Chasing the Flame: Sergio Vieira de Mello and the Fight to Save the World (95 page)

2
E.V.K. Fitzgerald, "The Economic Dimension of the Peace Process in Cambodia,” in Peter Utting, ed.,
Between Hope and Insecurity:The Social Consequences of the Cambodian Peace Process
(Geneva: UNRISD Report, 1994), p. 44.

3
Ibid., p. 55.

4
In 1992 and 1993, 65 percent of all UN food aid in Cambodia went to returnees, though they made up just 4 percent of the population. W. Courtland Robinson,
“Something Like Home Again”: The Repatriation of Cambodian Refugees
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1994), p. 59.

5
William Branigin, “Missteps on the Path to Peace; Problems Mount and Budgets Soar,”
Washington Post,
September 22, 1992, p. A1.

6
The United States, which had made the largest commitment in Tokyo, had only delivered $14 million of its pledged $135 million. Japan, the second-largest donor, had coughed up just $9 million. Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 722 (1992), February 13, 1993, para. 31, p. 8.

7
Philip Shenon, “Most Cambodians See Nothing of Aid,”
New York Times,
February 21, 1993, sec. 1, p. 10.

8
Jarat Chopra, “United Nations Authority in Cambodia,” Watson Institute for International Studies Occasional Paper no. 15, 1994, p. 65.

9
When a UN spokesman was asked whether the entire Bulgarian force could be withdrawn, he acknowledged that they “behave in a manner that makes all of us blush,” but said they could not be repatriated because “it would be a terrible insult” to Bulgaria. William Branigin,“Tarnishing the U.N.’s Image in Cambodia; Bulgarians Chided for Monkey Business,”
Washington Post,
October 29, 1993, p. A33.

10
A health ministry study found that 77 percent of Cambodians did not know what a condom was. William Branigin, “Key Phases of UN Peace Operation in Cambodia Seen Breaking Down,”
Washington Post,
October 4, 1992, p. A33.

11
Report on Public Perceptions of UNTAC in the City of Phnom Penh, Information/Education Division Analysis Report, September 18, 1992, p. 102.

12
“French U.N. Army Commander Orders Brothels Removed,”Agence France-Presse, November 1, 1992.

13
Terry McCarthy, “Hot Tempers Rise on the Seamier Side,”
Independent,
October 19, 1992, p. 12.

14
As on the military side, the quality of UN police varied. Singapore, for instance, sent a designated unit of seventy-five police who had been prescreened for the mission.They had ten years’ police experience and arrived on the heels of a special eight-week training course, where they were taught intercultural communication and lectured in Cambodian history. Janet E. Heininger,
Peacekeeping in Transition:The United Nations in Cambodia
(New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994), p. 80.

15
Nayan Chanda, “Cambodia: I Want to Retake Power,”
Far Eastern Economic Review,
February 4, 1993, p. 20.

16
Ibid.

17
Ibid., p. 28.

18
Nate Thayer, “Cambodia: Legal Weapon,”
Far Eastern Economic Review
, January 21, 1993; “Khmer Rouge Release 21, but Take 46 More Peacekeepers Captive,” Agence France-Presse, December 17, 1992.

19
Chopra, “United Nations Authority in Cambodia,” p. 27.

20
SVDM to Marrack Goulding, “Our Recent Conversations,” February 12, 1993.

21
Indochina Digest,
March 12, 1993, quoted in Chopra, “United Nations Authority in Cambodia,” p. 42.

22
William Branigin, "Montagnards End Fight Against Hanoi,”
Washington Post,
October 11, 1992, p. A46.

23
Nate Thayer, "The Forgotten Army,”
Far Eastern Economic Review,
September 10, 1992, p. 18.

24
Colonel Y-Pen Ayun to SVDM, handwritten “DECLARATION, September 28, 1992.”

25
SVDM to Lionel Rosenblatt, October 10, 1992.

26
SVDM to UNHCR headquarters, “Chronology of Events,” October 1992.

27
Robinson,
“Something Like Home Again,”
p. 63.

28
Ron Moreau, “Cambodia: ‘This Is My Home,’”
Newsweek
, February 22, 1993, p. 38.

29
SVDM, interview by James S. Sutterlin, May 5, 1998, Yale-UN Oral History, p. 15.

30
Robinson,
“Something Like Home Again,”
p. 46.

31
SVDM, “Refugee Repatriation and Reintegration in Cambodia,”
The UNTAC: Debriefingand Lessons, Report and Recommendations of the International Conference, Singapore, August 1994
(London: Kluwer Law International, 1995), p. 151.

32
SVDM to Ogata, “On visit of secretary-general to Cambodia, April 18-20, 1992,” May 6, 1992.

33
Nicholas Cumming-Bruce,“Sixth UNVictim Shot Dead in Cambodia,”
Guardian
, April 9, 1993, p. 11. The fallout from the incident underscored the fragility of many UN member states’ relationship with UN peacekeeping. In Japan the murder kicked off a debate that had been intensifying throughout the month. The constitution of Japan, the second-largest donor to the United Nations, “renounced war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.” In 1992 the Japanese parliament passed an international peacekeeping law that allowed six hundred Japanese soldiers and police to join UNTAC. But these troops served as engineers, road builders, and police, and according to law, they would have to be withdrawn if full-fledged war erupted. Some members of Parliament suggested that day had come.

34
“Angola: UN Secretary-General’s Envoy Margaret Antsee Reportedly to Be Replaced,” BBC News, May 11, 1993.

35
“Angola: UN to Appoint New Special Envoy Soon,” Inter Press Service.

36
“Angola Peace Parley Resumes,” Agence France-Presse, May 14, 1993.

37
“Angola: UN to Appoint New Special Envoy Soon,” Inter Press Service. The person chosen in Vieira de Mello’s stead was former Malian foreign minister Alioune Blondin Beye, who arrived in June. Beye died in a plane crash in 1998 as he shuttled between African capitals in pursuit of a settlement.

38
Chopra, “United Nations Authority in Cambodia,” p. 49.

39
“Akashi Declares Campaign a Success Despite Violence,” Agence France-Presse, May 20, 1992.

40
The official budget was $1.6 billion. But if one adds the pledged rehabilitation and repatriation assistance and off-budget costs, the amount came to $2.5-$2.8 billion. Michael W. Doyle,
UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC’s Civil Mandate
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1995), p. 29.

41
SVDM, interview by Sutterlin, p. 25.

42
SVDM to Courtland Robinson, August 9, 1993.

43
SVDM, draft proposal, “Deceit and Estrangement: The Aborted Relationship Between the KR and the Cambodian Peace Process (1989-1993).”

44
SVDM to Ogata, “Clearance to Engage in a Research Project Related to My Cambodia Experience,” September 20, 1993.

45
Christine Dodson to A. Henning, “Mr. Vieira de Mello: Request for Clearance to Engage in a Research Project,” October 29, 1993.

46
Lisa Coulombe to SVDM, June 23, 1992.

47
John Burns, “Sarajevans Jeer as U.N. Leader Urges Restraint,”
New York Times
, January 1, 1993, p. A1.

48
George Gordon-Lennox and Annick Stevenson,
Sergio Vieira de Mello: An Exceptional Man
(Geneva: Éditions du Tricorne, 2004), p. 67.

49
In December 1992 the first Bush administration sent 28,000 troops to Somalia to participate in a feeding mission. In May 1993 the Americans departed, handing off peacekeeping tasks to a smaller UN force. The largely non-American successor force was authorized at 28,000 troops, but only 16,000 troops deployed. The larger U.S. mission had deployed only in southern and central Somalia, while the smaller UN force was mandated to secure the whole country. After the June 1993 massacre of twenty-five Pakistani blue helmets, Clinton sent 400 Army Rangers and 130 Delta Forces to Somalia and offered a $25,000 reward for the capture of Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed.

50
Bill Clinton, news conference, October 14, 1993.

2
Five nations flew regularly: the United States, 4,597 flights; France, 2,133; the U.K., 1,902; Canada, 1,860; and Germany, 1,279. Tom Squitieri, “History’s Longest Airlift Ends with Food Delivery to Sarajevo,”
USA Today,
January 10, 1996, p. 4A. While many UN planes had been hit, a Serb surface-to-air missile had only once brought down a lumbering C-130 and its crew. A small piece of the wreckage from that plane, which crashed in September 1992, killing four Italian crew members, lay in High Commissioner Ogata’s office in Geneva. It sat atop a torn piece of one of the blankets that the plane had been carrying. Sadako Ogata,
The Turbulent Decade
(New York : Norton, 2005), p. 62.

3
George Gordon-Lennox and Annick Stevenson,
Sergio Vieira de Mello: An Exceptional Man
(Geneva: Éditions du Tricorne, 2004), p. 70.

4
Bill Clinton, Address to the Nation, October 7, 1993.

5
Bill Clinton, Remarks and an Exchange with Reporters Prior to a Meeting with Members of Congress, October 19, 1993.

6
Ruth Marcus and John Lancaster, "U.S. Pulls Rangers Out of Somalia; Officials Send Conciliatory Signals to Aideed,”
Washington Post,
October 20, 1993, p. A1.

7
John Lancaster, "Mission Incomplete, Rangers Pack Up; Missteps, Heavy Casualties Marked Futile Hunt in Mogadishu,”
Washington Post,
October 21, 1993, p. A1.

8
William Shawcross, “The UN Murderers Must Never Be Allowed to Achieve Their Aim,”
Daily Telegraph,
August 22, 2003, p. 18.

9
Steven A. Holmes, “Word of Bosnian’s Killing Cuts Clinton Briefing Short,”
New York Times,
January 9, 1993, sec. 1, p. 1.

10
Paul Alexander,“Renowned Soprano Headlines Concert of Peace,” Associated Press, December 31, 1993.

11
Boutros-Ghali liked to quote the White Queen in Lewis Carroll’s
Through the Looking-Glass,
arguing that the Security Council had asked UN forces to do “six impossible things before breakfast.” He wrote, “By helping to evacuate populations threatened by terror or death by advancing forces, the United Nations could be said to be helping ethnic cleansing. And by trying to negotiate cease-fires, the United Nations could be helping to seal the results of the acquisition of territory by force.” Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
Unvanquished
:
A U.S.-U.N. Saga
(New York: Random House, 1999), pp. 86-87.

12
Bernard Henri-Lévy, quoted in Roger Cohen “A Balkan Gyre of War, Spinning Onto Film,”
New York Times,
March 12, 1995, sec. 2, p. 1.

13
Milan Jelovac,“Hrvatska ne može biti cipar” (Croatia Cannot Be Like Cyprus),
Danas
, June 21, 1994, pp. 7-9.

14
Ibid.

15
“Oproštajna posjeta Serda di mela kód Dr. Harisa Silajdažić” (A Farewell Visit of SVDM with Dr. Haris Silajdžić),
Oslobodjenje,
February 3, 1994.

16
“In Bosnia’s Bog,”
Economist,
April 23, 1994, p. 16.

17
Tony Smith, “New British Commander of UN Troops Pledges New, Tougher Aid Approach,” Associated Press Worldstream, February 2, 1994.

18
Ibid.

19
Boutros-Ghali,
Unvanquished
, p. 141.

20
Michael Rose,
Fighting for Peace: Lessons from Bosnia
(New York: Warner Books, 1998), p. 35.

21
Ibid., p. 37.

22
Ibid., p. 241.

23
Rose told Bosnian prime minister Haris Silajdžić that he had been misquoted and that he had actually said that he did not want to develop a “siege
mentality
” in Sarajevo. As Rose later noted, Silajdžić “had chosen to sign up to the lie, probably on the grounds that he did not yet know if I would turn out to be helpful to the Bosnians or not.” Ibid., p. 42.

24
SVDM and Viktor Andreev to Akashi, “Security of Civil Affairs Staff in BH,” January 26, 1994, no. D-SRSG-SAR-0061.

25
“Civil War Between Good and Evil, Say Bosnian Officials,” CNN News, February 5, 1994.

26
John Kifner, “Mourners Fear Gunners Even at Burials,”
New York Times,
February 8, 1994, p. A15.

27
Paul Adams,“Mortar Attack in Sarajevo Kills at Least 60,”
All Things Considered,
February 5, 1994.

28
SVDM, interview by
De Frente Com Gabi,
Sistema Brasileiro de Televisão (SBT), 2002.

29
Rose,
Fighting for Peace,
p. 47.

30
“Serb Leader Claims No Responsibility in Shelling,” CNN News, February 5, 1994.

31
“Reciprocal Blame in Mortar Attack on Sarajevo Market,” CNN News, February 6, 1994.

32
Mark Heinrich and Robert Block,“Sarajevo Atrocity Turns Market into Bloodbath,”
Independent,
February 6, 1994, p. 1.

33
Roger Cohen, “NATO Gives Serbs a 10-Day Deadline to Withdraw Guns,”
New York Times,
February 10, 1994, p. A1.

34
Irish Times,
February 8, 1994, p. A1.

35
In 1997 NATO and Russia would create the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, giving Russia a formal tie with the alliance. The agreement that produced the joint council acknowledged the shared security goals of Russia and NATO and, with the tensions over Bosnia very much in mind, described the new body as “the principal venue of consultation between NATO and Russia in times of crisis or for any other situation affecting peace and stability.”

36
Boutros-Ghali,
Unvanquished,
p. 142.

37
Akashi to Annan, “Use of Air Power,” February 15, 1994, no. CCZ 229. Vieira de Mello was tasked with talking “wobbling” countries out of bombing the Serbs. He coauthored a paper for the British government that U.K. officials later said helped persuade Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind to continue to stand up to the Americans and resist the temptation to bomb. “It always amused me,” Rose later wrote, “that some of the most compelling arguments in the ‘UK Eyes Only’ paper had been drafted by a Brazilian diplomat.” Rose,
Fighting for Peace,
p. 64.

38
Rose,
Fighting for Peace,
p. 62.

39
A key turning point came on February 17 when, on British urging, Russia presented the Serbs with an option for retreating without losing face: The Serbs would withdraw as NATO had demanded, but four hundred Russian troops stationed in Croatia would take their place around Sarajevo. On February 20, with Karadžić among them, Serb crowds flooded the streets to shake hands with their arriving Slavic Russian “brothers,” who gave the three-fingered Serb salute. Rose later admitted that “our common determination not to allow air strikes placed me in some kind of unholy alliance with the Russians against NATO.” Ibid., p. 88.

40
Ibid., p. 89.

41
Trevor Huggins, “Weather Could Prevent Full Control of Some Weapons,” Agence France-Presse, February 20, 1994.

42
Nightline,
ABC News, February 21, 1994.

43
Akashi to Secretary-General, “Situation in Sarajevo,” February 20, 1994, no. CCZ 263.

44
“Tenuous Peace Reigns in Sarajevo after Deadline Passage,” CNN News, February 20, 1994.

45
SVDM to Akashi, “Meetings with President Izetbegović, Ministers Ljubijankic and Muratović,” February 21, 1994.

46
Alija Izetbegović, Summary of Statement for Bosnia and Herzégovina Television, February 21, 1994.

47
Laura Silber and Allan Little,
Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation
(New York : Penguin Books, 1997), p. 318.

48
In the immediate aftermath of the NATO ultimatum, Washington brokered a landmark deal between Bosnian and Croat forces, bringing an end to some of the most vicious fighting and ethnic cleansing of the war. And on February 28, when four Serb Galeb jets bombed a Bosnian factory, violating a UN no-fly zone, two U.S. F-16s acting for NATO shot them down. Peace
enforcement,
rather than merely peacekeeping, appeared to be the wave of the future.

49
David B. Ottaway, "Sarajevo Exit Route to Open; Muslims, Serbs Sign Access Pact,”
Washington Post
, March 18, 1994, p. A1.

50
SVDM, interview by
De Frente Com Gabi,
2002.

51
All told, on the first day, forty-one people crossed the bridge, nine people traveled by bus into central Bosnia, fifteen Bosnians crossed the airport, and ninety Serbs ventured between their two suburbs. Chuck Sudetic, “Siege of Sarajevo Lifts Briefly as 83 Leave the City,”
New York Times,
March 24, 1994, p. A5.

52
David B. Ottaway, “Routes out of Sarajevo Are Opened; A Few Risk Dangers to Reunite with Kin,”
Washington Post,
March 24, 1994, p. A21.

53
Emma Daly, "’I Think the Dark Days Are Almost Over,’”
Independent,
March 23, 1994, p. 1.