Losing Vietnam (42 page)

In early March 1975, this comparison of forces with respect to March 1974 indicated that both combatants had advantages and disadvantages. The enemy had largely improved over 1974, with the very important exception of its severe combat losses. FANK had improved its fire support coordination, tactical mobility, and close air support. These were the key areas where the Cambodians had a great advantage over the communists. However, because of casualties and desertions, the army had not brought its units up to strength; the navy was depleted; and all were attempting to reduce ammo expenditures. More important, they did not have the offensive spirit.

In summary, at the beginning of March 1975 both sides were exhausted. FANK, with its much greater firepower, had pretty much beaten up the enemy, but it had allowed the Mekong to be closed.
Since it was superior in both firepower and mobility, if it could find the will to fight aggressively, it might deny the communists success for at least another year, thus setting the stage for a possible negotiated settlement. However, with the current military assistance funding, Cambodia would soon run out of supplies, a situation made much more tenuous by the expensive and dangerous airlift requirements. The U.S. Congress's willingness to support the war was in question, and without supplemental funding there was no hope of success. Yet, the Cambodians continued to fight.

On 1 January, as discussed, the enemy initiated its dry-weather campaign with simultaneous attacks on the Phnom Penh perimeter, working to overrun Pochentong Airfield and the Kantauk ammunition depot. While all friendly attention was focused on defending Phnom Penh, the enemy routed the 36th FANK Brigade southeast of Phnom Penh along Highway 1 and overran the marines' positions south of Neak Luong along the Mekong. The Mekong Special Zone withdrew all artillery support to Neak Luong. Preoccupied with Phnom Penh, the government hardly noticed that its vital lifeline was in serious danger of being effectively closed. The enemy dug in and consolidated its hold on both banks of the Mekong and surrounded Neak Luong. The situation was such that on 7 January 1975 the following message was sent to all concerned in advance of the tripartite meeting to be held at Phnom Penh on 10 January:

Since the enemy had little, if any, communications security, friendly forces knew with precision its order of battle on the lower Mekong. Its battalions on both banks of the river were in place, including the 213th NVA/VC Battalion at gridline 21, a dangerous choke point. This was the first time North Vietnamese units had been identified.
²¹⁴
We subsequently received an intelligence report that the Viet Cong Dong Thap I unit was also camped on the west bank between gridlines 20 and 36 and another NVA/VC battalion was on the east bank between gridlines 20 and 42. The intelligence source stated that their mission was to interdict the Mekong River traffic. I knew that the Dong Thap I was a battle-hardened old line Viet Cong unit; in 1969 I had fought against two of its battalions. Additionally, at Vung Tau on 17 January at 0400 hours, a mine, probably placed by a sapper, blew a hole in the tug
Ocean Star
, beaching it. This was the second such incident against ammo tugs at Vung Tau within a year. It appeared that the North Vietnamese had joined the objective of closing the Mekong.

The Khmer high command instructed the navy to formulate a plan to reopen the Mekong; Rear Adm. Vong Sarendy briefed this plan to the tripartite deputies in detail. The joint staff approved the plan, the gist of which was to use 75 percent of navy vessels and all available air force resources, to land at least five additional battalions at choke points, and to reintroduce 105 mm artillery if the situation permitted.
²¹⁵

The tripartite deputies accepted the Cambodian plan and spent additional time discussing TP-111 convoy tactics—whether to go as one entity or be broken into two sections and whether to have a night convoy, which would greatly reduce the air force's effectiveness. However, navy vessels could return fire more effectively in this situation because they could home in on the enemy weapons' flashes. The deputies decided that the navy should cross the border at daylight to gain maximum daytime operational capabilities.

We anticipated the potential use of mines but had no idea of the threat's precise nature. It could consist of sophisticated techniques, such as command-detonated mines or buoyancy mines ballasted to float below the surface of the water. Alternatively, it could be the run-of-the-mill surface-floating mines or explosive charges already encountered singularly or in conjunction with channel barricades. Mine countermeasure craft would be required for coping with the sophisticated threat, but finding and detonating floating mines would only require active reconnaissance.

Everyone understood the importance of the first 1975 convoy. Reporting to the State Department concerning the convoy, Ambassador Dean stated that the next forty-eight to seventy-two hours, between 21 and 23 January, would be crucial for Cambodia, because they would determine whether the large-scale economic and military assistance made available to Cambodia could actually be brought up the Mekong River to Phnom Penh. He believed it was imperative that TP-111 reach Phnom Penh. The Khmers—both friendly and enemy—knew it.
²¹⁶
Headquarters CINCPAC stated that there was a high level of interest in Mekong convoy TP-111 and requested some type of arrangement in which CINCPAC could receive an hourly update once the convoy crossed the border.
²¹⁷
To accommodate this, USSAG sent situation reports on the January convoys as information of importance developed.

The sagas of the 1975 Mekong convoys were interesting. They included owners refusing to sail, missing river pilots, crews abandoning ships, fires on-board vessels, withering attacks by fire, detonating mines, capsized ships, tugs run aground, propellers fouled by barricades, and plenty of heroics. (See
appendix D
.)

The January convoys managed to move 17,471 metric tons of cargo—but at what a price in both shipping and personnel casualties!
On downriver PT-112, the cargo vessel
Port Sun 1
was lost. On upriver TP-113, two petroleum tankers, the
Han Seung 2
and the
Han Seung 7
were lost, as was the rice-carrying coaster
Wah An
(see
photo 7
). On 3 February, the downriver convoy PT-113 lost three tugs:
Timberjack, Hawkeye
, and
Buckeye
, with their six shield barges and the petroleum tanker
Bayon Trader
as well as the self-propelled barge
Saigon 120
and three others. On upriver TP-114 the tugs
Asiatic Trust
and
Shinso Maru
were sunk and the tug
Asiatic Enterprise
went aground and was set afire—causing the convoy to turn back to South Vietnam. The Mekong
River below Neak Luong was a shipping graveyard.
²¹⁸
Five crewmen were killed and at least thirty wounded in the month's convoy. Cambodian Navy losses also were severe.

Photo 7. Mekong Convoy, 29 January 1975. (Source: Headquarters USSAG, Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, produced by 432nd Reconnaissance Technical Squadron, U.S. Air Force.)

After the “Black Monday” losses on the downriver PT-113 on 3 February, the deputies decided to have a replay of TP-111 and send the next convoy north with only two ammo barges and four tugs, all with shield barges. The convoy was scheduled to sail on 5 February.

Anticipating problems, particularly with the new mine menace, we scheduled a transportation meeting with the U.S. agencies and ship owners associated with Mekong convoys at Saigon on the same day, primarily to solicit firsthand information on how the security and operations of convoys could be improved and secondarily to head off potential withdrawals, should TP-114 encounter serious problems. At the meeting, contractors suggested that the U.S. and Khmer governments allow them to construct and operate a minesweep; provide competent river pilots when ship captains requested them; ensure that navy radio personnel provided for tugs were bilingual; arm tugs; provide a large, bunkered barge to be used as a standoff between the contractor tug and contractor sweep ensemble, with bunkered barges manned by mortar and 40 mm gun crews; have the army occupy banks at the Peam Reang choke point; have the navy aggressively sweep for mines; ensure adequate air coverage; and have the convoy commander on the lead tug be designated by the contractor.
²¹⁹

These comments were strictly informal and received from various individuals. At the meeting, the contracting office granted permission to begin the construction of a mine ensemble. All of the other matters were brought up at the tripartite deputies' meeting at Phnom Penh on Friday, 7 February. The suggestions that contractor personnel offered were agreed upon and were in the process of being implemented by the various governmental agencies with one exception: the Khmer Navy said it would not man a bunkered barge immediately behind the minesweep.

The owners, managers, and tug captains of the contracted corporations attended the transportation meeting. This was an amazing group of men. They were of many nationalities, rugged, brave—they had to be brave to willingly submit to the intense gamut of fire along the Mekong. I brought them up to date on the military situation in Cambodia
and reassured them that everything possible would be done to improve convoy security. I impressed upon them the importance of the next convoy, TP-115, and asked them to agree to sail. In conclusion, I said that if we failed to keep operating the Mekong convoys, and Phnom Penh fell as a result, more than three hundred thousand Cambodians would be slaughtered. They left noncommittal.

That night, three representatives of the group asked to speak to me. They had only one question. “We know you are truthful, do you really believe that three hundred thousand Cambodians would be killed?” I told them I definitely believed they would. The delegates then agreed to sail.

I was pleased to report to the tripartite deputies that if we could ensure that the contractors' recommendations were fulfilled, the crews would sail. Several days later I received a call from the embassy in Saigon reporting that it did not concur with my statement concerning what would occur should Phnom Penh fall to the communists. Obviously, they seriously misjudged the Cambodian communists.

Now there were two major threats to shipping on the Mekong. One was the mines, which had such an impact on the SCOOT tugs, and the other was the continual intensive weapons fire from the banks at choke points, which had a devastating effect on the higher-silhouetted petroleum and cargo vessels.

Mines appeared to be the number-one threat on the Mekong. Ground fire had not stopped tugs and barges, but mines had sunk six tugs recently. However, owners and captains said they could design a minesweep that could eliminate mines as a danger. Saigon immediately grasped this suggestion, and the Military Sealift Command agreed to alter the SEAPAC contract, and the CINCPAC representative assisted by ordering foam and equipment immediately. The immediate acceptance of the contractors' requests was necessary for SEAPAC to agree on one more trip. Although at the tripartite meeting Rear Admiral Sarendy had been lukewarm to the idea of the minesweep, its use had the deputies' approval. The minesweep was to be pushed by a high-powered
tug spaced from the sweep barges by an empty ammo barge. The rig would be ready in time for TP-115.

Very thorough discussions were carried on both in Saigon and Phnom Penh concerning the mine threat. To date, no mines had been recovered, and information was pieced together to determine the threat's extent. Crews had stated that whenever they ran into a mine they saw pieces of bamboo four to five inches in diameter and two to three meters long floating on the surface. Some surmised that the mines were hung from these floating platforms, two to three meters below the surface. Others believed that the bamboo marked the submersed mines on the bottom that were command detonated when the ship reached the bamboo. The personnel in the hospital in Saigon with whom the problem was discussed thought the mines were command detonated, their rationale being that the mine exploded midship. One crewman was in the hospital with severe head injuries because the mine's force hurled him upward against the bulkhead. Yet the captain of the
Timberjack
, which was sunk during darkness, claimed that it was too dark for the enemy to see to command detonate. The
Luzon
crew, though, said that before they were hit by mines the enemy fired flares. The mines' extreme impact on the shipping led experts to believe that they were 210-pound Chinese mines. The Khmer Navy had chain drags capable of sweeping to the bank to sever wiring if the mines were command detonated as well as the barricades. (See
photo 8
.) Sarendy firmly believed that within forty-eight hours he could successfully drag the area for the mines. We next had to discern the extent of the mine threat. Four convoys had been run between Phnom Penh and Neak Luong without encountering mines. Therefore, we believed that the minefields were located at the ends of Peam Reang Island. Since these were large mines, it would have taken a major logistical effort to provide sufficient mines to effectively close the channel here alone without considering additional locations. For the time being, all concerned surmised that the mine threat was probably at Peam Reang only. But to be certain, the tripartite deputies requested the navy sweep all of the river.