Talking to the Enemy: Faith, Brotherhood, and the (Un)Making of Terrorists (79 page)

16
  R. Garwin (2002), “Nuclear and Biological Megaterrorism.” Report to the 27th session of the International Seminars on Planetary Emergencies, World Federation of Scientists, Erice, Italy, August 21. www.fas.org:rlg/020821-terrorism.htm; and personal communication, February 11, 2005.

17
  B. Fischhoff, S. Atran, and M. Sageman (2008), “Mutually Assured Support: A Security Doctrine for Terrorist Nuclear Weapons Threats.”
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
special issue,
Terrorism Briefing for the New President
618:160–67.

CHAPTER 15: A QUESTION OF HONOR

  1
  T. L. Pennell (1909),
Among the Wild Tribes of the Afghan Frontier: A Record of Sixteen Years’ Close Intercourse with the Natives of the Indian Marches.
London: George Bell & Sons, pp. 48–49, 60–61, 116, 124.

  2
  House of Lords debate, February 26, 1908, vol. 184, cc. 1715–32. hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1908/feb/26/india-north-west-fron-tier-policy#S4V0184P0_19080226_HOL_23.

  3
  H. Hussain (2004), “Waziristan—The Past.”
Defence Journal,
November. www.ordersofbattle.darkscape.net/site/analysis/waziristanthe_past_ overview_of.htm.

  4
  Madeleine Albright responds to questions by Atran and others at “The Strategic Importance, Causes, and Consequences of Terrorism: A Multi-disciplinary Colloquium.” University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, March 11, 2004.

  5
  G. Rasuly-Paleczek (2001), “The Struggle for the Afghan State: Centralization, Nationalism and Their Discontents.” In W. van Schendel and E. Zürcher (eds.),
Identity Politics in Central Asia and the Muslim World.
London: I. B. Tauris.

  6
  R. Tapper (1988), “Ethnicity, Order, and Meaning in the Anthropology of Iran and Afghanistan.” In J.-P. Digard (ed.),
Le Fait Ethnique en Iran et en Afghanistan.
Paris: Editions du CNRS.

  7
  A. Ahmad and L. Grau (2002),
Afghan Guerrilla Warfare: In the Words of the Mujahideen Fighters.
Osceola, WI: Zenith Press.

  8
  O. Roy (1994),
The Failure of Political Islam.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 158–59.

  9
  O. Roy (1990),
Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan,
2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

10
  G. Crile (2007),
Charlie Wilson’s War.
New York: Grove Press.

11
  T. Barfield (2003),
Afghan Customary Law and Its Relationship to Formal Judicial Institutions.
Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace. www.usip.org/files/barfield2.pdf.

12
  A. Wardak (2002),
“Jirga:
Power and Traditional Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan.” In J. Strawson (ed.),
Law After Ground Zero.
London: Cavendish.

13
  S. Atran (1985), “Managing Arab Kinship and Marriage.”
Social Science Information
24: 659–96.

14
  F. Barth (1954),
Political Leadership Among the Swat Pathans.
London: Athlone Press.

15
  R. Pehrson (1966),
The Social Organization of the Marri Baluch.
Chicago: Aldine.

16
  This same branching structure can also merge into ever more inclusive and strongly tethered groups when opportunities to expand the resource base arise. Indeed, by harnessing the structural possibilities inherent in the segmentary lineage system, and in the codes of honor and loyalty associated with it, Mohammed and his successors were able to unite the fractious Arab tribes in one poor, small corner of the world, and expand their dominion across three continents. Of course, the lineage system strongly supported tribal loyalty, and it took great skill to transfer the primary loyalty of his followers from the tribe to the community of believers.

17
  T. Pennell,
Among the Wild Tribes of the Afghan Frontier.
pp. 122–23.

18
  T. Barfield,
Afghan Customary Law and Its Relationship to Formal Judicial Institutions,
p. 36.

19
  Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (2007),
Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in Al-Qa’ida 1989–2006,
September, pp. 14ff. http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/pdf/Harmony_3_Schism.pdf.

20
  N. Kralev (2000). “Clinton to Taliban: Forsake al Qaeda.”
Washington Times,
July 16.

21
  M. Sageman, personal communication, July 2009.

22
  S. Gregory (2009), “The Terrorist Threat to Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons.”
CTC Sentinel
(Combating Terrorism Center at West Point) 2 (7). www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol2Iss7.pdf.

23
  House of Lords debate, February 26, 1908, vol, 184, cc. 1715–1732.

24
  J. Burke, personal communication, January 2009.

25
  A January 2010 report by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee adapted part of this framework (outlined in my
New York Times
op-ed, “To Beat Al Qaeda, Look to the East,” December 13, 2009) to the problem of “Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia” (http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/ medi/doc/Yemen.pdf, p. 6). But more field research is needed to justify the extension of the framework to new contexts.

26
  P. Chalk (2009), “The Philippines’ Continued Success Against Extremists.”
CTC Sentinel
(Combating Terrorism Center at West Point) 2 (8), www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol2Iss8.pdf.

27
  M. Sageman (2009), “Confronting al-Qaeda.” Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 7. http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2009/SagemanTestimony091007p.pdf.

28
  A. Giustozzi, ed. (2009),
Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field.
New York: Columbia University Press.

29
  A. Rubin and M. Mazetti (2009), “Afghan Suicide Bomber Killed C.I.A. Operatives.”
New York Times,
December 31.

30
  R. Rahimullah (2009), “The Significance of Qari Zain’s Assassination in Pakistan.”
CTC Sentinel
(Combating Terrorism Center at West Point) 2 (7), www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol2Iss7.pdf.

31
  R. Pape (2009), “To Beat the Taliban, Fight from Afar.”
New York Times,
October 15.

32
  Gen. S. McChrystal to Sec. Defense R. Gates (2009), Commander’s Initial Assessment, NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, August 30, p. 2. http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/ politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf.

33
  See also C. Dickey (2009), “Losing Afghanistan’s Drug War.”
Newsweek,
July 31. www.newsweek.com/id/209830.

34
  N. Rosen (2010), “Something from Nothing: U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan.”
Boston Review,
January–February, www.bostonreview.net/BR35.1/ rosen.php.

35
  S. Atran (2010), “Pathways to and from Political Violence: Testimony to the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities.” March 10. http://armed-services.senate.gov/ statemnt/2010/03%20March/Atran%2003–10–10.pdf.

CHAPTER 16: THE TERROR SCARE

  1
  S. Atran (2006), “Commentary: A Failure of Imagination (Intelligence, WMDs, and ‘Virtual Jihad’).”
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism
29: 263–78.

  2
 
Daily Times
(2009), “Al Qaeda Still Greatest Threat to US, UK: Obama, Brown.” November 17. www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009 %5C11%5C17%5Cstory_17-11-2009_pg1_3.

  3
  P. Webster (2009), “Al-Qaeda Still Biggest Threat to British Security, Says Gordon Brown.”
Times
(London), November 16. www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article6918483.ece.

  4
  A. de Borchgrave (2007), “Terror Wars: The Missing Sleeper Cells.” United Press International online, May 3. http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2007/5/3/150302.shtml.

  5
  G. Tenet (2007),
At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA.
New York: HarperCollins.

  6
  M. Sageman (2004),
Understanding Terror Networks.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.

  7
  Ibid.

  8
  J. Burke (2008), “Omar Was a Normal British Teenager Who Loved His Little Brother and Man Utd: So Why at 24 Did He Plan to Blow Up a Nightclub in Central London?”
Guardian,
January 20.

  9
  D. Buss (2006),
The Evolution of Evil.
“What Is Your Dangerous Idea?” Edge World Question Center. www.edge.org/q2006/q06_12.html.

10
  K. Haider (2009), “Taliban Planned to Use Americans in Pakistan Attacks.” Reuters, December 26. www.reuters.com/article/idUS-TRE5BP0HI20091226.

11
  P. Rucker and J. Tate (2009), “In Online Postings Apparently by Detroit Suspect, Religious Ideals Collide.”
Washington Post,
December 29.

12
  V. Morton (2009), “Awlaki Personally Blessed Detroit Attack.”
Washington Times,
December 29.

13
  Cited in E. Schmidt and E. Lipton (2010), “Focus on Imams as Recruiters for Al Qaeda.”
New York Times,
January 1.

14
  Cartoon by P. Steiner (1993),
New Yorker,
July 5, p. 61.

15
  See C. Dickey (2009),
The Shadowland Journal,
October 1, christopher dickey.blogspot.com/2009/10/warning-very-graphic-video-of-bombing.html.

16
  See F. Laporta (2007), “Sobre la pervivencia del terror.”
El País,
July 2.

17
  F. Khosrokhavar (2004),
L’Islam dans les prisons.
Paris: Balland.

18
  Pew Research Center Survey (2007),
Muslims in America: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream,
May 22. http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/ muslim-americans.pdf.

19
  Ibid.

20
  ABC News (2005), “Terror Plot Hatched in California Prison: Authorities Thwart Attack Intended for Next Month,” August 16. http://abcnews. go.com/WNT/Investigation/story?id=1042853.

21
  Author interviews with FBI personnel, April 2007.

22
  E. Lichtblau, D. Johnston, and R. Nixon (2008), “F.B.I. Struggles to Handle Wave of Financial Fraud Cases.”
New York Times,
October 19.

23
  CNN (2009), Discussions and interviews on
State of the Union with John King,
March 5.

24
  D. Johnston and N. Lewis (2009), “President to Maintain Agencies’ Terrorism Focus.”
International Herald Tribune,
March 25.

25
  S. Atran (2010), “Pathways to and from Violence: Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities,” March 10, http://armed-services.senate.gov/statement /2010/03%20March/Atran%2003-10-10.pdf.

26
  For a particularly insightful critique of the foolishness of much formalization in economics, see N. Nicholas Taleb (2007),
Black Swans: The Impact of the Highly Improbable.
New York: Random House.

27
  S. Page (2007),
The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.