The Burden of Power: Countdown to Iraq - The Alastair Campbell Diaries (85 page)

During the day I had had three long calls with Dan, a difficult but productive conference call with Condi, a totally useless thirty-minute conference call, yet despite all that we were not really in the same place. I could sense Condi felt we were weakening. She really didn’t like the final, final opportunity line, couldn’t see that it was simply a way of trying to show we preferred peace to war. TB had done a very strong message at his press conference with Berlusconi, strong on the moral case again. He called to say he felt much better placed on the arguments but it was all still very tricky. John Williams [FCO] had already suggested prior to the Condi call that we say the gap between tabling a resolution and a vote was the closing of the final opportunity for 1441. It was a bit convoluted but we went for that, though Condi kept coming back with noises and a voice that seemed to get shriller as the call went on, that she was concerned we weren’t firm enough. I said she had to understand that we were hit hard here because people felt we were rushing to a timetable set by others. The ITV programme on me and the marathon was fine and seemed to get an OK response.

TB was seeing the Pope [John Paul II]. He called but then said as he was on a mobile, to say nothing. Bit of a pointless call really. Tom briefed strongly on ‘the last push for peace’ while I listened in to a TB/Bush/Aznar/Berlusconi call, livened up a bit by Bush saying he planned to get out his biggest guns and cowboy hat to help Aznar’s rating in Spain.

TB was full of it re the Pope, had clearly found it very special. He was for once asking about the marathon. ‘Are you really going to run twenty-six miles?’ That’s what a marathon is. He wanted us to keep pushing on the push for peace, but said we kept being undone by the Yanks and their mode of communication. I called Alan Milburn to suggest he try to cool the public spat going on between him and GB. I watched Rory Bremner which had me and Condi swapping places and was moderately amusing.

Iraq was totally dominating, but at TB’s morning meeting it was the usual whinge about asylum, crime, health and all the dreadful figures
that were coming out. He was really fed up with it all, in a rage at departments who he felt took their feet off the accelerators once we were all occupied with something else. On Iraq, I said I felt we needed to add some substance to the ‘last push for peace’, which at the moment just sounded vacuous, something to say to get us through a bit more time. We needed something concrete, like signs of Arab pressure on Saddam, or a new diplomatic effort that meant something. He said the last push WAS the pressure being applied, or the pressure was the last push. But I still felt it looked like we were trying to meet a US timetable, not genuinely trying to avoid war. But all the US politicians did was communicate an impatience to get to war. Hilary A was a little bit more confident about the Commons [vote], but said it was all going to be tough. She, Jack and I negotiated the final motion, which was fine, not explicit re military action or UNSCR.

I think TB was beginning to think I was a bit distracted by the marathon, and maybe I was, though I felt the training was on balance a bonus for the job. It was the focus on the event itself, the build-up and the fund-raising, that was maybe taking my attention away. I discussed Carole [Caplin] with him again. The
Mail
were doing a string of stories at the moment that seemed to be coming from her or someone close to her. He was still maintaining she was a victim in all this and that she would do nothing to harm them, and was upset by the way these stories were coming out. Even after the TV documentary, he was saying she was victim in all this.

I had a meeting with some of the SIS people, including a former member of the Iraqi government who had some good insights into the way we were putting our case, the messages that were likely to get through, and those which didn’t. He was clear a lot of the US messages were undermining what we were trying to do. We also needed to emphasise we didn’t want to be there for long, and that the commitment to the MEPP was absolute. No matter how closely you read all the briefing and the intelligence, it was always a help to get this kind of verbal face-to-face analysis. He was interesting on the way the regime worked, and felt we should be getting messages into Iraq re that – how they worked against the interests of business, against families – e.g. by using them to spy on each other – and against women. He claimed Uday [elder son of Saddam] raped a different woman every day.

I went to [David] Yelland’s farewell [as
Sun
editor]. TB popped in briefly. [William] Hague [former Conservative leader] very nice re my marathon efforts and sponsored me, along with a few others there.
The SCR [draft UN Security Council resolution] went down. Jack and [Sir Jeremy] Greenstock were both out on it but what the French would do was not clear. We put it down with the Americans and the Spaniards, while the French put down a memorandum with the Germans and the Russians. TB was keen to rubbish it but not go OTT. But the main perception of the whole thing was a riven international community and the perception for TB was pretty grim.

Saddam interview with Dan Rather [American TV news anchor] was going big, both saying he was NOT going to destroy al-Samoud [missiles, with a range in breach of UNSCR 1441] – though we knew he would – and also challenging GWB to a TV debate, which was hilarious, but also a good way of getting up a clear and straight line. I went up to see TB who was fairly relaxed re the French, just wanted us to keep making the case, setting out the whole background. At the Iraq communications group, both John S and I were stressing that the regime-change argument was more productive than the technicalities of 1441. Over to the House for the statement [on Iraq].
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He was on form, and had a lot of Tories strongly supporting.

Later, TB had a meeting with GB and Balls on the euro. Yet again, he said at the end it was the worst yet, that ‘I just can’t be bothered with it any more.’ He said GB talked to him like he was a five-year-old. If it was serious, he would be worried, but it’s a total joke. If he had any sense, he would just be totally, absolutely, totally supportive on the war. GB had sent a copy of TB’s progressive governance [
FT
] article to JP, with bits underlined, and was saying a lot of it could be said by a Tory. JP was onside at the moment. TB said ‘I’m afraid I have reached the position where I trust nothing he says because everything is worked out through the prism of his own position.’ There was real contempt in his voice.

TB called during the Juventus vs Man U game. He said it was going to be really tough from now on in. The truth was we may well have to go without a second UNSCR, or even without a majority on the UNSC. The Bush poodle problem would get bigger. We were giving the Lib Dems a big opening, but he was adamant it was the right thing to do, and worth the political consequences. I said what
if a hundred of our own MPs are voting against the government and he said fine, they’re mainly the dispossessed and disaffected. He knew it was more serious than that but was pushing the argument now that those against us had to face up to the fact that the consequence of their actions was Saddam staying in power. Hilary Armstrong called and said things did not look good. He must be worried about the growing talk of his job being on the line over this. He was getting a good response for doing well in the House, but an awful lot of our side were already publicly committed to rebellion. The question they were asking was is Iraq a threat to us, and now? TB was dismissive of Blix. He said his job was to set out the facts, but he now saw his mission as to stop war.

Jack went a bit loopy re a JR interview in which he seemed to suggest today’s [Commons] debate would be the last vote before action – it wasn’t. With the debate straight after PMQs, that was almost all we discussed at the PMQs meeting. I did though have a meeting with Alan M and Darren Murphy [Milburn’s special adviser] to try to get them in a less confrontational position re GB, which was doing nobody any good, and to try to get the dividing lines back to being about us and the Tories, not internal. On Iraq, Alan was very much of the view that we should get on with it.

TB was good at PMQs, and [Charles] Kennedy [Liberal Democrat leader] was so opportunistic it would begin to damage him soon. JP meeting, where he was very supportive, and urging TB to do more of the direct communication, both with MPs but also on the media. There was a sense among most people that if the uncommitted and unsure could hear the arguments direct, unmediated by a cynical media, we would win over more people.

Then all eyes on the vote. Through the day, we got the indications the majority would be bigger than we thought initially. Dan Bartlett sent through lines from Bush’s MEPP speech for us to start briefing from midnight to try to build it big from the morning. It was imperative our people felt there was something substantial involved in this. Then back for Burnley–Fulham [FA Cup replay at Turf Moor, Burnley]. We were on great form, 3–0, and I had avoided the nightmare of not being able to go. The Iraq debate itself was good, though the dangers were very clear and there was a growing sense of menace in the voices of the disaffected, particularly former ministers. Frank Dobson [former Health Secretary] was now pretty determinedly anti, and as Alan M said, we had handled him disastrously. There was also Chris Smith,
Peter Kilfoyle, Kate Hoey, Glenda Jackson [all former ministers], the list went on. At least we ended up with a majority of the PLP, though David Miliband said to me he reckoned there were about ten backbenchers who were actually totally supportive of TB’s position on this. Jack did a good job in the debate and probably helped keep a few on side. Ann Clwyd [Labour MP and Iraq expert] was absolutely terrific and we needed to hear more of her. She brought a real passion to the debate and everyone knew it went back a long way. But the result was pretty tough.
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TB was exercised re the French. ‘They are really going for it now. This is war by other means.’ TB remained reasonably chirpy, said he felt comfortable with the arguments and we just had to keep making them. Philip told me that the groups were far less cynical than the media. They were looking to hear TB more, and when they did, they just about gave him the benefit of the doubt. There was an instinctive understanding that no prime minister would do anything as difficult and unpopular as this for the hell of it. The public wanted a deeper sense of engagement. They were actually ready and willing to listen to deeper arguments on it. There was a hunger for debate on the substance, not just the media headline stuff. TB felt we had to be pushing on two main arguments – the moral case, and the reason why the threat was real and current, not because he could whack missiles off at London but because he could tie up with terrorists and others with a vested interest in damaging us and our interests. But we should understate rather than overstate, a point I made on the conference call. The Americans’ saying there was a direct link was counterproductive. Far better to be saying this was a possibility and one we were determined to ensure never came about.

TB, JP, Jack S meeting at which we went over the distinct possibility of no second resolution because the majority was not there for it. TB knew that meant real problems, but remained determined on this, and convinced it was the right course. He said later that he felt only now was Bush really aware of the full extent of the stakes here. This had the potential to transform for good America’s relations with Europe and the rest of the world, and in a worst-case scenario was a disaster for everyone. He wanted to get the thing done quickly, but he also wanted them to understand better the broader agenda. He
felt Bush had moved a good deal on that but was less convinced it permeated throughout the administration.

At Cabinet, things were pretty much rock solid. TB looked very tired and I could sense a few of them only fully realising, when they saw him close up like this going through the arguments, the enormity of the decisions, and the enormity of the responsibility involved. Robin was the trickiest, and was delighting in giving the sense of how isolated we were from normal traditional partners. Clare was doing her usual interruptions and mutterings but a bit less provocatively and for her was relatively onside. She wanted to do a big number on aftermath preparations but TB was there ahead of her. He was very calm, matter-of-fact, just went through where we were on all the main aspects of this. Margaret Beckett, who had been excellent on the radio this morning, made a very strong intervention. She was a useful barometer and she was very supportive. Nobody was really looking to make TB’s position more difficult out of today, with the possible exception of Robin, who was moving towards exit.

Later I headed with Sally for the airport to meet TB, who had been at the archbishop’s enthronement at Canterbury.
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There was a cock-up over the planes but we finally met at the Hounslow Suite after a long bus journey and went over themes for the speech in Madrid tomorrow. He had a cold and was surprisingly OK considering the delay. He did an OK interview with Jackie Ashley [
Guardian
] on the flight, and was strongly putting the moral case, but whether it was his cold or her rather irritating manner, he didn’t really get into his stride. It was OK but no better and would be unlikely to change Guardianista opinion. I’m not sure anything will at this stage. When I told him that Fiona felt he was on some kind of kamikaze mission on this, he said sometimes when you were in the top job, you just had to do what you thought was right, even if you knew so many people thought you were wrong. We finally got to Madrid, then by helicopter to Moncloa [palace]. He said he knew the risks but he was clear we were doing the right thing.

The Ritz Hotel [Madrid] was a bit faded and jaded, and for various reasons I didn’t sleep as well as I had hoped to. I went out for a run early on, and gave up after three miles, just couldn’t get going. I had worked late on TB’s speech for Wales, in particular trying to explain in ways that would connect why he cared so deeply about this, why
he was willing to face potentially disastrous personal and political consequences for this one issue. I was struck more and more by how many people, mainly but not limited to critics, said they couldn’t understand why it seemed to matter so much, and that was what we needed to explain. All the rational arguments were out there and yet for a lot of people this had become emotional as much as rational. It had to be in the area of the nature of the threat, but also the lessons of history when it came to failing to stand up to danger.