Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (25 page)

The one outstanding exception to the army's austerity measures was nevertheless a revealing one. In May 1941 production of armoured fighting vehicles was not only protected from being cut back, but plans were afoot to embark on a massive new initiative with all the hallmarks of illusory planning that typified the preparation for Barbarossa. The plan, known as ‘armour programme 41’, was based on achieving the projected target of June 1940, completely outfitting 20 panzer divisions and ten motorised divisions. At a minimum this would necessitate the construction of some 34,661 vehicles, requiring an unattainable fivefold expansion of the current manufacturing capacities and a completion date of December 1944. Beyond this the programme took no account of design modifications or new models and blindly included the continued construction of the Mark II light tank which was already considered obsolete.
⁸
Likewise, projections in August 1940 for properly fielding 180 divisions with all requisite men and materiel proved demanding enough to require a full three years to achieve.
⁹
Such impractical plans reflect the degree of delusion that pervaded the upper circles of the Wehrmacht, offering a further insight into the lack of reality underpinning the strategic thinking of Hitler
and his senior
commanders.

To
make an informed analysis of the military campaign against the Soviet Union one must first gain a rudimentary grounding in the technical means by which it would be fought. The central component of the blitzkrieg strategic concept was without doubt the tank, a device commonly treated in much of the secondary literature as a generic, standardised instrument, without regard for the radical differentiation between designs and models which determined their use and effectiveness. Thus, the common citation of a total figure for the number of German tanks in the invasion of the Soviet Union tells us little without an appreciation of the different models involved.

The
smallest and most feeble German tank to enter service against the Red Army was the Pz Kpfw I.
¹⁰
Produced in two main models since 1934, the design included a fully rotating turret mounted with two 7.92mm machine guns and an armour thickness of just 13mm, restricting its usefulness wholly to engagements with enemy infantry. It first saw action in the Spanish Civil War where, despite the primitive battlefield conditions, it was recognised to be lacking in armament and protection. The early campaigns of World War II only reinforced this point and by the time of Barbarossa it was plainly considered an obsolete model. Despite this
281
¹¹
were included in the invasion force. Thereafter remaining stocks were relegated largely to training roles.
¹²

A year after the Mark I came into service the Mark II appeared, a slightly heavier tank that saw many upgrades and variant adaptations. The improved D and E models known as ‘fast fighting vehicles’ (
Schnellkampfwagen
) entered service in 1938. These were adapted with armour twice the thickness of earlier models (up to 30mm) and included a torsion bar suspension system with larger wheels which in addition to a new more powerful engine raised the top speed to 55 kph. The trade-off was that high speeds could only be achieved on sealed roads, while cross-country performance was hampered – an important factor for the barren landscape of the east.
¹³
The main armament was a 2cm L/55 gun with a secondary 7.92mm machine gun mounted next to it in the traversing turret. Panzer training regulations of 1939 classed the Mark II as being ‘chiefly designed as an anti-tank weapon’,
¹⁴
yet its record in France proved so poor as to be only effective in this role in the most exceptional circumstances.
¹⁵
By the beginning of 1941 the Mark II was remodelled in a new F series with only slightly thicker armour and no change to the main armament, rendering it, like the Mark I, outdated on the modern battlefield, particularly for combat with the Red Army. In spite of such deficiencies the army employed some 743 Mark II
¹⁶
tanks in Operation Barbarossa, which together with the Mark I makes up over 1,000 tanks. This meant that 28 per cent of the total tank force consisted of obsolete models.

As a result of the bloodless occupation of
Czechoslovakia in 1939 the Wehrmacht was able to benefit from the considerable arsenal of high-grade Czech weapons and their well developed armaments industry. The tank arm of the Czech armed forces was of particular value owing to their advanced design, which outstripped both the Mark I and Mark II, at that time the mainstays of the German tank fleet. The heavier of the two Czech models was dubbed by the Germans Pz Kpfw 35 (t) and featured 35mm armour, a 3.7cm vz 34 anti-tank gun as main armament, plus two 7.92mm machine guns, one mounted in the turret and the other alongside the driver in the hull. The early service life of the Model 35 (t)
was beset by problems, most of which were overcome by the time the Germans took control, although some remained basic to the design. The armour was riveted, not welded like the German tanks. The rivets had the dangerous tendency to pop out under the impact of a heavy shells, sending the rivet shanks flying through the inside of the tank as secondary projectiles. By the launch of Barbarossa, the Model 35 (t) was in decline and, according to the account of one former officer from the 6th Panzer Division, was deemed ‘no longer suitable for combat’, a classification borne out by the fact that not one of the division's 105 Model 35 (t) tanks saw out the year 1941.
¹⁷
In total 157 Pz Kpfw 35 (t) tanks supported the German invasion.
¹⁸

Following on from the early disappointment of the Pz Kpfw 35 (t), the Czech authorities commissioned a new design which evolved into what the Germans later called the Pz Kpfw 38 (t). Lighter than its predecessor, the first four designs had thinner armour (25mm) until November 1940 when the new series E and later F attempted to rectify this inadequacy with an extra 25mm plate added to the frontal surfaces and 15mm to the sides. The armament was similar to the Pz Kpfw 35 (t), supporting a 3.7cm KwK 37 (t) main gun and two 7.92mm machine guns. The Pz Kpfw 38 (t) was also adapted by the Germans to fit a four-man crew with the addition of a gun loader to the driver, radio operator and commander/gunner. Most outstanding of all, however, was the excellent performance and durability of the chassis, proving extremely reliable mechanically and offering itself as an appealing base for later variants in design including the
Panzerjäger
Marder III and Hetzer.
¹⁹
The Pz Kpfw 38 (t) represents the best of all the German light tanks at this time and some 651
²⁰
were deployed for service in Operation Barbarossa, making up a large portion of Hoth's
Panzer Group 3.
²¹
Yet, for all its assets and success in previous campaigns, the Pz Kpfw 38 (t) remained a light tank which, against the unparalleled strength of Soviet medium and heavy tanks as well as the numerous heavy calibre artillery of the Red Army, proved simply inadequate. Accordingly, the attrition rate of the Pz Kpfw
38 (t) in the east was exceedingly high with one source putting the figure at 796 tanks being lost in the first six months of the war
²²
– a figure well in excess of the entire initial deployment. These losses also underline the basic weakness of the German tank force invading the Soviet Union, upon which so much of the operational plan rested. To break this down more clearly, if one adds the totals of all light tanks deployed for Barbarossa and takes that as a percentage of the overall total it equals 50 per cent, meaning that half of the German tanks gathered for the invasion of the Soviet Union were largely obsolete for that theatre.

Germany's panzer formations were initially conceived of with two main models in mind – one light and one medium. The lighter variant, the Mark II, was for reconnaissance and an anti-tank role – which even in 1934 was an optimistic assessment of its capabilities given the poor 2cm armament, although it was hoped that the heavier enemy tanks could be drawn into the fire of infantry-manned anti-tank guns. The medium model later became known as the Pz Kpfw IV (Mark IV) and was to be used in a close support role against fortified field positions. Yet it was not long before the inadequacies of the Mark II were recognised and the need for a purpose-built anti-tank model was realised. This model became known as the Pz Kpfw III (Mark III) with the first few being produced in 1936–37.
²³
The Mark III had a troubled beginning with designers unable to perfect a suitable suspension and accordingly none of the first four series A–D, all produced in small quantities, were employed after Poland for action in France and the Low Countries. The E series saw the first run of large-scale production with almost a hundred being built. It adopted an entirely new suspension system, a better engine and upgraded frontal armour from a pitiful 15mm plate to 30mm, giving it a total weight of 19.5 tons. At the beginning of 1939 it was decided to replace the increasingly ineffectual 3.7cm main armament with a new 5cm L/42, yet the time taken to develop and adapt the new gun meant that three-quarters of the new F series (425 produced in total) were equipped with the old standard 3.7cm gun. The G series (600 produced) added the 30mm armour to its rear plating, while the H series (308 produced) benefited from a newly designed turret, transmission and running gear, as well as an extra 30mm armoured plate welded to its front. The last of the Mark III upgrades to be initiated before Barbarossa was the J series which commenced production in March 1941 and incorporated
the new frontal armour in the basic design.
²⁴
With so many upgraded variants it is difficult to talk of a standard Mark III. For that reason it is important to make a distinction between the models of tanks and also recognise the sometimes radical evolution of each series and the consequent differences that existed within a given model. In the case of the Mark III those equipped with a 5cm L/42 gun and additional armour represented a great improvement among the Barbarossa tank force. In total, 979 Mark III tanks
²⁵
were to see action from the beginning of Barbarossa, with the later models bringing the first real backbone to the panzer divisions.

For the attack on the Soviet Union the Germans employed the first large-scale use of the so-called StuG III –
Sturmgeschütz
(assault gun). The main armament was mounted on the chassis of the Mark III and they were commissioned to provide close armour support for infantry and serve in an anti-tank role. The central difference between the StuG III and panzer was the absence of a revolving turret. In order to keep the silhouette low, the 7.5cm L/24 armament was built directly into the hull and the saving in weight from the turret was put towards extra armour, reaching a maximum thickness of 50mm. The total weight came to 20 tons and it was manned by a crew of four. Like the Mark III the design progressed through many series with the addition of a new engine and gearbox being the only major alterations before the StuG III took its place for the beginning of Barbarossa.
²⁶
Mass production was only begun in 1940 with just six StuG III available for the French campaign. By June 1941, 250 were assigned to the invasion force,
²⁷
forming a valuable addition to the German tank fleet.

The final German model to participate in the invasion of the Soviet Union was the Pz Kpfw IV (Mark IV) which first began production in 1936. All series produced before the Barbarossa campaign (A–F) were armed with a 7.5cm L/24 main gun. The Mark IV was originally designed to provide close infantry support,
²⁸
with two machine guns fitted for local defence. Like all early tank models the A series (35 produced) was exceedingly weak in frontal armour, having a thickness of only 20mm. The latter B, C and D series improved on this somewhat with a maximum thickness of 30mm. Starting with the B series (42 produced) it was fitted with a more powerful engine and gearbox, increasing its weight to 17.7 tons.
The C series (140 produced) saw few substantive changes aside from the removal of the hull machine gun, which was reinstated in the next series. Rear armour was increased from 15mm to 20mm in the D series (220 produced) but only a few were finished in time for the Polish campaign. The E series reflected the need for greater protection, with the armour strengthened to 50mm for the front glacis plate and additional plates secured to the front (30mm) and sides (20mm). The F series was the last version of the Mark IV to commence production before Barbarossa (April 1941) and included 50mm armour as standard to the turret, hull and superstructure, and 30mm for the sides.
²⁹
As with the Mark III, the Mark IV underwent many improvements, meaning that earlier variants were markedly inferior to later ones, particularly in terms of armour. In total, 444 Mark IV tanks were deployed against the Red Army for the beginning of Operation
Barbarossa.
³⁰

Without doubt, the Mark III, StuG III and Mark IV, which together numbered some 1,673 vehicles, represented the cream of the German tank force. Yet their true value is of course relative to their opponents. This therefore necessitates a brief comparison with Soviet models.
Clearly the best in the Soviet arsenal were the medium T-34 and heavy KV-1
³¹
of which a combined total of 1,861 were available by the time of the German invasion.
³²
The KV-1 was simply beyond anything the Germans had yet imagined and was a giant of its time. Weighing in at 43.5 tons, with 90mm armour and a 7.6cm F-34 main gun plus three 7.62mm machine guns, the KV-1 could penetrate 69mm armour at a range of 500 metres and was effective against the thickest German armour up to a range of almost 2,000 metres.
³³
In similar fashion, the T-34 proved greatly superior to its German contemporaries, with 45mm armour, twice the cross-country speed of the German medium tanks and a main armament identical to the KV-1.
³⁴
The qualitative advantage of these Soviet tanks was enormous. In practical terms it meant that none of the German tanks regardless of armament could penetrate the armour on the T-34 at ranges above
500 metres. Indeed, only the later models of the Mark III equipped with 5cm L/42 main guns could effectively penetrate the armour of the T-34 at less than 500 metres. The KV-1 was simply impervious to all tank-mounted German firepower as well as the standard 3.7cm anti-tank guns issued to infantry divisions.