Losing Vietnam (19 page)

At the same time, on an extended trip to the United States, Ambassador Martin was relaying to the South Vietnamese government
assurances that the administration would keep trying for more military aid. There was no doubt Martin was taking part in a strong lobbying effort to increase the military aid so desperately needed, while at the same time those in Saigon were totally preoccupied in reducing the level of expenditures required by the cuts in U.S. military aid to South Vietnam.

These events and others like them left the South Vietnamese with high hopes that a supplemental bill would be forthcoming after the November elections, enabling them to conduct the war aggressively. They fully understood that their previous success in blunting the 1972 all-out North Vietnamese Easter Offensive was accomplished with tremendous U.S. air power support. They strongly believed that the United States would intervene in the case of a major communist offensive in the future.

In January 1973, during the final stages of the negotiations leading up to the cease-fire agreement, senior South Vietnamese officials stated that President Nixon personally wrote to President Thieu pledging to actively assist South Vietnam, should North Vietnam seriously violate the cease-fire. Since Nixon had reinstated bombing of military targets in North Vietnam and had mined Haiphong Harbor in the closing months of 1972, the South Vietnamese had confidence that the United States would react vigorously. Additional credibility was assured when the United States continued to maintain the Seventh Air Force bases and equipment in Thailand. When MACV phased out and its remaining functions were transferred to USSAG at NKP, the JGS insisted upon a twenty-four-hour hotline to Headquarters USSAG so it could call upon U.S. air support when it was reintroduced.

It was an article of faith with the South Vietnamese that the United States would intervene to save the military situation if it were required. President Thieu always held out that hope up to the very last. So did many others. In December 1974, Vien, when discussing communist intentions and capabilities for 1975, opined that there would be no enemy countrywide general offensive in 1975 as there was in 1972, because, according to JGS reasoning, the communists feared U.S. Air Force intervention and therefore would not escalate the war beyond the limits the communists believed would result in a U.S. reaction. Later that month the JGS J-2, Colonel Lung, briefed that he thought an
all-out North Vietnamese offensive, although well within communist capabilities, would cause a U.S. intervention, which they wished to avoid.

Not only the South Vietnamese believed that U.S. intervention was probable; so did the communists. As mentioned, the North Vietnamese estimate in September 1973 stated that the U.S. troop withdrawal would be permanent and U.S. troops would not be returned even in the face of a heavy communist buildup in the South. However, the United States probably would resume bombing raids over communist “liberated” areas in South Vietnam if it were convinced that communist forces in the South were strong enough to challenge the ARVN and were preparing to launch an offensive. U.S. air support probably would include tactical support of Vietnamese ground forces if they were unable to contain the communist offensive.

President Thieu's hope that the U.S. Air Force would intervene unfortunately colored South Vietnam's decision-making. Not until early January 1975, when Phuoc Long Province fell, did a more realistic mind-set begin to emerge. Yet, even in April 1975 the hope of U.S. intervention still existed at the highest levels of government, particularly with President Thieu.

Rumors concerning military corruption surfaced periodically, and in late August 1974
Time
magazine reported, “President Thieu has not taken any strong action, perhaps because he fears that by eliminating the military's traditional involvement in corruption, he would cause unrest among his most powerful supporters.”
⁸⁹
However, in late 1974 an anticorruption campaign was organized to attempt to force President Thieu to clean up the upper echelons of his regime. Several antigovernment demonstrations were staged in Saigon and other major cities. To defuse the situation, the president replaced several senior officers, among them the II Corps commander, Lieutenant General Toan, who was charged with corruption; he was replaced by Maj. Gen. Pham Van Phu. As events later unfolded, this personnel change was one of the major causes of the complete debacle in MR-2 in March 1975.

In early November 1974 we reviewed our operational analysis as well as all other intelligence to determine major trends in the prosecution of the war. In compliance with President Thieu's instructions on war
policy, the RVNAF had emphasized small unit activities and had dramatically cut back on air and artillery support. At the same time, the North Vietnamese had stepped up their tempo of attacks. They greatly increased the number of attacks by fire, and although the number of ground attacks remained constant, they were emphasizing large-unit tactics.

As a consequence, the ARVN efficiency (Enemy KIA/Friendly KHA) when faced periodically with the large-unit enemy offensives was continually being degraded, having been reduced from 3.98 in period 1 to 1.81 in period 4. This was due to a major swing in relative firepower of the two forces. Ammunition conservation and the greatly reduced air sorties rapidly diminished South Vietnam's initially superior firepower, just as the enemy's firepower was increasing.

In like manner, enemy effectiveness for its initiated contacts increased 42 percent between the third and fourth periods, particularly in MR-1 and MR-2. At the same time, there was a great increase in weapons lost per soldier killed by hostile action in MR-1 and -2. The 3.06 weapons lost per KHA in MR-1 was previously unheard of. Countrywide, the number of weapons lost increased 48 percent (see
table 12
). It was these rather large reductions in the ARVN's efficiencies that led to my pessimistic assessment provided at year's end.

Table 12.
Friendly Weapons Ratio (weapons lost/friendly killed)

Source
: Analysis, “Summary of Ceasefire Statistics,” June 1975, Headquarters USSAG, Nakhon Phanom, Thailand.

Not only was the enemy becoming more effective in its tactical attacks, but for the first time the RVNAF's effectiveness when it took the initiative dropped appreciably. Although the foregoing indicates that the situation was deteriorating, it was also true that the RVNAF, particularly the army, was acquitting itself well. The friendly efficiency
of 3.52 in period 4 was lower than the earlier periods, but it was still respectable. ARVN's efficiency, at 5.40, was good, and the regional forces were improving, but the popular forces in MR-3 and -4 were still struggling.

Notwithstanding that the efficiency of units in MR-1 increased in the June–November 1974 period from the previous six months, they did not fare as well against enemy initiatives, and they lost more than three weapons per soldier killed. But disquieting to me was that in the DAO's “Major Engagement Won-Lost Ledger” between July and September 1974, units in MR-1 had six major engagements and lost them all. Because of the high respect they had for Lieutenant General Truong, most U.S. observers thought MR-1 was the most effective military region. But in late 1974 and in 1975, MR-1 had major problems. Our analyses foretold the serious morale problems in MR-1 that would lead to the debacle during the communists' 1975 major offensive.

In November 1974, having followed the war on a daily basis, we believed the South Vietnamese had reached their high point that summer and that the situation was getting worse as the year progressed. Particularly distressing was the lack of logistics support to enable them to pursue an aggressive military posture. In the realm of firepower, not only was South Vietnam's air force circumscribed in the number of sorties available, but the North's twenty-two antiaircraft regiments were so dominant that the close air support sorties were not effective because they were flown at high altitudes. Although the RVNAF continued to perform well, its combat superiority declined as the enemy grew stronger and stronger. From here on out it was going to be all downhill.

As a military man, President Thieu should have been able to foresee the severe consequences of the drastically reduced funding upon which the success of war depended. Since the country was at the time in a position of strength, it was an opportune time to initiate negotiations with the communists or, at a minimum, to reassess the government's political and military strategies. However, he was blinded by the hope of supplemental funding and the belief that U.S. forces would intervene if the military situation deteriorated—so he took no action.

The snowballing effect of inflation on South Vietnam led to sub-subsistence standards of living for soldiers and their families, caused increased desertions and corruption, and was exacerbated by the
greatly reduced military aid funding. This state of affairs was not lost on the communists. The COSVN Resolution for 1975, issued in mid-November 1974, stated:

Recognizing the deteriorating situation, Lt. Gen. John J. Burns, a well-known fighter pilot who had effectively replaced General O'Keefe as commander in late August, decided to pull together a briefing, the South Vietnam Threat Assessment,
⁹¹
which Headquarters USSAG thought would present the realities of the conflict by analyzing key indicators, reviewing enemy capabilities, and focusing on possible enemy courses of action.

Our operations and intelligence staffs, which put together the assessment, noted several indicators that might reveal the North's estimate of the situation and the probable courses of action to be adopted by them in the first half of 1975: the enemy's reorganization, its training emphasis, its logistical and infiltration activities, and its directives and resolutions.

The enemy redesignated its military regions to return to the pre-1962 military region organizational structure, emphasizing the current North Vietnamese propaganda, “One Vietnam.” More important, however, was the formation of possibly four new corps whose purposes obviously were to control large combined arms forces on a conventional warfare battlefield. The corps would assume responsibility for major
tactical unit operations, and the military regions would primarily be responsible for logistical and administrative tasks. Also, new divisions and regiments were being formed primarily by upgrading local forces and through infiltration.

The most significant training emphasis was on combined arms operations. Major artillery and antiaircraft units were assigned to the direct support of their divisions. This was noted in the May 1974 multidivisional attack on the Iron Triangle.

In the first ten months of 1974, the communists demonstrated their improved lines of communication and logistical system by transporting more than three hundred thousand tons of matériel to South Vietnam. At the time of the USSAG assessment, this huge transportation offensive was under way, moving large amounts of ammo and weapons.

Infiltration of personnel was always a hallmark of increased enemy activity, and during 1974 the North infiltrated at least a hundred thousand soldiers. There were more enemy soldiers in South Vietnam now than at any other time.

Finally, intelligence obtained by personnel (HUMINT) indicated that heavy fighting would take place in 1975. COSVN Resolution No. 12 and the recent COSVN Resolution for 1975 corroborated this. The new resolution indicated a new widespread dry-season campaign. It implied that the fighting would be heaviest in northern South Vietnam. The overall purpose was to defeat pacification and destroy the South Vietnamese armed forces, thereby accelerating the communists' territorial and population expansion.

In summary, these indicators led us to conclude that North Vietnam believed the South was weaker, the NVA was stronger, and communist forces could launch major offensive activities that would defeat the government of South Vietnam's pacification, increase communist territorial and population control, and attain victories that would lead to the removal of the present South Vietnamese government and eventually to a communist government. The indicators pointed toward a significant intensification of military activity in late December 1974 and the first half of 1975. Knowing this, what were the enemy capabilities?