CHAPTER 4. HITTING THE GROUND RUNNING
1
Vieira de Mello knew Yasushi Akashi only by his CV. Akashi had begun his career in the Japanese foreign service and in 1979 had left to join the staff of the UN Secretariat, where he spent thirteen years. Prior to being named Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cambodia, Akashi had run the UN Department of Public Information and the more obscure UN Department of Disarmament Affairs.
2
Philip Shenon, “Norodom Sihanouk: The Prince of Survivors,”
New York Times,
October 25, 1991, p. 6.
3
The Paris agreement left the power of the Supreme National Council (SNC) ambiguous. It was established as “the unique legitimate body and source of authority in Cambodia in which, throughout the transitional period, national sovereignty and unity are enshrined.” But in Paris the SNC also agreed to delegate to the UN “all powers necessary to ensure the implementation of this Agreement.” When it came to the UN relationship with the named ministries of defense, foreign affairs, finance, public security, and information, the agreement assigned UNTAC only the task of exercising “such control as is necessary to ensure [their] strict neutrality,” leaving Akashi and the local actors great discretion in deciding the extent of UN interference, supervision, and executive action. See
4
Sihanouk to SVDM, January 23, 1993.
5
Planning was so chaotic that General John Sanderson, the commander of the UN force, was shown a UN Security Council statement that listed him as commander of the UN force that was then deploying to Bosnia.
6
Nate Thayer, “Plunder of the State,”
Far Eastern Economic Review,
January 9, 1992, p. 11.
7
Rodney Tasker and Nate Thayer, “Tactics of Silence,”
Far Eastern Economic Review,
December 12, 1991, p. 10.
9
Nate Thayer, “Murderous Instincts,”
Far Eastern Economic Review,
February 6, 1992, p. 13.
10
UN reports warned that returnees would have likely “lost part of their ‘peasants memory’” and would not be able to fend for themselves. UNHCR Absorption Capacity Survey, January 1990, p. 15, quoted in W. Courtland Robinson,
“Something Like Home Again”: The Repatriation of Cambodian Refugees
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1994), p. 13.
11
William Branigin, "U.N. Starts Cambodian Repatriation,”
Washington Post,
March 31, 1992, p. A1.
12
Ron Moreau, “The Perilous Road Home,”
Newsweek,
April 13, 1992, p. 37.
13
Jarat Chopra, “United Nations Authority in Cambodia,” Watson Institute for International Studies Occasional Paper no. 15, 1994, p. 57.
14
UNHCR, “Cambodia: Land Identification for Settlement of Returnees, November 4-December 17, 1991,” PTSS Mission Report 91/33, p. 12, quoted in Robinson,
“Something Like Home Again,”
p. 19.
15
Robinson,
“Something Like Home Again,”
p. 13.
16
In 1991 there were 30,000 Cambodian amputees within the country and an additional 5,000 to 6,000 residing in Thai border camps.“Land Mines in Cambodia: The Coward’s War,”
Asia Watch,
September 1991.
17
Mats Berdal and Michael Liefer, “Cambodia,” in James Mayall, ed.,
The New Interventionism1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 48.
18
Clearing one mine cost between $300 and $1,000, including the cost of training de-miners. John Ryle, “The Invisible Enemy,”
New Yorker,
November 29, 1993, p. 126.
19
Cambodia’s local politics had also been invisible from the skies. As UNHCR representatives traveled the countryside, they realized that while Hun Sen had boasted of the abundance of land his government would cede to the refugees, autonomous provincial and district officials had their own ideas. Many had begun privatizing the land in their districts in order to make a financial killing before the UN attempted to give it away for free.
20
Nicholas Cumming-Bruce, “UN Struggles to Meet Pledge to Refugees,”
Guardian,
May 6, 1992, p. 11.
21
Robinson, “
Something Like Home Again,
” p. 66.
22
Cumming-Bruce, “UN Struggles.”
23
SVDM to Sadako Ogata, March 21, 1992.
24
William Branigin, “Cambodians Launching Offensive; Khmer Rouge Cited as Endangering U.N. Peace Operation,”
Washington Post,
March 30, 1992, p. A1.
25
Nate Thayer, “Phnom Penh Launches Offensive as Cease-Fire Efforts Stall,” Associated Press, March 29, 1992. The UN Charter authorizes two forms of military intervention. In the first, which falls under Chapter 6, a host government invites UN blue helmets to perform a consensual set of tasks. In such a mission the troops are supposed to use force only in self-defense. The other type of UN intervention force, which falls under Chapter 7 of the Charter, can be deployed even without the parties’ consent; it permits blue helmets to “make” peace and not simply keep it. Cambodia was a Chapter 6 deployment.
26
Bruce Wallace, “Death Returns to the Killing Fields,”
Maclean’s,
March 1, 1993, p. 32.
27
Prior to UNTAC, the UN’s most ambitious peacekeeping mission had been the UN Transitional Assistance Group in Namibia. There the UN policing component was seen as a success. But Namibia had begun with a much stronger, more professional indigenous police corps, and English was spoken throughout the country, making it easier for English-speaking police to help local forces carry out police work.
28
SVDM, Statement at Site 2, March 30, 1992.
29
Teresa Poole, “Cambodians Take Road Back to the Future,”
Independent,
March 28, 1992, p. 14.
30
Yuli Ismartono, “Refugees Head Home to Uncertainty and Strife,” Inter Press Service, March 31, 1992; Branigin, "U.N. Starts Cambodian Repatriation.”
31
Philip Shenon,“Peppered with Mines, Awash in Civil War, It Still Is Home for Cambodians,”
New York Times,
March 30, 1992, p. A3.
32
SVDM, Statement at the Sisophon reception center, March 30, 1992.
33
Teresa Poole, “Cambodians Begin New Life,”
Independent,
March 31, 1992, p. 16.