"Non-Germans" Under the Third Reich (68 page)

Other cultural facilities and activities of the “non-Germans” were totally suppressed or permitted only to a limited extent. All registered and unregistered Polish clubs and associations were dissolved on August 1, 1940; they could receive a special “confirmation” from the German authorities to continue their activities if these involved German interests.
²³
All foundations and religious sects
²⁴
were also dissolved.

The policy of the National Socialist authorities on cultural institutions was essentially that all valuable institutions and collections were treated as de facto German property, and the authorities behaved as if an independent Polish culture had never existed. Polish literature in public libraries was seized, and the collections of important libraries were removed to the Reich.
²⁵
All Polish theaters and cinemas were also confiscated; they were released only on a limited scale.
²⁶

The printing and distribution of Polish newspapers was heavily restricted and placed under the strictest supervision.
²⁷
German propaganda (book exhibitions, poetry readings, publicity events, etc.),
²⁸
particularly for the rural population (by loudspeakers, posters, wall newspapers),
²⁹
increased considerably.

All cultural activities were placed under German supervision or were subject to approval;
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public music performances were completely forbidden; the ownership and continued operation of printing establishments and publishing houses, the publication of printed matter of any sort, and the continued operation of bookstores required the approval of the authorities; the publication of books and independent newspapers and (from 1942) the manufacture of paper products of any kind (e.g., exercise books) were prohibited; the distribution of “philosophical or political” literature was banned but not that of “entertainment or technical books.”
³¹

The regulations governing mandatory approval for cultural activities and the publishing of printed matter were mostly of a general nature and did not distinguish between German and “non-German”; the special-law character of these regulations was inherent, since their main purpose was to create bans, controls, and supervision of the activities of the “non-Germans.” This is shown by the fact that it was not the internal administration or the Central Department for Education and Adult Education but the (Central) Department for
Education of the people and Propaganda
that was responsible for the supervision and approval requirements described above,
³²
the latter being one of the prime proponents of a severe anti-Polish line, and authorized to issue implementing regulations to the corresponding decrees of the governor general.
³³

Church life was not affected, in contrast to the Annexed Eastern Territories, because the church was required as a steadying and disciplinary factor. The Polish Church retained its status as a public corporation and the Polish seminaries were reopened.
³⁴
But, according to the principle of segregation, the Polish-German (“racially mixed”) Evangelical Protestant congregations were dissolved; the reduction of the Evangelical congregations to private associations, as in the Warthegau (or Wartheland), did not, however, occur; again, the principle of segregation was applied, with the governor general ordering the establishment of “German” and “non-German” congregations.
³⁵

II. The Economic and Commercial Sector

In the same way as in the cultural sector, a policy of oppression was pursued in the areas of economic administration and economic law; but in contrast to the intentions for the Annexed Eastern Territories, this did not aim to
extinguish
the economic life of the Poles but to reduce it to such a level (subsistence level) that the Poles could be used only as labor.

The consequence of this attitude for general economic policy was that the General Government, in any case poor and dependent on imports, was pillaged, with everything of value transported to the Reich;
¹
later, when the General Government produced no further “spoils of war,” production was revived, but for the sole purpose of squeezing the country dry once again of “everything that could be extracted.”
²
The British system of colonial administration, allegedly the role model for the National Socialists, was not practiced at all, with the development of an economy for Poles themselves deliberately neglected;
³
instead, an expensive centralized economic bureaucracy was installed,
⁴
but this was unable to achieve its goal of the supervision of the “non-German” economy because of its cumbersome structure.
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All possible assets were exploited by this bloated economic administration
⁶
exclusively in the interests of the Reich.
⁷
Contrary to the announcements of the governor general, the original priority status awarded to Galicia was implemented to no more than a minimal degree and soon gave way to the general policy of exploitation;
⁸
the governor general himself once said that the relationship with the Poles in the General Government was “the relationship between an ant and a greenfly.”
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The predatory exploitation of human and material resources that ensued never reached its set objectives and merely led to the complete impoverishment of the colony of the General Government.
¹⁰

With regard to the details of the implementation of this policy, there was no general policy of expropriation as practiced in the Annexed Eastern Territories. State assets were confiscated and expropriated, but not
private
assets,
¹¹
because the Germans were dependent upon the willingness of the Polish population to work. However, sufficient opportunities were created to oust the Poles from their property and block all possibility of acquiring assets. In this instance as well, the administration was able to make use of relevant regulations under Reich special law.

1. Polish Assets

The Decree on the Confiscation of Private Assets in the General Government of January 24, 1940,
¹²
had given the governor general and the subordinate authorities (the district chief, the
Kreishauptmann
) the opportunity to order confiscations by
single decree
from case to case “to fulfill tasks in the public interest.” No compensation was generally envisaged, but this could be granted at the discretion of the administration for damages resulting from the implementation of the decree.
¹³
At any rate, the decree created a degree of legal certainty by preventing controlled seizure by all types of authorities as was the order of the day in the Annexed Eastern Territories. Under certain circumstances, it was even possible to appeal to the courts against confiscation orders.
¹⁴

A decree issued by the governor general on March 27, 1940, stipulated a
requirement of official approval
for the disposal of real estate in order to “safeguard an appropriate regional policy and economic system”; although this had a
global
effect, it did, of course, principally relate to the Poles. All acquisitions of enterprises and warehouses were also subject to official approval, intended to restrict the economic activities of the Poles and ensure control over them.
¹⁵
As in the Reich, Jews were not permitted to acquire either real estate or real property rights under this decree. From the beginning of 1943, the administration was also able to order the merger and closure of enterprises (without any right of appeal or entitlement to compensation).
¹⁶

The police, of course, enjoyed substantially greater powers. Under a decree issued on January 24, 1940, the HSSPF (higher SS and police leader) had declared a right of seizure “in exceptional cases” with the aim of “increasing the power of the regular police and the armed SS,” in particular with regard to objects “directly linked to criminal acts” (secs. 12 ff.). This wording is yet another example of the boundless omnibus provisions found in National Socialist law, on the basis of which the (security) police could do as they pleased: under the conditions reigning at that time, was there anything that could not be linked “to criminal acts”?

At any rate, this right of seizure was no more than a weak remnant of the original plans of the RFSS, who as Reich Commissar for the Strengthening of German Nationhood had presented a draft decree on October 11, 1939, “under which
all
real estate of Polish land owners will be expropriated and confiscated” (this amounted to a ban on disposal of property) and “given in its entirety to the [German] settlers without compensation.”
¹⁷
Both this plan and efforts by the police to achieve a
general expropriation
of the “non-Germans” were curbed by the administration as far as possible for reasons of economic policy.

To preempt the police, however, the administration itself had drawn up a decree on the expropriation of real estate, which it presented as a draft in October 1942.
¹⁸
The draft was a response to a draft expropriation decree submitted by Higher SS and Police Leader (HSSPF) Friedrich Wilhelm Krüger in his capacity as commissioner of the RFSS/RKF, which was based on Himmler’s own ideas as set out above and went so far as to remove from the internal administration all general jurisdiction for expropriations, since these involved “racial and settlement policy plans,” for which the RFSS was responsible as Reich Commissar for the Strengthening of German Nationhood.
¹⁹
Neither of the two drafts was adopted, however, because at the latest in 1942, the administrative leadership was unable to enforce anything of importance against the will of the police, and the extremist notions of the police in turn met the delaying passive resistance of the bureaucracy.

This meant that the confiscation decree of January 24, 1940, continued in force; it met the needs of expropriations to almost the same degree, because seizures under this decree resulted not only in
restrictions on disposal
but also in the
loss
of all rights in rem and rights in personam giving title.
²⁰
In the case of expropriations ordered under this decree, the assets seized were subject to the complete
power of disposal
of the German administration.
²¹
Despite the lack of any legal basis, these confiscated assets were frequently impounded in favor of the General Government;
²²
the favored argument of the administration at that time, that the ownership status was not affected by the confiscation but was “merely” subject to restrictions on disposal,
²³
thus flew in the face of reality. However, if German statements on the matter are to be believed, only very few assets were confiscated “for economic or political reasons.”
²⁴
Unless confiscated, the assets of private Polish individuals remained relatively protected for the same “political reasons” (preservation of willingness to work) as long as the
administration
(and not the police) had jurisdiction.

2. Jewish Assets

These principles did not apply to Poles of Jewish extraction;
²⁵
they were subject to the principle of special law and overt discrimination in all its harshness. With the aim of segregating Polish and Jewish economic life (in the terminology of the day, “eliminating” the earlier Jewish influence on the economy),
²⁶
their total assets were subject to compulsory registration, as in the Reich: the acquisition of foreign currency, gold, and other precious metals was rendered de facto impossible;
²⁷
all accounts were blocked; unregistered assets were impounded as ownerless;
²⁸
and the almost total exclusion of Jews from “industry, wholesaling, import and export activities, the ownership of land, and the banking, insurance, and transport sectors” was ordered. As was explained quite frankly within the administration itself, Jews were still permitted to engage in “retailing” and “strictly controlled craft and trade sectors” because they were “still” required to supply the population.
²⁹
In other words, all Jewish enterprises were confiscated—first the large businesses (smaller enterprises remained provisionally open) and Jewish real estate.
³⁰
The earnings from the confiscated enterprises and goods flowed into German pockets, and the confiscated real estate was used to meet the demands of the administration for accommodation and office space. Reports of the day make a subtle distinction between confiscations per se, which were seen as quite proper, and their implementation, which was evidently so brutal and arbitrary that it had given the “impression[!] of arbitrary acts and lawlessness” and had damaged the reputation of the Germans.
³¹