Losing Vietnam (20 page)

The South Vietnamese were still acquitting themselves well in the field. They maintained initiatives, but their efficiency and effectiveness
were decreasing. They were, because of a lack of support, forced to fight a much improved adversary with one hand tied behind their back. They had much less ammunition to expend, for example, than U.S. troops and the RVNAF had expended earlier in the war to fight an enemy that had been generally utilizing small-unit tactics without modern weapons and had an inadequate support base. In 1972 and earlier, the formidable U.S. tactical air and B-52 bombers had supported the allies, whereas in November 1974 South Vietnam was rationed not only on ammunition but also petroleum and short on repair parts. Its forces were highly dispersed, required to support a policy of giving up no territory or population, and facing a vastly improved enemy force utilizing large-scale combined arms tactics, supported by modern tanks, artillery, and antiaircraft weapons, and backed up by an adequate logistics system. Compounding the situation, the armed forces had no strategic reserves and the U.S. Air Force was not available. In other words, the communists could choose the time and place to attack, always with an initially superior force.

Headquarters USSAG believed that a general coordinated offensive probably would not occur but that major regional offensives would take place. The enemy definitely would attempt to annex Quang Tri Province and isolate the cities of Hue and Da Nang in MR-1, isolate Kontum and Pleiku Provinces for the purpose of annexing Kontum Province in MR-2, isolate Tay Ninh Province and eliminate friendly enclaves in Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces in MR-3, and increase territorial and population control in the delta and interdict highway QL-4 in MR-4. But the North Vietnamese had the capability to launch a general offensive, and the reinforcement of their current force structure was the key variable.

In MR-1, with a commitment of two to four strategic reserve divisions, the enemy would be capable of seizing all territory north of the Hai Van Pass and would eventually capture Da Nang. In MR-2, with two additional division-size forces, the enemy could capture both Kontum and Pleiku, and the coastal areas of northeast Binh Dinh Province would eventually fall, thus severing MR-1 from the rest of South Vietnam. Finally, in MR-3, reinforced by two divisions and coupled with heavy fighting in the other military regions, it could possibly isolate Saigon, inflict heavy damage on the Bien Hoa complex, and cause the
downfall of the South Vietnamese government. Thus, with the reinforcement of two to five infantry division equivalents, either through infiltration or commitment of its strategic reserve divisions, the enemy could achieve significant gains, which might lead to the eventual removal of the present South Vietnam government.

When Charles Whitehouse, the U.S. ambassador to Laos, visited NKP in late November 1974, we decided to have him review our assessment briefing, which had not yet been shown to anyone outside the command. He was a highly competent and respected Vietnam hand, for several years having been the senior State Department official in MR-3, where I had had close contact with him, and we were anxious for his comments. I can still vividly recall his reaction. He said, “That was an outstanding briefing and very distressing. You should take this briefing to Washington.” We thought very seriously about his advice, and Lieutenant General Burns decided to send the briefing to CINCPAC, our next higher headquarters, to see if they would pass it on to the Pentagon.

About 10 December, our two briefing officers, a major and a captain, flew to Hawaii and presented the briefing to CINCPAC. This was a very thorough briefing consisting of thirty-six charts. Subsequently Brigadier General Doyle E. Larson, the CINPAC J-2, called me to very politely inform me that our “Threat Assessment” briefing was not well received; it was too pessimistic, and CINCPAC was sending our briefers back to NKP. I thanked Larson for his comments. They just did not get it; like the embassy in Saigon, CINPAC was not as yet facing the rapidly deteriorating situation. That the U.S. military chain of command could not grasp the implications of South Vietnam's serious loss of firepower and mobility precluded a realistic comprehension by our politicos. I always thought that if the briefing had been forwarded to the Pentagon, its substance would have galvanized a more intensive JCS approach to obtaining the critical supplemental funding.

Although USSAG did not forecast a general coordinated offensive, the most likely scenario for the upcoming enemy dry-season campaign was not too difficult to hypothesize, should the NVA commit its reserves. A major B-3 front effort against MR-2 with the objective of driving to the coast and dividing the upper provinces from the South was almost certain. At the same time, the new MRTT Corps could be
expected to attack MR-1, hoping to seize Hue and Da Nang. If successful, these forces would link up and drive south along the coastal plain and attack MR-3 defenders. In the meantime, the COSVN forces from bases in MR-3 would attack toward Saigon down the Saigon River corridor while the enemy's troops in the delta would use limited ground attacks and attacks by fire to tie down South Vietnam forces in MR-4. The enemy would then converge on Saigon from all directions for the last great battle. We believed that if the enemy committed its reserves in an all-out general offensive, this scenario could possibly occur in late spring or early summer. This was how we briefed the potential situation in November 1974. However, no one could have predicted the debacle in MR-2 that led to the rapidly deteriorating situation and the North's responsive commitment of all its reserves. This threat assessment briefing and the August USSAG study were kept in U.S. channels and were not disseminated to the government of South Vietnam.

As mentioned, Headquarters USSAG also processed the data for the hamlet evaluation surveys. When we looked at the population control macroscopically, it appeared that South Vietnam still had excellent control. However, in November 1974 the South began losing control of the people in the densely populated areas, particularly MR-4. In one month, those living in contested areas or under communist control in MR-3 and MR-4 increased 24 percent, and by the end of December 1974, following the Phuoc Long offensive, the number had increased greatly in these two MRs.

Commencing with the cease-fire in 1973, the DAO kept a ledger of major engagements. The choices of the incidents considered major were subjective: the DAO applied no firm criteria, as USSAG had in its combat analyses. However, Colonel LeGro and his staff were highly experienced officers and their judgments were sound. They also determined which side had the upper hand in the major engagement—and so the Won-Lost Ledger was created. It contained histories of the major engagements during the 1973–1975 period, which are summarized in
table 13
.

Clearly, the last half of FY 74 was the high point for the RVNAF. The situation started downhill in FY 75, particularly in December 1974. By reviewing the ledger, one could note that the situation in MR-1 definitely was not good, the South having lost six out of seven major engagements.

Table 13.
The Won-Lost Ledger

Source
: DAO, Operations and Plans Division, “Major Engagements Won-Lost Ledger.”

One of the incidents considered a major engagement was the attack on the petroleum storage depot at Nha Be. On the evening of 3 December 1973, the DAO reported that an enemy rocket attack had destroyed or damaged thirty fuel tanks, causing the loss of approximately six hundred thousand barrels at the Nha Be Petroleum Storage Facility, the largest in South Vietnam. However, neither of the adjacent Shell or Exxon storage facilities was hit. Fortunately, the civilian in charge of the DAO petroleum section was on hand, and he reportedly braved numerous incoming rounds to attempt to put out the fires and limit the damage. The DAO cited him for his bravery and quick reaction. This was a major catastrophe, and it was listed as one of the major battles the South had lost to the enemy.

I was familiar with Nha Be, as I had landed there many times to have my helicopter refueled while on operational missions in 1968–1969. Nha Be was within the 9th Infantry Division's tactical area of interest but not in our tactical area of responsibility. I recall that in the fall of 1968 the Viet Cong had fired twelve to eighteen rockets at the storage facility, destroying one storage tank. About a week later, Gen. Creighton Abrams, the commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, invited our division commander, Maj. Gen. Julian J. Ewell, and me to his quarters in Saigon for dinner. We were having pleasant, business-type conversations before dinner when Abrams turned to his aide and said, “Bring in the gift I have for General Ewell.” The aide left the room and returned with the tail fin of a rocket mounted on a wooden base with a brass plaque, inscribed somewhat as follows: “To MG Julian Ewell, Commander 9th Infantry Division, The last rocket to hit Nha Be.” We all had a good laugh, and Julian said, “Abe, I've got the message.” After dinner we headed back to Dong
Tam, concerned about how we were going to stop future rocket attacks. We concluded that the Viet Cong had to have some ground control and were probably using old French maps. With some difficulty we found one of these maps, and by noting the benchmarks in the dense growth of weeds that surrounded Nha Be we found their firing point, which, to ensure no further rocket attacks, we checked out periodically with ambushes and helicopter flyovers.

The loss of one storage tank in 1968 was of such importance that Abrams took a personal interest. The Viet Cong had fired over a dozen rockets and hit only one tank. Yet, in the 3 December 1973 attack thirty tanks were damaged or destroyed. Something stank—particularly since none of the storage tanks in the adjacent civilian storage compounds were damaged. Rather than take my doubts to the DAO, we asked USARPAC to send two demolition experts to assess the situation. They inspected the storage area on 15 December 1973, with the purpose of determining the probable cause of extensive damage to the area. The experts, W. R. Dobbing and J. J. Koebl, concluded, “All tanks appeared to have been damaged or destroyed either by placed charges containing approximately 1–3 lbs of explosives or by the resulting fire which spread from adjacent tanks. No evidence that rockets or mortars were used was found.”
⁹²

All detonation points except on one tank were close to the ground, in locations where charges could easily be placed and concealed—that is, on concrete pads, behind stairs, on or under fuel lines and valves. And the damage to the other tank was obviously caused by placed charges rather than projectiles. The experts stated that with such an extensive sapper-type operation conducted, it seems unlikely that a rocket or mortar attack would have been deemed necessary.

In late November 1973, at the height of the oil crisis, to assure sufficient petroleum supplies the U.S. government made arrangements to deposit funds monthly in a special Saigon account, from which a designated DAO official could issue checks to oil companies for delivery of stocks. Such commerce was generally negotiated in Singapore. This new procurement initiative could have been the impetus for an insider to destroy the petroleum reserves; the storage was destroyed by a sapper attack and definitely not an attack by fire, as reported. Could it have been an inside job, or was it an enemy sapper attack?

On 8 December 1974, a COSVN-wide general offensive kicked off in MR-3 and MR-4. The number of enemy-initiated incidents was the greatest since the cease-fire. The combat intensity factor approached a hundred thousand, the highest of the war. It was strictly a COSVN offensive, since the tempo of battle did not pick up in MR-1 and -2. The beginning of the expected North Vietnamese winter-spring offensive would come later. Nevertheless, the tempo of these attacks was an indication of what could occur. A look at the percentiles of activities clearly demonstrated the COSVN high point. By December 1974 we had collected data on all friendly- and enemy-initiated incidents for the ninety-nine weeks since the cease-fire. Therefore, a percentile of 99 would indicate the level of combat activities that week was the highest since the cease-fire. A reading of 2, for example, would indicate that the level of activities were low and had been exceeded in ninety-seven other weeks. We could easily discern trends by presenting the data in four-week increments. Percentiles were a useful tool, enabling us to quickly review the levels of combat activities in the many various geographical areas.

A review of the combat intensity factors for the period of the main attack on Phuoc Long and the four previous weeks graphically illustrates that it was business as usual in MR-1 and -2, with a great upsurge in MR-3 and -4.

Table 14.
Weekly Percentile of Activities, 6–12 December 1974