Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (90 page)

184
‘3rd Pz. Gr. KTB 25.5.41 – 31.8.41’ BA-MA Microfilm 59054, Fol. 216 (17 August 1941). Strauss returned to command the 9th Army on 5 September 1941. In January 1942 he again had to request a leave of absence on the basis of poor health, but this time his condition was much more serious. A doctor's report in April 1942 made it clear that Strauss had suffered severe heart problems and that over the past four years he had been addicted to sleeping pills. See ‘Personalakten für Strauss, Adolf’ BA-MA Pers 6/56, Fol. 34 (14 April 1942).

185
Glantz,
Battle for Smolensk
, p. 62.

186
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Osten I’, Fols. 66–67,
War Diary
, pp. 285–287 (17, 18 and 19 August 1941).

187
‘Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 (Band August 1941) des Oberkommandos der Heeresgruppe Mitte’ BA-MA RH 19II/386, pp. 355–356 (20 August 1941); Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Osten I’, Fols. 67–68,
War Diary
, p. 287 (20 August 1941).

188
‘3rd Pz. Gr. KTB 25.5.41 – 31.8.41’ BA-MA Microfilm 59054, Fol. 227 (21 August 1941); ‘Kriegstagebuch Nr.3 der 7.Panzer-Division Führungsabteilung 1.6.1941 – 9.5.1942’ BA-MA RH 27–7/46, Fol. 104 (21 August 1941). See also Bock's comments: Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Osten I’, Fol. 68,
War Diary
, p. 288 (21 August 1941); Werner Haupt,
Army Group Center. The Wehrmacht in Russia 1941–1945
(Atglen, 1997), p. 67.

189
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Osten I’, Fol. 74,
War Diary
, p. 294 (26 August 1941).

190
Ibid., Fol. 72, pp. 292–293 (24 August 1941).

191
Ibid., Fol. 73, pp. 292–293 (24 August 1941). The English translation of this quotation incorrectly dates it to 24 August.

192
Ibid., Fols. 75–76, p. 295 (28 August 1941); Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 202 (28 August 1941).

193
It is an instructive background to the megalomaniac practices of the Nazi state that throughout 1941, in spite of the demands of the front, Hitler refused to scale back any of the enormous building projects he had commissioned for Berlin and Nuremberg. Albert Speer, Hitler's architect and later minister for armaments, explained that on 20 August he told an astonished Admiral Lorey, the commander of the Berlin armoury, that on Hitler's orders he needed 230 captured pieces of heavy enemy artillery to line Berlin's central boulevard. Any extra large tanks were to be reserved for positioning in front of important buildings. In addition, contracts to the value of 30 million Reichmarks were awarded to companies in Sweden, Norway and Finland for granite. Speer,
Inside the Third Reich
, p. 259.

194
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 187 (18 August 1941).

195
Blumentritt, ‘Moscow’, pp. 51–52.

196
Haape with Henshaw,
Moscow Tram Stop
, p. 112.

197
As quoted in Kershaw,
War Without Garlands
, p. 117.

198
Lammers (ed.),
Fahrtberichte
, pp. 255–257 (20 and 22 August 1941).

199
Overmans,
Deutsche militärische Verluste
, p. 277.

200
Müller-Hillebrand,
Das Heer 1933–1945
, Band III, p. 19.

201
Glantz,
Battle for Smolensk
, p. 74.

202
Geyer,
Das IX. Armeekorps im Ostfeldzug 1941
, p. 122. See also ‘Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 (Band August 1941) des Oberkommandos der Heeresgruppe Mitte’ BA-MA RH 19II/386, p. 381 (25 August 1941).

203
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 182 (16 August 1941).

204
Glantz,
Battle for Smolensk
, pp. 74–76.

205
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Osten I’, Fol. 78,
War Diary
, p. 298 (30 August 1941).

206
Ibid., Fol. 82, p. 302 (2 September 1941).

207
Frisch with Jones, Jr.,
Condemned to Live
, pp. 74–77.

208
Georg Grossjohann,
Five Years, Four Fronts. The War Years of Georg Grossjohann, Major, German Army (Retired)
(Bedford, 1999), pp. 40–41.

209
As quoted in Fritz,
Frontsoldaten
, p. 62.

210
As quoted in Knopp,
Der verdammte Krieg
, p. 91.

211
Bähr and Bähr (eds.),
Kriegsbriefe gefallener Studenten
, p. 74 (18 August 1941).

212
Ibid., p. 75 (22 August 1941).

213
Theodor Mogge's unpublished account was recorded in 1978.

214
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 213 (3 September 1941).

215
Ibid., p. 199 (26 August 1941).

216
Knappe with Brusaw,
Soldat
, p. 219.

217
As quoted in Muller,
The German Air War in Russia
, p. 57.

218
Hürter,
Ein deutscher General
, p. 74 (9 August 1941).

219
‘Kriegstagebuch Nr.3 der 7.Panzer-Division Führungsabteilung 1.6.1941 – 9.5.1942’ BA-MA RH 27–7/46, Fol. 104 (22 August 1941).

220
‘KTB 3rd Pz. Div. vom 16.8.40 bis 18.9.41’ BA-MA RH 27–3/14, p. 187 (22 August 1941).

221
As quoted in Steiger,
Armour Tactics
, p. 69.

222
David Irving,
The Rise and Fall of the Luftwaffe: The Life of Erhard Milch
(London, 1973), p. 131.

223
Murray,
The Luftwaffe
, p. 84.

224
Muller,
German Air War in Russia
, p. 57.

225
Boog, ‘Die Luftwaffe’, pp. 300–301.

226
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 167 (10 August 1941).

227
Ibid., p. 172 (11 August 1941).

228
Gareis,
Kampf
, p. 125.

229
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 202 (28 August 1941).

230
Klaus Schüler, ‘The Eastern Campaign’, p. 213, footnote 6.

231
Ibid., p. 213, footnotes 6 and 8.

232
Earl F. Ziemke,
The German Northern Theater of Operations 1940–1945
(Washington DC, 1959), p. 176.

233
‘KTB Nr.1 Panzergruppe 2 Bd.II vom 22.7.1941 bis 20.8.41’ BA-MA RH 21–2/928, Fol. 294 (19 August 1941).

234
‘Kriegstagebuch der 10.Panzer Division Nr.5 vom: 22.5. bis: 7.10.41’ BA-MA RH 27–10/26b (17 August 1941).

235
‘Panzerarmeeoberkommandos Anlagen zum Kriegstagesbuch “Berichte, Besprechungen, Beurteilungen der Lage” Bd.IV 22.7.41 – 31.8.41’ BA-MA RH 21–3/47, Fols. 78–79 (21 August 1941).

236
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 104 (23 July 1941).

237
Figures for Schmidt's XXXIX Panzer Corps (12th Panzer Division, 18th and 20th Motorised Infantry Divisions) were not listed.

238
‘Panzerarmeeoberkommandos Anlagen zum Kriegstagesbuch “Berichte, Besprechungen, Beurteilungen der Lage”’ Bd.IV 22.7.41 – 31.8.41’ BA-MA RH 21–3/47, Fols. 78–79 (21 August 1941). See also ‘3rd Pz. Gr. KTB 25.5.41 – 31.8.41’ BA-MA Microfilm 59054, Fol. 231 (23 August 1941).

239
‘Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 (Band August 1941) des Oberkommandos der Heeresgruppe Mitte’ BA-MA RH 19II/386, p. 364 (22 August 1941).

240
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 195 (23 August 1941).

241
Müller, ‘Das Scheitern der wirtschaftlichen “Blitzkriegstrategie”’, p. 976.

242
Müller-Hillebrand,
Das Heer 1933–1945
, Band III, pp. 20 and 205.

243
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 195 (22 August 1941).

244
Von Luck,
Panzer Commander
, p. 60.

245
As quoted in Clark,
Barbarossa
, p. 55. Clark provides no date for this quote, but includes it in his discussion of the early summer campaign.

246
Harrison E. Salisbury (ed.),
Marshal Zhukov's Greatest Battles
(London, 1971), p. 155. See also Besymenski,
Sonderakte Barbarossa
, pp. 299–300.

10 Showdown

Hitler's triumph in defeat

Hitler's long period of procrastination before finally reaching a decision over strategy in the east was not without consequences for commanders on the front. The absence of a clear strategic directive caused hesitancy and confusion about where particular forces were to be deployed along the front, and what timetable they could expect for the commencement of operations. There were also major strategic questions such as the holding of the Yel'nya salient which was being stubbornly defended on nothing more than an assumption of what the next phase of the campaign would be. The uncertainty was especially troubling for
Guderian as he was constantly unsure how much strength he should devote to his offensive in the south. On 18 August he wrote in a letter to his wife:

This situation has a bad effect upon on the troops, for everyone is aware of the absence of harmony. That is the product of unclear orders and counter-orders, absence of instructions sometimes for weeks…we are missing so many opportunities. But it is annoying when no one knows the reasons. These most probably cannot be put right in this war which we will win despite it all. That is human nature in great moments and with great men.
¹

Guderian's Chief of Staff, Colonel Kurt Freiherr von
Liebenstein, also noted the absence of clarity and even the outright contradictions in the issuing of orders, leading to his conclusion: ‘The troops must think we are crazy.’
²
While Guderian's forces were constantly being pushed south by Hitler's desire to clean up the southern flank and exploit successes, at the army group headquarters, under Bock's wilful tutelage, there was an attempt to resolve the ambiguity by favouring
Moscow as the clear priority. When
Greiffenburg met with
Weckmann on 17 August to clarify the coming offensive operations, the Chief of Staff of Army Group Centre told his counterpart at 9th Army: ‘The enemy in front of the army group is to be destroyed. The armies will break through
in the general direction of Moscow.’
³
Similarly, on 19 August Bock set his sights firmly on Moscow and urged Weichs to make all haste in concluding the operations in the south. This, together with a successful drive towards
Velikie Luki, would mean in Bock's estimation, ‘the entire army group can attack towards the east’.
⁴

The joint proposals prepared and submitted by Warlimont and
Heusinger on 18 August had received no direct response from Hitler by 20 August and so Heusinger was sent to meet with
Jodl in order to gauge the mood at the Wolf 's Lair. Jodl had certainly been predisposed towards Halder's plans, but his interview with Heusinger now betrayed real doubts. Jodl certainly possessed an intimate knowledge of Hitler's moods and frame of mind, and the events of the past days must have impressed upon Jodl the dictator's rejuvenated determination and stubborn unwillingness for any further deliberation on his chosen strategic solution. Jodl was also extremely wary of challenging Hitler when he knew his mind was made up, which stemmed partly from raw pragmatism, but also owed a debt to the enduring Führer myth of which Jodl was a compliant disciple. Thus, according to Heusinger's account, Jodl was now quite reluctant to have anything more to do with the OKH's plans. Undeterred, Heusinger again pressed the importance of Moscow and defeating the ‘life strength’ of the Red Army. After this, he concluded, ‘everything else will fall into our lap’. Jodl is said to have retorted: ‘That's what
you
say. Now let me tell you what the Führer's answer will be: There is at the moment a much better possibility of beating the Russian forces. Their main grouping is now east of Kiev.’ Heusinger, however, stood his ground and raised the issue of the coming winter which, he reminded Jodl, would arrive earlier in the northern and central sectors than in the south. Ultimately Jodl agreed to continue doing what he could to support the OKH's plans, but his resolve was clearly weakening and he warned Heusinger: ‘You must admit that the Führer's reasons are well thought out though and cannot be pushed aside just like that…One must not try to compel him to do something which goes against his inner convictions. His intuition has generally been right. You can't deny that!’
⁵

The fact that
Halder's support at the OKW was drying up came as a direct result of Hitler's new found sense of purpose and the emphatic tone with which he now dictated the strategic goals of the campaign. On the same day that Heusinger was appealing for continued support from Jodl (20 August), Hitler was unequivocal in his rejection of the
OKH's memorandum.
⁶
With clear instructions for the future course of the war, the subservient OKW soon abandoned any independent ideas, and indeed sought to rein in the wayward OKH. On 21 August the head of the OKW, Field Marshal
Keitel, appeared at Halder's headquarters with the task, according to Warlimont, of winning Halder over to Hitler's point of view, or at least weakening his opposition to the diversion of Bock's panzers.
⁷
Keitel must have known that Hitler's mind was already firmly made up; he was careful, however, not to disappoint all of Halder's hopes and left the army's Chief of Staff with the impression that Hitler's final decision was still pending. Instead, Keitel told Halder that Hitler was insisting on carrying through the northern operation towards Leningrad, and in the south sought to eliminate the Soviet 5th Army.
⁸
If Keitel tried to convince Halder of Hitler's strategic wisdom it was probably nothing more than Halder expected from a man with such blind obedience to the Führer. In any case, Halder had never hoped for, nor counted on, support from Keitel. Whatever passed between them that day, it seems from Halder's record of the meeting that he still had no idea just how far events had progressed against him. On that same day (21 August), Hitler instructed Jodl to draft new orders for the OKH detailing the direction of future operations.
⁹
These would reach Halder's office late in the evening and strike, according to Heusinger, ‘like a
bomb’.
¹⁰
Hitler's army adjutant, Major
Engel, simply dubbed it: ‘A black day for the army’.
¹¹