Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (40 page)

On 30 June Guderian flew to Hoth's headquarters for discussion of the next stage of their advance. Both commanders were becoming increasingly infuriated at the perceived procrastination of higher command and it is not outside the realm of possibility that their joint disobedience to the restrictive orders was discussed and even planned. Although it is important to point out that nothing so exact exists among the primary material, subsequent events strongly indicate a degree of co-ordinated action in blatant defiance of orders. It was also well within the character of each man to ‘interpret’ their orders in terms of the wider strategic goals of the campaign and therefore implement actions as they saw fit, conveniently excusing themselves from any meticulous definition of insubordination.
¹³⁷
This introduces the question of whether a commander's operational freedom, practised under the concept of
Auftragstaktik
¹³⁸
(mission tactics), was sometimes abused, especially by the panzer
commanders.

Given the need to reorganise forces for the renewed attack,
Halder was not prepared to release the panzer divisions until 5 July.
¹³⁹
Subsequent pressure finally brought this forward to 3 July, although even this represented more of a delay than the panzer commanders would have liked. Agreeing on an exact starting date was in many respects aimed purely at placating higher command, as in practice there were already much
more than just reconnaissance forces striking out to the east. From their meeting, both Hoth and Guderian reaffirmed their determination that it was ‘high time’ for forthright action towards the
Dvina and
Dnepr Rivers to prevent Soviet forces consolidating their defensive positions.
¹⁴⁰

In addition to the obstructions of higher command, they faced sizeable obstacles in implementing the next stage of the advance because of the hard fought battle at Minsk. On 29 June a tour of inspection by General of Panzer Troops Wilhelm Ritter von
Thoma reported that while an extensive halt in operations was not necessary, the 3rd
Panzer Group would nevertheless have only 70 per cent of its panzer forces fit for service by 2 July.
¹⁴¹
Although a sizeable number of the 30 per cent shortfall were only broken down and therefore salvageable in the long term, the significance of such a dire rate of attrition in tank numbers was made all the more striking by the fact that it was only the eighth day of the war.

A
further omen of foreboding consequence, reminiscent of Hitler's obtuse belief that ardent conviction alone could alter fact, appeared in the form of Guderian's baseless confidence in the security of his southern side to the ring. Contrary to intelligence reports and events on the ground, Guderian's belief that no serious threat existed to his rear area was further reinforced by his flight to Hoth's headquarters, which swept over the Puszcza Nalibocka forested area and convinced Guderian that, in contrast to the army group and 4th Army, ‘there were no considerable enemy forces in the forest and that there was, therefore, no danger from this quarter’.
¹⁴²
Although excluded from his memoirs, events would prove otherwise, questioning the merit of Guderian's airborne assessment and the dependence he placed upon it. This was especially true given his own observation that the Red Army's ‘battle technique, particularly his camouflage, was excellent’.
¹⁴³

At the same time as Guderian and Hoth had been planning the next phase of their operations,
Brauchitsch hosted a meeting at his home attended by
Hitler,
Halder and
Heusinger. Halder began proceedings with a summary of operations and then Hitler spoke of the importance he attached to securing the Gulf of
Finland and eliminating the threat to ore shipments posed by the Soviet fleet. In contrast to Hitler's intentions over the preceding months, Halder's record of the meeting claimed that
Hitler was ‘not sure’ whether additional panzer forces for the rapid seizure of
Leningrad would have to be made available by Bock.
¹⁴⁴
Conceivably, under pressure from Halder and Brauchitsch, who may only have had to laud the successes of Leeb's progress, Hitler was compelled to waver on the issue of diverting strength from
Army Group Centre. The encouraging reports left Hitler in a buoyant mood, giving Heusinger the impression that one was ‘completely free to speak with him’, even to the point of telling him things ‘that maybe he wouldn't normally
accept’.
¹⁴⁵

In addition to his discussion of operations in the north, Hitler also expanded on the importance of the
Ukraine for its food supply and industry, underlining the importance of economic goals in Hitler's strategic conception. Yet significantly the one available record of the meeting (from Halder's diary) includes no indication that Hitler was yet considering an alternative diversion of Bock's panzers to the south. In Hitler's estimation, comparatively little significance was attached to the march on
Moscow, which he forecast could only be undertaken by infantry units, at the earliest in August, once
Smolensk had been secured. Only when the northern theatre of operations had been satisfactorily dealt with would Hitler release armoured forces to assist the infantry in the drive on Moscow.
¹⁴⁶
Whatever the case, the future employment of
Army Group Centre was still undecided following the 30 June meeting and would not be conclusively settled until Smolensk was in German hands.

On the surface, the result of the meeting seemed to offer Halder and Brauchitsch a promising format to end Hitler's opposition to their plans for a continued drive on Moscow with the full force of Army Group Centre. The key would be ensuring
Army Group North carried out the drive on Leningrad under its own strength, allaying Hitler's fears of cutting the Soviets off from the Baltic and freeing Bock's panzer forces for a direct thrust on Moscow. Yet Halder and Brauchitsch must also have recognised that there were few certainties in dealing with Hitler, who could be as impetuous as he was stubborn, especially with the ever changing fortunes of war. Above all, an amicable solution was hoped for, but the army commanders were determined to drive for Moscow. In their view this was the linchpin of victory against the Soviet Union and accordingly a matter of uncompromising importance. If Hitler overruled the army on a matter of such decisive significance, it would constitute a direct challenge to the authority of Halder and Brauchitsch – an issue which had long since become a persistent and tiresome source of irritation for
both men. For the moment, however, the external facade of harmonious relations was maintained, with the army commanders hoping anxiously to win Hitler
over.

Reviewing preparations for the continuation of the advance scheduled for 3 July,
Halder noted the disparity between the
9th Army and Panzer
Group 3 in the north and the
4th Army and Panzer
Group 2 in the south, with the latter two noticeably less prepared. The liquidation of the pocket was dominating all 4th Army's resources, while Panzer Group 2, Halder complained, ‘against all orders and with a measure of defiance has failed to mop up the territory traversed by it and now has its hands full with local enemy breakthroughs’.
¹⁴⁷
Personnel losses were another stark indication of the difficulties confronting
Guderian in the south, particularly as a result of his exposed left flank. On 2 July Hoth's panzer group reported officer casualties at 125 men and all other ranks at 1,644 men;
¹⁴⁸
by contrast Guderian's group, in a casualties report from two days earlier on 30 June, recorded officer losses to be already twice those of Hoth (246 men) and all other ranks at well over double Hoth's losses (4,143 men).
¹⁴⁹
Guderian, however, remained resolutely undeterred and focused himself entirely on the next big push east. Yet the issue of firmly closing the eastern pocket was again a matter of central importance at
Hitler's headquarters on 2 July and
Brauchitsch was summoned to see what could be done.
¹⁵⁰
By the time Brauchitsch had concluded his report, which was based in some measure on an earlier discussion with
Bock that confirmed the pocket was far from hermetically sealed, Hitler's nervous anxiety had reached such heights that he was considering a postponement to the renewed advance of the panzer forces. When Bock was later informed of this possibility, he reacted with exasperation, claiming that the operation had already been delayed too long.
¹⁵¹
Halder too was now eager to avoid any delay and, after receiving a clarification of the situation from Bock and garnering the support of Brauchitsch and Jodl, the Army
Chief of Staff visited the Wolf's Lair personally to allay Hitler's fears and assure him that the renewed offensive could proceed as
planned.
¹⁵²

Among the tangible measures Halder took to seal the perimeter of the pocket and restore Hitler's confidence was a particular order to Guderian that units of his panzer group were forbidden ‘from being pulled out of the encircling ring without orders’.
¹⁵³
The order came about as it had become evident Guderian was siphoning-off forces from the ring to strengthen his main attack, a circumstance that produced the first open clash between
Kluge and Guderian and plainly illustrated the difficulties commanders were having balancing operational demands with available
forces.

Map 3 
Dispositions of Army Group Centre 1 July 19411: David M. Glantz,
Atlas and Operational Summary The Border Battles 22 June–1 July 1941

As recently as 1 July, Guderian had again been specifically ordered by the army group command not to endanger the encirclement of enemy forces west of
Minsk by drafting more forces into the upcoming offensive.
¹⁵⁴
Attributing such hesitation to another bout of Hitler's over-anxious trepidation, Guderian wrote to his wife on 1 July: ‘Everybody is scared of the Führer and nobody dares say anything. Regrettably, this is what causes a useless waste of blood.’
¹⁵⁵
Unyielding as always and contrary to his instructions, Guderian ordered the
17th Panzer Division away from the encircling ring towards Borisov, only to have his order quickly countermanded by Kluge (see
Map 3
).
¹⁵⁶
On the following day (2 July) Guderian visited the 17th Panzer Division holding the long, eastern segment of the pocket front and, although no record exists of what was said,
¹⁵⁷
the 17th Panzer Division subsequently departed for Borisov. When Guderian returned to his headquarters he dispatched a communiqué to Kluge at 4th Army claiming that a mishap had occurred in the transmission of orders to the 17th Panzer Division and that the division had not received the order to remain on the encirclement front and had instead set off for Borisov. According to Guderian, it was too late to do anything about it. On the same day a similar ‘mishap’ had occurred on Hoth's front, causing Kluge to seethe with fury that, on the eve of his ascension to the new command of
4th Panzer Army, which controlled Hoth's and Guderian's panzer groups, he was being confronted by
a generals’ conspiracy.
¹⁵⁸
He demanded that Guderian present himself the following morning at 8 a.m. with the intention of having both panzer generals brought before a court-martial for insubordination. When Guderian appeared he was strongly taken to task for what he subsequently referred to as ‘the accident’, but in the end Guderian was able to convince Kluge that it was indeed only a misunderstanding and that it would be best to let the matter
rest.
¹⁵⁹

The escalation in tension between Kluge and his panzer generals highlights the widening disparity in opposing strategic conceptions, brought to the fore so quickly by the headstrong refusal of Guderian to compromise his own plans or defer to higher authority even in the face of direct orders. Yet, the overall strategic problem confronting the army group was not a simple one, and certainly presented more of a danger than either of the two panzer generals was aware of or prepared to
admit. An untitled memorandum sent to
Army Group Centre on 3 July outlined the problem categorically, which confirms that the imposing nature of the predicament, as well as its seriousness, was not unknown to the army. The memorandum stated: