Losing Vietnam (49 page)

Only in February and March 1975 did the Cambodian defenses start to unravel, and a serious malaise accompanied by a precipitous drop in morale ensued. The U.S. Congress's failure to provide the funding necessary to adequately support the war effort caused much of this defeatism. Had the Cambodians not capitulated, they would have completely run out of ammunition within days. All funds had been utilized to provide critical ammunition, so they were not available for replacement equipment, repair parts, or even uniforms. FANK was
derided as a “ragtag” army. This visible lack of support unquestionably had a severely deleterious effect on morale, to say nothing of combat effectiveness.

The Khmer communists, in contrast, seemed to become better equipped and supplied as the war wore on. They certainly did not lack either sufficient ammo or replacements. Whereas the government was reluctant to enforce conscription or crack down on deserters, the communists had no qualms about enforced conscription and rigid discipline. That these units all had a cadre of North Vietnamese or North Vietnamese–trained Khmers enhanced their combat capabilities, whereas, unfortunately, U.S. advisers were not authorized to support Cambodian units and were limited to two hundred in-country personnel.

Another key factor was that, as in South Vietnam, the United States withdrew its supporting combat forces; on 15 August 1973, Congress forbade the U.S. Air Force from contributing its formidable firepower support. As in South Vietnam, we attempted to augment that loss by providing the fledgling Cambodian forces with additional armor, artillery, and tactical air equipment. However, funding constraints seriously undercut the effectiveness of the increased firepower and mobility.

The fall of Cambodia was due to a clash of ideologies: the cautious democratic approach of the Cambodian government versus the communists' harsh disciplinary methods; the failure of the U.S. Congress to support the war versus the People's Republic of China's and North Vietnam's continual support of the Khmer communists.

In these wars by budgets, the U.S. budgets were woefully insufficient. Vietnamese and Cambodian combatants bravely fought the communist aggression and gave their lives in futile efforts. Both countries were doomed. They could not have prevailed militarily because they lacked the sinews of war—ammunition, petroleum, and equipment. They were doomed by the budget—the United States' lack of financial support and resolve. We had a commitment to the peoples of South Vietnam and Cambodia, and we let them down. The killing fields of Cambodia need not have happened. The loss of Southeast Asia is not in the United States' national conscience; its citizens generally are unaware of how Congress abandoned our allies in South Vietnam and Cambodia.

USSAG/7AF had just completed its responsibilities for the emergency evacuations of American citizens from Cambodia and South Vietnam, and with the loss of those two countries to the communists our headquarters was due to stand down on 30 June. Personnel were enjoying the calm after the hectic days of April 1975. Shortly after noon on 13 May we received an important message from the JCS that the Cambodians had commandeered a U.S. merchant ship in the Gulf of Thailand and we were to immediately launch aircraft to locate the ship. We quickly went to the command center and directed two standby F-111 aircraft, which were on an alert status, to locate the vessel. They found it at anchor about one kilometer off Koh Tang Island. Subsequently, the JCS directed us to maintain constant surveillance and take any actions necessary to ensure that the vessel did not enter a Cambodian port. Koh Tang Island was only thirty miles from the major port of Kompong Som.

The Seventh Air Force battle staff took over the operation, with the aircraft assets available from the airbases in Thailand, which included F-4s, F-111s, A-7s, OV-10s, C-130s, KC-135s, and helicopters, as well as an airborne command and control aircraft, which was deployed from Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines.

The U.S. merchant vessel was a container ship called the SS
Mayaguez
. Washington obviously was very displeased with this affront by the Cambodians, and strong actions might have to be taken to secure the release of the
Mayaguez
and its crew. CINCPAC directed Lieutenant General Burns to plan for a helicopter assault operation to land on top of the
Mayaguez
's containers and take the vessel by force. The only troops in country at that time trained for such an operation were those in the air force security police unit stationed at NKP. When the
unit was asked for volunteers, every member stood tall. So USSAG made plans for a helicopter assault at first light on 14 May. That evening, about a hundred air force security police went by helicopter to U-Tapao, the closest U.S. base in Thailand to Koh Tang, which was to be used as the staging area. During the transfer, a CH-53 crashed, killing eighteen security police and five crew members on board. It was downed in the same area in which a previous helicopter crash had occurred several months earlier. This caused some serious initial concerns: at the time, there were many unidentified aircraft reportings from southern Laos. However, the cause of the accident was definitely established as a mechanical failure.

At U-Tapao, at 0400 hours on 14 May, the security police and helicopter crews were ready to seize the
Mayaguez
. However, the order to execute was not given. Subsequently, two platoons of marines from Cubic Point in the Philippines and a marine combat battalion from Okinawa were deployed to U-Tapao. As the marines arrived, they replaced the security police, who were still on alert status.

Late in the day on 13 May, USSAG/7AF received instructions to sanitize the island—that is, to isolate the area so no boats could leave the island for the mainland, and, in particular, no shipping could reinforce Koh Tang. Only movement between the
Mayaguez
and the island was to be allowed. During the evening, AC-130 and F-111 aircraft monitored watercraft in the area. In the morning, tactical aircraft were on station. The Seventh Air Force had established rules of engagement and ordinance requirements as well as the aircraft tasking necessary to ensure constant surveillance.

On the morning of 14 May, I was at the command center observing activities and Lieutenant General Burns and the Seventh Air Force staff were in a planning session. A little after 0800, the aircraft on station reported that three vessels had departed Koh Tang, heading in different directions toward the mainland. In following instructions, the fighter aircraft engaged the leading vessel. It first fired rockets and .20-caliber machine guns forward of the craft. When the craft did not alter its course, A-7s dropped CBU-30 canisters filled with the riot-control agent CS on the speeding patrol boat. When this had no effect, the pilot asked for instructions and I responded, “Sink it”—which he proceeded to do. When our aircraft initiated the same procedures
on the second boat, it turned back toward Koh Tang. Attention now turned to the third boat, still holding a course for Kompong Som. On the first pass the aircraft fired rockets. Then it made a second pass, firing its machine guns. One of the pilots reported, “I think I saw a ‘round-eye' on board but I can't be sure.” We requested the aircraft make several additional passes to see whether it could verify that potential sighting. It could not. The A-7s then dropped riot control agents on the vessel. The boat did not veer from its course, and no additional personnel verifications could be made. The lead pilot then stated that the boat was nearing land and asked for his instructions. I instructed the command center officer in charge to tell him to “Let it go.” I then said I would take the responsibility for the decision if there was any fallout from letting the vessel reach land. It turned out later that by the grace of God all the
Mayaguez
crew was on board that boat. If not for the sharp-eyed pilot, it could have been a disaster.

At midday there was a conference call among the National Military Command Center, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, and COMUSSAG to discuss the concept of operations for the recapture of the
Mayaguez
and its crew. The concept was to board and secure the ship, conduct selected air strikes on the Cambodian mainland, and carry out a helicopter assault on Koh Tang to recover the crew.

By this time the USS
Harold E. Holt
, a destroyer escort, was in the vicinity of Koh Tang Island, so it was decided to have three CH-53 helicopters lift a boarding party onto the
Holt
. The boarding party was made up of forty-eight marines of D Company, 1st Battalion, of the 4th Marines, who were to secure the
Mayaguez
, six military sealift personnel and six naval crew who were to place the vessel under steam, two ordinance experts to defuse any booby traps or explosives found on board, and an army linguist. The helicopters deposited their troops about 0600 hours, and the
Holt
maneuvered expertly up against the container ship. Fortunately, its main deck matched the elevation of the main deck of the
Mayaguez
, facilitating an old-fashioned assault boarding. There were no Cambodians on board. By 0800 hours, the
Mayaguez
had been secured (see
photo 9
).

The aircraft carrier
Coral Sea
, previously bound for Australia, was ordered to make all speed to the vicinity of Koh Tang Island. This proved very fortunate for two reasons. First, the aircraft from the
Coral
Sea
would carry out the directed air strikes against the Cambodian mainland, and second, the flight deck of the carrier was indispensable to the helicopters extracting the marines from Koh Tang on the evening of 15 May. Some have criticized the National Security Council decision to bomb selected targets on the mainland to prevent potential Koh Tang reinforcements. However, I believe the decision was a wise one. It showed the United States' determination. A-6 and A-7 aircraft from the
Coral Sea
bombed the Ream navy base, the Ream airfield, and warehouses at the port of Kompong Som. Bomb damage assessment
indicated that the effort was successful. The assessment at Kompong Som showed major damage to two warehouses (see
photo 10
).

Photo 9. The Recovery of the
Mayaguez
. (Source: Headquarters USSAG, Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, produced by 432nd Reconnaissance Technical Squadron, U.S. Air Force.)

Photo 10. Bomb Damage Assessment, Kompong Som, 15 April 1975. (Source: Headquarters USSAG, Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, produced by 432nd Reconnaissance Technical Squadron, U.S. Air Force.)

The military actions taken by the air force, navy, and marines to secure the
Mayaguez
and conduct an assault on Koh Tang Island were primarily for the purpose of recovering the crew. The air strikes against the mainland were also conducted to leverage the crew's recovery. Yet, the crew's status was still unknown on the morning of 15 May. No word or sightings had been received.

Consequently, all concerned were absolutely amazed when an
aircraft identified a Thai fishing boat flying white flags and heading toward the guided missile destroyer USS
Henry B. Wilson
, which had just arrived in the area—as having some of the
Mayaguez
crew on board. It was 1000 hours when the Thai boat came alongside the
Wilson
, which determined that all forty crew members of the
Mayaguez
were on board. What a fantastic change of events!

According to an official translation of a Thai Army report based on the debriefing of five Thai fishermen after they had been released by the Khmer communists along with the crew of the
Mayaguez
and had returned to Thailand, on 12 May, KC gunboat 126 had taken the Thai boat
Sin War I
while it was sailing in international waters in the vicinity of Koh Tang Island, where it was forced to land. There were also two captured Vietnamese vessels at Koh Tang. Khmer communists had executed seven Vietnamese abducted in late 1974 while sailing in adjacent waters; the pirating of the
Mayaguez
was definitely not an isolated incident.