Chasing the Flame: Sergio Vieira de Mello and the Fight to Save the World (93 page)
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Authors: Samantha Power
BOOK: Chasing the Flame: Sergio Vieira de Mello and the Fight to Save the World
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The book is dedicated to three people: Mort Abramowitz, Frederick Zollo, and Stephen Power. Mort and Fred are two people who, despite all they have seen, retain a capacity for incredulity over hackneyed thinking and unjust acts. Both thought this book a lousy idea—“Samantha, Sergio worked for the
United Nations,
” Fred would say. "What did he achieve exactly?” Mort, who never saw Sergio at his best, was simply puzzled by all my fuss. But their skepticism was rooted in such high standards, and such unyielding support for me, that they helped move me eventually, belatedly, to understand the point of the book and, in many ways, the point of my career. And Stephen Power, my brother, has done what many of us pledge to do and few of us manage: change his life. Indeed, the depth of his self-scrutiny and transformation is staggering.
United Nations,
” Fred would say. "What did he achieve exactly?” Mort, who never saw Sergio at his best, was simply puzzled by all my fuss. But their skepticism was rooted in such high standards, and such unyielding support for me, that they helped move me eventually, belatedly, to understand the point of the book and, in many ways, the point of my career. And Stephen Power, my brother, has done what many of us pledge to do and few of us manage: change his life. Indeed, the depth of his self-scrutiny and transformation is staggering.
Of course, as anybody who knows me is aware, every word I write is implicitly dedicated to my parents, Edmund Bourke and Vera Delaney. Just as they did on my first book, they again read every word of every draft, managing to act as though each read were a revelation. I believe it was printing out the sixth draft of what was then an eight-hundred-page book that finished off the third of their “Sergio printers.” Their commitment to the project was so thorough that they actually hid chapters from each other—behind cereal boxes, under couch cushions, and in sock drawers—so as to be the first to give feedback. Eddie called most mornings to refer me to books he thought might offer insight. And when I didn’t leap, he’d buy and read the books so as to sharpen the point. His openness to new ideas and personal growth are a wonder. As for my mother, she might as well have written this book for all the emotion she invested in the last four years. It can’t be easy on her to internalize my struggles as if they are her own, but her verbatim renditions of Jon Stewart monologues, exuberant Off-Broadway theater discoveries, obligatory anti-A-Rod updates, and simple cheer made every hard day seem a whole lot softer. Eddie and Mum continue to present a model of how to aspire to be in the world—insatiably curious, unfailingly sincere, and constantly on the lookout for the chance to fall over laughing. I’m so very lucky.
NOTES
I conducted more than four hundred interviews with Sergio Vieira de Mello’s colleagues, friends, and family members, many of whom shared their letters and e-mails. To protect confidentiality, I have not listed my own interviews in the endnotes but have cited any material I received from others. I owe a special thanks to UNHCR in Geneva and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York, which generously granted me access to internal files that had not previously been reviewed by scholars or journalists. In the end I was able to peruse more than ten thousand pages of classified cables and internal memos, along with Vieira de Mello’s own handwritten notes from his missions.
INTRODUCTION
1
Dick Cheney, interview by Tim Russert,
Meet the Press,
March 16, 2003.
Dick Cheney, interview by Tim Russert,
Meet the Press,
March 16, 2003.
2
Bernard-Henri Lévy quoted in Roger Cohen, “A Balkan Gyre of War, Spinning Onto Film,”
New York Times
, March 12, 1995 sec. 2, p.1.
Bernard-Henri Lévy quoted in Roger Cohen, “A Balkan Gyre of War, Spinning Onto Film,”
New York Times
, March 12, 1995 sec. 2, p.1.
3
Paolo Lembo, “Lest We Forget: The UN in Iraq—Sergio Vieira de Mello (1948- 2003),”
Azerbaijan International
11, no. 3 (Autumn 2003).
Paolo Lembo, “Lest We Forget: The UN in Iraq—Sergio Vieira de Mello (1948- 2003),”
Azerbaijan International
11, no. 3 (Autumn 2003).
CHAPTER 1. DISPLACED
1
Ambassador Lincoln Gordon, Top Secret Cable, March 29, 1964, U.S. State Department, .
Ambassador Lincoln Gordon, Top Secret Cable, March 29, 1964, U.S. State Department, .
2
“Brazil: The Military Republic, 1964-85,” in Rex A. Hudson, ed.,
Brazil: A Country Study
(Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1998), p. 80.
“Brazil: The Military Republic, 1964-85,” in Rex A. Hudson, ed.,
Brazil: A Country Study
(Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1998), p. 80.
3
“The Post-Vargas Republic, 1954-64,” ibid., p. 78.
“The Post-Vargas Republic, 1954-64,” ibid., p. 78.
4
Bahia would later be home to such Brazilian cultural icons as singers Caetano Veloso and Gilberto Gil and the novelist Jorge Amado. It had the most racially diverse population and some of the most fertile soil in Brazil.
Bahia would later be home to such Brazilian cultural icons as singers Caetano Veloso and Gilberto Gil and the novelist Jorge Amado. It had the most racially diverse population and some of the most fertile soil in Brazil.
5
Arnaldo Vieira de Mello,
Bolivar, o Brasil e os nossos vizinhos do Prata
(Bolivar, Brazil, and Our Neighbors in the Southern Cone) (Rio de Janeiro, 1963).
Arnaldo Vieira de Mello,
Bolivar, o Brasil e os nossos vizinhos do Prata
(Bolivar, Brazil, and Our Neighbors in the Southern Cone) (Rio de Janeiro, 1963).
6
Far fewer died in Brazil than in Argentina, where more than thirty thousand people were “disappeared.”
Far fewer died in Brazil than in Argentina, where more than thirty thousand people were “disappeared.”
7
When Tarcilo left parliament, the daily
Jornal do Brasil
called him “the greatest Brazilian parliamentarian since 1930.”
Perfis parlamentares
29, pp. 55-58, Camara dos Deputados, Centro de Documentação e Informação, Coordenação de Publicacões, Brasilia, 1985.
When Tarcilo left parliament, the daily
Jornal do Brasil
called him “the greatest Brazilian parliamentarian since 1930.”
Perfis parlamentares
29, pp. 55-58, Camara dos Deputados, Centro de Documentação e Informação, Coordenação de Publicacões, Brasilia, 1985.
8
Sergio Vieira de Mello (hereinafter SVDM), “
Sentido da Palavra Fraternidade
” (Sense of the Word Fraternity) in
Pensamiento e Memória
(Thought and Memory) (São Paulo: Editora da Universidade de São Paulo, 2004), pp. 231-32.
Sergio Vieira de Mello (hereinafter SVDM), “
Sentido da Palavra Fraternidade
” (Sense of the Word Fraternity) in
Pensamiento e Memória
(Thought and Memory) (São Paulo: Editora da Universidade de São Paulo, 2004), pp. 231-32.
10
Ibid.
Ibid.
11
SVDM to a girlfriend who prefers to remain anonymous, March 2, 1969.
SVDM to a girlfriend who prefers to remain anonymous, March 2, 1969.
12
SVDM to anonymous, March 12, 1969.
SVDM to anonymous, March 12, 1969.
13
SVDM to anonymous, May 19, 1969.
SVDM to anonymous, May 19, 1969.
14
SVDM to anonymous, June 23, 1969.
SVDM to anonymous, June 23, 1969.
15
“‘Jamie’: A Man of Action,” UNHCR no. 1, March 1974.
“‘Jamie’: A Man of Action,” UNHCR no. 1, March 1974.
16
SVDM to anonymous, July 11, 1970.
SVDM to anonymous, July 11, 1970.
17
“‘Jamie’: A Man of Action.”
“‘Jamie’: A Man of Action.”
18
Ibid. Gil Loescher,
The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 157. Bangladesh’s independence was declared in March 1971 and was recognized by Pakistan in December.
Ibid. Gil Loescher,
The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 157. Bangladesh’s independence was declared in March 1971 and was recognized by Pakistan in December.
19
“Quotes from the Press Conference,” UNHCR no. 1, July 1972. The press conference took place on July 6, 1972, at the Palais des Nations.
“Quotes from the Press Conference,” UNHCR no. 1, July 1972. The press conference took place on July 6, 1972, at the Palais des Nations.
20
Arnaldo Vieira de Mello,
Os Corsários na guerras do Brasil e o dramático batismo de fogo de Garibaldi
(The Privateers in the Wars of Brazil and the Dramatic Baptism of Fire of Garibaldi) (Sialul, 1992).
Arnaldo Vieira de Mello,
Os Corsários na guerras do Brasil e o dramático batismo de fogo de Garibaldi
(The Privateers in the Wars of Brazil and the Dramatic Baptism of Fire of Garibaldi) (Sialul, 1992).
21
Robert Misrahi, interview by Michel Thieren, June 7, 2007.
Robert Misrahi, interview by Michel Thieren, June 7, 2007.
22
SVDM, “La rôle de la philosophie dans la société contemporaine” (The Role of Philosophy in Contemporary Society) (Panthéon-Sorbonne, 1974).
SVDM, “La rôle de la philosophie dans la société contemporaine” (The Role of Philosophy in Contemporary Society) (Panthéon-Sorbonne, 1974).
CHAPTER 2. “I WILL NEVER USE THE WORD ‘UNACCEPTABLE’ AGAIN”
1
Sources differ on the number of fatalities brought about by the Israeli invasion. A
Newsweek
account estimated that 1,000 Palestinian and Lebanese civilians were killed, along with 18 Israeli soldiers and some 250 PLO guerrillas. Raymond Carroll et al., “Operation Cease-fire,”
Newsweek,
April 3, 1978, p. 39.
Sources differ on the number of fatalities brought about by the Israeli invasion. A
Newsweek
account estimated that 1,000 Palestinian and Lebanese civilians were killed, along with 18 Israeli soldiers and some 250 PLO guerrillas. Raymond Carroll et al., “Operation Cease-fire,”
Newsweek,
April 3, 1978, p. 39.
2
The first round of the Lebanese civil war, which ran from April 1975 to October 1976, left the central government without control of southern Lebanon. When Syrian troops making up an Arab Deterrent Force tried to deploy there, Israel objected. After the Israeli invasion in 1978, Lebanese government officials complained that Israel’s obstructionism had denied Lebanon the means to neutralize Palestinian forces in the south.
The first round of the Lebanese civil war, which ran from April 1975 to October 1976, left the central government without control of southern Lebanon. When Syrian troops making up an Arab Deterrent Force tried to deploy there, Israel objected. After the Israeli invasion in 1978, Lebanese government officials complained that Israel’s obstructionism had denied Lebanon the means to neutralize Palestinian forces in the south.
4
The first UN military missions were observer missions rather than what would become known as peacekeeping deployments. In 1948, after Israel went to war with Palestinian fighters and Arab armies, the Security Council voted to send twenty-one monitors to supervise the truce. In 2007 the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) still kept 152 observers in the Sinai. Similarly, after fighting broke out in 1947 between India and Pakistan over the disputed province of Kashmir, the Security Council established a commission to monitor the India-Pakistan cease-fire, a role that the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) performs to this day. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was established in 1956 in the Suez region of Egypt, when the General Assembly held its first-ever Emergency Special Session after the British-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt, which had been precipitated by Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal. Under UNEF’s supervision, the U.K. and France withdrew from the region within two months and Israeli forces withdrew within five months. The cease-fire held for ten years until 1967, when UNEF was withdrawn at the request of the Egyptian government.
The first UN military missions were observer missions rather than what would become known as peacekeeping deployments. In 1948, after Israel went to war with Palestinian fighters and Arab armies, the Security Council voted to send twenty-one monitors to supervise the truce. In 2007 the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) still kept 152 observers in the Sinai. Similarly, after fighting broke out in 1947 between India and Pakistan over the disputed province of Kashmir, the Security Council established a commission to monitor the India-Pakistan cease-fire, a role that the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) performs to this day. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was established in 1956 in the Suez region of Egypt, when the General Assembly held its first-ever Emergency Special Session after the British-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt, which had been precipitated by Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal. Under UNEF’s supervision, the U.K. and France withdrew from the region within two months and Israeli forces withdrew within five months. The cease-fire held for ten years until 1967, when UNEF was withdrawn at the request of the Egyptian government.
5
Five missions began after that in the Congo in the 1960s. In West New Guinea (1962-63) peacekeepers monitored the cease-fire during the transition of West Irian from Dutch rule to Indonesian rule; in Yemen (1963-64) they supervised Saudi Arabia and Egypt’s disengagement from Yemen’s civil war; in Cyprus (1964-present) they helped prevent further conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots; in the Dominican Republic (1965-66) they monitored the situation following the outbreak of civil war; in India/Pakistan (1965-66) they supervised the India/Pakistan cease-fire outside of Kashmir.
Five missions began after that in the Congo in the 1960s. In West New Guinea (1962-63) peacekeepers monitored the cease-fire during the transition of West Irian from Dutch rule to Indonesian rule; in Yemen (1963-64) they supervised Saudi Arabia and Egypt’s disengagement from Yemen’s civil war; in Cyprus (1964-present) they helped prevent further conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots; in the Dominican Republic (1965-66) they monitored the situation following the outbreak of civil war; in India/Pakistan (1965-66) they supervised the India/Pakistan cease-fire outside of Kashmir.
6
In 1978 some 1,200 blue helmets were stationed on the Golan Heights, and 2,300 remained deployed in Cyprus.
In 1978 some 1,200 blue helmets were stationed on the Golan Heights, and 2,300 remained deployed in Cyprus.
8
H. McCoubrey and N. D. White,
The Blue Helmets
(New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996), p. 94.
H. McCoubrey and N. D. White,
The Blue Helmets
(New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996), p. 94.
9
David B. Ottaway, "Lebanon Is Alarmed by Increasing Israeli Activity in Its South,”
Washington Post,
October 26, 1980, p. A25.
David B. Ottaway, "Lebanon Is Alarmed by Increasing Israeli Activity in Its South,”
Washington Post,
October 26, 1980, p. A25.
10
In 1981 a
Washington Post
reporter recounted an exchange in which an Israeli liaison officer complained that Nigerian soldiers guarding checkpoints did not speak Arabic, Hebrew, or English. As a result, the Israelis claimed, when PLO guerrillas approached the checkpoints, the Nigerians did not conduct thorough inspections. “All they ask is, ‘You have boom-boom?’ If the answer is no, they let them go,” an Israeli soldier said. The
Post
reporter followed up by asking the Nigerian soldier on duty if he spoke English. “We’re from a former British colony,” the Nigerian said in a British accent. “Of course we speak English.” William Claiborne, “Israeli Army Warns of Clashes Between UNIFIL, Haddad Militia,”
Washington Post,
April 2, 1981, p. A16.
In 1981 a
Washington Post
reporter recounted an exchange in which an Israeli liaison officer complained that Nigerian soldiers guarding checkpoints did not speak Arabic, Hebrew, or English. As a result, the Israelis claimed, when PLO guerrillas approached the checkpoints, the Nigerians did not conduct thorough inspections. “All they ask is, ‘You have boom-boom?’ If the answer is no, they let them go,” an Israeli soldier said. The
Post
reporter followed up by asking the Nigerian soldier on duty if he spoke English. “We’re from a former British colony,” the Nigerian said in a British accent. “Of course we speak English.” William Claiborne, “Israeli Army Warns of Clashes Between UNIFIL, Haddad Militia,”
Washington Post,
April 2, 1981, p. A16.
11
Woerlee Naq to Erskine/Aimé, Most Immediate Code Cable, February 12, 1982, no. FILTSO 351 NAQ 503.
Woerlee Naq to Erskine/Aimé, Most Immediate Code Cable, February 12, 1982, no. FILTSO 351 NAQ 503.
12
When he visited Beirut in February 1982, Urquhart listened to the British ambassador to Lebanon insist (with what Urquhart later described as “the air of complete authority which only simpletons and autocrats enjoy”) that the only solution to the Lebanon problem was for UNIFIL to “fight its way to the border.” Urquhart noted drily that it was a shame that the British themselves had not seen fit to contribute troops to UNIFIL. Brian Urquhart,
A Life in Peace and War
(New York: Norton, 1991), p. 336.
When he visited Beirut in February 1982, Urquhart listened to the British ambassador to Lebanon insist (with what Urquhart later described as “the air of complete authority which only simpletons and autocrats enjoy”) that the only solution to the Lebanon problem was for UNIFIL to “fight its way to the border.” Urquhart noted drily that it was a shame that the British themselves had not seen fit to contribute troops to UNIFIL. Brian Urquhart,
A Life in Peace and War
(New York: Norton, 1991), p. 336.
15
Ibid.
Ibid.
16
Woerlee to Urquhart, Code Cable, February 17, 1982, no. NAQ 542.
Woerlee to Urquhart, Code Cable, February 17, 1982, no. NAQ 542.
17
Woerlee to Urquhart, Code Cable, February 18, 1982, no. NAQ 561.
Woerlee to Urquhart, Code Cable, February 18, 1982, no. NAQ 561.
18
Urquhart to Callaghan, Code Cable, April 10, 1982, no. NYQ 1009 UNTSO 680.
Urquhart to Callaghan, Code Cable, April 10, 1982, no. NYQ 1009 UNTSO 680.
20
Callaghan to Urquhart, Code Cable, June 8, 1982, no. NAQ 2045.
Callaghan to Urquhart, Code Cable, June 8, 1982, no. NAQ 2045.
21
Andersen to Husa, March 10, 1982, “Medical Facilities,” no. NAQ 807.
Andersen to Husa, March 10, 1982, “Medical Facilities,” no. NAQ 807.
22
Arafat in fact despised Abu Nidal, who is reported to have staged the assassination to cause maximum damage to the PLO. Argov, who was shot in the head, survived but was left partially blind and paralyzed for the rest of his life. He died in 2003, having spent the final twenty-one years of his life in a Jerusalem hospital.
Arafat in fact despised Abu Nidal, who is reported to have staged the assassination to cause maximum damage to the PLO. Argov, who was shot in the head, survived but was left partially blind and paralyzed for the rest of his life. He died in 2003, having spent the final twenty-one years of his life in a Jerusalem hospital.
23
Callaghan to Urquhart, Code Cable, June 6, 1982, no. NAQ 2016 FILTSO 1261.
Callaghan to Urquhart, Code Cable, June 6, 1982, no. NAQ 2016 FILTSO 1261.
24
Ibid.
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
Ibid.
26
“Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon,” June 11, 1982.
“Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon,” June 11, 1982.
27
From June to September some 17,825 were estimated to have been killed in Lebanon as a whole, with 5,515 killed in Beirut and its suburbs. Jay Ross, “War Casualties Put at 48,000 in Lebanon,”
Washington Post,
September 3, 1982, p. A22.
From June to September some 17,825 were estimated to have been killed in Lebanon as a whole, with 5,515 killed in Beirut and its suburbs. Jay Ross, “War Casualties Put at 48,000 in Lebanon,”
Washington Post,
September 3, 1982, p. A22.
28
David Ottaway,“Arafat Charges UN Force Failed to Resist Israelis,”
Washington Post,
June 9, 1982, p. A18.
David Ottaway,“Arafat Charges UN Force Failed to Resist Israelis,”
Washington Post,
June 9, 1982, p. A18.
29
Urquhart to Callaghan, Code Cable, June 7, 1982, no. NAQ 1600.
Urquhart to Callaghan, Code Cable, June 7, 1982, no. NAQ 1600.
30
Callaghan to Urquhart, Code Cable, June 8, 1982, no. NAQ 2045.
Callaghan to Urquhart, Code Cable, June 8, 1982, no. NAQ 2045.
31
Callaghan to Urquhart, Code Cable, June 14, 1982, no. NAQ 2141.
Callaghan to Urquhart, Code Cable, June 14, 1982, no. NAQ 2141.
32
Timour Goksel, interview by Jean Krasno,Yale-UN Oral History, March 17, 1998.
Timour Goksel, interview by Jean Krasno,Yale-UN Oral History, March 17, 1998.
33
The Lebanese naturally opposed the Israeli invasion, but they supported the continuation of UNIFIL. If the UN remained, it at least signaled the world’s intention to bring about an Israeli withdrawal and a return of Lebanese sovereignty. Indeed, when the UNIFIL mandate came up for renewal before the Security Council, Lebanese
mukhtars
(village mayors) wrote to the secretary-general to request an extension. McCoubrey and White,
Blue Helmets,
p. 103.
The Lebanese naturally opposed the Israeli invasion, but they supported the continuation of UNIFIL. If the UN remained, it at least signaled the world’s intention to bring about an Israeli withdrawal and a return of Lebanese sovereignty. Indeed, when the UNIFIL mandate came up for renewal before the Security Council, Lebanese
mukhtars
(village mayors) wrote to the secretary-general to request an extension. McCoubrey and White,
Blue Helmets,
p. 103.
34
Callaghan to Urquhart, Code Cable, July 29, 1982, no. NAQ 2564.
Callaghan to Urquhart, Code Cable, July 29, 1982, no. NAQ 2564.
35
Robert Misrahi, interview by Michel Thieren, June 7, 2007.
Robert Misrahi, interview by Michel Thieren, June 7, 2007.
36
Ibid.
Ibid.
37
Many Palestinians who lived in Lebanon resided in camps like Sabra and Shatila, dating back to the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.
Many Palestinians who lived in Lebanon resided in camps like Sabra and Shatila, dating back to the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.
39
Henry Kamm,“Arafat Demands Three Nations Return Peace Force to Beirut,”
New York Times
, September 17, 1982, p. A6.
Henry Kamm,“Arafat Demands Three Nations Return Peace Force to Beirut,”
New York Times
, September 17, 1982, p. A6.
40
In response to public outcry over the massacre in Israel and abroad, Prime Minister Menachem Begin established an investigative commission in late September. Headed by Supreme Court Justice Yitzhak Kahan, the commission issued its findings in February 1983, blaming the massacre on the Christian Phalangist forces that carried it out but faulting Defense Minister Ariel Sharon and Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Rafael Eitan for approving the Phalangists’ entry into the camps, for not preventing the massacre, and for not stopping it once it was under way. Prime Minister Begin dismissed Sharon, who the Kahan commission found bore “personal responsibility,” but Eitan remained in his job.
In response to public outcry over the massacre in Israel and abroad, Prime Minister Menachem Begin established an investigative commission in late September. Headed by Supreme Court Justice Yitzhak Kahan, the commission issued its findings in February 1983, blaming the massacre on the Christian Phalangist forces that carried it out but faulting Defense Minister Ariel Sharon and Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Rafael Eitan for approving the Phalangists’ entry into the camps, for not preventing the massacre, and for not stopping it once it was under way. Prime Minister Begin dismissed Sharon, who the Kahan commission found bore “personal responsibility,” but Eitan remained in his job.
41
Ronald Reagan, “Address to the Nation Announcing the Formation of a New Multinational Force in Lebanon,” September 20, 1982.
Ronald Reagan, “Address to the Nation Announcing the Formation of a New Multinational Force in Lebanon,” September 20, 1982.
42
Troop contributors to UNIFIL saw the decision by the major powers not to send a beefed-up UNIFIL to Beirut as a snub and a further blow to the UN’s reputation in the region. Callaghan wrote to UN Headquarters in New York that Nigeria had decided to withdraw its troops from UNIFIL because it did not want to be seen as assisting the Israeli occupation and also because the creation of the non-UN Multinational Force was “an outright blow to UN peace-keeping concept and can only be construed as humiliating for the UNIFIL contributors.” Callaghan to Urquhart, Code Cable, December 28, 1982, no. NAQ 4123.
Troop contributors to UNIFIL saw the decision by the major powers not to send a beefed-up UNIFIL to Beirut as a snub and a further blow to the UN’s reputation in the region. Callaghan wrote to UN Headquarters in New York that Nigeria had decided to withdraw its troops from UNIFIL because it did not want to be seen as assisting the Israeli occupation and also because the creation of the non-UN Multinational Force was “an outright blow to UN peace-keeping concept and can only be construed as humiliating for the UNIFIL contributors.” Callaghan to Urquhart, Code Cable, December 28, 1982, no. NAQ 4123.
43
Brian Urquhart, “A Brief Trip to the Middle East 5-11 January 1983,” confidential UNIFIL files.
Brian Urquhart, “A Brief Trip to the Middle East 5-11 January 1983,” confidential UNIFIL files.
44
Ibid. Urquhart was scathing of others as well. He wrote that U.S. forces in Beirut “have never been seen to go out on patrol except once on a heavily publicized patrol through east Beirut, which is much safer than New York City . . . What a posture for the marines, and how humiliating for them it must be. I did not see a single American military sailor, airman, marine or soldier in or around Beirut the whole time I was there. They stay in camp.”
Ibid. Urquhart was scathing of others as well. He wrote that U.S. forces in Beirut “have never been seen to go out on patrol except once on a heavily publicized patrol through east Beirut, which is much safer than New York City . . . What a posture for the marines, and how humiliating for them it must be. I did not see a single American military sailor, airman, marine or soldier in or around Beirut the whole time I was there. They stay in camp.”
45
A clan spokesman denounced UNIFIL, saying that the UN had come to bring peace but had taken to killing Lebanese. He insisted that all “colored UNIFIL personnel” be relieved of their checkpoint duties. UNIFIL was in such a vulnerable position that Callaghan felt he had no choice but to comply and quickly replaced the Fijians at volatile checkpoints with members of the largely Caucasian Dutch, Irish, and French platoons. Callaghan to Urquhart, Code Cable, March 31, 1983, no. NAQ 915 FILTSO 763.
A clan spokesman denounced UNIFIL, saying that the UN had come to bring peace but had taken to killing Lebanese. He insisted that all “colored UNIFIL personnel” be relieved of their checkpoint duties. UNIFIL was in such a vulnerable position that Callaghan felt he had no choice but to comply and quickly replaced the Fijians at volatile checkpoints with members of the largely Caucasian Dutch, Irish, and French platoons. Callaghan to Urquhart, Code Cable, March 31, 1983, no. NAQ 915 FILTSO 763.
46
Urquhart to Callaghan, Code Cable, June 3, 1983, no. NYQ 1219.
Urquhart to Callaghan, Code Cable, June 3, 1983, no. NYQ 1219.
47
Thomas L. Friedman, “Peacekeepers Become Another Warring Faction,”
New York Times,
October 23, 1983, sec. 4, p. 1.
Thomas L. Friedman, “Peacekeepers Become Another Warring Faction,”
New York Times,
October 23, 1983, sec. 4, p. 1.
49
Thomas L. Friedman, “Beirut Death Toll at 161 Americans; French Casualties Rise in Bombings; Reagan Insists Marines Will Remain; Buildings Blasted,”
New York Times,
October 24, 1983, p. A1; Friedman, “Marines Release Diagram.”
Thomas L. Friedman, “Beirut Death Toll at 161 Americans; French Casualties Rise in Bombings; Reagan Insists Marines Will Remain; Buildings Blasted,”
New York Times,
October 24, 1983, p. A1; Friedman, “Marines Release Diagram.”
50
Less than two minutes after the attack on the Marine compound, as French soldiers gathered at the windows of their compound to see what had caused the ruckus, a second car bomber smashed into their eight-story building, killing fifty-eight French paratroopers.Ten days later in southern Lebanon a young man in a green Chevrolet truck laden with some eight hundred pounds of explosives crashed through the main gates of the Israeli military intelligence headquarters just south of Tyre. The suicide bomb killed twenty-eight Israeli soldiers and security personnel, as well as thirty-two Arabs, most of whom were being held in detention cells. Terence Smith, “At Least 29 Die as Truck Bomb Rips Israeli Post in Lebanon,”
New York Times,
November 5, 1983, sec. 1, p. 1; Herbert H. Denton, “Bomb in Tyre Kills 39; Israeli Planes Retaliate, Strike PLO Near Beirut,”
Washington Post,
November 5, 1993, p. A1.
Less than two minutes after the attack on the Marine compound, as French soldiers gathered at the windows of their compound to see what had caused the ruckus, a second car bomber smashed into their eight-story building, killing fifty-eight French paratroopers.Ten days later in southern Lebanon a young man in a green Chevrolet truck laden with some eight hundred pounds of explosives crashed through the main gates of the Israeli military intelligence headquarters just south of Tyre. The suicide bomb killed twenty-eight Israeli soldiers and security personnel, as well as thirty-two Arabs, most of whom were being held in detention cells. Terence Smith, “At Least 29 Die as Truck Bomb Rips Israeli Post in Lebanon,”
New York Times,
November 5, 1983, sec. 1, p. 1; Herbert H. Denton, “Bomb in Tyre Kills 39; Israeli Planes Retaliate, Strike PLO Near Beirut,”
Washington Post,
November 5, 1993, p. A1.
51
Ronald Reagan, “Remarks to Reporters on the Death of American and French Military Personnel in Beirut, Lebanon,” October 23, 1983.
Ronald Reagan, “Remarks to Reporters on the Death of American and French Military Personnel in Beirut, Lebanon,” October 23, 1983.
52
Ronald Reagan,“Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with Regional Editors and Broadcasters on the Situation in Lebanon,” October 24, 1983.
Ronald Reagan,“Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with Regional Editors and Broadcasters on the Situation in Lebanon,” October 24, 1983.
54
Ronald Reagan, “Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada,” October 27, 1983.
Ronald Reagan, “Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada,” October 27, 1983.
55
Even before the attack on the Marine barracks, a
New York Times
-CBS poll found that three-quarters of respondents supported a withdrawal of U.S. troops from Lebanon if they remained unable to stabilize the country, while more Americans (47 percent) disapproved of Reagan’s handling of foreign policy than approved (38 percent). David Shribman, “Foreign Policy Costing Reagan Public Support,”
New York Times,
September 30, 1983, p. A1.
Even before the attack on the Marine barracks, a
New York Times
-CBS poll found that three-quarters of respondents supported a withdrawal of U.S. troops from Lebanon if they remained unable to stabilize the country, while more Americans (47 percent) disapproved of Reagan’s handling of foreign policy than approved (38 percent). David Shribman, “Foreign Policy Costing Reagan Public Support,”
New York Times,
September 30, 1983, p. A1.
56
Ronald Reagan, President’s News Conference, April 4, 1984.
Ronald Reagan, President’s News Conference, April 4, 1984.
57
Donald Rumsfeld, “Take the Fight to the Terrorists,”
Washington Post,
October 26, 2003, p. B7; “Donald H. Rumsfeld Holds Defense Department News Briefing,” October 23, 2003, online at .
Donald Rumsfeld, “Take the Fight to the Terrorists,”
Washington Post,
October 26, 2003, p. B7; “Donald H. Rumsfeld Holds Defense Department News Briefing,” October 23, 2003, online at .
58
“Donald Rumsfeld Delivers Remarks at the National Conference of State Legislatures,” December 12, 2003 online at
“Donald Rumsfeld Delivers Remarks at the National Conference of State Legislatures,” December 12, 2003 online at
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