back to the parliamentary arithmetic. TB said it was knife-edge, that we were maybe twenty-five short of comfort. He said I know you think I’ve gone mad about the road map but it really will help. Bush said that Rumsfeld had asked him to apologise to TB. He said after the diplomatic process collapsed he would do his ultimatum speech. Nothing military will happen before our vote. After our vote, if we win, the order goes to Rumsfeld to get their troops to move. Ops begin. He said he would not be doing a declaration of war. Wednesday 8pm in the region, 1pm US, 6pm UK ‘They go. Ten hours of operations before anyone finds out what is going on.’ He intended to wait as long as possible before saying the troops were in action.

Dan called later to say they were postponing the meeting to Sunday because Spain had big demos on Saturday and Aznar felt he should stay for that. Aznar didn’t like the idea of Bermuda so we settled on the Azores.
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I had a meeting with GB and his people to go over all the difficult lines and to engage him in more media. We had to pin this on the French now. Then another chat with Dan to work out how we fill the void in the coming days. I asked him to make sure Bush did not wear any of his bomber jacket-type stuff. Things were pretty rocky with Fiona, who was really pressing for departure now, and I was feeling pretty stressed. I called Neil [Kinnock] in Rome and asked for him to have a word with her, and just spell out the kind of pressure I was under, and why I needed her to hang in just a while longer.

A real sense the diplomatic scene was going nowhere but we kept going with the line we were working flat out for a second resolution. To a meeting with TB, JP and GB. Gordon was far more engaged, pressing for constant meetings, election-type hours, working with me on the arguments and lines, agreeing to do more media. I was keen we somehow avoid the Azores meeting being seen as a council of war but it would be hard. A message came through that Chirac wanted to speak to TB. It was a lot friendlier than it might have been and he said we should strive for good relations. He was straight on to the point TB expected, namely he could see a way of co-operating on the tests but it must be the inspectors who decide if Saddam is co-operating.
He said he could not support an ultimatum or anything taken as support for military action.

TB said the problem with that was that it meant he could have as many last chances and as much time as he wanted. There had to be automaticity [trigger for attack]. Chirac said there could not be automaticity. They agreed Jack and de Villepin should talk but TB issued instructions to Jack to concede nothing. There was intelligence suggesting the French were seeking to get the undecided six to go for tests plus more time. TB suspected Chirac would move to a position of automaticity but inspectors are the sole judges of compliance.

Robin called to discuss ‘rules of engagement’ in the event of his resignation. I got Sally to join us when he came over. We were pressing him to stay, saying we couldn’t have the French running our foreign policy, telling him Bush was about to do the road map. He said it would make a bit of difference but not much. He said this went deeper. He felt we were too close to a unilateralist right-wing US government that didn’t care two hoots about the UN and didn’t care two hoots about Tony, other than for his skills as a better politician and communicator than they are. He felt it was dishonest for him to pretend he supported them any more. He couldn’t. He said he did not want to be awkward and was clear he wanted TB to stay. ‘I do not want to be part of a process that sees Gordon become prime minister on the back of this.’

I said I thought if his mind was made up we should tie it all up before Monday’s Cabinet. He said fine, that he was sad but felt a great peace of mind having made the decision. He wasn’t questioning the integrity of those with a different view but he was doing what he felt was the right thing. He said he valued the good relationship we had and ‘Could we agree a pact of no rubbishing on either side?’ Absolutely. ‘Can you ensure John Reid is part of that? The man can start a fight in a paper bag.’ He intended to do a personal statement and speak in the debate. We agreed to consult re draft letters over the weekend. I said I would ensure TB was warm about him and he should be warm about TB.

I then went to another meeting with TB and GB. TB said it was extraordinary how much more dangerous the world seemed, when in fact more people were enjoying peace and prosperity than ever before. He had to leave for a few minutes and GB and I watched Bush doing his road-map statement. He did it pretty well and put the tone in as we had been suggesting. GB asked me what I really thought of Bush. Complicated, I said. Bits of him I like, bits I don’t.
But he has got a long way by being underestimated. I was conscious of putting a bit of a line, even with GB, because you never quite knew how he stored these things away and used them. We spoke fairly openly but there was none of the old flow and warmth and laughter. Sad really. I worked on TB’s draft words for the MEPP press conference. The Palestinians were being negative post Bush. TB said if they carry on like this they will lose the opportunity they’ve been given. It had a feel of Northern Ireland about it.

Then to the secure room to listen to another TB/Bush call. He kicked off with a ‘Tell Alastair we’re grateful he didn’t leak anything. Tell him we’re watching his every move, heh, heh.’ He and Cheney had spoken to eight Arab leaders. TB reported on his call with Abu Mazen. Bush said ‘If he plays his cards right he will be here in the Oval [Office].’ Then on to the vote. It was already in the US press that it was on Tuesday. Bush said he was predicting a ‘landslide, baby!’ TB said it was too close to call. Bush was pissed off with Clinton, felt he was being difficult. The Azores was on. TB said we had to be seen striving all the way even if we felt the French had made it impossible. Bush said it was a ‘moment of truth’ meeting after all the previous last chances. TB said we must not let it be built up as a council of war. The more we talk about the UN and the aftermath the better. Bush said Dan and I were working on the outcomes for the media and we were getting Cheney to set the context on the Sunday shows.

TB briefed on the Chirac call, said the divide was between those prepared to consider military action and those who were not, who would give him as much time as he wanted. Bush said he did not trust the French but we had to do a slow waltz with them in the next few days. He felt they thought America was more guilty than Saddam. TB said the French appearing to be so unreasonable had been a big mistake by Chirac. I did another call with Dan re the arrangements for the Azores then a stack of calls, a last meeting with TB and headed home. TB saw Clare again and was confident he could keep her in. He was resigned to losing Robin.