Talking to the Enemy: Faith, Brotherhood, and the (Un)Making of Terrorists (78 page)

18
  International Crisis Group (2004), “Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don’t Mix.” Asia Report No. 83, September 13. www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2967&l=1.

19
  International Crisis Group (2009), “Indonesia: Radicalisation of the ‘Palembang Group.’”
Asia Briefing
No. 92, May 29. www.crisisgroup.org /home/index.cfm?id=6110.

20
  S. Atran, J. Magouirk, and J. Ginges (2008), “Radical Madrassas in Southeast Asia.”
CTC Sentinel
(Combating Terrorism Center, West Point) 1 (3). www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol1Iss3.pdf.

21
  Interrogation of Parmin, alias Yasir Abdul Baar, alias Aslam, April 25, 2008. International Crisis Group (2010),
Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise in Aceh.
Asia Report No. 189, April 20.

22
  International Crisis Group (2009), “Indonesia: Noordin Top’s Support Base.” Asia Briefing No. 95, August 27. www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6289&l=1.

CHAPTER 11: THE GREAT TRAIN BOMBING

  1
  “Encuestas sobre temas de actualidad (April 2007)—Encuestas el juicio por el 11-M va despejando dudas en la ciudadanía.” www.neolectum.com/tmtic/tmt8200tdt/tvsport/tmt8221.html;
El Mundo
(2004), August 10, www.elmundo.es/papel/2004/08/10/espana/1677465.html.

  2
  Fernando Reinares, director of research on global terrorism, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, cited in
Le Monde
(2007), “A Madrid, fin du procès des auteurs des attentats,” July 4.

  3
  The information, quotes, and storyline in the following sections come from several sources: pretrial and trial testimony, interviews with investigative reporters, police, and intelligence. Several quoted reminiscences are from Justin Webster’s outstanding documentary
The Madrid Connection
(2007). The film independently takes much the same line that Marc Sageman and I developed, namely, that the Madrid plot was mostly a self-organized affair driven by the converging ambitions of two main players: Serhane Fakhet, “el Tunecino,” and Jamal Ahmidan, “el Chino.” We differ mainly on the operational role of Al Qaeda and other outside agents, which
The Madrid Connection
suggests may be significant but we see as insignificant.

  4
  Conversations with
El País
investigative reporters José Yoldi and Jorge Rodriguez (2007), Madrid trial, May 30.

  5
  “Atentados terroristas del día 11 de marzo de 2004 en Madrid, Juzgado Central de Instrucción N
^o
6, Audencia Nacional, Madrid, Sumario N
^o
20/2004, April 10, 2006 [hereafter called Madrid Train Bombing Indictment],
Quicaagésimo tercero:
Contexto Islamista de las investigaciones,” pp. 1344–47.

  6
  Ministerio del Interior, Dirección General de la Policía, Brigad Provincial de Extranjera y Documentación, “Asunto: Altercaciones convivencia C.I.E.” Madrid, December 2, 2004.

  7
  Cited in A. Elliot (2007), “Where Boys Grow Up to Be Jihadis.”
New York Times Magazine,
November 25. www.nytimes.com/2007/11/25/ magazine/25tetouan-t.html.

  8
 
El País
(2007), May 28.

  9
  M. Marlasca and L. Rendueles (2007),
Una historia del 11-M que no va gustar a nadie.
Madrid: Ediciones Temas de Hoy.

10
  Information provided to the author by the Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI), Madrid, March 2007.

CHAPTER 12: LOOKING FOR AL QAEDA

  1
  Conversation with Ernest Ekaizer,
El País
deputy editor, March 7, 2007.

  2
  Interview with Spanish Guardia Civil personnel, Madrid, May 28, 2007.

  3
  Lamari had been jailed in 1997 by Judge Baltasar Garzón along with ten members of the Algerian terrorist Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA), although there was scant evidence that Lamari ever belonged to GIA or engaged in any terrorist activity at the time. Sentenced to fourteen years (later reduced to nine), he was released from prison in 2002 through an administrative error, went underground, and vowed revenge against Spain. A few days before he died, Lamari called a friend in Valencia to say that “we will meet in heaven and tell my friends to pray for me.” Intelligence officials tell me insistently that Lamari was the “brains” behind the attack, though they say they can’t reveal the evidence. Marc Sageman is more than skeptical: “You don’t spend all your time picking asparagus and artichokes [as Lamari did before his arrest] if you’re running a terrorist operation. He probably was picked up because he happened to know some bad guys, got pissed off in jail, and came out ready to kill someone.”

  4
 
El País,
June 28, 2004.

  5
  M. Cohen and J. March (2000), “Leadership in an Organized Anarchy.” In M. Brown (ed.),
Organization and Governance in Higher Education.
Boston: Pearson Custom Publishing.

  6
  Madrid Train Bombing Indictment, “Cuadragésimo quinto: Análisis de la financiación y otras ceustiones relacionadas,” pp. 1126–49.

  7
  9/11 Commission Report, pp. 169–73.

  8
  M. Kenney (2007),
From Pablo to Osama: Trafficking and Terrorist Networks, Government Bureaucracies, and Competitive Adaptation.
University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

  9
  B. Ivry (2003), “Black-Market Arms Dealing Still Thriving.”
Record,
October 7. www.sais-jhu.edu/publicaffairs/SAISarticles03/Bond_Black-Market_100703.pdf.

10
  R. Axelrod and M. Cohen (2000),
Harnessing Complexity: Organizational Implications of a Scientific Frontier.
New York: Basic Books.

11
  H. Simon (1981),
Sciences of the Artificial,
Cambridge, MA: MIT.

12
  Cited in Pablo Ordaz (2006), “Entrevista con la esposa de Jamal Ahmidan, ‘El Chino,’ jefe operativo del ‘comando’ del 11-M.”
El País,
March 8.

CHAPTER 13: THE ORDINARINESS OF TERROR

  1
  G. Berns et al. (2005), “Neurobiological Correlates of Social Conformity and Independence During Mental Rotation.”
Biological Psychiatry
58:245–53.

  2
  M. Gardner and L. Steinberg (2005), “Peer Influence on Risk Taking, Risk Preference, and Risky Decision Making in Adolescence and Adulthood: An Experimental Study.”
Developmental Psychology
41:625–35, p. 612.

  3
  R. Collins (2008),
Violence: A Micro-sociological Theory.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.

  4
  H. Arendt (1970),
Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil.
New York: Viking Press.

  5
  S. Milgram (1974),
Obedience to Authority.
New York: Harper & Row.

  6
  P. Zimbardo, “The Stanford Prison Experiment.” www.prisonexp.org.

  7
  M. Haritos-Fatouros (1988), “The Official Torturer: A Learning Model for Obedience to the Authority of Violence.”
Journal of Applied Social Psychology
18:1107–20.

  8
  W. Klein (2002), “Social Reality and Self-Construction: A Case of “Bounded Irrationality?”
Basic and Applied Social Psychology
24:105–114.

  9
  C. McCauley (1972), “Extremity Shifts, Risk Shifts, and Attitude Shifts After Group Discussion.”
European Journal of Social Psychology
2:417–36.

10
  N. Christakis and J. Fowler (2007), “The Spread of Obesity in a Large Network over 32 Years.”
New England Journal of Medicine,
357:370–79.

11
  J. Cacioppo, J. Fowler, and N. Christakis (2009), “Alone in the Crowd: The Structure and Spread of Loneliness in a Large Social Network.”
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
97 (6).

CHAPTER 14: PRYING INTO PAKISTAN

  1
  S. Atran (2006), “Is Hamas Ready to Deal?”
New York Times,
August 17.

  2
  S. Atran (2006), “Pakistan: Balancing Act.”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
6 (2), November–December.

  3
  Al Qaeda’s chief of operations, Abu Zubaydah, was captured in a LeT safehouse in Faisalabad, Pakistan, in March 2002. He was responsible for training Islamic militants in Qaeda training camps and contacting field operatives when an atttack was being planned.

  4
  A. Sen (2008), “Terrorists Planned 9/11 in India.”
Washington Times,
November 30. www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/nov/30/terrorists-planned-a-911-in-india/?page =2.

  5
  A. Sen (2008), “Shaken India Points Finger at ‘Neighbors.’”
Washington Times,
November 27. www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/nov/27/125-now-dead-indias–911.

  6
  A. Sen (2010), “Double Take: The U.S. Now Acknowledges Lashkar-e-Toiba’s Global Gambit.”Outlook (India), April 12. www.outlookindia. com/article.aspx?264924.

  7
  C. C. Fair (2007), “Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: A New Look at the Militancy-Madrassah Connection.”
Asia Policy
4:107–34. http://nbr.org/ publications/asia_policy/AP4/AP4%20Fair.pdf.

  8
  A. Arqam Naqash (2008). Reuters, December 12.

  9
  According to Indian police, Ajmal Amir Kasab, sole survivor of the ten-member Mumbai attack team, was a Punjabi who trained in Muzaf-farabad, the capital of Azad Kashmir, and later in other camps. Much like the Qaeda-affiliated camps along the Afghan border, LeT camps had twenty to thirty people at a time, and some of the trainers were former Pakistani army officers. There Ajmal trained in handling arms, navigating the sea and survival techniques, and how to use GPS, Google Earth maps, and video images of his targets. At some of the sessions, he told interrogators, Hafiz Saeed, the Lashkar leader, gave motivational speeches, covering a host of pan-Islamic grievances, from Kashmir and Afghanistan, to Iraq and Palestine.

10
  P. Hoodbhoy, interviewed by C. Otten (2008), “Die Menschen sin blind vor Hass.”
Focus-Online-Redakteurin.
www.focus.de/politik/ausland/tid-12856/pakistan-die-menschen-sind-blind-vor-hass_aid_355157.html.

11
  Pervez Hoodbhoy is a courageous man of outspoken opposition to nuclear armament and all forms of fanaticism. Early on, he publicly denounced Abdul Qadeer Khan, revered father of Pakistan’s atomic bomb, for corruption and warmongering. Hoodbhoy’s tireless efforts to foster peace with India through dialogue and film documentaries, to challenge all forms of religious discrimination, and to defend and enable women’s access to education and even simple medical care, have earned him wide reprobation in his own country as an “enemy of the State and God.” But others see him as reluctantly heroic and better than most, though he thinks better than none.

12
  N. Kralev and B. Slavin (2009), “Clinton Warns of Pakistan Nukes.”
Washington Times,
April 24.

13
  S. Gregory (2009), “The Terrorist Threat to Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons.”
CTC Sentinel
(Combating Terrorism Center at West Point) 2 (7). www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol2Iss7.pdf.

14
  S. Younger (2009),
The Bomb: A New History.
New York: Ecco.

15
  From S. Atran (2006), “Risk in the Wild: Reassessing Terrorist Threats from the Field.” Presentation to the Risk and Society panel, annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, St. Louis, February.