The Burden of Power: Countdown to Iraq - The Alastair Campbell Diaries (89 page)

TB asked if we should not be a bit nicer to Clare and was met with a row of uniformly horrified looks. JP looked at him as though he was mad. TB briefed them on the diplomacy and we agreed I should do a briefing note to go to the whole of the PLP. JP and I also agreed, having persuaded TB to do more difficult TV, that there was a danger it was going too far, that Operation Access had become Operation Masochism and there was something a bit undignified about him getting beaten up too much. [Peter] Goldsmith had done a long legal opinion and said he did not want TB to present it too positively. He wanted to make it clear he felt there was a reasonable case for war under 1441. There was also a case to be made the other way and a lot would depend on what actually happened. TB also made clear that he did not particularly want Goldsmith to launch a detailed discussion at Cabinet, though it would have to happen at some time, and ministers would want to cross-examine. With the mood as it was, and with Robin and Clare operating as they were, he knew that if there was any nuance at all, they would be straight out saying the advice was that it was not legal, the AG was casting doubt on the legal basis for war. Peter Goldsmith was clear that though a lot depended on what happened, he was casting doubt in some circumstances and if Cabinet had to approve the policy of going to war, he had to be able to put the reality to them. Sally said it was for TB to speak to Cabinet, and act on the AG’s advice. He would simply say the advice said there was a reasonable case. The detailed discussion would follow.
²⁹

Alan Milburn called me later to say RC told him he would resign if we didn’t get a second resolution. Of the two, RC was easily the more serious and the more thought through. Peter G told TB he had been thinking of nothing else for three weeks, that he wished he could be much clearer in his advice, but in reality it was nuanced. I had a polling meeting with Stan Greenberg. The Lib Dems were on the up a bit. Tuition fees was a growing problem. The figures on right/wrong direction were not great. Asylum was still number one problem area, then crime, and the two were becoming linked in some people’s minds. We were losing young people, London swing voters, plus middle class. The Tories had the beginnings of a message that was getting through. Of those who voted for us last time, only sixty-three per cent were still solid. Stan was very sceptical about what we were doing with the Americans. He felt we were being used as part of a US strategy.

TB did a call with Lagos, who was still moving about, then to a meeting with JS, GH, CDS and the AG re the military plan. GH said he would be happier with a clearer green light from the AG. Andrew Turnbull really irritated TB when he said he would need something to put round the Civil Service that what they were engaged in was legal. TB was clear we would do nothing that wasn’t legal, and gave him a very heavy look. Peter [Goldsmith] did a version of the arguments he had put to TB, on the one hand, on the other, reasonable case. GH raised the US request for use of Diego Garcia and [RAF] Fairford, saying we should not say it was automatic but had to go round the system. TB said he did not want to send a signal that we would not do it. GH and JS were trying to press on him that the Americans were thinking about doing this very soon, i.e. even at the weekend, and that some of our forces would have to be in before.

CDS said his formal military advice would be that it was not sensible to go on the 17th because of the full moon. We would have to get in before any bombs with night vision and buggies. Our forces were to be involved in the operation to secure the oilfields and prevent the Iraqis setting off an environmental catastrophe to hit the oil markets. We desperately needed some change in the diplomatic weather. The best thing may in the end be to go in without a vote because of the timings, and that once troops are in there the mood changes. But short of that, which was risky enough, it was hard to see how the dynamic changed. There was another small step back with the news Guinea would not be coming with us because they were now in the chair. The system is crazy, like pot luck as to who
is in a voting seat at any one time, though I guess it is just about the only way they can make all countries feel more or less involved.

Then came another Rumsfeld disaster. He did a press conference at which he said he and Geoff Hoon had just spoken and went on to indicate that we would not necessarily be in the first wave of attacks because of our parliamentary difficulties. It was not entirely clear whether it was deliberate – i.e. a warning shot that they could and would do it without us – or a fuck-up. We all assumed the latter. He just didn’t get other people’s politics at all. David M said it made it virtually impossible to have a shared strategy with them. Hopeless. Yet another communications friendly fire. TB went bonkers about it, then called Geoff, who admitted he had put the thought in Rumsfeld’s head because he was trying to be very explicit about our difficulties as a way of reining him in. Rumsfeld must have thought he was being helpful, God knows. GH got on to the Defense Department and got them to put out a retraction, making clear we were with them. But it was all very ragged, and indicative once more of the difficulties.

TB had an audience with the Queen at the Palace which usually cheered him up a bit, but he came back still in a real fury re Rumsfeld. He spoke to Geoff, then Lagos, before going to JP’s flat where he was having dinner with him and GB. As if he didn’t have enough on his plate he was also in the midst of another ‘let’s sort GB and the future’ phase. He said afterwards it was all very odd because they didn’t really get to the point. He said he felt something close to contempt for GB at the moment, the way he was manoeuvring even on this. Hilary A had told him earlier that there were people in the PLP not sure which way to go because they were unclear where GB was, and whether it would affect their future chances if he took over. It was a bad scene, really bad, and one which TB felt reflected badly on GB’s leadership credentials.

Sally and I were both working late and waiting for his 11pm Bush call. We saw him in the flat when he came back. He said he couldn’t believe how the US kept fucking things up, the Rumsfeld thing just the latest. TB was pretty mellow, probably a bad sign. He had suddenly had a load of energy drained from him. He also took a call from Murdoch who was pressing on timings, saying how News International would support us, etc. Both TB and I felt it was prompted by Washington, and another example of their over-crude diplomacy. Murdoch was pushing all the Republican buttons, how the longer we waited the harder it got.

TB/Bush call, 11pm. Bush referred to Rumsfeld’s latest gaffe. ‘I want to apologise for that – one of those attempts to be helpful that
wasn’t very helpful.’ These things happen, said TB, but with enough irritation in his voice for the message to be clear. GWB described his latest calls with Fox and Lagos as ‘difficult’. He had said they had to give us their votes, that we had to get this over with. There were two options – the soft resolution, or no resolution, but there needs to be an up-and-down vote. He was determined we could not let the date slip. He told them they could have a week. He said the Africans were under huge pressure but solid. Pakistan looking for a way back. ‘I just don’t understand these guys.’ He said Lagos and Fox were clearly happier with no vote. TB said we needed to hold their feet to the fire. Bush ‘I’m waiting your instructions. If it falls apart I’m going to make a speech to the American people saying I tried, and now Saddam has forty-eight hours to leave the country.’ TB said he still felt Chile would come round and not walk away.

Bush felt seven days was too big a stretch to give them. He said Congress was getting restless and all the polls were showing criticism of the UN for inaction. ‘We just got to go.’ TB said we had to do something to change the diplomatic weather and get on the front foot but if we can’t get anything, we’re in real trouble and there is no point pushing the UN beyond what it will take. Bush said ‘We know he’s not going to disarm. We already had benchmarks. I said to Ricardo [Lagos] that it is time to stand up and be counted. I want your vote. He said no. I said I’ll tell Tony and he said no, I’ll tell him.’ He sounded pretty much at the end of it. TB said he would speak to him again and that a week’s delay was the top end for us. As Condi had said, the danger is losing altitude but if we were on the front foot we would gain it again. But Bush said these guys were just playing for time. He felt maybe we stand on Thursday and say there could be no new UNSCR, that it had failed in its mission so Saddam has forty-eight hours to leave. He did not feel the need to buy more time. He was more impatient than ever. TB said he felt a bit more give on the last Putin call but Bush wasn’t really listening to this stuff now. TB felt the problem was that the Chiles and Mexicos were not used to making decisions as big as these. But he felt Mexico was making a big mistake siding with the French against the US. Fox was less like a leader than an official. All we got was ‘I’ll get back to you.’

Jack S said that Rumsfeld’s idiotic comments gave us a way out, namely that we could not be involved at the start but could do humanitarian afterwards. TB was not keen but Jack was very blunt. He said we were dealing, however right we thought it was, with a
US ‘war of choice’ and we had to understand, as Powell told him the whole time, that some of these people around Bush could not care two fucks about us whatever, and that went for TB as much as the rest of us. Jonathan and I agreed that last night had effectively been a pincer movement. Rumsfeld fucking up had forced us to come out strong. TB felt the Murdoch call was odd, not very clever. Jack had clearly been wound up big time while he was over there. He said we were victims of hopeless bullying and arrogant diplomacy. David M also felt yesterday had been a rather crude attempt to shaft us. He came to see me later and said we really have to work hard to keep TB in position. He was so earnest about it but adamant that both America and France were so capable of doing the wrong things for the wrong reasons that TB was absolutely key to keeping the international community together. David felt he was in a different league to the rest and could not be sacrificed in all this.

David felt we should say to the Americans they could only use our troops after the first effort and also on humanitarian duties. TB did not want to go down that route, no matter how much he agreed the Americans were not being helpful. Jack was absolutely vituperative about Rumsfeld and said we were being driven by their political strategy. TB said maybe, but it was still the right thing to do. After Jack left, we went down for a meeting with JP, HA and JR. TB admitted things were not going in the right direction at all. We agreed we were going to put out six tests
³⁰
for Saddam today and also emphasise we were in this because it was right, not because the US wanted it. That was a point I made on the conference call where I didn’t hide how pissed off we were with Rumsfeld, and said we couldn’t have a situation where they were commenting on our politics.

TB had a couple of meetings with GB who was being brought in more closely on Iraq now, thanks to JP’s meeting with him. We agreed that we really had to put it to a vote in the Commons even if we didn’t get a second resolution because that was what we had promised and TB would just have to go and fight for his life on it. JP and Hilary both felt the note I did for the PLP was helpful and suggested I do
another to update facts and arguments. I also put round a note to Cabinet on arrangements and structures for communications in the event of war. At PMQs, TB was on form and IDS was awful because he tried to exploit the Clare Short situation. There was a suggestion that the French may try to put down a resolution based on our tests. TB agreed my note on the tests. Jack at the PLP set us up well and we were now clearly saying 1441 gave us the legal cover we needed.

Chirac had effectively said he would veto anything, so even though we were continuing to work for it, it was hard to imagine getting one. The French were clearly worried. Just before PMQs, Matthew Rycroft took a call from [Gérard] Errera to say the Elysée wanted to make clear that ‘whatever the circumstances’ was being taken out of context. They were clearly backtracking. Then to the secure room to listen to the Bush call. Bush said his people had watched TB at PMQs and said he was brilliant. TB said he had spoken to Lagos and the Chileans were buggering about. Bush said Fox had told him he would get back to him within an hour, and then went off to hospital for a back operation. TB laid it on the line that we had to have a vote in the Commons. He said we couldn’t pull the plug on UN negotiating because the bigger the gap between the end of the negotiation and a Commons motion, the worse it was for us. We had to keep trying. Bush said when do you anticipate a vote? TB said we had pencilled in next Tuesday. Bush: ‘Erm.’ Long pause. TB: ‘You want to go on the Monday?’ Correct. TB: ‘My military have given me formal advice re the full moon.’ It’s not a problem, said Bush. ‘What – are they taking away the moon?’ TB said he would have to check it out. There was clear tension between Bush wanting sooner and TB wanting later.

Bush was clear that the French position meant no UNSCR. But we were still trying to be reasonable. He felt that on withdrawal of the resolution he would give a speech saying the diplomatic phase is over, issue a 48-hour ultimatum to Saddam, say late Friday, which takes us to Sunday. TB went over the politics here, how we were pulling out every stop. TB said there was a danger the Tories would see this as their chance to get rid of him, support us on a war motion, but not a confidence motion. Bush said they would make it clear to the Tories that if they moved to get rid of TB ‘we will get rid of them’. He said he wouldn’t speak to ‘Iain Duncan Baker’ himself – TB didn’t correct him – ‘but he’ll know my message’.

The French had definitely allowed themselves to be presented as the unreasonable ones, which was probably swinging opinion our way a bit, but it was still very difficult. TB said it was important we still showed we were trying to be reasonable. But he said if Bush
could delay his broadcast till after our Commons vote, it would help. Sunday, say you’ve tried, the French are being impossible, we are working the phones. Monday, we take it to Parliament and say we must bring this to a conclusion. Vote Tuesday. Forty-eight hours you go to their people and say war. The best argument we had is that we don’t want our foreign policy decided by the French, though TB was clear again that Rumsfeld’s comments had given us a problem.