Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (44 page)

44
Ibid., Fol. 4, p. 228 (26 June 1941).

45
Ibid. (26 June 1941).

46
Fugate,
Operation Barbarossa
, p. 111; Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 14 (25 June 1941). An insight into the fanatical resistance of the Soviet garrison at Brest is provided in Albert Axell,
Russia's Heroes, 1941–45: An Epic Account of Struggle and Survival on the Eastern Front
(London, 2001),
Chapter 2
, ‘The Hero Fortress’. See also the first-hand accounts provided in Robert Kershaw,
War Without Garlands. Operation Barbarossa 1941/42
(New York, 2000), pp. 47–51, 59–60, 65–67, 78–79.

47
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Osten I’, Fol. 5,
War Diary
, p. 229 (26 June 1941).

48
Alfred Durrwanger, ‘28th Infantry Division Operations’ in David M. Glantz (ed.),
The Initial Period of War on the Eastern Front 22 June–August 1941
(London, 1997), p. 235.

49
Kempowski (ed.),
Das Echolot Barbarossa ’41
, p. 100 (25 June 1941).

50
Understandably it seems that some of these early figures were inaccurate.

51
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 14 (25 June 1941). In fact the answer depends on the type of ammunition fired, the distance to target and the angle of impact, but under favourable conditions it was possible, except on the frontal turret armour.

52
Glantz, ‘Border Battles’, pp. 189, 202, 207.

53
Fugate,
Operation Barbarossa
, pp. 106–107.

54
Braithwaite,
Moscow 1941
, pp. 77–78. For another example see pp. 275–276.

55
Ibid., p. 78.

56
Boog, ‘Die Luftwaffe’, see table: Ist-Stärke und Einsatzbereitschaft der fliegenden Verbände (einschl. Ergänzungsgruppen) der Luftwaffe im Osten am Vortage ‘Barbarossa’ (21.6.1941), p. 313.

57
Tsouras (ed.),
Panzers on the Eastern Front
, pp. 36–37. For more details of this battle, see Ritgen, ‘6th Panzer Division Operations’, pp. 113–116. A further example of the vexing predicament the KV-1 caused German commanders is provided by the appearance of a solitary tank in the rear area of Battle Group Raus (6th Panzer Division). The lone tank sat astride an important supply road defying all attempts at destruction for two days. See Tsouras (ed.),
Panzers on the Eastern Front
, pp. 38–45. Also published in Department of the U.S. Army (ed.),
Small Unit Actions During the German Campaign in Russia
, pp. 76–84.

58
Ritgen, ‘6th Panzer Division Operations’, p. 116.

59
Ziemke and Bauer,
Moscow to Stalingrad
, p. 11.

60
Horst Ohrloff, ‘XXXIX Motorized Corps Operations’ in David M. Glantz (ed.),
The Initial Period of War
, pp. 173–174.

61
Franz A. P. Frisch in association with Wilbur D. Jones, Jr.,
Condemned to Live. A Panzer Artilleryman's Five-Front War
(Shippensburg, 2000), p. 84.

62
Liddell Hart,
The Other Side of the Hill
, p. 330.

63
In 1942 Soviet industry would produce some 12,600 T-34s and 1,800 KV-1s. (Mawdsley,
Thunder in the
East, p. 27).

64
Barber and Harrison,
The Soviet Home Front 1941–1945
, p. 60.

65
Glantz and House,
When Titans Clashed
, p. 53.

66
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 16 (26 June 1941).

67
Karl Wilhelm Thilo, ‘A Perspective from the Army High Command (OKH)’ in David M. Glantz (ed.),
The Initial Period of War
, p. 298 (26 June 1941).

68
Von Manstein,
Lost Victories
, pp. 183–186; Klink, ‘Die Operationsführung’, p. 463.

69
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 17 (26 June 1941).

70
Glantz, ‘Border Battles’, pp. 216–217.

71
KTB OKW, Volume II, p. 418 (24 June 1941).

72
‘KTB 20th Pz. Div. vom 25.5.41 bis 15.8.41’ BA-MA RH 27–20/2, Fol. 20 (26 June 1941).

73
‘Panzerarmeeoberkommandos Tagesmeldungen 21.6 – 31.8.41’ BA-MA RH 21–3/43, Fols. 46–47 (28 June 1941).

74
Ohrloff, ‘XXXIX Motorized Corps Operations’, pp. 168 and 180.

75
‘Kriegstagebuch Nr.3 der 7.Panzer-Division Führungsabteilung 1.6.1941 – 9.5.1942’ BA-MA RH 27–7/46, Fol. 21 (28 June 1941). Although not specifically stated in the war diary for the 7th Panzer Division, the number of tanks destroyed or ‘total losses’ were probably only a very small percentage of these figures. Most tanks were simply broken-down and therefore salvageable. As the example illustrates, however, the rate of attrition exacted by the poor Soviet infrastructure was extremely high.

76
Fröhlich (ed.),
Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels
, Teil I: Aufzeichnungen 1923–1941, Band 9, Dezember 1940–Juli 1941, p. 405 (27 June 1941).

77
‘Panzerarmeeoberkommandos Anlagen zum Kriegstagesbuch “Berichte, Besprechungen, Beurteilungen der Lage” Bd.III 25.5.41 – 22.7.41’ BA-MA RH 21–3/46, Fol. 69 (29 June 1941).

78
Kenneth Macksey, ‘Guderian’ in Barnett (ed.),
Hitler's Generals
p. 450.

79
‘KTB Nr.1 Panzergruppe 2 vom 22.6.1941 bis 21.7.41’ BA-MA RH 21–2/927, Fols. 63–64 (27 June 1941).

80
Ibid., Fol. 65 (27 June 1941).

81
Guderian's letter as cited by Macksey,
Guderian
, p. 136.

82
Ibid.

83
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Osten I’, Fol. 5,
War Diary
, p. 229 (27 June 1941).

84
Ibid., Fol. 7, p. 230 (27 June 1941).

85
Ibid., Fol. 7, p. 231 (28 June 1941).

86
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 21 (28 June 1941).

87
‘KTB Nr.1 Panzergruppe 2 vom 22.6.1941 bis 21.7.41’ BA-MA RH 21–2/927, Fols. 73–74 (28 June 1941).

88
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 22 (28 June 1941).

89
This was the only division of its kind remaining in the German army.

90
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Osten I’, Fol. 7,
War Diary
, p. 231 (28 June 1941).

91
‘KTB Nr.1 Panzergruppe 2 vom 22.6.1941 bis 21.7.41’ BA-MA RH 21–2/927, Fols. 78–79 (29 June 1941).

92
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Osten I’, Fol. 8,
War Diary
, p. 232 (29 June 1941).

93
Underlining in the original; ‘KTB Nr.1 Panzergruppe 2 vom 22.6.1941 bis 21.7.41’ BA-MA RH 21–2/927, Fol. 80 (29 June 1941).

94
Beyond the role of the Waffen SS in Hitler's ideological war of annihilation, the organisation also fielded a limited number of elite military formations in Operation Barbarossa, which steadily expanded in number as the war continued. For a good overview of the military role of the Waffen SS see Bernd Wegner, ‘“My Honour is Loyalty.” The SS as a Military Factor in Hitler's Germany’ in Wilhelm Deist (ed.),
The German Military in the Age of Total War
(Warwickshire, 1985) pp. 220–239.

95
‘KTB Nr.1 Panzergruppe 2 vom 22.6.1941 bis 21.7.41’ BA-MA RH 21–2/927, Fol. 80 (29 June 1941).

96
Liddell Hart,
The Other Side of the Hill
, p. 272.

97
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 25 (29 June 1941).

98
KTB OKW, Volume II, pp. 1019–1020, Documents 64 (29 June 1941) and 65 (30 June 1941).

99
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 25 (29 June 1941). See also Guderian,
Panzer Leader
, p. 167.

100
Fröhlich (ed.),
Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels
, Teil I: Aufzeichnungen 1923–1941, Band 9, Dezember 1940–Juli 1941, p. 411 (29 June 1941).

101
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Osten I’, Fol. 9,
War Diary
, pp. 232–233 (29 June 1941).

102
‘Kriegstagebuch Nr.2 XXXXVII.Pz.Korps. Ia 25.5.1941 – 22.9.1941’ BA-MA RH 24–47/2. This war diary has no folio stamped page numbers so references must be located using the date (24 June 1941).

103
Bartov,
Hitler's Army
, p. 102.

104
‘Kriegstagebuch Nr.2 XXXXVII.Pz.Korps. Ia 25.5.1941 – 22.9.1941’ BA-MA RH 24–47/2 (27 June 1941).

105
‘Kriegstagebuch der 29.I.D. (mot) vom: 25.5.1941 bis 29.7.1941’ BA-MA RH 26–29/6. This war diary has no folio stamped page numbers so references must be located using the date (27, 28, 29 June 1941).

106
Joachim Lemelsen,
29.Division
(Bad Nauheim, 1960), p. 114; Edgar Röhricht,
Probleme der Kesselschlacht. Dargestellt an Einkreisungs-Operationen im zweiten Weltkrieg
(Karlsruhe, 1958), pp. 30–31.

107
Guderian,
Panzer Leader
, p. 158.

108
Guderian's letter as cited by Macksey,
Guderian
, p. 136.

109
Fröhlich (ed.),
Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels
, Teil I: Aufzeichnungen 1923–1941, Band 9, Dezember 1940–Juli 1941, p. 410 (29 June 1941).

110
Ibid., p. 413 (30 June 1941).

111
Ibid., p. 415 (1 July 1941).

112
‘Tagesmeldungen der Heeresgruppe Mitte vom 22.6.41 bis 15.7.41’ BA-MA RH 19 II/128, Fol. 87 (29 June 1941). In this same report it was later noted that the motivation for Red Army resistance was the common belief among Soviet troops that they would be either immediately shot or mistreated. A similar statement is found in the same file on 24 June (Fol. 29).

113
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Osten I’, Fol. 8,
War Diary
, p. 231 (28 June 1941).

114
‘Tagesmeldungen der Heeresgruppe Mitte vom 22.6.41 bis 15.7.41’ BA-MA RH 19 II/128, Fol. 76 (29 June 1941).

115
Walter Kempowski (ed.),
Das Echolot Barbarossa ’41
, p. 113 (26 June 1941).

116
‘KTB 3rd Pz. Div. vom 16.8.40 bis 18.9.41’ BA-MA RH 27–3/14, p. 48 (26 June 1941).

117
Zobel, ‘3rd Panzer Division Operations’, p. 244.

118
‘KTB 3rd Pz. Div. I.b 19.5.41 – 6.2.42’ BA-MA RH 27–3/218 (28 June 1941). This war diary has no folio stamped page numbers so references must be located using the date. See also comments in Zobel, ‘3rd Panzer Division Operations’, p. 246.

119
‘KTB 3rd Pz. Div. I.b 19.5.41 – 6.2.42’ BA-MA RH 27–3/218 (28 June 1941).

120
‘Tagesmeldungen der Heeresgruppe Mitte vom 22.6.41 bis 15.7.41’ BA-MA RH 19 II/128, Fol. 92 (30 June 1941).

121
Klink, ‘Die militärische Konzeption’, p. 270.

122
DiNardo,
Mechanized Juggernaut
, p. 40.

123
Hürter,
Ein deutscher General
, p. 66 (8 July 1941).

124
Haape with Henshaw,
Moscow Tram Stop
, p. 60.

125
DiNardo,
Mechanized Juggernaut
, pp. 41–43.

126
‘Tagesmeldungen der Heeresgruppe Mitte vom 22.6.41 bis 15.7.41’ BA-MA RH 19 II/128, Fol. 92 (30 June 1941).

127
DiNardo,
Mechanized Juggernaut
, pp. 43–45.

128
Theodor Mogge's unpublished personal account of his experiences on the eastern front were recorded in 1978 and kindly provided to me by his son Klaus Mogge.

129
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Osten I’, Fol. 10,
War Diary
, p. 233 (30 June 1941).

130
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 25 (29 June 1941).

131
DiNardo,
Mechanized Juggernaut
, p. 44.

132
Hoth,
Panzer-Operationen
, p. 69.

133
‘3rd Pz. Gr. KTB 25.5.41 – 31.8.41’ BA-MA Microfilm 59054, Fol. 71 (29 June 1941).

134
Ibid., Fol. 72 (29 June 1941).

135
Hoth,
Panzer-Operationen
, p. 65.

136
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Osten I’, Fol. 11,
War Diary
, p. 234 (1 July 1941).

137
Knowing very well his actions directly contravened Kluge's intentions Guderian evokes just such a defence in his memoir: ‘My views concerning the next stage of operations were as follows: to detach the minimum amount of the Panzer Group for the destruction of the Russians in the Belostok pocket, while leaving the major part of this operation to the following infantry armies: thus our rapidly mobile, motorised forces would be able to push forward and seize the first operational objective of the campaign, the area Smolensk-Yel'nya-Roslavl…I was thus in agreement with the original orders that had been issued’ (Guderian,
Panzer Leader
, p. 159).

138
Developed in the nineteenth century under the tutelage of Helmuth von Moltke the Elder (Chief of the General Staff 1857 to 1887),
Auftragstaktik
was ‘a command method stressing decentralized initiative within an overall strategic framework’ (definition by Gunther E. Rothenberg). The concept sought to reduce ‘friction’ in the command process by making lower-level commanders responsible for set objectives and empowering them to make independent decisions, while freeing the higher command of tactical details. Strictly speaking it is not a tactic, nor, as seen in the above discussion, is it limited to the tactical level of command, rather
Auftragstaktik
is best understood as a leadership method. A key element of this process is forward control, which accounts in large measure for the German army's high rate of officer casualties. The success of the concept rested on the receiver of the orders correctly understanding the
intent
of the issuer, which in Barbarossa provided Guderian and Hoth with a potential loophole in conducting their own operations.