Talking to the Enemy: Faith, Brotherhood, and the (Un)Making of Terrorists (77 page)

18
  S. Qutb (1964; 1981),
Milestones [Ma’alim fi al-Tariq].
Mother Mosque Foundation.

CHAPTER 7: A PARALLEL UNIVERSE

  1
  “Jarrah ended up in Germany because the only other option his family left him was to marry his cousin in Canada” (Dirk Laabs, personal communication, June 13, 2007).

  2
  Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, mastermind of the 9/11 attack, also credited U.S. support for Israel as his main motive for wanting to kill Americans and Jews, and not his time spent at a small Baptist college and then at the North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University.

  3
  National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (2004),
Final Report,
September 22, p. 160. www.9–11commission.gov/ report/index.htm (hereafter, 9/11 Commission Report).

  4
  T. McDermott (2005),
Perfect Soldiers.
New York: HarperCollins, p. 54.

  5
  9/11 Commission Report and interrogations of Ramzi Bin al-Shibh (aka Omar), October 7, 2002, and May 20, 2003.

  6
  Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (2007),
Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in Al-Qa’ida 1989–2006,
September. www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/pdf/Harmony_3_Schism.pdf.

  7
  M. Sageman (2008),
Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-first Century.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

  8
  M. Sageman (2004),
Understanding Terror Networks,
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

  9
  D. Gambetta and S. Hertog (2006), “Engineers of Jihad.” Paper presented at the CSCW-PRIO Workshop on the Role of First Actors in Civil Wars, Oslo, August 17–18.

10
  M. Sageman,
Leaderless Jihad.

11
  K. Peraino (2008), “Destination Martyrdom: What Drove So Many Libyans to Volunteer as Suicide Bombers for the War in Iraq? A Visit to Their Hometown—the Dead-End City of Darnah.”
Newsweek,
April 19.

12
  Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (2007),
The Saudi Experience of Countering Terrorism.
Riyadh: Ministry of Interior, Document Processing Center.

CHAPTER 8: FARHIN’S WAY

  1
  S. Atran (2005), “In Indonesia, Democracy Isn’t Enough.”
New York Times,
October 5.

  2
  Agence France-Presse (2008), “Indonesia Executes Bali Bombers, Backlash Feared.” November 8.

  3
  See interviews in S. Neighbour (2005),
In the Shadow of Swords: On the Trail of Terrorism from Afghanistan to Australia,
Sydney: Harper Perennial, pp. 18–32.

  4
  Ibid., p. 91.

  5
  Farhin never gave a loyalty oath to Sungkar, nor was he ever “officially” JI, as were other Afghan Alumni who held titled positions. Indeed, most JI operatives were not “official,” namely Imam Samudra, operations chief of the Bali bombing, who stayed with Darul Islam.

  6
  P. Bergen (2006),
The Osama Bin Laden I Know.
New York: Free Press.

  7
  L. Wright (2006),
The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11.
New York: Knopf, p. 107.

  8
  P. Bergen and P. Cruickshank (2008) “Special Report: Is Al Qa’ida in Pieces?”
Independent,
June 22.

  9
  In 2007, Saudi scholar Sheikh Salman al-Qudah, one of Bin Laden’s former favorites for having urged Muslims to fight Americans stationed in Saudi Arabia, went on MBC Middle East television to denounce “my brother Osama” for killing “many innocent people, children, elderly, and women.” More than two-thirds of commentaries on the Al Jazeera Web site were favorable. Most telling is the book
Rationalization of Jihad
by Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (available in translation at www.lauramansfield.com/j/revisions.asp). In the book, Al Sharif, known as Dr. Fadl, denounces the “blemishing of
jihad”
with “grave violations of sharia in recent years [by] those who kill hundreds, including women and children, Muslims and non-Muslims, in the name of Jihad.” This is an important declaration by someone with impeccable jihadi credentials: Al-Sharif is an Egyptian surgeon who tended wounded mujahedin in the Soviet-Afghan war, cofounded a branch of Al Jihad with Zawahiri in Pakistan, operated on Bin Laden in Sudan after an attempted assassination, and wrote influential treatises defending the doctrine of
takfir,
which gives theological cover to targeting even Muslim civilians in Islam’s defense. This so unsettled Zawahiri that he penned his own book-size renunciation of his erstwhile mentor’s “revisionism.”

CHAPTER 9: THE ROAD TO BALI

  1
  Imam Samudra (2004),
Aku Melawan Teroris
[I Fight Terrorists]. Solo, Indonesia: Jazeera.

  2
  CNN (1997) Peter Arnett interviews Osama Bin Laden, March. www.anusha.com/osamaint.htm; www.robert-fisk.com/usama_interview_cnn.htm.

  3
  Printout in police interview with Imam Samudra, January 12, 2003, cited in S. Neighbour,
In the Shadow of Swords,
p. 316.

  4
  In Indonesia’s first parliamentary elections in 1955, the PNI (Indonesia National Party), the party founded by President Sukarno, the leader of the struggle for independence, garnered 22.3 percent of the vote and the Indonesian Communist Party 16.4 percent. These two parties combined fell just short of the 39.3 percent secured by the two main Muslim parties, Nahdlatul Ulama (“Revival of Islamic Scholars”) and Masyumi
(Partai Majelis Syuro Muslimin),
dedicated to setting up an Islamic state. When smaller nationalist, Christian, and left-wing parties are included, however, the non-Islamic parties slightly outperformed the combined Islamic parties.

  5
  E. Ho (2006),
The Graves of Tarim: Genealogy and Mobility Across the Indian Ocean,
Berkeley: University of California Press.

  6
  Abu Bakr Ba’asyir (2000), “A System for the Caderisation of Mujahidin in Creating an Islamic Society,” presented to the First Indonesian Congress of Mujahidin, Yogyakarta, August 5–7, trans. Tim Behrend. www.arts.auckland.ac.nz/FileGet.cfm?ID=1291fbbb-4eed-4eb8-bca4–375a0d95fa63.

  7
  S. Neighbour,
In the Shadow of Swords,
p. 155.

  8
  International Crisis Group (2003),
Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous.
Asia Report No. 63, August 26, p. 10. www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=1452.

  9
  International Crisis Group (2006),
Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s Networks.
Asia Report No. 114, May 5. www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4092.

10
  P. Lloyd (2003), “Imam Samudra to Face the Death Penalty,” transcript from ABC Radio (Australia), September 10. www.abc.net.au/am/content/2003/s942690.htm.

11
  International Crisis Group,
Terrorism in Indonesia,
p. 19.

12
  Ibid., p. 16.

13
  Indonesian security forces interrogation of Parmin, alias Yasir Abdul Baar alias Aslam, April 25, 2008.

14
  International Crisis Group (2010),
Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise in Aceh.
Asia Report No. 189, April 20, www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia /south-east-asia/indonesia/189-indonesia-surprise-in-aceh.aspx; T. Allard (2010), “Aceh Group Planned to Kill Yudhoyono,”
Sydney Morning Herald,
May 15.

15
  Cited in S. Atran (2005), “The Emir: An Interview with Abu Bakr Ba’asyir, Alleged Leader of the Southeast Asian Jemaah Islamiyah Organization.”
Spotlight on Terrorism
3:9, Jamestown Foundation. http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369782.

16
  S. Rionaldo (2009), “Two Indonesian Churches Receive Bomb Threats.”
Compass Direct News,
October 14. www.rightsidenews.com/200910146845/global-terrorism/two-indonesian-churches-receive-bomb-threats-from.html.

17
  P. Gelling (2009), “Radical Books Raise Fears in Indonesia of Spread of Militants’ Ideas.”
New York Times,
February 9.

CHAPTER 10: THE JI SOCIAL CLUB

  1
  D. Sevastopulo (2007), “Al-Qaeda Operative Admits Planning 9/11.”
Financial Times,
March 15.

  2
  CNN (2004), “Praise, Caution at Hambali Arrest.” CNN.com, February 26. www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/08/15/hambali.reax /index.html.

  3
  9/11 Commission Report, p. 154.

  4
  Nasir Abas and Ken Ward, personal communications, September 9–10, 2007.

  5
  S. Atran (2005), “The Emir: An Interview with Abu Bakr Ba’asyir, Alleged Leader of the Southeast Asian Jemaah Islamiyah Organization.”
Spotlight on Terrorism
3:9, Jamestown Foundation, http://james-town.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369782.

  6
  Testimony of Abu Bakr Bafana (2006),
United States v. Zacarías Mous-saoui,
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria, Virginia, March 8. http://cryptome.org/usa-v-zm-030806–01.htm.

  7
  Ibid.

  8
  9/11 Commission Report, p. 151.

  9
  Defendant’s exhibit 946,
United States v. Moussaoui
(No. 01–455), substitution for the testimony of Riduan Isamuddin (“Hambali”).

10
  Ibid.

11
  Ken Ward, former Australian intelligence officer, personal communication, September 5, 2006.

12
  Abu Rusdan was appointed caretaker JI emir in April 2002, when Ba’asyir was about to be arrested, though it was Zulkarnaen who chaired the meeting announcing the change. Abu Rusdan presided over the Markaziyah meeting on October 17, 2002, when Nasir Abas asked Zulkarnaen his famous question. Markaziyah secretary Abu Dujana issued the invitations. Zulkarnaen reported on the situation in Ambon. According to Abas, Zulkarnaen disappeared after that meeting. (Nasir Abas and Ken Ward, personal communication, September 10, 2007.)

13
  In a pretrial police interrogation, Mubarok said that Amrozi had sought approval from Ba’asyir for an event in Bali that he wanted to carry out with his brothers. Ba’asyir reportedly replied, “It’s up to you, as you know the situation in the field.” Later, Mubarok withdrew this statement. (Interrogation of Wan Min Wan Mat in Police Report No Pol:Lp02/III/2004/DENSUS 88 Anti Terror, case of Abu Bakr Ba’asyir, Kuala Lumpur, March 30, 2004.)

14
  Abu Bakr Ba’asyir (2000), “A System for the Caderisation of Mujahidin in Creating an Islamic Society.” Presented to the First Indonesian Congress of Mujahidin, Yogyakarta, August 5–7. Trans. Tim Behrend; available at http://www.arts.auckland.ac.nz/FileGet.cfm?ID=1291fbbb-4eed-4eb8-bca4–375a0d95fa63.

15
  There are two kinds of schools that provide explicit religious education in Indonesia. The first is an “Islamic day school” administered by the state and is called
madrassah negeri.
The second, dubbed
pesantren,
is privately funded and administered and has no explicit ties to the state and very little oversight. The term
madrassah
(pl.
madaris)
is used to refer to both Islamic day schools and to
pesantrens.

16
  J. Magouirk and S. Atran (2008), “Jemaah Islamiyah’s Radical Madrassah Network.”
Dynamics of Asymmetric Warfare
1 (1).

17
  Ali Imron (2004),
Ali Imron Sang Pengebom (Ali Imron, the Bomber).
Jakarta: Republika Press.