Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (63 page)

On the afternoon of 15 July the earth shook with the unusual explosion of jet mines. Like red-tailed comets, the mines were hurled into the air…The effect of the simultaneous explosions of dozens of these mines was terrific. The Germans fled in panic, and even our own troops,…who for reasons of security had not been warned that this new weapon would be used, rushed back from the front line.
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Yet the real Soviet advantage lay not in specialised weaponry, but in the proportionate number of guns they could assemble and supply with ammunition. This is not to say there were not considerable imperfections in the Soviet employment and handling of artillery early in the war, but the Germans by comparison were frequently outgunned, and even then had great trouble bringing up sufficient stockpiles of shells.

Under the conditions of static warfare now beginning along the vast eastern front, the pre-eminence of the infantryman was on the rise, no
longer in just securing the territory won by the panzers, but now holding the long front together. In this role the German infantry proved themselves well trained, but their equipment was deficient, especially in comparison to their Soviet opponents. One officer from the
4th Panzer Division remarked after the war: ‘The equipment, which had proved efficient in the previous campaigns, was not robust enough for battle under the conditions prevailing in Russia. Russian equipment seemed to be more robust and less sensitive. Therefore, whoever got hold of a Russian tommy-gun kept it.’
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An Italian officer who inspected a Russian machine gun for the first time remarked: ‘I loved the simplicity, easy handling and firepower of this gun.’
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Likewise, Colonel-General Ewald von
Kleist, who later rose to the rank of Field Marshal and remained on the eastern front until March 1944, stated after the war: ‘[The Soviet] equipment was very good even in 1941, especially the tanks. Their artillery was excellent, and also most of the infantry weapons – their rifles were more modern than ours, and had a more rapid rate of fire.’
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Colonel-General Erhard
Raus, another former German commander with extensive experience on the eastern front, wrote for a post-war US military study:

The best weapon of the Russian infantryman was the machine pistol. It was easily handled, equal to Russian winter conditions, and one which the Germans also regarded highly…The mortar also proved highly valuable as the ideal weapon for terrain conditions where artillery support was impossible. At the beginning of the Eastern Campaign, Russian infantry far surpassed the German in mortar equipment and its use. The same was true for the Russian anti-tank gun, which at the beginning of the campaign considerably surpassed the anti-tank gun of the German infantry divisions in efficiency, and therefore was readily put to use whenever captured.
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Another element of the Red Army which is incorrectly regarded as antiquated for the time, is their extensive early use of horse cavalry. Fundamental to its success was the ability to maintain constant movement in difficult terrain (marshes and forest) where cover was plentiful and the German motorised forces could not operate. These advantages allowed for surprise raids on weak German positions, or long forays into the German rear to cut supply lines and destroy vital infrastructure.
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Although not a replacement for mechanised operations, the cavalry was useful when employed on a limited scale against the exposed flanks of the over-extended German
armies.
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The
air battle on the eastern front was a more one-sided affair, but not to the degree that many histories have suggested hitherto.
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In the opening days of Barbarossa the Luftwaffe inflicted carnage upon the Soviet air force, with staggering aircraft losses reaching into the thousands.
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One authority put the figure at 4,614 Soviet aircraft destroyed by the end of June, 3,176 of these being eliminated on the ground and 1,438 in the air. By comparison, German losses amounted to just 330 planes.
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Such figures underline a clear German superiority in the air, but for a variety of reasons this did not translate into anything more than a very short period of air supremacy on the eastern front.

In accordance with the precepts of a successful blitzkrieg, the Luftwaffe's first priority in the east was to win control of the immediate Soviet airspace, and then to concentrate resources on tactical support for the advancing army. Within just two days, the Luftwaffe had achieved total domination of the skies and had wreaked havoc on Soviet airfields in the western districts,
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allowing the tactical switch towards assisting army operations. Yet there were still thousands of Soviet aircraft stationed well back from the western border districts, as well as many more in the Soviet interior. These had survived the initial devastation and could gradually be moved west to new airfields. In this brief period the Luftwaffe's dominance over the front was absolute, but not without pointed concerns. The chief of the operations department of the Luftwaffe, Major-General Hoffman von
Waldau, commented to Halder on 1st July: ‘The air force has greatly underestimated the numerical strength of the enemy. It is quite evident that the Russians initially had far more than 8,000 planes.’
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Two days later Waldau wrote in his diary:

The military means of the SU [Soviet Union] are considerably stronger than studies before the start of the war…indicated…The material quality is better than expected…As a result we scored great successes with relatively low losses, but a large number of Soviet aircraft remain to be
destroyed.
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Not only was the Soviet air force still far from eradicated, but the Luftwaffe was now forced to divide itself between servicing the hefty demands of the army and combating a resurgent Soviet aerial presence.
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As the size of the operational theatre rapidly expanded, the already limited resources of the German air force soon became seriously over-extended. Air bases had to be relocated eastwards to new, sparsely equipped airfields where the feeble supply situation proved as detrimental to the Luftwaffe as it was to the army.
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Moreover, these new airfields were particularly vulnerable to attacks by the roving enemy bands infesting the rear area.
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Although by no means as successful as the Luftwaffe, the Soviet air force also had a share of successes raiding German airfields in July 1941. As one Soviet pilot recalled:

Approaching
Bobruisk the Shturmoviks were flying very low…The leader turned and launched the attack. Missiles hit the rows of bombers and exploded, tracer bullets shredded the wings with black crosses. Just above the ground Shturmoviks dropped their hundred-kilo bombs. Junkers and Messerschmitts ready for operational flights blazed up. Our aircraft came in time and did not allow the enemy planes to take off!…The regiment flew to attack Bobruisk airfield three times and caused much damage to the enemy. It destroyed and damaged dozens of bombers and Messerschmitts.
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German aircraft losses were starting to take a heavy toll on operations. Although light by comparison with Soviet losses, by 12 July a total of 550 German planes had been destroyed with another 336 damaged, representing about 40 per cent of all the combat ready aircraft available on 22 June.
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By contrast the enormous Soviet losses must be seen in light of three important factors. First, like the pre-war Soviet tank force, the Soviet air force was a ramshackle collection of aircraft, with some models
dating back as far as the 1920s, meaning the overwhelming majority of the large losses were long since obsolete aircraft.
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Up to 80 per cent of the 15,599 pre-war Soviet aircraft fleet were old designs and could not have posed a serious threat to the modern designs of the German Luftwaffe.
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Second, since a sizeable majority of Soviet planes were destroyed on the ground in the initial German attacks, the loss of skilled pilots was correspondingly much lower.
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Third, the Soviet industrial base for aircraft production significantly exceeded the output of German industry, and would continue to maintain its dominance even through the chaos and disruption of 1941.
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Between July and December the Soviet Union produced some 5,173 modern fighters, easily surpassing the Luftwaffe's 1,619 fighters.
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One must also remember that the Luftwaffe's lower production levels had to be divided between the demands of the eastern front and the ongoing war against the British RAF,
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which was also far exceeding the Luftwaffe in fighter production.
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Figure 7.5 
Operation Barbarossa exacted a huge toll on the German army with more men killed in July 1941 than in any other month of the war until December 1942. Countless roadside graves marked Army Group Centre's advance.

While the Luftwaffe certainly proved superior in the earliest period of Barbarossa, it was incapable of eliminating the Soviet air force and, by the end of July, could not even guarantee aerial superiority above the German front. On 26 July
Leeb wrote in his diary: ‘From day to day the enemy air force are winning more the upper hand and increasingly interfering in the ground operations.’
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Similarly,
Kleist stated after the war: ‘such air superiority as we enjoyed during the opening months was local rather than general. We owed it to the superior skill of our airmen, not to a superiority in numbers.’
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Army Group Centre was afforded the support of the strongest of the Luftwaffe air fleets (
Air Fleet 2) commanded by the redoubtable Field Marshal Albrecht
Kesselring, but even Kesselring was unable to ensure comprehensive cover to guard against costly Soviet airborne attacks. The war diary of the
14th Motorised Infantry Division complained on 25 July that while on a march it suffered from regular ‘attacks by bombers which cost time and resulted in particular in
personnel and material losses’.
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Two days later on 27 July
Lemelsen's XXXXVII Panzer Corps reported: ‘Strong enemy air superiority, many low-level strafes and bomber attacks, many casualties’.
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In addition to the great demands being made on the Luftwaffe's dwindling resources, three weeks into the campaign Hitler insisted upon ‘terror air raids’ to be launched against
Moscow.
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Extraneous to its duel tasks of suppressing Soviet air activity, and providing tactical support to the army, the demands of a strategic bombing campaign were well beyond the capacity of the Luftwaffe. Kesselring spoke of a ‘harmful dissipation’,
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while
Bock wanted the Luftwaffe concentrated ‘without any limitation to smash the enemy's reserves’.
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Yet, as
Warlimont explains, the raids had nothing to do with the operational objectives of the campaign, Hitler ordered them in reprisal for Soviet raids against
Bucharest and
Helsinki.
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In the end they proved both costly and wasteful. In the first raid on 22 July almost two hundred bombers flew in four waves towards Moscow, dropping 104 tons of high explosive and 46,000 incendiary bombs. In total, 22 planes were shot down at a cost to the Soviets of 130 people killed and 37 buildings destroyed.
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Moscow was exceedingly well defended
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and too far from the German airfields, meaning that bombs had to be substituted for extra fuel, with the result that the damage done could not justify aircraft losses. As Kesselring stated: ‘The raids on
Moscow caused me great anxiety. Crews shot down had to be written off, the effectiveness of the Russian anti-aircraft guns and searchlights impressing even our airmen who had flown over England. Also as time went on Russian defence fighters appeared in increasing
numbers.’
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