The Battle of Britain (12 page)

For the fighter role, the Blenheim was simply adapted from the standard Mk I bomber by the addition of a ventral pack manufactured by the Southern Railway's Ashford workshops, containing four 0.303in Browning guns plus 500 rounds of ammunition for each weapon. This supplemented the normal armament of a single wing-mounted Browning and a Vickers ‘K' gun of similar calibre in a B.I. Mk III semi-retractable hydraulically-operated dorsal turret. Some 200 Blenheims were modified to fighters, the first examples entering service with No. 600 AAF Squadron at Hendon in September 1938.

Powered by two 840hp Bristol Mercury VIII air-cooled radial engines, the Blenheim IF, as the fighter was designated, weighed in at 8,840lb (4,100kg) and had a loaded weight of 12,200lb (5,534kg). At that weight, the max speed was 237mph (381km/h) at sea level and 278mph (447km/h) at 15,000ft (4,572m), and the aircraft cruised at 215mph (346km/h) at 15,000ft. Initial rate of climb was l,480ft/min (451m/min), the time to 5,000ft (1,524m) was 3.9 min, and to 10,000ft (3,048m) was 8.1 min. Service ceiling was 24,600ft (7,498m), and the aircraft had a reasonably high maximum range of 1,050 miles (1,690km).

Early operational experience with the Blenheim IF dictated the provision of a reflector sight, self-sealing tanks and some armour. No. 23 Squadron undertook the first night intruder sortie of the war on
December 21–22, 1939. The fact that the operation of the Blenheim fighter by day was suicidal in areas where enemy single-seat fighters were likely to be encountered in strength quickly became obvious in the course of fighting over the Continent during May and June 1940, and subsequently the Blenheim IF was restricted largely to nocturnal activities. On June 5, the Luftwaffe made its first night attack on London, and Blenheim IFs instituted a system of nocturnal patrols which, on June 18, resulted in the destruction of five bombers in conditions of moonlight.

Meanwhile, the Blenheim IF had been closely involved in the development of airborne intercept radar. A flight of three aircraft of No. 600 Squadron operating from Manston had performed operational trials with AI Mk III radar, and on the night of July 2–3 a Blenheim IF from the Fighter Interception Unit at Ford gained the first ‘kill' by means of this equipment. Subsequently the Blenheim IF was to provide the backbone of RAF Fighter Command's night interception force, soldiering on through the Luftwaffe's nocturnal Blitz of 1940–41 until finally supplanted by the Beaufighter.

A
t the outbreak of war the Luftwaffe had 1,180 bombers, 366 dive bombers, 771 single-engine fighters and 408 twin-engine fighters, 40 ground attack aircraft and 887 for reconnaissance. With 552 transport aeroplanes, its operational force totalled 4,204 machines.

Considering the greatly increased complexity of airframe and engine design and manufacture since 1918, this was an impressive strength for an arm that the peace treaty at the end of World War I had reduced from some 20,000 aircraft to fewer than 5,000, for defence only. Moreover, until Hitler became Chancellor in 1933, this reconstruction had to be done in secret. The armistice terms were impracticable to enforce on a nation that had been one of the leaders in the development of military flying. Germany was free to develop a civilian aircraft industry and airlines, so took advantage of this obvious opportunity to train a new air force under cover.

At the Ministry of Defence General Hans von Seeckt, Chief of the Army Command, appointed former Luftstreitkräfte officers – future Luftwaffe Field Marshals, Albert Kesselring and Hugo Sperrle, and General Hans Juergen Stumpf among them – to deal with aviation matters. The Director of Civil Aviation at the Ministry of Transport was a wartime pilot and the two Ministries set about forming the nucleus of a reborn Luftwaffe.
Manufacturers of civil aircraft and aero engines began to design and build also for military purposes. In 1920 State-financed gliding clubs began the instruction of new pilots and by 1929 had 50,000 members. Crews flying for Deutsche Lufthansa, the national airline formed in 1926 under the chairmanship of Erhard Milch, who had commanded a fighter Geschwader in World War I, were training for future service in the air force.

Russia allowed Germany to set up a flying school at Lipesk, 200 miles (322km) southeast of Moscow, where, from 1924 to 1933, hundreds of air and ground crews were trained. Germany also did development work on aircraft and equipment in Russia.

In 1933, Adolf Galland, at the age of 19, was typical of the young glider pilots who were selected for conversion to powered flight in Lufthansa and then went to Lipesk to train as fighter pilots. Next they went to Italy for further experience with the Italian Air Force. By now his course of 20 had each logged some 300 hours in aeroplanes and were keen to practise air fighting. ‘Instead', he says, ‘the Italians, ignoring that we were already trained fighter pilots, concentrated on aerobatics.' Young Galland and his comrades convinced their instructors that there was more to air combat than performing elegant arabesques in the sky. ‘But there was little the Italians could teach us about actually fighting.' The time spent in Italy was nonetheless considered to be of great value. Galland says, ‘We had the all-important opportunity to fly modern types of Italian aeroplanes. In addition to aerobatics and general training, we did target practice with live ammunition, which we weren't able to do in Germany.'

They returned to Lufthansa to fly multi-engine types, perfect their instrument flying and navigation and travel the international air routes.

Hermann Goering, who had joined the Nazi Party in 1922, was appointed Air Minister in 1930 with Erhard Milch, another wartime Geschwader commander, as his Deputy. Goering had shot down 22 Allied aircraft in World War I and, in 1918 as a Hauptmann, commanded Jagdgeschwader I, whose first leader was Manfred von Richthofen. In 1923 he was wounded in the groin during the Munich Putsch, suffered excruciatingly for years, took heroin to ease the pain and became a lifelong addict. The habit sapped his concentration, unbalanced his mind and distorted his judgment, much to the detriment of his air force.

In 1935 the Luftwaffe, now comprising 1,888 aircraft and 20,000 officers and men, came out of concealment. Milch became Secretary of State
for Air and set about a vigorous expansion of the Service. The production of military aircraft accelerated and by late 1935 averaged 300 a month. Among the new types were the Bf 109 and 110, the Ju 87 and 88, the Do 17 and He 111, all of which would be unleashed against Britain five years later. The anti-aircraft artillery – Flak – and the balloon defence units had always formed part of the German Air Force and were now incorporated in the new expansion. A Signals Service was formed and the Air Force Staff College was founded.

The man who is regarded as the father of strategic air power was an Italian, General Giulio Douhet (1869–1930), first commander of the Italian Air Force. One of his theories was that decisions about air strategy must be made before decisions about land strategy. Many of his principles, expounded in his best-known work, ‘The Command of the Air', were adopted before and during World War II by the major powers. Germany and Britain were among those that shared the belief that the bomber would always get through, however numerous the opposing fighter force and anti-aircraft guns. Despite this, the Luftwaffe was deprived of a long-range heavy bomber capable of 12 hours' endurance and carrying a 13,000 to 22,000lb (5,897 to 9,980kg) bombload.

In 1936 General Wever, a pilot and a man of outstanding talent, was appointed the first Chief of Air Staff. Among his plans was the manufacture of a large number of four-engine bombers. Milch also became a general in the Luftwaffe. His exceptional ability as an administrator, organiser and planner had always rankled with Goering, whose jealousy drove him to open hostility. In consequence, another figure of seminal importance in the supply of equipment to the German Air Force came to prominence. This was Generalleutnant Ernst Udet, who had scored 62 victories as a young fighter pilot in 1917–18 and was the most popular man in German aviation circles. Goering promoted him to replace Milch as chief of the Technical Department. Although the two men were close friends, Milch said of Udet, ‘Hitler recognised in him one of our greatest pilots, and he was right. But he also saw him as one of the greatest technical experts, and here he was mistaken.' This was true: Udet was far out of his depth. He floundered about at the head of an enormous bureaucracy, while exercising inadequate control over aircraft production. He indulged his enthusiasm for the Bf 109 and dive bombers by equipping the Luftwaffe as a tactical rather than a strategic air force. This, linked to Goering's irrational appraisal of every changing facet of Gemany's air
campaign against Britain, and Hitler's insanity that led to wild decisions and the issue of orders based on ‘intuition', was a major factor in the Luftwaffe's defeat.

An equally disastrous flaw was that the only four-engine bombers were the Focke-Wulf Kondors: converted airliners, used only for maritime reconnaissance and attacking ships on the Atlantic; they carried a mere 4,600lb (2,086kg) bombload (RAF twin-engine bombers carried from 4,000 to 7,000lb (3,175kg). General Wever's foresight had come to nothing (he had been killed in an air crash in June 1936). Two four-engine prototypes, a Dornier and a Junkers, were test flown soon after. Wever's successor, Kesselring, told Goering that two four-engine purpose-designed bombers could be built for the same cost and factory space as three twin-engine bombers. Goering retorted that Hitler would ask how many bombers there were, not how big they were, and decided to limit the Luftwaffe to fast medium bombers and dive bombers.

July 1936 presented Hitler and Goering with a welcome chance to display the aggressiveness of the resurgent Luftwaffe. Civil war broke out in Spain between the Nationalists, an apology for Fascists, led by General Franco, and the Republican Party, which was a euphemism for Communists. Within a month, 85 German air and ground crew volunteers, 20 Ju 52/3m transport aircraft and six He 51A-1 biplane fighters arrived to support Franco. During October and November, 30 more fighters of the same type, with 400 volunteers who travelled by sea under the guise of ‘strength through joy' tourists, joined them to form the Legion Kondor under the command of General Hugo Sperrle. They included pilots from III/JG134 and JG234, 132 (‘Richthofen', later JG2) and 26. Sperrle returned home the next year on promotion to General of Aviators and was replaced by General Wolfram von Richthofen.

Among those who had their first experience of air operations in the Legion Kondor and profited greatly by it in enhancing their skill, were future fighter aces Wilhelm Balthasar (47 victories, 7 in Spain), Herbert Ihlefeld (130 victories, 7 in Spain), Walter Oesau (125 victories, 8 in Spain), Werner Mölders (115 victories, 14 in Spain), and Adolf Galland ( 104 victories, none in Spain; but a thorough education in air cooperation with infantry and armour). Mölders was destined to become General of Fighters in November 1940, with the rank of Generalmajor, at the age of 28. When he was killed a few months later, Galland, aged 29 then, replaced him.

The Spanish Civil War was immensely useful to the Luftwaffe in gaining expertise at fighter-to-fighter combat and perfecting the technique of close support for ground troops, which culminated in 1939 and 1940 with the Blitzkrieg. It was in this role that Hauptmann Galland (who, like all officers posted to Spain, had been temporarily promoted one rank) had his baptism of fire, as commander of Jagdstaffel 3 in November 1936. The enemy was equipping with American Curtiss and Russian Polikarpov monoplane fighters, which compelled the antiquated He 51s to be relegated to ground attack. They flew in formations of nine, each carrying six 22lb (10kg) bombs that they released from a height of 495ft (150m) before strafing with their twin 7.92mm Rheinmetall machine guns.

Ju 87 and Hs 123 dive bombers arrived in the closing months of 1937, to practise the terrorist tactics that would defeat Poland, the Low Countries, Norway and France, and fail against Britain.

In April 1938 Werner Mölders took over from Galland and two months later the Staffel re-equipped with the new Bf 109B. Now, it could cover the low-flying He 51s from attacking fighters. Mölders soon found that the classic formation based on close Vs of three aircraft was unwieldy. When opposing fighters met, they broke formation and fought singly. But a pilot on his own had no one to watch his tail and warn him of an attack from astern. So he devised a new formation of which the basis was a loose pair, called a Rotte. Two Rotten operating together became a Schwarm and tactical freedom of manoeuvre was paramount.

As fighter pilots returned home on completing a tour in Spain, they became instructors in the new fighter tactics. Mock combat was not limited to dogfights between single aircraft. Rotte would fight Rotte, Schwarm would fight Schwarm, and even a whole Staffel would take on another. This typically Teutonic thoroughness was of inestimable value: no other air force in the world practised in this manner. Attacks in Staffel strength were made against bomber formations, and the escorting of bombers was also practised. These exercises again were generally neglected by other nations.

While the RAF was accumulating a varied experience in the 1920s and '30s, Lufthansa's 120 aeroplanes were flying up to four million miles (6,437, 200km) a year, operating by night as well as by day: an excellent training for future night-bomber pilots and navigators. From 1935 all Lufthansa crews became Luftwaffe reservists.

When Hitler came to power on January 1, 1933, the German aviation industry's output of aircraft averaged 31 a month. One year later Milch presented his production schedule for the next 24 months: 4,021 aircraft with which to lay the foundation for six fighter, six bomber and six reconnaissance Geschwader. These in turn would complete the operational training of newly fledged aircrew and ground staff. Although 25 types of aircraft were involved, by the end of 1934, 164 a month were coming out of the factories, to a total of 840 operational types; and by December 1935, 265 a month were being produced, of which 1,923 were for the Luftwaffe. In 1937 the monthly average reached 467. In 1938 it fell to 436. For the war that Hitler intended to provoke, a minimum of 700 a month was necessary. Under Udet's incompetent direction, German aircraft production struggled to attain a monthly 691 in 1939.