Hitler's Bandit Hunters (51 page)

Bandenbekämpfung in western Europe shaped the rules of the engagement under which it was conducted. In effect, Hitler was unable to stop adjusting these rules, which he introduced, then amended.
³
Part of the reason for Hitler’s continual interference lay with allied covert methods, which were waged across all Europe and in league with the resistance. Fitzroy MacLean later confessed that covert methods contravened the laws of war, but the German response was disproportionate.
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Bandenbekämpfung was further shaped by the prominence of command quarrels and rivalries that exposed the rules of engagement to undue influence at the local level. Commanders continually overstretched themselves in security operations in what Kershaw has described as “working towards the Führer.” By the spring of 1944, therefore, these two issues ensured that the violence of German security operations spiraled.

Since October 1942, Hitler had instructed the Wehrmacht and SS on how to treat captured soldiers from the allied Special Forces.
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One such example driving Hitler to distraction occurred on March 21, 1944. The chief of the Gestapo reported the capture of French SAS soldiers. They had parachuted into France to conduct sabotage against railway targets in the Rennes area but were captured one by one. Following intensive interrogations, the
Gestapo learned of extreme covert training facilities in England and recommended that these captured commandos be killed after interrogation.
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The timing of the April 1944 Bandenbekämpfung regulations was opportune in this respect but Hitler continued to tinker.
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In June 1944, Warlimont confirmed on Hitler’s behalf that the original Commando Order of October 1942 was still enforceable, although the Allies were sending individuals (indicating they were to be treated as spies or saboteurs). On June 23, a conference was called to consider the “treatment of commando men”; it set guidelines for operations in the west. The allied invasion in Normandy forced reconsideration. Troops captured in “open” battle remained POWs, but in doubtful cases, the captives were to be handed over to the SD for decision. An example of the new guidelines was the case of allied parachutists in Brittany. The Germans declared them saboteurs because they operated beyond the boundaries of conventional fighting in Normady and thus could be “massacred in combat.”
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Similar confusion over the treatment of paratroops occurred during the Battle of Arnhem when the SS sent British POWs to Auschwitz. Another OKW circular of June 26 instructed that allied commandos captured beyond the beachhead must be killed “in combat” or in special cases turned over to the SD. The German high command in the west was ordered to make a daily return of the figures for prisoners and their executions.

Hitler was also distracted by the question of allied military missions attached to resistance movements. On July 22, 1944, new guidelines addressed the treatment of British, American, and Soviet soldiers, in or out of uniform, working alongside the partisans. The military section of the RSHA requested handing them over for interrogation. Warlimont confirmed this, adding a postscript that the Commando Order had not been instrumental against the missions thus far, but

the principle must be adopted from the start that all members of partisan groups, even in the south-east are fundamentally insurgents. Indeed they are treated as prisoners of war for reasons of expediency, in order to obtain the largest possible number of deserters and workers.

On July 30, OKW issued instructions that allied military missions were henceforth treated as commandos.
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That same day, Hitler and the judge advocate of the Wehrmacht released instructions for occupation security stating, “Those who attack us from the rear at the decisive stage of our fight for existence deserve no consideration.” Any acts of violence by non-German civilians were to be immediately dealt with by troops from the SS and Wehrmacht. Captives were to be handed over to the SS. Women were to be enslaved, although the children were “spared.”
¹⁰

To ensure the various parties adhered to Bandenbekämpfung
regulations, Bach-Zelewski monitored overall performance. “He spent two days receiving voluminous reports,” wrote Karl Gaisser after the war, “and then gave it as his opinion that, compared with the eastern front, fighting the partisans in Croatia was child’s play, pointing out that the partisans never made a stand but ran away whenever they were energetically attacked.”
¹¹
Gaisser accused of Bach-Zelewski of only once visiting the region, but British decodes and Bach-Zelewski’s diary indicate otherwise. From early July 1943, when Bach-Zelewski took his first appraisal tour of security in southeastern Europe, he became a regular visitor. There were at least fourteen visits. He traveled to Belgrade on November 29, 1943, to assess the general security situation and the imminent threat of allied invasion.
¹²
During one trip, Bach-Zelewski experienced a partisan attack against his train in Croatia. He later wrote in his diary, “Swines! The train in front has driven over a torpedo [German term for a mine], and the train behind mined and has been bombarded. We drove clear of the skirmishes.”
¹³
This suggests Bach-Zelewski did not delay to witness the partisans leaving.

The visits were interrupted when Hitler summoned Bach-Zelewski to Kovel (
chapter 8
) in January 1944. He did not return until May 1944. During this absence, the SS field command in the east was relocated to the region. Between March and June 1944, the KSRFSS moved to Glasenbach near Salzburg, while the headquarters of the Chef der Bandenkampfverbände moved to Königssee, a small lakeside town near Berchtesgaden.
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According to Ernst Rode, these moves were intended to improve the liaison between HSSPF Alpenland, HSSPF Adriatic Coastland, HSSPF Croatia, and their centralization under HstSSPF Italy.
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Bach-Zelewski took two trips back to back on May 20–26, 1944, and on June 1–17; he was forced to tour by road transport owing to allied air superiority. Later, expectations for his arrival in Laibach on July 9 were the prelude to a special drive against the partisans.
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After the war, Bach-Zelewski summarized his work: “I found out on the spot in the southeast about the band fighting and I myself took part actively with the Wehrmacht in a partisan operation in Croatia.”
¹⁷

By July 1943, Hitler had judged Italian reliability suspect and, in the expectation of their defection, initiated extensive planning for intervention. Operation “Axis” (
Achse
) was untertaken to seize Italian military assets, capture the navy, and form defensive positions against allied invasion.
¹⁸
On September 3, 1943, British troops landed on the Italian mainland across the straits of Messina. The German army responded quickly, deploying armored and infantry divisions, while the SS-Police sent in twenty thousand troops to secure northern Italy. On September 8, 1943, as allied forces were set to invade mainland Italy at Salerno, General Eisenhower informed his soldiers that Italy had surrendered. Three days later, Luftwaffe Field Marshal Albert Kesselring declared martial law in Italy. Elsewhere, both the Germans and the partisans
raced to disarm Italian troops. Each side declared success and shared the booty. This boosted Tito’s influence and inspired Communist partisans in Italy to revolt. A domino effect was set in motion; Communist-led resistance movements in southern France took up arms and renewed outbreaks of violence in Greece, Albania, Slovakia, and Croatia. This was the consequence of German failure to defeat Tito militarily and as a popular figure. German sentiment railed against Italy as emotions ranged from calculation to vengence to cold-bloodedness. Bach-Zelewski noted in his diary the impending problems with Italy on July 26; however, by September 9, he had begun describing the Italians as “traitors.”
¹⁹
Skorzeny stole media attention by rescuing Mussolini from captivity in an airborne commando raid.
²⁰
This enabled Hitler to construct an Italian puppet government around Mussolini. Then the reshuffles followed. In October 1943, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel was transferred to France and the overall supreme command in the southeast passed to Kesselring.

The relationship between the SS, Wehrmacht, and Nazi agencies remained relatively stable in the region until April 1944. One postwar study outlined the different authorities in Italy. There were three principal offices, the Foreign Office under ambassador Dr. Rahn in Rome, the Wehrmacht under Albert Kesselring, and the SS-Police under SS-Oberstgruppenführer Karl Wolff. In addition to representatives and staffs from the food requisition agency (army authority), chief of ordinance (army authority), propaganda units (embassy staff), “Reich Foreign Labour Service,” and the Organization Todt, there were also layers of rear-area and headquarters formations.
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In France, Holland, and elsewhere, the various agencies found a working compromise that suited all. This was the case in Italy at the end of 1943. Wolff and Kesselring appeared to have established a professional working relationship. However, circumstances contrived to undermine their relationship.

Hitler caused complications when he confused the strategies for southern Europe. During the winter of 1943–44, he granted Kesselring unlimited command over forces in the south, including the SS. Then he issued three directives. In January 1944, he issued Directive 52 for the defense of Rome. Fear of the outflanking of German fortifications caused Hitler to make provisions for defending the Alpine areas. Another string of instructions from Hitler led to Directive 60. This ordered the construction of fortifications, effectively weaving Istria, Trieste, and the Gulf of Venice into a defensive network stretching across northern Italy. Hitler’s orders were addressed to civilian and military authorities alike, mobilizing labor and construction gangs. Then in August 1944, Hitler stipulated that HstSSPF in Italy was to continue aggressive operations against “banditry” in cooperation with the Wehrmacht. In September, Hitler issued Directive 65 for the construction of defenses in Austria and Slovakia. This time, Wehrkreis XVIII and Gauleiters Dr. Rainer in Carinthia and Uiberreither in Styria were to cooperate in constructing defenses.
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Himmler added to the complications by declaring upper and middle Italy Bandenkampfgebieten on April 3, 1944,
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and by handing out political mandates to his cronies who used their positions to pursue conflicting decisions. For example, Kesselring opposed the Bandenkampfgebieten, but his alternate strategy was risky in Nazi terms. He wished to use tactical withdrawals entwined with rigid defensive strongpoints. His plan was to frustrate the Allies by slowing or stalling the pace of the advance. The problem came during withdrawal; large military formations entered the security zones and declared Bandenkampfgebiet, thereby reducing SS control and authority. Thus, Himmler placed the SS and Wehrmacht at odds by exposing contradictory priorities. Kesselring’s semi-flexible strategy and the rigid SS security policy caused friction within high command circles. Bach-Zelewski observed on April 20, “The Army-Bandenkampfverbände relationship in the Adriatic coast and Italy area had been declared a
Bandenkampfgebiet
by ‘Wölffchen.’” He added, “Discussions had followed with the OKW and the final chance of clarification was lost. Only areas where the RFSS [Himmler] himself declared a
Bandenkampfgebiet
, it actually happened. There were strained relations when the HSSPF were subordinated to the army.”
²⁴
Bach-Zelewski wrongly attributed the decision, but the actual situation was far less clear-cut. “Wölffchen,” as his comrades called Wolff, was yet another senior SS leader blighted by ill health. In March 1944, Wolff was absent on sick leave. Hans-Adolf Prützmann, redundant as HSSPF Russia-South since the Soviet advance during the winter of 1943–44, deputized for Wolff until late July 1944. With Wolff absent (and possibly reluctant to face up to Kesselring), Himmler took the opportunity to declare Italy a Bandenkampfgebiet.
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On May 1, 1944, Field Marshal Keitel initially confirmed Kesselring’s stance and authority over the SS. Then on May 4, he equivocated and decided the commander of the larger forces held automatic seniority over field operations. Opportunism led Kesselring to wait until June 17 to issue new guidelines, “New Measures for Bandenbekämpfung.” They aligned Kesselring to Hitler and the war of extermination on all fronts. The guidelines followed the familiar mixture of observations, advice, and orders but were also loaded with cringing political overtones. Kesselring blamed the “bandits” for the deteriorating situation in Italy, endangerment of the troops and supply lines, and Germany’s exploitative economy. His only answer was to impose measures “of the utmost severity.” He referred to Hitler’s directive that enacted Achse to justify his decision. The troops were pressed to carry on regardless of “mistaken” actions rather than not to act at all. Responding to the growing awareness that the Allies intended to prosecute war crimes, Kesselring advised, “I will protect any commander who exceeds our usual restraint in the choice of severity of the methods he adopts against the partisans.” These security arrangements acknowledged a balance between “passive and active”
measures, but emphasized the need for aggressive responses. Command proportioning was also sanctioned; the commander of the larger field force was granted overall command but insisted that SS-Police troops were restricted to the security zones.
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Kesselring ordered his chief of staff to erect transit camps to hold suspects and civilians. He recommended an extensive propaganda program to support exterminating the “bandits.” Kesselring had woven Hitler’s tinkering and Keitel’s indecision into his machinations.