Hitler's Bandit Hunters (53 page)

By coincidence, the growing intensity of Tito’s incursions peaked just as Hitler and Himmler met to discuss the Bandenkampf- und Sicherheitslage (discussed in
chapter 4
). On June 21, 1943, Himmler declared the Alpenland a Bandenkampfgebiet, writing letters to all interested parties. He made Rösener deliver the confirmation documents to the Gauleiters personally.
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During the meeting with Hitler, Himmler was offered the vague promise that the SS-Police Mountain Regiment “Franz” might be returned to his command. On the strength of this, Himmler informed the Gauleiter Rainer of Carinthia that this regiment would be assigned to his district.
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In his general instructions on Bandenbekämpfung of June 1943, Himmler advised forming a Leadership Headquarters (
Führungsstab
) for all districts involved in Bandenbekämpfung. Thus the Bandenstab Laibach reported to Bach-Zelewski command staff and so Rösener became part of the Bandenkampfverbände by default. The Bandenstab Laibach became responsible for coordinating all Bandenbekämpfung in the Alpenland, Croatia, and the Karst (Istria) region. Tracking the constant organizational changes from September 1943 to May 1945 shows that Rösener came under the command of Bach-Zelewski, Wolff, and Prützmann at different times.

In July, Rösener received a frosty letter from Himmler. He was accused of not informing the wife of a senior SS comrade, in person, of her husband’s death and was rebuked for his military shortfalls. Himmler wrote, “I am not at all happy with your Bandenbekämpfung. Please don’t try to calm me with your excuses of not enough troops.” He added, “Stay in your main district more and don’t drive so much to Berlin. Take care personally and things will improve. Please be reminded to keep up your marriage and be cautioned—I am not waiting for a third disaster.” Rösener was contrite, apologizing for everything, although his excuses were plausible. He replied that a senior SS officer had gone in his place, a man who had lost two sons to the war and who understood her grief. He explained away his absences as having to attend on Bach-Zelewski in Agram and being engaged in combat against the “bandits.” He also reminded Himmler that his trips to Berlin were part of his marital relations duties, ordered by the Reichsführer, and that they were still monitored by Wolff.
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In comparison with the HSSPFs in the east, the HSSPF Alpenland operated under tight economies of troops, materials, and cooperation from the Wehrmacht. The Order Police use was prioritized, and Rösener’s command was rationed. He received packets of formations and equipment. For example, on August 6, 1943, the Hauptamt Ordnungspolizei organized an artillery
company “Alpenland” to provide heavy weapon support for police operations.
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The unit was made up of career police officers and conscripts. The company commander, a career Oberleutnant, came from the Hamburg police department. The battery officer was a lieutenant from the Halle police department who was to command recruits from the 1st Police Weapons Training school (Polizei-Waffenschule I). In keeping with usual practice, this police company was assigned to Klagenfurt for its home depot.
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The company received eight pieces of field artillery: the 75mm Light Infantry Gun 18, produced by the Rheinmetall Company in Düsseldorf and configured for employment in mountain operations. Highly maneuverable, these guns could provide accurate fire support from restricted ground positions and were also simple to train gunners with. Again following usual procedures, the company joined the communications network organized by the 181st SS-Police Signals Company. This integrated its battery fire liaison communications to other police units.
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The intensification of incursions, in May 1943, led Rösener’s staff to pressure General von Unruh into releasing two or three captured French armored vehicles. This caused the routine paper war involving the army’s inspector of armored troops (Heinz Guderian), Unruh’s personal staff, the KSRFSS, and Winkelmann at the Hauptamt Ordnungspolizei. Eventually, the vehicles, Hotchkiss armored cars and Renault tanks, were released but had to be engineered to conform with German munitions standards. The SS was also expected to collect the vehicles from Gien-on-the-Loire and transport them.
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The combination of manpower issues and Bandenbekämpfung guidelines gave rise to some strange decisions. In July 1943, following the guidelines to the letter, the district commissioner (
Landrat
) of Cilli telexed Rösener’s staff, to confirm three Jagdkommando teams had been raised and were operating in his area. They included an SD-Jagdkommando, an army Jagdkommando, and a civil-service (Beamten) Jagdkommando. Each Jagdkommando had been mustered through by rugged selection and were patrolling in six-week stints, avoiding contact with safe villages. No doubt Rösener was reassured that German civil servants (Beamten) were aggressively hunting down Tito’s partisans.
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The Bandenstab Laibach’s overall situation changed after Italy’s surrender. The Italian army representative in the area of Laibach, General Ceruli, handed over his weapons to Tito’s partisans. This allowed Tito to renew his operations and incursions. A gendarmerie situation report from Styria in September recorded mayhem in the Warasdin-Toplitz area. On September 5, two Croatian women laden with peaches were accosted by partisans. The “bandits” ordered them to hand over the fruit to the poor; the women refused. The partisans shaved their heads and then released them; the next day, fighting broke out between German soldiers and “bandits.” Six hundred troops came under repeated attacks lasting for three hours with barrages from “bandit” artillery. The Germans were forced to retreat, suffering eight dead and six wounded; afterward, the “bandits” stripped the dead. At midnight on September
7, an air raid alarm served as a decoy for a mass breakout and desertion of officer cadets from a local cavalry depot. The cadets joined the partisans.
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A week later, the 19th SS-Police Regiment warned BdO Marburg that reconnaissance had identified the presence of the Kalniki-Bandit Brigade, reinforced by the 12th Slovenian Brigade. They estimated five thousand “bandits” approaching the Alpenland area. They carried heavy weapons, including four artillery pieces, and were “advancing toward the Reich border.” The “bandits” had not cut the telephone cables but had caused numerous train derailments. They stopped one locomotive, removed the crew, locked the passengers in the carriages, and sent the train hurtling down the line toward Laibach.
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The impact and influence of Bach-Zelewski and Wolff on operations in the region can be contrasted with heightened operations from September 1943. One report discovered from a large-scale operation, conducted on the Italian border (September 21–23), is incomplete but provides a small but significant indication of the changes. The central fighting component, the 19th SS-Police Regiment, was joined by several smaller auxiliary and collaboration troops. There were indicators of the coordination of ad hoc forces, including antitank detachments and squadrons of tanks—all working toward a common mission. Although casualties are not known, the report recorded that the bands used mortar barrages, while the “bandits” were emboldened to stand against the Germans.
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From September 30, 1943, thirteen thousand Slovenian partisans from the 2nd Partisan Corps, arranged into five brigades, attempted to surround Warasdin, and lay siege. The fighting forced them out of Styria only after pulverizing attacks by Stuka dive-bombers.
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Information passed by a “trusty” to the gendarmerie on October 1, 1943, indicated a large body of bandits, up to four thousand strong, entering the area.
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On October 8, 1943, Bach-Zelewski attended a meeting with Rösener, SS-Oberstgruppenführer Paul Hausser, and Odilo Globocnik, in Trieste.
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The presence of the elite Waffen-SS commander indicated how determined the SS were to finally crush Tito. On October 15, Rösener assembled the troops for a cleansing action of a large “bandit” force concentrated by the Agram–Laibach railway. They crossed the Reich border by traveling along the River Save and came close to threatening the coal-mining districts. The “bandits” were reputed to have five thousand in number and be heavily armed with artillery. Rösener’s plan involved blockading the river, fighting free-form (
freikämpfen
) to liberate St. Georg, and finally destroying the “bandits,” or at least preventing them from entering Austria. Rösener’s main force was the 19th SS-Police Regiment; its 2nd Battalion was ordered to enforce a blockade and to place an armed reconnaissance on the heights overlooking St. Georg. The fighting escalated into running battles as the Germans struggled to comprehend that they were outnumbered and outgunned. The Luftwaffe was urgently requested to provide Stuka support to break up the “bandit” attacks.
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Efforts to pacify the vicinity of Laibach intensified, with the Wehrmacht and SS-Police
employing armored forces. The partisan response was to hit back even harder. For seven days until November 14, a police battalion was surrounded in Rudolfswerth, a town lying between Laibach and Agram. The battalion was kept alive and fighting by regular resupply from the air. The presence of elite units made the difference. Troops from the 9th SS-Panzer Division and the 16th SS-Panzer Grenadier Division supported by Luftwaffe dive-bombers destroyed the partisans on November 15. Five days later, two battalions from the reconstituted 14th SS-Police Regiment destroyed five hundred partisans.
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Political squabbles added to Rösener’s stress. On October 28, 1943, Himmler received a serious complaint about him from Gauleiter Uiberreither. A bandit incursion had breached the Reich’s borders by up to five kilometers and threatened the strategic Agram–Laibach railway. Uiberreither, following Himmler’s general instructions for Bandenbekämpfung to the letter and raised ad hoc police, army, and militia units under the command of an SS-Sturmbannführer. The troops were passed on to an Order Police major in Agram. Uiberreither was then informed that the force was not large enough, so he contacted the army, receiving a mountain Jäger company and several field howitzers to his growing order of battle. He roused the local Luftwaffe representative into dispatching a flight of Stuka dive-bombers and flak units. Taking the imitative further, Uiberreither raised nine companies of militia and formed a special train to transport them. Uiberreither explained to Himmler that without his political influence the troops could not have been moved with such speed. Rösener, according to Uiberreither, interfered in the process, upsetting many people and undermining the cooperation between the parties. Rösener and Uiberreither’s differences, couched in typical Nazi polycratic terms, lay in their perspectives; Rösener held a lofty “birds-eye view,” while Uiberreither believed he projected a “front-line perspective.” Rösener made a counter-complaint that Uiberreither was insulting and demanded his replacement. Himmler soothed troubled waters by ordering Rösener to apologize.
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Partisan activity grew in intensity throughout 1944. In response, German operations increased in scale. By August 1944, Rösener was promoted to SS-Obergruppenführer and was working on joint operations with Globocnik. The British identified the growing close relationship between Rösener and Globocnik as distinct: “Evidently there is close liaison among the Germans on this frontier to meet such Partisan cooperation.”
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The Bandenstab Laibach received a squadron from the 7th Special Flying Group based in Laibach. During another bout of illness in August, Rösener fretted over the level of air support the Bandenstab was receiving.
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On September 13, Bach-Zelewski instructed Rösener to safeguard all rail traffic in his area. A conference was held on railway security and a liaison officer from the Railway Police (Eisenbahn-Polizei) was seconded to Rösener’s staff. The railway police were to monitor luggage and take protective measures inside guard vans against bombs.
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The railway line between Laibach and Postumia was brought under the
protection of the SS-Police, as ten thousand rolls of barbed wire and boxes of nails were ordered to seal the exclusion zone. In November, Rösener was advised that, because of the changing military situation, his region was the safeguard for all connections between the southern and eastern fronts. With growing surety, Rösener pressed for urgency from his lieutenants and ordered SS-Oberführer Harm to inflict greater damage on the partisans during cleansing actions north of Laibach. Later in November, he ordered the Gestapo and the 13th SS-Regiment to annihilate “bandits” and enemy parachutists near Klagenfurt. The seriousness of the situation led all leave to be cancelled until the “bandit menace” had been eradicated.
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On August 18, 1944, Rösener was proposed for the German Cross in Gold medal, through an accreditation report, prepared by Bach-Zelewski.
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The report delighted in praising Rösener’s success as a Bandenbekämpfung leader, commanding troops against overwhelming enemies in unfamiliar terrain. Covering January 30 to June 1944, this report confirmed Rösener’s total “score” of 6,297 “bandits” killed in combat, 2,779 captured “bandits,” 1,344 “bandit” deserters, and 5,930 arrested “bandit” suspects. Bach-Zelewski cited six actions to confirm Rösener’s leadership qualities. In February, Rösener’s daredevil (
Draufgängertum
) actions under severe conditions broke up the advance of the XIV Partisan Division, with 1,200 “bandits” into Styria. In the hard fighting that followed, 600 “bandits” were killed, 163 were taken prisoner, and large amounts of booty were captured. In March, Rösener was judged responsible for destroying the IV Battalion of the Canker Bandit Brigade in Jurowitz, where his “excellent” leadership resulted in 132 “bandits” killed. From that same month, Bach-Zelewski drew attention to operations in Rakitowitz. Under difficult conditions, Rösener had personally led his troops to victory, with the destruction of a band four thousand strong. The assault involved hand-to-hand combat or close-fighting (
Nahkämpfe
), and many “bandits” were killed in burning buildings. In April, Rösener led reconnaissance assaults to breaking up concentrations of bands and destroying hundreds of “bandits.” The report concluded with Rösener’s actions of June 23, 1944, when he had commanded SS and Wehrmacht troops with great success and personal courage (
persönliche Tapferkeit
). Bach-Zelewski concluded, “I think HSSPF Rösener is worthy of the German Cross in Gold because of his merit in leading troops and his particularly repeated dignified courage.” Rösener’s accreditation was refused on October 15, 1944, confirmed in writing by the liaison officer (IIb) of the Chef der Bandenkampfverbände, Bach-Zelewski’s office. Rösener’s achievements were recognized along with confirmation that he had reached the required statistics. In recompense, he received the Bandenkampfabzeichen in Silver for time served on August 12, 1944. On January 27, 1945, Rösener finally received the German Cross in Gold.
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