Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (16 page)

78
Leach,
German Strategy Against Russia
, pp. 88–89.

79
Document 56 ‘Aktennotiz über eine Besprechung des Chefs des OKW über die forcierte Steigerung der Rüstungsproduktion zur Vorbereitung des Überfalls auf die Sowjetunion, 17. August 1940’ in Moritz (ed.),
Fall Barbarossa
, p. 201.

80
Rolf-Dieter Müller, ‘Von der Wirtschaftsallianz zum kolonialen Ausbeutungskrieg’ in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.),
Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg
, pp. 171–173.

81
Seaton,
The German Army 1933–45
, p. 145.

82
Bernhard R. Kroener, ‘Die Winter 1941/42. Die Verteilung des Mangels oder Schritte zu einer rationelleren Personalbewirtschaftung’ in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.),
Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg
, Band V/1:
Organisation und Mobilisierung des deutschen Machtbereichs
. Erster Halbband:
Kriegsverwaltung, Wirtschaft und Personelle Ressourcen 1939–1941
(Stuttgart, 1988), pp. 871–872.

83
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 4 (1 August 1940).

84
Ibid., pp. 117–118.

85
The actual figures of German strength on 20 June 1941 proved much higher; three million men, 625,000 horses and 600,000 motor-vehicles. Klink, ‘Die militärische Konzeption’, p. 270.

86
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 176 (12 November 1940).

87
Müller, ‘Von der Wirtschaftsallianz’, pp. 116–117.

88
Clausewitz defined ‘friction’ as ‘Countless minor incidents – the kind you can never really foresee – combine to lower the general level of performance, so that one always falls far short of the intended goal.’ Howard and Paret (eds.), Carl von Clausewitz,
On War
, p. 138.

89
Kershaw,
Hitler 1936–1945
, p. 343.

90
‘Tagebuchnotizen Osten – Vorbereitungszeit, 20.9.1940 bis 21.6.1941’ BA-MA N-22/7. Fol. 2 (3 December 1940). Fedor von Bock,
Generalfeldmarschall Fedor von Bock. The War Diary 1939–1945
, Klaus Gerbet (ed.) (Atglen, 1996), p. 194 (3 December 1940). The editorial notes included in this otherwise first-rate English volume are to its disadvantage, supporting the theory of Barbarossa as a preventive war. Hereafter references for Bock's diary will be cited first with the German archival reference and second with the published English translation: Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Vorbereitungszeit’, Fol. 2.
War Diary
, p. 194 (3 December 1940).

91
Trevor-Roper (ed.),
Hitler's War Directives
, p. 86; Domarus,
Hitler
, Volume III, pp. 2121–2122, 2125.

92
Walter Görlitz,
Paulus and Stalingrad
(London, 1963), pp. 99–100. This evidence is based on an account written by Paulus in August 1946. Although his account provides a unique insight into the undisclosed problems of the planning process, Paulus's contentions still need to be viewed critically.

93
Ibid., p. 108.

94
Glantz and House,
When Titans Clashed
, pp. 67–69. Paulus also stated that the lack of trained officers and equipment available to the freshly raised divisions would reduce their overall effectiveness. While this was certainly true, it does not effectively mitigate their enormous impact on the battlefield of 1941.

95
Görlitz,
Paulus and Stalingrad
, p. 104.

96
Ibid., p. 113.

97
Ibid., pp. 114–116.

98
Although Paulus added that the line was weakly held in certain positions.

99
Görlitz,
Paulus and Stalingrad
, p. 102.

100
Ibid., pp. 116–118.

101
Indeed German intelligence reports until 22 June 1941 repeatedly increased their estimates of Soviet strengths; see Glantz,
Stumbling Colossus
, Appendix C, p. 290; Leach,
German Strategy Against Russia
, Appendix IV, p. 270. The actual correlation between Soviet and German forces facing each other on the eve of war equalled a difference of 370,000 men in favour of the Germans. This must be set against the fact that the Red Army contained an overall total of 5.5 million men with many employed outside its western military districts and a mobilisation base of some 14 million men. By contrast the German invasion forces, numbering just over 3 million men, did not have recourse to substantial manpower reserves. Figures for the German army in the east on 20 June 1941 are taken from Klink, ‘Die militärische Konzeption’, p. 270. For the Soviet figures, see Glantz and House,
When Titans Clashed
, pp. 68 and 301.

102
Görlitz,
Paulus and Stalingrad
, pp. 118–120.

103
Ibid., p. 106.

104
Ibid., p. 100.

105
Ibid., p. 106.

106
Ibid. This statement should also be seen in context of the fact that Paulus was writing in 1946 while still in Soviet custody. He was no doubt also bitter about the great debacle he was led into at Stalingrad.

107
For a helpful overview, see Martin Middlebrook, ‘Paulus’ in Barnett (ed.),
Hitler's Generals
, pp. 361–372; Samuel Mitcham and Gene Mueller,
Hitler's Commanders. Officers of the Wehrmacht, the Luftwaffe, the Kriegsmarine, and the Waffen-SS
(Lanham, 2000), pp. 73–99.

108
Samuel Mitcham,
Hitler's Field Marshals and Their Battles
(Chatham, 1988), p. 235.

109
Görlitz,
Paulus and Stalingrad
, p. 105.

110
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 212 (5 December 1940).

111
KTB OKW, Volume I, p. 205 (5 December 1940). Nicolaus von Below,
Als Hitlers Adjutant 1937–45
(Mainz, 1999), p. 253.

112
This proved to be incorrect, highlighting a considerable failure of German intelligence. See John Erickson,
The Soviet High Command 1918–1941. A Military-Political History 1918–1941
(London, 1962), pp. 556–557; Glantz,
Stumbling Colossus
, pp. 92–95.

113
KTB OKW, Volume I, p. 208 (5 December 1940). Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (ed.),
Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtführungsstab)
, Band I/2:
1. August 1940–31. Dezember 1941
(Munich, 1982), pp. 981–982, Document 41 (5 December 1940). Hereafter cited as: KTB OKW, Volume II. Moritz (ed.),
Fall Barbarossa
, p. 138, Document 34 ‘Aus der Niederschrift über die Vorträge des Oberbefehlshabers und des Generalstabschefs des Heeres zur Operationsplanung gegen die Sowjetunion und die Stellungnahme Hitlers, 5. Dezember 1940’; Helmuth Greiner,
Die Oberste Wehrmachtführung 1939–1943
(Wiesbaden, 1951), p. 327.

114
KTB OKW, Volume I, pp. 208–209 (5 December 1940); KTB OKW, Volume II, p. 982, Document 41 (5 December 1940); Moritz (ed.),
Fall Barbarossa
, p. 138; Greiner,
Die Oberste Wehrmachtführung
, pp. 327–328.

115
KTB OKW, Volume I, p. 209 (5 December 1940); Moritz (ed.),
Fall Barbarossa
, pp. 138–139; Greiner,
Die Oberste Wehrmachtführung
, p. 328. Hitler's acceptance of force strengths supplied by the army for completion of the operation belies the post-war myth supported by many former generals, including Halder, that Hitler's gross underestimation of the Soviet Union was simply a result of his ideologically-inspired megalomania. Indeed through supplying such flawed factual information to their head of state the generals are implicated with at least as much guilt for the extent of the blunder. For further useful discussion see Leach,
German Strategy Against Russia
, pp. 119–120.

116
KTB OKW, Volume I, p. 209 (5 December 1940); Moritz (ed.),
Fall Barbarossa
, p. 139; Greiner,
Die Oberste Wehrmachtführung
, p. 329.

117
Görlitz,
Paulus and Stalingrad
, p. 106.

118
The later argument is favoured by Christian Hartmann in his biography of Halder. Hartmann,
Halder Generalstabschef Hitlers 1938–1942
, p. 234.

119
Len Deighton,
Blitzkrieg. From the Rise of Hitler to the Fall of Dunkirk
(London, 1980), pp. 243–254.

120
Cecil,
Hitler's Decision to Invade Russia 1941
, p. 129; Leach,
German Strategy Against Russia
, p. 114; see also footnote 1.

121
Franz Halder, KTB II, pp. 213–214 (5 December 1940).

122
Wilhelm-Ernst Paulus,
Die Entwicklung der Planung des Russland Feldzuges 1940/41
(Bonn, 1957), pp. 179–180; Leach,
German Strategy Against Russia
, pp. 106–107.

123
Alfred Philippi, ‘Das Pripjetproblem: Eine Studie über die operative Bedeutung des Pripjetgebietes für den Feldzug des Jahres 1941’ in
Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau
, Beiheft.2 (Darmstadt, 1956), pp. 13–15, 73–75. Also see Klink, ‘Die militärische Konzeption’, p. 233, footnote 117; Leach,
German Strategy Against Russia
, p. 107.

124
Klink, ‘Die militärische Konzeption’, p. 233, footnote 117.

125
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 224 (13 December 1940).

126
Ibid., p. 227.

127
It is interesting that Hitler or Halder should characterise the army's role in the invasion as a one-front war given that Paulus's war game felt it necessary to assign no less than 56 German divisions to western defence, North Africa or occupation duties, while the success of the proposed Operation Marita (invasion of the Balkans) would no doubt tie down more units.

128
Italics in the original. Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 228 (13 December 1940).

129
Warlimont,
Im Hauptquartier
, Band I, p. 154.

130
Ibid., p. 153. Klink, ‘Die militärische Konzeption’, pp. 238–239.

131
Moritz (ed.),
Fall Barbarossa
, p. 142. Italics in the original. Document 36 ‘Hitlers Weisung Nr. 21 (Fall Barbarossa) für den Überfall auf die Sowjetunion, 18. Dezember 1940’. Trevor-Roper (ed.),
Hitler's War Directives 1939–1945
, pp. 95–96; Domarus,
Hitler
, Volume III, pp. 2157–2159. Domarus incorrectly attributes the date of the Directive to 16 December 1940.

132
Ibid. all.

133
KTB OKW, Volume I, p. 233 (17 December 1940); Klink, ‘Die militärische Konzeption’, p. 239. See also the first-rate English translation: Ernst Klink, ‘The Military Concept of the War Against the Soviet Union’ in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.),
Germany and the Second World War
, Volume IV:
The Attack on the Soviet Union
(Oxford, 1998), p. 281. For referencing purposes the original German edition has been used except where otherwise stated.

134
Klink, ‘The Military Concept’, p. 282; Megargee,
Inside Hitler's High Command
, pp. 131–132.

135
Klink, ‘Die militärische Konzeption’, p. 240.

136
Warlimont,
Im Hauptquartier
, Band I, p. 154. There also exists an English translation: Walter Warlimont,
Inside Hitler's Headquarters, 1939–1945
(New York, 1964), p. 139.

137
Although definitive evidence is lacking, divergent opinions are held; see Irving,
Hitler's War
, Volume I, p. 206; Klink, ‘Die militärische Konzeption’, p. 239.

138
Klink, ‘Die militärische Konzeption’, p. 239 and footnote 137; Cecil,
Hitler's Decision to Invade Russia 1941
, p. 125. Warlimont writes that there is no evidence Jodl influenced Hitler's thinking, but this lack of evidence neither proves nor disproves the fact. Warlimont,
Im Hauptquartier
, Band I, p. 154.

139
KTB OKW, Volume II, p. 996, Document 45 (21 December 1940).

140
Trevor-Roper (ed.),
Hitler's War Directives 1939–1945
, p. 94; Moritz (ed.),
Fall Barbarossa
, p. 141.

141
Trevor-Roper (ed.),
Hitler's War Directives 1939–1945
, p. 96; Moritz (ed.),
Fall Barbarossa
, p. 142.

142
Trevor-Roper (ed.),
Hitler's War Directives 1939–1945
, pp. 95–96; Moritz (ed.),
Fall Barbarossa
, pp. 141–143.

143
Trevor-Roper (ed.),
Hitler's War Directives 1939–1945
, pp. 96–97; Moritz (ed.),
Fall Barbarossa
, p. 143.

144
Klink, ‘Die militärische Konzeption’, p. 240.

145
Trevor-Roper (ed.),
Hitler's War Directives 1939–1945
, pp. 94, 97; Moritz (ed.),
Fall Barbarossa
, pp. 141, 143–144.

2 The gathering storm

The army deployment directive

On 23 December 1940 Halder held further discussions regarding the effectiveness of
Soviet tanks. Intelligence on the subject was acknowledged to be sparse, but their relative inferiority, in comparison with German models, was identified in both armour and speed. The maximum thickness of Soviet armour was predicted to be 30mm, while the 4.5cm Ehrhard armament could penetrate German armour up to a range of only 800m. The Soviet panzer corps faced further disadvantages with very poor communication equipment and optical sights which were understood to be hazy and limited in range. In regard to the Wehrmacht, Halder noted that an additional 4,930 captured enemy tanks and ammunition carriers were being incorporated into German units.