Losing Vietnam (21 page)

Source
: “Republic of Vietnam Ammunition Conservation Study,” June 1975, Headquarters USSAG, Nakhon Phanom, Thailand.

Subsequently, it became obvious that the COSVN-wide offensive was to fix South Vietnamese forces in MR-3 and MR-4 in place so that the 301st NVA Corps could successfully attack Phuoc Long Province. The total incidents and combat intensity factors in MR-3 and -4 were
never exceeded, not even in the 1975 general offensive. The RVNAF had been expecting an enemy attack on Phuoc Long Province since November as the result of information it had obtained from intelligence sources, including agents and enemy prisoners of war as well as usually reliable intelligence (intercepts). All sources indicated ongoing enemy preparations.

Table 15.
Combat Intensity Factors, 8 November–12 December 1974

Source
: “Republic of Vietnam Ammunition Conservation Study,” June 1975, Headquarters USSAG, Nakhon Phanom, Thailand.

Even with all the intelligence information, unfortunately, few if any preparations were made to defensively prepare for the expected attack. In the overall scheme of MR-3 defense, Phuoc Long Province, with its population of only 44,000 inhabitants out of the total MR-3 population of 5,838,000 and its relatively minuscule economic impact, was not high on the MR-3 priority list. Consequently, only five regional force battalions, with 2,598 troops, and some forty popular force platoons, with 1,837 men, defended the province. These units were highly dispersed, to protect the provinces' sixty-six hamlets and four district towns.

Phuoc Long was also a relatively secure province, with 86.4 percent of its population in HES categories A and B and only nine of its hamlets contested. Phuoc Binh, the provincial capital, was about seventy-five miles northeast of Saigon, and an airfield several kilometers from the city at Song Be served it. During the NVA land-grabbing offensive in early 1973, Phuoc Binh and its district towns had their main supply routes cut by the enemy and became dependent upon the airlift of men
and supplies to Song Be and thence to the district towns by helicopter. That airlift had proved successful then, and perhaps the corps commander thought it could be successful again, if necessary.

At any rate, the secondary enemy assaults against outposts along Highway 13 northeast of Tay Ninh and then against Nui Ba Den in the eastern sector of MR-3 and against friendly units in Long Khanh and Binh Tuy Provinces in the western sector were successful in fixing the III Corps units in place. Thus, when the main attack against Phuoc Long came five days later, the corps commander was indecisive; he had to protect the more strategic and populated provinces.

The communists launched a coordinated attack on 13–14 December 1974 with elements of two divisions. One of these was the 7th NVA Division, which had participated in and learned lessons from the May attack on the Iron Triangle. First, the enemy cut all routes of communication. Then they introduced an antiaircraft regiment to prevent aerial attack on their forces and prevent aerial resupply to the surrounded territorials. Heavy artillery with 130 mm guns, which outgunned the ARVNs few 105 mm and 155 mm howitzers, supported the enemy troops. The enemy used tanks and infantry in combined arms tactics, and its massive observed artillery fires were accurate and highly effective. Even though the ARVN's light antitank weapons were relatively ineffective against the enemy tanks, which had standoff protection, the greatly outnumbered South Vietnamese fought doggedly and, with concentrated close air support, managed to destroy many enemy tanks. (This battle was an example of the JGS's ability to employ tactical aircraft from other military regions, specifically MR-2 and MR-4.)

Yet neither III Corps nor the JGS had a general reserve that could be utilized for counterattacks—a glaring general weakness for which the South would pay dearly. On 28 December, one regular infantry battalion, three reconnaissance companies pulled from the three MR-3 divisions, and ten tubes of artillery reinforced the territorial forces. Later, when the situation at Phuoc Binh was desperate, the corps commander inserted elements of two airborne ranger companies on 3 January 1975. Total reinforcements amounted to 933 men—obviously grossly inadequate for any chance of success. Phuoc Binh was lost on 6 January.

The battle for Phuoc Long portended things to come. The enemy
was now conducting multidivisional corps-type operations supplemented with armor, artillery, and antiaircraft units. The formerly effective U.S. and South Vietnamese tactical air support was no more—the U.S. had withdrawn and the Vietnamese were forced by the enemy's antiaircraft units to fly at altitudes that generally rendered their support ineffective. The enemy carefully chose his objectives, ensuring that he always had greater numerical superiority. MR-3 and the JGS had no general reserves and imprudently sent minor reinforcements to be chewed up by the numerically superior enemy.

The communist tactics were simple and effective. Surprise was to them a major ingredient, but in this case that strategy failed, although the RVNAF was not prepared. They cut all ground lines of communication to prevent resupply and reinforcements. They then utilized coordinated multidivisional combined arms tactics against the highly dispersed South Vietnamese forces. The combat results of the enemy tactics at Phuoc Long were bad. Two weeks after the battle had terminated, out of 5,368 soldiers only 776 beaten remnants had made it to Quang Duc. Fewer than 10 percent of the popular force troops, who were mostly Montagnards, escaped. Although the loss of Phuoc Long hurt militarily, its psychological and political effects were even worse. This was the first provincial capital to be lost, and it was now obvious that the North had no intentions of abiding by the Paris peace treaty. That the United States did not react to this loss demoralized the South Vietnamese. With President Nixon gone and the U.S. antiwar sentiment, it was evident that no active military support could be expected.

During my previous tour in Vietnam I had noticed that enemy ground attacks were greatly reduced for an extended period prior to a major enemy attack. I assumed this occurred for two reasons: First, the communists were careful planners, going into every detail, and they did not want an allied counterattack against one of their ground forays to disturb these carefully laid plans. Second, it was a long supply tail to North Vietnam and they had to carefully husband their ammunition and supplies to have enough for a successful operation. I also noticed that to keep pressure on their intended objectives, they continued to conduct attacks by fire, but with much less frequency and with fewer rounds than previously. The communists had used the subterfuge of a cease-fire to prepare for the 1968 Tet attack, and they did it again in our
area for Tet 1969. In the latter case, without any intelligence reports, we put Dong Tam Base on full alert in anticipation of an attack, which on 22 February 1969 turned out to be the largest ever on the base. So, when the enemy attacked Phuoc Long on 13–14 December 1974 I had my staff break out the statistics for Phuoc Long Province. Sure enough, there was an appreciable reduction in enemy-initiated ground attacks for a prolonged period prior to the main attack. There had been only one ground attack in the previous five months, compared to about twelve per week earlier. Such an analysis could be a useful indicator of communist intentions in the future.

The government dictum to protect all territory and pacify all population created a major military problem. The army was highly dispersed and spread too thinly along the perimeter, with little defense in depth and a sparse strategic reserve. No one understood this critical problem better than General Vien, who in July 1974, to provide depth, directed the regional forces' reorganization into mobile battalions. At every opportunity, he attempted to provide a strategic reserve near Saigon. As part of this, he formed two ranger divisions from existing ranger battalions, to provide command and control elements. The lack of a strategic reserve was a matter of great concern to me, and I had several conversations with Vien about this subject. I recall vividly one from mid-January 1975 at his joint staff compound office, with General Khang, who was also the marine corps commander. I asked Vien how he intended to protect Saigon without a strategic reserve. He said he would recall the airborne and the marines from MR-1 to protect Saigon. Having previously been an airborne division commander, he had the highest regard for the fighting capabilities of the airborne soldiers; obviously, Khang had the same for his marines. The home base of the airborne and marine divisions was in the Saigon area, so their dependents were not generally in MR-1; thus, these troops would fight more effectively knowing that their families were safe.

More than anything else, it should have been a wake-up call to President Thieu and the joint staff. They were now facing a determined modern North Vietnamese force, one that had superior equipment and abundant logistics support capable of fighting a conventional war. The South Vietnamese could no longer expect to protect every one of their twelve thousand hamlets. They could no longer effectively react
without adequate reserve forces. It was time—really, past time—to consolidate and defend critical territory only.

In 1973, greatly concerned about U.S. reactions to the incessant North Vietnamese propaganda concerning alleged RVNAF cease-fire violations (more than four hundred thousand blatantly claimed by North Vietnam), the South Vietnamese maintained an almost completely defensive posture against the continued enemy aggressions. This was reflected in their reports of their minimal (10 percent) offensive actions as security operations. The cease-fire agreement required all foreign troops (at one time well over five hundred thousand) to evacuate. This included the U.S. Air Force's and Navy's formidable close air and strategic bombing power—while at the same time allowing the communist forces, at an all-time high, to remain in place throughout South Vietnam. In other words, anticipating reduced U.S. assistance, President Thieu issued instructions to fight a poor man's war. When the anticipated reductions in funding became a reality in 1974, the JGS issued several directions requiring the conservation of ammunition and other resources. RVNAF ammunition expenditures were the lowest since 1968. Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese were free from the previous U.S. air interdiction, but with our aerial reconnaissance we were able to observe that they were improving their road and petroleum lines of communication and initiating a major logistical offensive, transporting tanks, artillery, air defense weapons, and supporting supplies in great numbers to South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese also continued to infiltrate tens of thousands of troops and to organize the forces into divisions and corps capable of conducting coordinated combined arms operations. By the end of 1974, the balance of power had shifted greatly, although the South Vietnamese were still capable of carrying the war to the enemy and of defending their country.

Recognizing the aforementioned in late December 1974, I prepared for Headquarters USSAG a “South Vietnam Assessment,”
²⁹⁷
which I include here in its entirety:

Since the ceasefire on 28 January 1973, the communists have continued to improve their military posture in South Vietnam. Today, the NVA
have more troops, more artillery, more tanks, more antiaircraft, and more logistical supplies on the ground than at any other time since the beginning of the war. The enemy has also continued to escalate his military activities against the South Vietnamese. His strategy has been to maintain a constant pressure across the board to attrit the RVNAF, while, lately, he has initiated large scale combined arms attacks (infantry, tanks, artillery, sappers) against selected strategic targets.

On the other hand, RVNAF has been circumscribed by a static force ceiling and declining weapons inventory because it has not been able to replace military equipment losses on a one-for-one basis. Additionally, operational funds have been reduced to the point that stockpiles are dwindling seriously. In April 1975, the communists will have more ammunition on the ground in South Vietnam than the RVNAF. Right now, the RVNAF has the manpower and the will to fight. Combat analysis indicates that the RVNAF, because of its superior firepower and mobility, gives much more than it takes, utilizing our military assistance with great skill. However, recent severe reductions in funds have caused a diminution in tactical mobility (particularly helicopters) and firepower (ammunition has been severely limited by conservation measures). The efficiency of RVNAF, as measured by the ratio of enemy killed to friendly killed, has fallen off and the number of RVNAF weapons lost per RVNAF soldier killed has increased appreciably until it is now at the pre-1965 level—indicating a deteriorating morale situation. The current situation can be summarized by the following two tables, which show the greatly reduced military funding with a concomitant increase in combat intensity. We have reduced military aid over 63 percent while the level of combat activities has increased by more than 75 percent.