Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (9 page)

It was only at this point that substantial forces were redirected towards the Reich's eastern border, which was the result of both the changed strategic situation in Europe and the events unfolding in the east beyond Germany's frontier. Stalin was moving quickly to absorb his share of the territory allocated to him under the Nazi–Soviet pact, and the remarkable successes Germany achieved in the west added to his sense of urgency. Finland had already been forced to yield territory in the Winter War (1939–40) and by the middle of June the Baltic states were completely occupied and eventually absorbed into the Soviet empire as member republics. June also saw Soviet forces occupying the
Romanian regions of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, heightening German fears that Soviet ambitions might extend as far as Romania's oil fields at Ploesti, which were vital to Germany's war economy.
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With these concerns in mind, and indeed before the Soviet armies had completed their occupations on the Baltic and in Romania, the first
operational plans were drawn up to provide contingencies in the unlikely event of a Soviet attack. This first plan envisaged an offensive type of defence, which placed emphasis on blunting the initial attack and then launching a counter-offensive at the earliest possible opportunity. As the Chief of the Army General Staff, Franz Halder, observed in his diary on 18 June: ‘Everything we have should be used for offensive action.’
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On 26 June the transfer of the
18th Army was ordered from the west to shore up Germany's eastern defences, with the bulk of its 15 divisions in place by the end of July.
³
Following discussions between Halder, the 18th Army's commanding officer Colonel-General
Georg von Küchler and his Chief of Staff Major-General
Erich Marcks, a new directive was drawn up under the title, ‘Deployment Instructions for Eighteenth Army’. This involved a fundamental departure from the earlier plan by adopting a wholly offensive posture based on the assumption that Soviet preparations could be identified and attacked before operations began against Germany. Even at this embryonic stage of Germany's concept for war in the east, the plan was not simply an offensive reaction to a war already in progress, but rather an action which represented the beginning of a war.
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Thus we might well consider the ‘Deployment Instruction for Eighteenth Army’ as the first distinct plan for a German attack on the Soviet Union, even though this involved only limited immediate objectives and was not the result of any directive on Hitler's part.
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On 21 July the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Walter von Brauchitsch
, met Hitler to receive instructions regarding the future conduct of the war. The outcome of this meeting was reported back to Halder by Brauchitsch and the resulting account in Halder's diary offers many clues to
Hitler's strategic deliberations, indicating consideration of an attack on the Soviet Union. Hitler believed that Britain was beaten, but that Churchill continued the war only in the hope that either the Soviet Union or the
United States would soon come to his aid. The objective Halder noted was: ‘To smash the Russian army’. Such an undertaking was estimated to require between 80 and 100 German divisions and they
could be expected to encounter only 50 to 75 ‘good’ Soviet divisions.
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The attack was thought possible as early as the autumn of 1940, but accordingly there was some concern about the ability of the Luftwaffe to support operations in the east as well as against Britain. German strength was to be concentrated in the north and south for advances along the Baltic Sea and into the Ukraine.
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Halder also wrote of ‘political aims’ being the creation of a Ukrainian state, a separate Belorussia and a confederation of Baltic
states.
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Hitler's strategic vision at this point was still rather erratic, jumping between options aimed at finding the elusive resolution to cement his victorious war.
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The confusion was reflected in the emerging war plans of the OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht – High Command of the Armed Forces) and OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres – Army High Command), where contrasting priorities required radically different armament programmes. The OKW called for U-boats and aircraft for the ongoing war against Britain, while the OKH would require tanks and men for the invasion of the Soviet Union. At this point Hitler did not yet see the invasion of the Soviet Union as the long prophesied showdown with Bolshevism and the achievement of ‘living space’ (
Lebensraum
), but rather as a chiefly strategic manoeuvre, designed to clarify to the British the hopelessness of their situation and result in a favourable peace for Germany.
¹⁰
Yet even in Hitler's proposed war on the Soviet Union, Halder's notes suggest that this was not a proposition for full-scale war, but rather something more limited, in line with the ‘Deployment Instructions for Eighteenth Army’ already prepared.
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In either case, Hitler commented at the time of the French capitulation, in comparison to what had just been achieved, war against Russia would represent nothing more difficult than ‘child's play’ (
Sandkastenspiel
).
¹²

Figure 1.1 
In the aftermath of the Polish campaign Hitler decorates many of the generals who would later spearhead the invasion of the Soviet Union. From left to right are generals Franz Halder, Heinz Guderian, Hermann Hoth, Adolf Strauss and Erich Hoepner.

Upon hearing Brauchitsch's report,
Halder instigated a new round of strategic study briefing the Operations Department, the Department of Foreign Armies East and the Military Geography Department. The
first reports were presented a few days later and the discussions that followed centred on the deployment directive for the main German thrust. The head of the operations department, Colonel
Hans von Greiffenberg, proposed a strong southern grouping in support of operations directly into the Ukraine, where intelligence indicated the large concentration of the
Soviet 6th, 12th and
5th armies were located.
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Halder, on the other hand, argued for a powerful northern deployment, capable of striking towards Moscow with a subsequent secondary operation into the Ukraine, compelling the Soviet forces there to fight with reversed fronts.
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The notes of Lieutenant-General
Gerhard Feyerabend, who served in the Army General Staff Operations Department, indicate that Halder believed the drive on Moscow would result in a decisive battle with the bulk of the Red Army, presumably involving a rapid redeployment
from the south. Feyerabend
noted that victory in such a campaign was regarded by Halder as the prerequisite for the political collapse of the Soviet Union.
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Despite the planning and preparations advanced until now by Halder
, there had still been no formal decision announced by Hitler, nor had he issued specific orders that a plan for an aggressive war in the east be prepared. It was on 29 July that Hitler informed the head of the Wehrmacht Operations Department, Colonel-General
Alfred Jodl, of his decision to invade the Soviet Union in May 1941. When told of this decision Jodl's deputy Major-General
Walter Warlimont described ‘a chorus of objection’ followed by an hour of bitter debate.
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The consternation Warlimont claimed to have witnessed centred on the dreaded prospect of a war on two fronts, long since the bane of German military planners. Jodl sought to counter with assurances that victory in the east would stimulate the Luftwaffe with ‘a new pitch of efficiency’ and allow it to be deployed once again in full strength against England in the autumn of 1941. He also asserted Hitler's belief in the inevitable confrontation with Bolshevism, claiming it was better that the war be fought now at the height of Germany's military dominance in Europe.
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Following the meeting with Hitler, Jodl ordered his staff to begin planning, under the operational name ‘Build-up East’ (
Aufbau-Ost
), facilitating the movement and concentration of forces into the poorly-developed regions of western
Poland. Additionally, an operational study was ordered, to be authored by Lieutenant-Colonel
Bernhard von Lossberg, in preparation for a campaign against the Soviet Union.
¹⁸
This study was later to prove the first document in the evidence of the prosecution at Nuremberg, charging German commanders with complicity in planning and waging a war of aggression.
¹⁹

Two days after Jodl's meeting with Hitler, on 31 July, a major conference took place at the Berghof, Hitler's mountain retreat. Present along with Hitler were the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Grand Admiral
Erich Raeder,
²⁰
Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht, Field Marshal
Wilhelm Keitel, Jodl, Halder, Brauchitsch and representing the Luftwaffe, Lieutenant-General
Hans Jeschonnek.
²¹
The formalities began with a briefing by Raeder regarding the state of preparations
for the invasion of England, the preference of the navy being for the postponement of any cross-channel attack until at least May of 1941. Hitler was made well aware of the risks involved owing to serious complications with the weather and German naval deficiencies. The Admiral even raised veiled objections to the army's invasion plan on such a broad front.
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When Hitler finally spoke, it was clear that Raeder's address had only confirmed his own misgivings about the operation. Politically astute, Hitler was aware that Germany's prestige following the victory over France was at an all time high and could plainly see the risks involved in a cross-channel invasion in 1940. Thus he arrived at the question: if there was not to be an attempted landing until the spring of the following year, which even then would involve considerable risks, how best should Germany proceed in forcing Britain's recognition that the war was in fact lost? The root of such thinking stems from Hitler's belief that the British cause was a hopeless one and that refusal to accept terms was maintained only in the lingering hope that either the United States or the Soviet Union would eventually join the war against Germany. Hitler therefore resolved to eliminate the Soviet Union, which he believed would have the dual effect of directly removing one threat, and simultaneously removing the other by consequence of the tremendously increased power
Japan would enjoy in the Far East and the Pacific. The result, Hitler prophesied, would leave Germany ‘master of Europe and the Balkans’.
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Halder's diary spells out the new direction in Hitler's strategic thought and hints at some of the reckless assumptions, which astonishingly were allowed to persist throughout the numerous planning phases and operational studies.

With Russia smashed Britain's last hope would be shattered
…Decision:
Russia's destruction must therefore be made part of this struggle. Spring 1941. The sooner Russia is crushed the better. Attack achieves its purpose only if Russian state can be shattered to its roots with one blow. Holding part of the country will not do
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…If we start in May 1941, we would have five months to finish the job.

Object is destruction of Russian manpower.
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The campaign was to aim for nothing less than the total destruction of the Soviet state and the occupation of the industrial western regions of the country. To do this Hitler spoke of two operational thrusts, one through the south towards
Kiev and the other striking north through the Baltic
states and then on towards
Moscow. The two operational groups would then link up for a subsequent drive on the oil fields near Baku. Following the defeat of France and the reduction in the size of the army to 120 divisions, the demands of a major new campaign in the east prompted Hitler to reverse his earlier decision by directing an increase in the size of the army to a new total of 180 divisions. This denoted 120 divisions for use in the east with the remainder on occupation duties in
France (50),
Norway (7),
Belgium and
Holland (3).
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