Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (93 page)

Throughout late August and September operations on the flanks of Army Group Centre became the focus of German operations and led to more hard won battlefield victories, but at an ever increasing cost to their dwindling offensive strength.
⁵⁴
Even the great encirclement battle at
Kiev, which has in the past attracted attention for its supposed significance as the quintessential example of German operational perfectionism, is in need of careful revision. The same problems, so devastatingly prevalent in the summer campaign, worsened in the autumn, while the German command remained incurably divided and fatally blind to its growing weaknesses. The attritional drain that had begun from the first day of Operation Barbarossa had progressed so far by the end of two months that Germany no longer possessed the ability to defeat the Soviet Union in 1941. Future battles, whether centred on Moscow or the Ukraine, were simply not able to crush the Red Army and conquer the Soviet Union, undermining the persistent arguments favouring one strategic alternative over another. Failure to end the war in another blitzkrieg campaign entailed destructive consequences for Germany and this was a foreseeable reality by the late summer of 1941. On 23 August
Ribbentrop conceded to the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, General
Oshima, that the war against the Soviet Union might last into 1942.
⁵⁵
Furthermore, an OKW memorandum dated 27 August stated: ‘The mandatory collapse of Russia is the next, decisive objective, which must be reached by employing all the troops that can be spared on other fronts. If this aim is not achieved in 1941, the continuation of the eastern campaign will have first priority in 1942.’
⁵⁶
Three days later on 30 August von
Hassell wrote in his diary: ‘Hitler is pressing hard for swift advances, but the Army High Command has certain misgivings…In any event, it is generally believed that there will be a Russian front through the winter.’
⁵⁷
Even
Halder now recognised the futility of seeking a knockout blow against the USSR and on 23 August, presumably after hearing the result of Guderian's fateful meeting with Hitler, he wrote to his wife: ‘The goal which I had set myself to achieve, namely to finish off the Russians in this year, will not be attained and we will have a strength-draining eastern front over the winter.’
⁵⁸
Yet Halder was still incapable of understanding the full implications of this for Germany's chances in the ongoing world war. It was only in late November 1941, long after the intended blitzkrieg had failed, that Halder belatedly observed: ‘It is possible that
the war is shifting from the level of military success to the level of moral and economic
endurance.’
⁵⁹
To others in the German command, the decisive importance of the summer of 1941 became clear after the war. Although erroneously claiming that Hitler ruined the army's grand plan for assured victory by not striking towards Moscow,
Heusinger and
Hoth both identified the summer campaign as the turning point of the war. As Heusinger wrote:

The Army High Command's opposition to this decision [to send Guderian and Weichs south into the Ukraine] had been in vain. Hitler had brushed all their arguments aside. He left the ground of purely operational command following basic military principles in favour of other aspects. This was the decisive turning point of the Eastern campaign.
⁶⁰

Likewise, Hoth described Hitler's plan to strike towards the north and south as ‘
the
decision of the war’.
⁶¹

In the strategic crisis that dominated the German command for a month in July and August 1941, Hitler emerged the undisputed victor. He not only asserted his authority over the army and prevailed against almost unanimous opposition, but his strategic choice was certainly the wiser alternative given both German logistical constraints and the dreadful Soviet strategic deployment in the south. Yet his triumph in taking control of the campaign from the OKH was never really in doubt once he had made up his mind to do so, and even if he did offer a better alternative for the next phase of the campaign, by the late summer of 1941, he could not change the fundamentally flawed undertaking that Barbarossa represented. If Hitler's victory over the army was any kind of victory at all, it was only a hollow success in a war that was doomed to be lost. Perhaps, therefore, the historical reference to a ‘July/August crisis’ should be thought of, not in reference to a somewhat trivial strategic debate fought out between the military commanders and Hitler, but rather as a reflection of the catastrophic predicament Germany now confronted in the east.

1
Guderian's letter as cited by Macksey,
Guderian
, p. 144.

2
Ibid., p. 146.

3
‘Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 (Band August 1941) des Oberkommandos der Heeresgruppe Mitte’ BA-MA RH 19II/386, p. 341 (17 August 1941).

4
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Osten I’, Fol. 67,
War Diary
, p. 287 (19 August 1941).

5
Italics in original. Heusinger,
Befehl im Widerstreit
, pp. 132–135.

6
KTB OKW, Volume II, p. 1061, Document 97 (20 August 1941); Mendelssohn,
Die Nürnberger Dokumente
, p. 411.

7
Warlimont,
Im Hauptquartier
, Band I, p. 203. Warlimont's memoir states that Jodl accompanied Keitel, but Halder's diary makes no mention of Jodl.

8
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 191 (21 August 1941).

9
Warlimont,
Im Hauptquartier
, Band I, p. 204.

10
As cited in Meyer,
Heusinger
, p. 156.

11
Von Kotze (ed.),
Heeresadjutant bei Hitler 1938–1943
, p. 110 (21 August 1941).

12
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 192 (22 August 1941).

13
KTB OKW, Volume II, p. 1062, Document 99 (21 August 1941).

14
Ibid., p. 1063 (21 August 1941).

15
KTB OKW, Volume II, pp. 1063–1068, Document 100 (22 August 1941).

16
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 193 (22 August 1941).

17
Ibid. (22 August 1941).

18
As cited in Meyer,
Heusinger
, p. 156.

19
Halder's letter as cited by Schall-Riaucour,
Aufstand und Gehorsam
, p. 168 (23 August 1941). See also Hartmann,
Halder Generalstabschef Hitlers 1938–1942
, p. 283.

20
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Osten I’, Fols. 69–70,
War Diary
, pp. 288–289 (22 August 1941). Fol. 70 of Bock's KTB ‘Osten I’ has been bound in the wrong order and can be found between fols. 52 and 53.

21
Guderian,
Panzer Leader
, p. 198.

22
‘Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 (Band August 1941) des Oberkommandos der Heeresgruppe Mitte’ BA-MA RH 19II/386, pp. 364–365 (22 August 1941).

23
Underlining in the original. ‘Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 (Band August 1941) des Oberkommandos der Heeresgruppe Mitte’ BA-MA RH 19II/386, p. 365 (22 August 1941).

24
Underlining in the original. Ibid., p. 366 (22 August 1941).

25
Ibid. (22 August 1941).

26
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 194 (23 August 1941).

27
Underlining in the original. ‘Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 (Band August 1941) des Oberkommandos der Heeresgruppe Mitte’ BA-MA RH 19II/386, pp. 371–372 (23 August 1941).

28
This figure comes from Bock's diary, although Army Group Centre's war diary discusses the same problem and cites the distance as 300 kilometres. The discrepancy may be explained by the difference in distance that individual divisions would have to travel. Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Osten I’, Fol. 71,
War Diary
, p. 291 (23 August 1941). ‘Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 (Band August 1941) des Oberkommandos der Heeresgruppe Mitte’ BA-MA RH 19II/386, p. 374 (23 August 1941).

29
‘Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 (Band August 1941) des Oberkommandos der Heeresgruppe Mitte’ BA-MA RH 19II/386, p. 374 (23 August 1941).

30
Haape with Henshaw,
Moscow Tram Stop
, p. 88.

31
Guderian,
Panzer Leader
, p. 195; Frisch with Jones, Jr.,
Condemned to Live
, p. 74.

32
As quoted in Kershaw,
War Without Garlands
, p. 121.

33
As quoted in Knopp,
Der verdammte Krieg
, p. 91.

34
Stahlberg,
Bounden Duty
, p. 172.

35
As quoted in Kershaw,
War Without Garlands
, p. 122.

36
Guderian,
Panzer Leader
, p. 198.

37
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 111 (25 July 1941).

38
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Osten I’, Fol. 71,
War Diary
, p. 291 (23 August 1941).

39
Von Gersdorff,
Soldat im Untergang
, p. 95.

40
Guderian,
Panzer Leader
, p. 199.

41
Ibid.

42
Ibid.

43
Ibid., p. 200.

44
According to Gersdorff, an unidentified officer of the OKH who was also said to have attended Guderian's meeting with Hitler later gave another version of events. Hitler apparently dominated the conference, refusing to allow Guderian to get a word in, and only after an unending monologue spanning economic and political considerations did Hitler say: ‘Now then my dear Colonel-General, you will do what I order.’ To which Guderian is said to have simply replied: ‘Yes, my Führer.’ Von Gersdorff,
Soldat im Untergang
, pp. 95–96.

45
Guderian,
Panzer Leader
, p. 200.

46
Macksey,
Guderian
, pp. 145–147; Macksey, ‘Generaloberst Heinz Guderian’, p. 83; Macksey, ‘Guderian’, pp. 452–453.

47
In spite of his claims to the contrary, in his time as an active field commander in the east Guderian's units have been shown to have repeatedly implemented Hitler's criminal orders. Later Guderian avoided giving any aid to the plotters planning to assassinate Hitler and he even sat briefly on the notorious Court of Honour set up to condemn and execute many of the plot's participants. During his time as Chief of the General Staff he presided over some of the most draconian orders ever issued in the German army. These accounted for the deaths of thousands of German soldiers who were hanged or shot as deserters. For two contrasting depictions of Guderian's role in the war see Macksey, ‘Guderian’, pp. 441–460 and Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, ‘Heinz Guderian – “Panzerpapst” und Generalstabschef ’ in Ronald Smelser and Enrico Syring (eds.),
Die Militärelite des Dritten Reiches. 27 biographische Skizzen
(Berlin, 1995), pp. 187–208.

48
Von Below,
Als Hitlers Adjutant 1937–45
, p. 288.

49
Guderian,
Panzer Leader
, p. 202.

50
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 195 (24 August 1941).

51
Guderian,
Panzer Leader
, p. 202.

52
‘Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 (Band August 1941) des Oberkommandos der Heeresgruppe Mitte’ BA-MA RH 19II/386, p. 375 (24 August 1941).

53
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Osten I’, Fols. 71–72,
War Diary
, pp. 291–292 (24 August 1941).

54
Michael Geyer accurately summed up the German strategic dilemma at the end of the 1941 summer: ‘What more could be done than to defeat major parts of the Russian army? How could one break the will of a nation that would not surrender, but recuperated again and again, while German forces became weaker and weaker? More battles could be won, perhaps at Leningrad, at Moscow, or in the Ukraine, but obviously one could win battles and lose the war. This was the main operational problem after August 1941. It was the insoluble operational problem for an army and a political leadership that had come to believe that the mere accumulation of success would ensure victory. This is a prime example of strategic decadence, but by no means the last of its kind’ (Geyer, ‘German Strategy’, p. 591).

55
Chapman, ‘The Imperial Japanese Navy’, p. 178.

56
Document as cited by Reinhardt,
Moscow – The Turning Point
, p. 39; Reinhardt, ‘Moscow 1941. The Turning Point’, p. 210.

57
Von Hassell,
Vom andern Deutschland
, p. 220 (30 August 1941); von Hassell,
Diaries
, p. 191 (30 August 1941).

58
Halder's letter as cited by Schall-Riaucour,
Aufstand und Gehorsam
, p. 168 (23 August 1941).

59
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 306 (23 November 1941).

60
As cited by Dieter Ose, ‘Smolensk: Reflections on a Battle’ in David M. Glantz (ed.),
The Initial Period of War
, p. 351.

61
Italics in the original. Hoth,
Panzer-Operationen
, p. 124.