Losing Vietnam (37 page)

The level of attacks by the enemy on Mekong convoys did not abate during the 1974 wet season as it had in the past. In fact, late in the year the communists began increasing their forces on the lower Mekong. Aerial photos indicated new individual and crew-sized weapons bunkers throughout the area and that the enemy was possibly constructing barricades at two locations south of Neak Luong. The communists had an estimated forty-one battalions on the lower Mekong. Unquestionably, steps had to be taken to improve Mekong security. Obviously, the forthcoming dry season was going to be a difficult one.

Notwithstanding the problems, a review of Mekong security for calendar year 1974 indicated that it had been a successful year:

By the summer of 1973, with MEDTC's expert advice and assistance, FANK had made great progress in its reorganization. At that time the military assistance–supported force included 166 infantry battalions, about 200 aircraft, and 150 boats. Although reorganized and streamlined, FANK was still deficient in the organizational and technical skills necessary to conduct a major coordinated military campaign. However, it was receiving modern military equipment that greatly improved its firepower and mobility, which at the time provided the edge over the communists. In late June 1973, with fifty-four battalions, the enemy initiated a major attack against Phnom Penh. The situation was tough, but the newly formed infantry units, supported by the formidable U.S. air power, plus the firepower provided by ninety-one tubes of recently delivered artillery, successfully defended Phnom Penh. The enemy called off the attack on 15 August—coincidentally, the same day Congress mandated a halt to all U.S. air support of Cambodia.

At the time, many observers believed that without U.S. air support Cambodia could not possibly hold off the forthcoming communist dry-season offensive. However, recognizing the loss of firepower, the United States effected an accelerated delivery of artillery, M113s, radios, vehicles, and air and watercraft to build up Cambodia's firepower and mobility. The standardized organizations and equipment enabled the divisions and brigades to get a better handle on their situation. Additionally, a direct air support center and an artillery fire support coordination center were established in the summer of 1973 and integrated with the FANK operations center. (USSAG maintained radio contact
with the operations center as well as with the MNK headquarters.) This newly improved command and control was of immediate benefit in the battle for Kompong Cham, which called for coordinated efforts by all three services.

The communists had reinforced their forces around Kompong Cham, and on 24 July 1973 they launched an attack, overrunning several villages. They followed this with a 17 August attack against Kompong Cham itself, and by 7 September they had succeeded in occupying peripheral areas of the city as well as the central marketplace, where heavy street fighting occurred. Between 18 August and 14 September, with newly arrived air force C-123s and the boats of the Khmer Navy, the Cambodians reinforced the city with four brigades of four battalions each and a navy task force. They launched offensive operations on 21 September, and they forced the communists by 2 October to begin to withdraw and by 21 November to ultimately redeploy. The combined efforts of the army, air force, and navy contributed to the success at Kompong Cham and gave morale a big boost. The stage was now set for the commencement of the 1974 dry season.

In early December 1973, Lt. Gen. Lon Nol requested a meeting with Gen. Timothy O'Keefe, the USSAG commander. O'Keefe presented him a thoughtful talking paper, covering three subjects: the spirit of the offensive, lines of communication, and joint command and control.
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In essence, it noted that FANK generally had been oriented on the defense of population centers and had conducted few offensive operations. It listed the definite benefits to the offensive side, as it keeps opposing forces off balance, gains psychological advantages, receives favorable press releases, influences world opinions, and normally can influence events to its liking. It also stated that next to the defense of Phnom Penh and the implementation of the Mekong river plan, in the interest of lines of communication the clearance of Highway 4 was the highest priority item. Finally, it stated that we were very encouraged by the great improvement in joint command and control, particularly with the steps that had been taken to integrate air support with ground operations and the navy's contributions. A strong air force was essential, and O'Keefe suggested improved coordination between the army and the air force.

Map 8. Cambodia, Major Routes and Enclaves. (Source: FANK, Cambodian Joint Staff, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.)

Route 4 was one of the major ground lines of communication connecting the deep-water port of Kompong Som to Phnom Penh. In late 1973 and early 1974, the security of Route 4 was a major FANK objective; if the route could be secured, then the major resupply of Phnom Penh could be more easily effected over this 210-kilometer route than by using the Mekong River or by airlanding supplies (see
map 8
).

At least two-thirds of Route 4 runs through dense forests, mountainous areas, and high passes dotted with more than thirty major bridges and numerous culverts, making it vulnerable to enemy interdiction. The communists had three to five battalions between Kompong Som and Kompong Seila and four to six between Kompong Seila and Phnom Penh. Should extensive convoy activities commence, the enemy could be expected to reinforce the area.
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FANK had eleven infantry battalions deployed along Route 4 from three different brigades whose average strength was about 250 men. The Route 4 special zone commander controlled only the twenty-six territorial force companies, with an average strength of sixty men, which were positioned at outposts along the road and the ten artillery positions with 105 mm howitzers spaced along the route to provide fire support. Although FANK had substantial forces committed to Route 4 security, their success was limited because of command and control problems. A single unified command was necessary to ensure immediate response to any enemy-initiated action.
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FANK also had to improve the positioning of artillery platoons for proper overlapping coverage and mutual support. But the real problem boiled down to its not having the manpower to form additional territorial force companies to secure the new fire support bases.

In December 1973, the joint staff directed the 1st FANK Infantry Division to clear Route 4 west of Kompong Speu. This was the first time the newly organized full division conducted an offensive operation, and some operational shortcomings were to be expected as the unit progressed up the learning curve. The assistant army attaché's field report was most enlightening; after one month the 1st Division had cleared only two kilometers of the fifteen controlled by the enemy.

The attaché reported that the division's plan lacked imagination and often violated basic elements of sound tactics. The division commander never once brought to bear the full combat power available
to him; rather, he committed it piecemeal or kept it in reserve. He parceled M113s out to the brigades and did not use them effectively to take advantage of their firepower and maneuverability. However, he did use artillery and air support fairly effectively. Slowness and caution characterized the division's operations; it forfeited any possibility of achieving surprise. The 48th Brigade commander and several battalion commanders were in faraway Phnom Penh when their units were supposedly conducting a decisive engagement. Some infantry battalions had only about 150 personnel in the operational area, and the average operational strength was between 150 and 250 troops, out of 512 authorized. The almost daily enemy contact or harassment by fire, combined with relatively high casualties, high sick rates, and long separations from families lowered the morale in some units. However, the 1st Division opened Route 4 on 6 January, mainly because the communists withdrew troops to attack Phnom Penh. Later on, the division did achieve some significant successes; these resulted in a marked improvement of morale at all levels.

In 1973, the army had made substantial progress in its reorganization into military assistance–supported divisions and brigades. The major equipment infusion of artillery, M113s, and aircraft had strengthened both its firepower and maneuver capabilities. More important, FANK had successfully defended Phnom Penh, defeated the enemy at Kompong Cham, and resisted major enemy attacks at Takeo. Yet it had a difficult time keeping Route 4 open, and in October and November the communists managed to overrun several large towns. Notwithstanding these setbacks, FANK was definitely an improved force on paper, but it still lacked the leadership necessary for it to become fully operationally effective—and it had endemic manpower problems.

At year's end we noticed the redistribution of communist forces, reflecting a major buildup in the Phnom Penh area—to fifty-nine battalions, much greater than the thirty-five it had available at the initiation of the summer offensive. Countrywide, the enemy had increased its forces by about ten thousand troops and increased the number of operational battalions from 121 to 166. Many of the new units had not been battle tested, and the communists appeared to be going through a protracted period of minor skirmishes outside the Phnom Penh area to
gradually test their new battalions. Once these forces had been battle tested, they would move to Phnom Penh. Additionally, we expected that once the rice harvest had been interdicted in the Battambang area four or five more battalions would be available for the main attack against Phnom Penh, which had always been the communist key objective. In 1974 the enemy would have more battalions with tighter command and control and therefore could be more effective. At the same time, however, limited junior leadership, understrength units, and possible shortages of rice and ammunition mitigated against their success.

A well-planned dry-season attack on Phnom Penh proper kicked off on 6 January 1974. The enemy found a weak spot in the northwestern sector of the capital defenses and attacked with fifteen battalions. It pushed to within four kilometers of the Pochentong airbase, the most serious threat of the war. FANK reacted by ordering into the area of conflict two battalions of the 28th Brigade, reinforced with M113s. This rapid reaction, supported by effective close air support, blunted the attack and stabilized the situation. Tactical air sorties flown throughout the day also provided effective support to army units in contact elsewhere. Other enemy forces threatened the southern sector, where there were massive gaps in friendly defenses. Surprisingly, the communists displayed a lack of alertness and aggressiveness, permitting FANK to reinforce the sector in a piecemeal fashion and negating their best opportunity to enter the city. However, on 20 January, in the southwestern sector the enemy managed to move a sizeable force as far north as the Prek Thnot River, putting it within howitzer range of Phnom Penh. The communists fired more than five hundred 105 mm rounds into Phnom Penh, causing absolute panic among the population. One artillery attack on 11 February caused more than two hundred civilian casualties. By the end of February, FANK had halted the attack on Phnom Penh and seized the initiative in the outlying provinces. Its determined defense had created substantial communist casualties, which required the enemy to replace units in the Phnom Penh area with battalions elsewhere. This permitted the Cambodians to conduct
highly successful population reclamation projects at Kompong Thom and Siem Reap and to expand the Takeo perimeter. For the time being, the enemy reverted to interdicting the lines of communication and conducting attacks against provincial capitals, particularly Kampot.

The war in Cambodia was unique in many ways. The following intelligence report shows the “light side” of this very real conflict: