Hitler's Bandit Hunters (28 page)

The tendency of the existing literature has been either to focus on Hitler’s headquarters, in the hope of unlocking secrets, or to isolate a well-known German commander and extract a character study from former staff officers. As a result, a patchwork picture has emerged, which paints the staff as faceless men busying around gossiping, conspiring, or doing everything but being inspirational. The German General Staff was a reflection of German state bureaucracy and absorbed a considerable level of institutional inertia. A report on the German General Staff by Karl Allmendinger ignored many truths about German General Staff Corps.
¹⁵
One impression that becomes apparent from the records is that the staff work was a very personal affair. Another senior German staff officer, under interrogation, identified the personal qualities of the staff, including “devotion to the commander,” even if the commander is “corrupt or unsoldierly” while aspiring to a job well done; “knowledge of the procedures and terminology of command,” the issue of clear and understandable orders; and “assistance in command.” Staff officers usually were better trained than their commanders; they had the “ability to advise,”
which some believed, after the war, ran at odds with the Nazi philosophy of Führerprinzip by removing joint responsibility of staff and command; “character”; confidence in the face of defeat; and “knowledge and flexibility.”
¹⁶
Several staff officers were given “dynamic” missions that side-stepped the bureaucracy. In 1942, Hitler had ordered Generalleutnant Walter von Unruh to undertake a special OKW commission (
Sonderbeauftragter Hitlers und Kommandeur des OKW-Stabes z.b.V
) to investigate the potential for rationalization within the German war effort. Unruh and Warlimont fit that picture perfectly.

The headquarters functions and command purpose of the Ch.BKV created a complex and advanced interpretation of command in the predigital age. Since June 1941, all planning and preparation for SS operations in the east had emanated from the KSRFSS. Under the June and September orders, Himmler arranged for the headquarters of the Ch.BKV to be established alongside the KSRFSS. This placed Bach-Zelewski at the heart of strategy and policymaking, as well as at the hub of the communications system that stretched across Europe. Telephone, signals, and coded communications with the HSSPF, Waffen-SS commands, army groups, armies, military governors, civilian governors, the military districts (
Wehrkreis
), the headquarters of the Luftwaffe, and Kriegsmarine could be connected to the Ch.BKV. This command system remained on high alert, reading signals, analyzing data and making reports on a twenty-four-hour basis. This forced the staff to work shifts. German headquarters replicated many military staff organizations with four senior staff officers assisting the commander, including the chief of staff, the first operations staff officer (designated Ia), the intelligence staff officer (Ic), and the quartermaster. The headquarters complement had four detachments: Operations (Ia), with one general staff officer and five assistants; Intelligence (Ic), with three general staff officers and three assistants; and the Quartermaster detachment, with seven senior staff officers and seven assistants. The Signals function (In) included a senior officer, a radio specialist, and the liaison officer to the army. Bach-Zelewski later testified that his “experts,” the Ia and Ic, were in daily communication with OKW/OKH and the HSSPFs.
¹⁷

The role of the chief of staff in the army involved being the commander in chief’s aide and confidant. The chief of staff was the senior staff officer, responsible for ensuring the smooth running of the headquarters and setting the pace of work. In the absence of the commander, he usually took over the command. On the occasions when Bach-Zelewski was assigned to other duties, Himmler took overall command until he returned. The chief of staff to Ch.BKV regulated the political-military-security temperature of the commander’s activities. The chief of staff issued direct orders, on behalf of Bach-Zelewski, to the HSSPF personally. He controlled the staffs of HSSPFs,
police regiments and other fighting formations, ensuring consistent and routine staff performance. Bach-Zelewski’s chiefs of staff included SS-Standartenführer und Oberst der Polizei Gölz and SS-Brigadeführer Eberhard Herf (see
chapter 7
). Perhaps Ernst Rode proved the most effective. Rode was born in 1894 in Silesia, a Protestant. Briefly a member of the Freikorps, he joined the Schutzpolizei in 1920. He was quick to support the Nazi Party from May 1, 1930. In August 1942, Ernst Rode circulated instructions warning of the lack of preparation and slow movement by field commands that had alerted the helpers and supporters of the criminals (“bandits”) and enabled them to escape.
¹⁸

Bach-Zelewski had several officers to undertake intelligence functions on his behalf, but Eduard Strauch was the one for whom he indicated the most concern in Nuremberg. When asked if he knew Strauch, Bach-Zelewski answered, “Yes and keen to meet him,” but then qualified this by implying Strauch really worked for Kube and was a mass-murderer by conviction.
¹⁹
He had participated in the rounding up and execution of Jews since 1941. In 1942, Kube wrote, “In exhaustive discussions with SS-Brigadeführer Zenner and the exceedingly capable leader of the SD, SS-Obersturmbannführer Dr. (Law) Strauch, we have liquidated in the last ten weeks about 55,000 Jews in White Ruthenia.”
²⁰
In his diary, on January 30, 1943, Bach-Zelewski mentioned that SD leader Strauch had informed him that his housekeeper, Helena Bashina, was spying for the “bandits.”
²¹
In 1947, the prison medical services diagnosed Strauch as insane. A lawyer by profession, Strauch joined the SS in 1931. The ability to exterminate was the main quality that the chief of intelligence of the Bandenkampfverbände applied to his work.

Strauch was expected to accumulate information indicating the level of forces required to pacify an area and, more important, the level of disenchantment and resistance in a region. All formations and troops were expected to help collect information, although this was primarily the responsibility of the SD and GFP. Officers from these services collected all possible information on a community. Locating the source of supply to the bandits was imperative. A band with large stores of supplies, using landing strips, and isolated from villages probably worked in isolation from local communities. Bands short on supply and based close to villages raised the level of suspicion. Native inhabitants were questioned carefully, and their statements were measured against the level of band activity. Reconnaissance examined the band camps, road conditions, and the respective strength of the “bandits” as a reflection of civilian loyalty. The three approved methods for reconnaissance included installing agents, and Jagdkommandos and employing slow- flying reconnaissance airplanes. Useful information came from observing the population. The rural leaders, economic experts, and officials of the forestry service monitored
workers, collaborators with the German armed forces (known as
Hilfswillige
, or Hiwis for short), and any suspicious people. The flow of Red Air Force traffic to the band indicated its situation and importance.

The SD handled punishments, which usually led to imprisonment or execution. On December 30, 1942, Himmler ordered all captive bandits, sympathizers, and those under the threat of execution to be sent to concentration camps in Germany. On January 6, 1943, correspondence passed from Himmler to SS-Obergruppenführer Oswald Pohl, chief of the SS Economic and Administration Main Office (
Wirtschafts- und Verwaltungshauptamt
, WVHA) regarding the application of the concentration camps to Bandenbekämpfung. “In operations against [bandits] men, women and children suspected of [bandit] activities will be rounded up and shipped to the camps in Lublin and Auschwitz,” Pohl confirmed.
²²
On January 21, Himmler, in his capacity as chief of the RSHA, requested that all cases of Bandenverdächtigte be placed into slave labor. Four days later, with his request acknowledged, a confirmation was dispatched to OKH enforcing the order throughout the army. The order warned not to communicate the punishment openly as it might reduce those willing to volunteer for labor. Suspects sent to concentration camps or detention centers received an examination as to their suitability for deportation. Jodl believed that like Himmler, who sent detainees to camps in Germany, the army should work to a similar routine. The wheel had turned; the police had given orders to the army.
²³
The failure of Russians to “voluntary mobilize” as labor in the German economy led to extensive punitive reprisals against villages. One British interrogation report noted the deliberate destruction of villages in the area of Minsk, including Dubichi, Teplyn, and Zezulevka; the populations of the villages were all burned alive. The village of Staroye Selo was destroyed because it failed to pay its taxes.
²⁴

Paragraph 162 (1944 regulations) instituted the formal use of execution: “repression and coercion and if necessary, extermination of the political enemy is conducted in the uncompromising and brutal manner typical of any war.” The execution of people occurred in the same area but under different circumstances. Public executions usually involved death by hanging with the bodies left dangling from trees, lampposts, makeshift gallows, and even balconies. The bandits killed in action were not guaranteed a quick death. “Finishing off” (
erledigt
) was a common remark in many field reports. Search-and-destroy missions usually involved people collected in a community hall or church, the building was then set on fire and the victims burned to death, while the SS-Police gathered around to ensure no one escaped. Jews were killed as a matter of course when discovered during Bandenbekämpfung conducted by the Wehrmacht or the SS. Taking control (
überholen
) of a “bandit-suspicious” village required experience, and the SD and GFP were the acknowledged experts in this task. The “bandit helpers” were identified, usually by informants, and arrested. The complete deportation of a village became the
most appropriate action if “bandit helpers” were repeatedly found in a village. The “special treatment” of a community involved certain rules. The SS-Police leader gave the orders for
Kollektivmassnahmen
against a village, including burning it down. Bach-Zelewski confirmed the form of destruction:

The village was suddenly surrounded and without warning the police gathered the inhabitants into the village square. In the presence of the local mayor, persons not essential for the local farms and industry were immediately taken off to collection points for transfer to Germany.
²⁵

In the SS alphabet, “a” did not come before “c.” The Ic was the most important staff officer after the COS and next came the operations mandarin. “I had to work on the great, large ‘bandit-maps’ which I myself had to draw up,” Bach-Zelewski mentioned to his interrogators, “and which during the daily situation discussions with the Führer had to be presented to him by Himmler.”
²⁶
A few pages that have survived from the operational officer (Ia) war diary (
Kriegstagebuch
) briefly cover the period June 1943 to March 1944. The primary concerns of the section during this time were locating suitable quarters and staffing needs. Initially, part of the section was placed with the KSRFSS in Grossgarten, on August 15, 1943. New staffs were placed in small offices in Kruglanken, but not until October 7, 1943, did the department finally move into a single barracks.
²⁷
By mid July, another four map draftsmen and a statistician joined the department. On June 21, 1943, Oberstleutnant Korn became the director of statistics and maps (
Amt für Statistik und Kartographie
) in the staff of the Ch.BKV under Himmler’s direct orders. Korn, his assistant Leutnant Steudle, and a map draftsman were to conduct graphical and statistical assessments of the campaign’s successes. In addition to adding details to the maps of Bandentätigkeit and the Bandenlage, they were to create a data bank of maps and statistics of criminals (
Kartothek
), statistics of agricultural produce, and a registration of labor (
Erfassungen von Arbeitskräften
). On October 11, 1943, the department of statistics was renamed Operations Assessments, Ia/Mess (
Messungen
).

The Ia/Mess officer worked primarily on cartographic-based analyses. Alongside the final reports of the operations, a large maps atlas that identified every movement was drawn. This was intensive work. By the end of August, a new work roster was introduced as the first department was divided into Operations and Intelligence. The new sections were allocated new draftsmen, and from October 1943, the operational draftsmen were separated from the mapmakers. The SS-Police leaders were provided with twenty-five thousand examples from 1 to 200,000-scale and 1 to 300,000-scale maps. On September 3, 1943, they began to enter geo-references into the analysis maps. Operation
“Heinrich” had developed such proportions that on October 25, a further three draftsmen were allocated from the command staff to support drawing tasks. By the end of October, German mapmakers had produced 1 to 200,000-scale ordinance maps for use in the Carpathians, Styria (HSSPF Alpenland), Croatia, and Serbia. From November 11, 1943, the teams began work on creating the blueprint for a 1 to 300,000-scale map to allow Himmler and Bach-Zelewski to conduct strategic analysis. That same month, the department received statistical material from the Office of the Four-Year Plan to conduct further research. In March 1944, all the HSSPFs of occupied Eastern Europe and Russia received “bandit” grid maps. These maps were used to plot partisans’ movements with grid references that corresponded with Bandenkampfverbände headquarters. In March 1944, the BdOs were instructed to report according to grid reference agreed with the Luftwaffe-net on 1 to 200,000-scale maps. To create uniform reports, a report grid (
Meldegitter
) was established that covered HSSPF Russia-North, Russia-Centre, Russia-South, Ostland, Königsberg, Danzig, and Breslau. The maps were issued in the field, and a report grid was overlaid on the maps to allow units to make their reports in the field from agreed reference points to speed up the process of recognition. On March 12, 1944, the office presented Himmler with the finished atlas: a compilation of Bandenbekämpfung operation maps for 1943.