Losing Vietnam (46 page)

During March, the reports of many attaché inspections were depressing; for example, it was stated that the 1st Division was in miserable condition and should be rated combat ineffective.
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The rolling stock of the division remained in poor condition due to a shortage of repair parts. There were 250 desertions during the month (10 percent). In the 3rd Division, low foxhole strengths were also a big problem. Even greater was the loss of commanders at the platoon and company levels. Since 1 January, the 3rd Division had had over seventeen hundred casualties and received only three hundred new recruit replacements. Personal gear was old and worn out—the soldiers needed uniforms, boots, mosquito nets, and ponchos—no wonder the newspapers called FANK a ragtag army. The 7th Division had only one brigade capable of offensive operations. At some of its defensive positions, combat losses were staggering, and the remaining defenders were capable only of close-in defense, because many suffered from malaria, combat fatigue, and food-related problems. The navy had taken so many casualties that it became super-cautious. When sent to evacuate marine forces on the lower Mekong, its boats would stand off from the shore and make the evacuees swim toward them. (It is hard to maintain your weapon when forced to swim for your life.)

Notwithstanding all of their grave shortcomings, the friendly soldiers stood their ground and fought. On numerous occasions, they
bloodied the enemy as the communists continued to press their attacks. It was really a shame that the infantry soldier was not better led; however, some of the Cambodian leaders were truly outstanding. Recognizing that many of the older senior officers were a definite detriment, Marshal Lon Nol attempted to shake up the senior command. On 11 March, Lieutenant General Fernandez resigned, and Lt. Gen. Sak Sutsakhan replaced him. Younger and tougher men replaced several other senior officers, but it was too late.

On Sunday afternoon, 23 March 1975, at his accommodations in Bangkok, I met with Fernandez for over an hour of frank discussions.
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He said there were two situations in Cambodia, the military and the political, and the political situation was in disarray. He agreed with the current newspaper accounts that Marshal Lon Nol probably would not remain in the country too much longer; however, he believed there would be a major vacuum when he left and none of the four political parties had the strength to unify the country. Therefore, the military would eventually be the vehicle to unify the government and stabilize the situation. (Lon Nol left on 1 April, and Sutsakhan took over on 12 April.) Many times in our conversation, he said the politicians were not thinking of the good of their country but only their own welfare and safety. He stressed the importance of having both Brigadier General Chhong (Khmer Air Force) and Rear Admiral Sarendy (MNK) in on all military planning and considered part of the team (something initiated only since January 1975, which had greatly improved planning). He did not believe Sutsakhan could be effective at the joint staff headquarters, as Lon Nol had appointed him defense minister in addition to chief of staff, so he would probably have to spend most of his time in meetings and would not be able to follow day-to-day operations. (The next day in discussion, Brigadier General Palmer said that Sutsakhan had spent the whole day in meetings with the marshal and was not available to assist in military decisions.)

In updating Lieutenant General Fernandez on the current situation, I mentioned that the 23rd Brigade had fallen back and that this upset the schedule to retake the rocket pocket, and eliminate indirect fire on Pochentong. Fernandez said the marshal himself had appointed the commander of the 23rd Brigade, a very weak man who reported directly to the marshal. He then said he thought Gen. Lon Non and
Gen. Ith Suang were going to the joint staff operations center each day and were giving orders and directing affairs. He believed such interference could not be tolerated. (This subject had been a matter of concern to both Palmer and Ambassador Dean.)

Fernandez had put his finger on a major problem: there was no strong leader in charge of military operations. In Phnom Penh, there was a deep frustration with the poor military performance, and the government was unable to bring the Khmer Rouge to the negotiating table. This led Marshal Lon Nol to once again reshuffle his government, but to little avail, and he left Cambodia on 1 April for an extended visit to Indonesia. With the marshal out of the way and Sukham Khoy as acting president, everyone hoped that peace negotiations could be jump-started. However, by then it was obvious that Cambodia was on its last legs.

The attaché field report of the 3rd FANK Division, probably the most competent of all Cambodian army units, summarized the situation in April 1975.
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According to the report, Lon Nol's departure at first raised hopes for the United States' increased military assistance, which would provide the soldiers with the uniforms and equipment they so drastically needed. As time wore on without U.S. assistance, however, morale dropped; and when Banam–Neak Luong was captured, it hit a new low, visibly affecting the soldiers' will to resist. On 7 April, as the division fell back along Route 4 under enemy pressure, it still managed to kill more than two hundred communists. Since 1 January 1975, the 3rd Division had undergone more than seven hundred attacks by fire and almost three hundred ground contacts. Its dry-season campaign casualty figures were high. With Chinese/NVA weapons and equipment, the enemy appeared better supported than the FANK was.

Regardless of severe shortages, the FANK fought on, severely bloodying the poorly trained and inexperienced enemy fillers. It reported that “its operations on 10 April caused heavy communist casualties. North of Route 4, the 13th Brigade reported killing 150 communists. Farther north the 45th Brigade claims 550 enemy killed, mostly by air attacks. Elsewhere on 10 April, Prey Veng reported 125 KC killed and 9 prisoners taken, while Takeo claimed 69 enemy killed and 3 prisoners.”
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If the reporting was reasonably accurate, then the heavy enemy
losses—combined with a carefully planned 12 April operation utilizing three M113 squadrons, five artillery batteries, and full air support to counter the communists in the critical northwest sector—should have provided a manner of relief in the defense of Phnom Penh. Yet there was little hope.

A message from the JCS in Washington at the end of February 1975 conveyed concern that ammunition rationing and other understandably imposed restrictions had strangled Cambodian initiatives and, noting that the recently increased airlift resupply operations were temporarily building supplies at the Kantauk ammunition depot, questioned what actions could be taken in the field to encourage a higher tempo of operations.
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The message suggested that the authorized supply rate for units actively engaged in combat be increased—that is, “shoot more.” However, ammunition was not rationed, nor was it ever, and throughout the enemy's dry-weather offensive friendly units had no restrictions and greatly exceeded their funding-related authorized supply rates. Rationing would have acutely affected the army's ability to react to crisis situations.
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In the same time frame, a message from CINCPAC staff expressed serious concern about Cambodia's increased rate of ammunition expenditures. So as to preclude a major drawdown of ammunition, Admiral Gayler suggested a reduction in the 0.67 conservation ratio—that is, “shoot less.”
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His well-intentioned suggestion would not have solved the problem, since FANK was greatly exceeding current authorized supply rates. CINCPAC headquarters had anticipated the congressional cutback in funding and diligently monitored the need for ammunition conservation in Cambodia.

These two messages graphically highlighted the ammunition dilemma—how to successfully fight a war on a budget? Should there be all-out or constrained expenditures of ammunition? The troops combating the communists solved the dilemma. Utilizing available equipment and supplies, they were fighting all-out, and consequently, within a short period they would completely run out of ammunition without knowing it.

While all the Cambodian political and military machinations were going on, the well of U.S. funding was going dry, almost unnoticed. It was now obvious that the U.S. Congress was not willing to grant President
Ford's request for supplemental funding. Cambodia was running out of supplies. It had no equipment replacement for combat losses; what equipment it had was short of repair parts; many of its troops needed uniforms; and, most important, there was little ammo left. So, on 27 March, Headquarters USSAG informed all concerned that the ammunition stocks at Phnom Penh and the enclaves were approaching critical levels.
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As of 26 March 1975, there were 2,309 short tons at Samae Son set aside for airdrops to the Cambodian enclaves. This ammo required palletized standard loads and special rigging. With a delivery of 105 short tons per day, the airdrop would end on 17 April. When the 2,019 short tons at Samae Son awaiting airland delivery were added to the 9,249 short tons stored at Phnom Penh, this amounted to 11,268 short tons. At the current ammunition consumption rate of 400 short tons per day, there would be zero depot stockage by 22 April. Long before then, however, there would be zero balances in many key individual line items, so in reality there would be severe ammunition shortages by mid-April. With the fiscal year only half over, the government had already exhausted its military assistance funding. No matter how valiantly Cambodia fought, defeat was inevitable.

The U.S. country team in Cambodia, led by the dynamic Ambassador Dean, was doing everything possible to shore up the flagging Cambodian situation. Dean reported:

We at Headquarters USSAG heartily endorsed the ambassador's tribute to Palmer, his dedicated, overworked MEDTC team, and the members of the defense attaché staff—their professional performances were truly exemplary.

The U.S. and South Vietnamese military support of the Cambodian
conflict was at all times commendable. The same was definitely true of Ambassador Dean, his staff, and the USAID personnel. Unfortunately, both military and civilian in-country assistance were severely circumscribed by Congress's limit of two hundred U.S. personnel available in country.

The first of April was the turning point of the war. The overrun of Banam and Neak Luong, the last government strongholds on the Mekong River, freed up the communist forces on the lower Mekong to join in the siege of Phnom Penh. Additionally, the departure of Marshal Lon Nol indicated to all that the situation was grim. The Cambodians' morale fell drastically, although those who had assumed positions of responsibility put on optimistic faces. The malaise so evident at the end of February had taken its toll. Although it was business as usual in Phnom Penh, there was an atmosphere of great apprehension. Most of the foreign embassies had withdrawn their staffs, and it was time for Ambassador Dean to think seriously about evacuation.
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As early as April 1973, CINCPAC had tasked Headquarters USSAG to both plan and execute the emergency evacuation of Americans from Cambodia. USSAG's surface operations and plans division had completed evacuation plans for Operation EAGLE PULL, as it was called, by April 1974. The marines who were to serve as the security force had been in training for this operation at least since then. Initially, there were three evacuation options: fixed-wing civilian aircraft, fixed-wing military aircraft, and military helicopter. The continuous shelling of Pochentong by the Khmer communists generally eliminated any thought of fixed-wing aircraft evacuation. In January 1975, Lieutenant General Burns had called a planning conference at Nakhon Phanom, attended by key marine and air force personnel. The initial EAGLE PULL plan needed to be updated and closely reviewed. As was to be the case in the evacuation of Saigon, the anticipated number of evacuees kept changing. At one time, the American embassy estimated well over three thousand civilians. But that number kept decreasing, particularly since the embassy used airland resupply operations at Pochentong to backhaul both American and Cambodian personnel. On
3 April, Col. Sydney H. Batchelder and his advance group of marines arrived in Phnom Penh. His command element was extremely helpful in assisting the by now reduced embassy staff in last-minute evacuation planning as well as operational matters. Although plans initially included use of multiple landing zones, particularly the large Olympic athletic stadium, the group decided to use only one landing zone, a soccer field, LZ Hotel, about one kilometer northeast of the embassy and protected by a row of apartment buildings to the east that masked the area from probable direct fire from the communists on the east bank of the Mekong.

The choice of LZ Hotel necessitated a security force of 360 marines, to be inserted by twelve CH-53 helicopters flying in groups of three. The same CH-53s were to be used to evacuate the embassy and Cambodian personnel. Another heavy helicopter squadron would then evacuate the security force. At the last tally, about six hundred evacuees were expected, one-fourth American and the remainder foreign nationals. Actually, only 287 were evacuated, including eighty-four U.S. citizens.

Burns established L-hour as 0900 on 12 April. At 0730 hours that day, Ambassador Dean notified key Cambodian officials of the evacuation, instructing them to assemble at the embassy by 0930 hours if they desired to leave. Amazingly, only one senior official, Acting President Khoy, accepted. The others decided to stay and fight to preserve their government.