"Non-Germans" Under the Third Reich (73 page)

From the outset, both the administration and the police had jurisdiction over the residence of the Jews. The decree of September 13, 1940, served not only as a “legal basis” for the establishment of the ghettos themselves but more and more as a general authorization for regulating
all
issues relating to the treatment of the Jews (the prohibition on the use of public streets and transport, etc.).
¹⁰
But even in those towns where ghettos had yet to be established, the Jews had been tied to their place of residence from the beginning by the decree of the HSSPF mentioned above and had thus become easily manageable “material” for rounding up for forced labor and ghettoization. Violations of residence prohibitions issued on the basis of the decree of September 13, 1940, in particular leaving the ghetto without authorization, were punished severely, initially by administrative penal proceedings instituted by the relevant
Kreishauptmann
¹¹
and, after the infamous Third Decree on Residence Restrictions in the General Government of October 15,1941,
¹²
even by death following sentencing by the special courts. The same applied to any assistance provided to fugitive Jews and—after internal consultation—to unauthorized entry into the ghetto by “non-Jews.”
¹³
These measures, although put into more concrete form by specific regulations issued by the district chiefs,
¹⁴
were the source of growing friction between the justice authorities and the police, because the justice authorities regarded the death penalty as too harsh a punishment and would rather have handed over all such matters to the Security Police,
¹⁵
whereas for the police, the judicial machinery was far too slow; the ultimate consequence was that the police increasingly took the punishment of the Jews into their own hands and simply shot all Jews found outside the ghetto “without permission” on the basis of a secret order of the BdO (senior police officer) in Kraków.
¹⁶

The definitive isolation of the Jews from the outside world took place in 1942—with the start of the deportations to the extermination camps—by the issue of numerous additional regulations about the establishment of Jewish residential quarters, forcing the Jews to take up residence there and obliging the former inhabitants to leave these districts. It should be noted that these regulations were no longer issued in the form of directives (
Anordnungen
) or proclamations (
Bekanntmachungen
) of the internal administration (the
Kreishauptmann
and the district chief) on the basis of the powers conferred by the First Decree on Residence Restrictions of September 13, 1940;
¹⁷
in this instance, the latent jurisdiction of the police over Jewish affairs had already developed to the point where
police regulations
of the HSSPF now intervened. Their only “legal” basis was the general authorization set out in section 3 of the Decree on Security and Public Order in the General Government of October 26, 1939,
¹⁸
which contained no indication of the object, nature, and scope of the subject and regulations to be adopted (“the Senior SS and Police Officer is authorized to issue police regulations”) and thus opened the floodgates to the boundless discretion of the police and continuous jurisdictional conflicts with the administration. This blanket authorization and the regulations issued on its basis show clearly that
at the latest
on this date, the police leadership had assumed control of the solution of all issues connected with the establishment of ghettos and had increasingly outplayed the internal administration (with either its overt approval or its tacit consent), because the police—as was recorded at a police meeting—had a very strong interest “in the Jewish question for obvious reasons.”
¹⁹
The regulations on the establishment of ghettos in specific districts of Warsaw, Kraków, Radom, Lublin, and Lemberg (L’vov) issued by the HSSPF in 1942 thus replaced de facto the existing regulations of the administrative authorities governing “Jewish residential quarters,” or created “original” new “law” where no such previous regulations had existed.
²⁰
Evidently, clarification of the jurisdiction to establish ghettos in accordance with the letter of the law was regarded as superfluous, since the stronger power—the police—had already prevailed: the rule of “might has right” was confirmed.

Equally unclear, and of much more far-reaching importance, was the problem—never settled—of who was responsible for regulating matters
inside
the ghetto. Under the general regulations, this should have been the Interior Administration, as the Jewish “residential quarters” did not represent any formal exception;
²¹
however, the police regarded the ghettos as the exclusive domain of the Security Police outside the jurisdiction of any regular administration (and the administration was increasingly ousted from such jurisdiction),
²²
as demonstrated particularly clearly by the situation in the Warsaw Ghetto. The pretense adopted was the usual argument that the police, responsible for supervising the forced labor by the Jews, must also control the ghetto.
²³
The consequence of this trend was ultimately that the police undermined the jurisdiction of the Interior Administration
²⁴
and monopolized or had the major say in all Jewish affairs, because most of the Jews had been deported to the ghettos after the end of 1941.

2. Other Restrictions on Personal Freedom of Movement

The total isolation of the Jewish population in “Jewish residential quarters” was prepared for and accompanied by a total elimination of all personal freedom of movement—again with the aim of fettering the Jews to their place of residence so that they would be more easily managed for police measures. Countless travel and usage prohibitions for public transport systems were issued, which had a particularly grotesque impact because under the aforementioned decree of the HSSPF of December 11, 1939, Jews could not leave their place of residence in any case. These prohibitions can thus be regarded as no more than an attempt to give the public impression that the Jews could “essentially” move around freely within the General Government with the exception of a few restrictions; these restrictions were, however, comprehensive. For instance, Jews were in principle forbidden to use the railway and other public transport for “reasons of security and epidemiological policy” as well as for “general policy reasons.”
²⁵
The fees for special permits from the police were set extortionately high so that “unsubstantiated applications as well as avoidable journeys were suppressed wherever possible”;
²⁶
fees of between 20 and 100 złoty (between RM 10 and 50 in nominal terms) were demanded,
²⁷
thus making travel impossible for many Jews, even for urgent reasons. Even stricter regulations were imposed in the individual districts, such as a prohibition on the use of
all
private and public transport, the use of public streets and squares, and so forth.
²⁸
The restrictions on the freedom of movement of Jews were thus subject to two sets of rules. Jews could enjoy a minimum standard of personal freedom of movement only if the police approved an exception to the general residence restrictions (to the Jewish residential quarters) and an exception to the general restriction on the use of all forms of transport. It is quite obvious that such special permits for Jews, who had long since lost the status of legal entities, were never issued for personal reasons; they were issued only if there was an “urgent public interest”: “illness,” forced labor conscription, and “resettlement and evacuation.”
²⁹
The consistent consequence was that in this self-contained system of administrative regulations, even the road to forced labor, deportation, and extermination was paved with official “licenses” and “permits.”

The Poles, in contrast, were in many respects treated more leniently, as more consideration had to be taken of them in the interests of trouble-free
Arbeitseinsatz.
The restrictions to which they were subject were thus primarily related to segregation from the Germans, as shown by the prohibition on Poles’ use of railway compartments reserved for Germans.
³⁰
The use of public transport remained in other respects relatively free. Although the Poles were forbidden to use the Eastern Railway (Ostbahn) without special permission in 1941, probably at the initiative of the district administration in Warsaw, this ban had to be lifted several months later because it was obstructing
Arbeitseinsatz
and food supplies.
³¹
Police attempts to introduce a regulation enforcing a general prohibition on Poles using the railways were frustrated at the last minute
³²
by the Central Department of Interior Administration in 1943 when that department invoked the supply problems prevailing at the time, in view of the fact that the railway was the only functioning means of transport during adverse weather conditions and also the means of transport upon which the Poles were solely dependent, private transport (motor traffic) having been banned in the General Government since the end of 1939.
³³
However, after failing to achieve concessions from the administration, the police—as usual—acted independently. As a form of substitute for their failure in 1941 to enforce a general prohibition on the use of the
Ostbahn
without a special permit, the police reintroduced this very same general prohibition by a regulation of October 18, 1943, and made the use of the
Ostbahn
subject to the issue of a permit by the local police authorities;
³⁴
for the police, allowing long-distance and commuter traffic without any control was an intolerable situation. In addition, a directive issued by the government of the General Government prohibited all official agencies from carrying Poles in motor vehicles,
³⁵
with the aim of excluding the Poles from all means of transport other than the
Ostbahn.
In contrast, such petty regulations as the prohibition on using the tram service, either globally or at certain times, as was customary in parts of the Annexed Eastern Territories, were not introduced. The exception to this rule was Warsaw, where special streetcar sections were designated for Germans, Poles, and Jews.
³⁶
As in the Warthegau (or Wartheland), the use of bicycles was prohibited except with a special permit. No doubt with the intention of preventing illegal communications among the Poles, all bicycles were required to be registered (with the exception of bicycles owned by Germans) under a police regulation issued by the higher SS and police leader (HSSPF) on August 3, 1942;
³⁷
and after August 30, 1942, bicycles could be used only with a police permit (issued exclusively for occupational purposes and other important reasons); in addition, they could be confiscated or expropriated for German agencies at any time.
³⁸

IX. Restrictions on Communication and Information Exchange among “Non-Germans”

The restrictions on external personal freedom of movement corresponded to restrictions on the use of communication and news media, to “ensure” the segregation and insulation of the “non-Germans” from information and the social environment.

Until 1942 postal services remained free from intervention. Only then, according to a decree issued by the governor general, were “non-Germans” limited to a maximum of two letters a month per person, each letter a maximum of two pages long (there was no restriction on postcards); correspondence was permitted only with non-enemy countries.
¹
There were additional restrictions on telecommunications and on sending and receiving parcels. To facilitate censorship, the full name and address of the sender had to appear on each sheet of paper.
²
The Armed Forces High Command was also authorized to order restrictions on domestic mail services “for the prosecution of the war” under the same decree.
³
Polish postal workers suffered severe penalties for mail offenses, imposed by the courts from case to case without any consideration of the statutory range of punishments.
⁴
The desire for additional restrictions on postal services for “non-Germans” expressed by the head of the Security Police and the Security Service in November 1943 in the Security Service Reports on Domestic Issues should be seen as a means of combating the activities of the Polish underground movement, which was particularly active among Polish postal workers; the reasons given were that the Polish underground was growing in strength via correspondence with Poles in the General Government, hostile propaganda was being spread by post, reports on conditions in the Altreich were reaching the General Government, and the risk of theft, black market activities, and so forth was in- creased.
⁵
Because of the course of the war, however, the proposed countermeasures did not result in any further restrictions, at least not any directed by the governor general.