Chasing the Flame: Sergio Vieira de Mello and the Fight to Save the World (94 page)

BOOK: Chasing the Flame: Sergio Vieira de Mello and the Fight to Save the World
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CHAPTER 3. BLOOD RUNNING BLUE
1
SVDM, interview by Philip Gourevitch, November 22, 2002.
2
Jean-Pierre Hocké succeeded the previous high commissioner, Poul Hartling, a seventy-two-year-old Dane who had served for seven years.
3
UNHCR racked up a deficit of $7 million in 1988 and $40 million by 1989.
4
“Hocké Says Resignation Was His Decision,” Associated Press, October 27, 1989.
5
“Démission de M J-P Hocké: Bon organisateur mais trop autoritaire,”
Le Monde,
October 28, 1989.
6
Anthony Goodman, “UN Aide Says He Was ‘Stabbed’ Over Refugee Job,” Reuters, November 14, 1990.
7
Paul Lewis, “2 Camps in the Search for U.N. Refugee Chief,”
New York Times,
November 18, 1990, sec. 1, p. 6.
8
“General Assembly President’s Remarks at Conclusion of General Debate,” press release, October 14, 1988.
9
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,
Inhumane Deterrence: The Treatment of VietnameseBoat People in Hong Kong
(1989), p. 8.
10
In the immediate wake of the war, those who fled Vietnam had generally been people implicated by their ties to the Americans and their South Vietnamese allies. Others had fled Communist “re-education” or military conscription.
11
President Carter had agreed to take in an astonishing 168,000 Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians per year. France, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and others followed suit. But these numbers had dropped precipitously.
12
Malaysia had already adopted a policy of “redirection”—giving the Vietnamese boats, life jackets, a compass, and maps and urging them to make their way to Indonesia. Arthur Helton, “The Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indo-Chinese Refugees: An Experiment in Refugee Protection and Control,”
New York Law School Journal of Human Rights
8, part 1 (1990-1991).
13
Pierre Jambor, the UNHCR representative to Thailand, first raised the screening idea back in 1986, but the human rights lawyers at UNHCR were slow to embrace it.
14
See Sten Bronee, “The History of the Comprehensive Plan of Action,”
International Journal of Refugee Law
5, no. 4 (1993), pp. 534-43.
15
New York Times,
June 14, 1989, p. A26.
16
W. Courtland Robinson,
Terms of Refuge: The Indochinese Exodus and the International Response
(London: Zed Books, 1998), p. 208.
17
Helton, "The Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indo-Chinese Refugees.”
18
W. Courtland Robinson, “The Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees, 1989-1997: Sharing the Burden and Passing the Buck,”
Journal of Refugee Studies
17, no. 3 (2004), p. 323.
19
Robinson,
Terms of Refuge,
p. 217.
20
Overall, about 28 percent of Vietnamese asylum-seekers were successful in gaining refugee status. Robinson, “Comprehensive Plan of Action,” pp. 323, 328. Hong Kong officials were the most reluctant to grant asylum, finding only 20 percent of Vietnamese applicants to have a well-founded fear of persecution. Alexander Betts,
Comprehensive Plans of Action
(Geneva: Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, Working Paper No. 120, 2006), p. 37.
21
Betts,
Comprehensive Plans of Action,
p. 40.
22
More than a million Kurds and other Iraqis had fled to Iran. Another 450,000 headed toward Turkey, which refused to admit them. Stranded in the inhospitable, freezing mountain ranges south of the Turkish border, between 500 and 2,000 Kurds were thought to be dying daily.
23
The United States, the U.K., France, and Turkey were the big players, but in the end, thirteen nations participated directly in the Combined Task Force and the material support came from a total of thirty countries. The Security Council also declared a no-fly zone to prevent Saddam Hussein from using his bombers to strafe civilians huddled in the mountains.
24
SVDM,
Civitas Maxima: Origines, fondements et portée philosophique et pratique du concept de supranationalité,
thèse pour le Doctorat d’État ès Lettres et Sciences Humaines, Université de Paris I (Panthéon-Sorbonne), Paris, April 1985.
25
This and all subsequent quotes from the speech are from SVDM, “Philosophical History and Real History: The Relevance of Kant’s Political Thought in Current Times,” Geneva International Peace Research Institute, December 4, 1991.
26
SVDM, interview by
De Frente Com Gabi,
Sistema Brasileiro de Televisão (SBT), 2002.
CHAPTER 4. HITTING THE GROUND RUNNING
1
Vieira de Mello knew Yasushi Akashi only by his CV. Akashi had begun his career in the Japanese foreign service and in 1979 had left to join the staff of the UN Secretariat, where he spent thirteen years. Prior to being named Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cambodia, Akashi had run the UN Department of Public Information and the more obscure UN Department of Disarmament Affairs.
2
Philip Shenon, “Norodom Sihanouk: The Prince of Survivors,”
New York Times,
October 25, 1991, p. 6.
3
The Paris agreement left the power of the Supreme National Council (SNC) ambiguous. It was established as “the unique legitimate body and source of authority in Cambodia in which, throughout the transitional period, national sovereignty and unity are enshrined.” But in Paris the SNC also agreed to delegate to the UN “all powers necessary to ensure the implementation of this Agreement.” When it came to the UN relationship with the named ministries of defense, foreign affairs, finance, public security, and information, the agreement assigned UNTAC only the task of exercising “such control as is necessary to ensure [their] strict neutrality,” leaving Akashi and the local actors great discretion in deciding the extent of UN interference, supervision, and executive action. See
4
Sihanouk to SVDM, January 23, 1993.
5
Planning was so chaotic that General John Sanderson, the commander of the UN force, was shown a UN Security Council statement that listed him as commander of the UN force that was then deploying to Bosnia.
6
Nate Thayer, “Plunder of the State,”
Far Eastern Economic Review,
January 9, 1992, p. 11.
7
Rodney Tasker and Nate Thayer, “Tactics of Silence,”
Far Eastern Economic Review,
December 12, 1991, p. 10.
8
Ibid., pp. 10-11.
9
Nate Thayer, “Murderous Instincts,”
Far Eastern Economic Review,
February 6, 1992, p. 13.
10
UN reports warned that returnees would have likely “lost part of their ‘peasants memory’” and would not be able to fend for themselves. UNHCR Absorption Capacity Survey, January 1990, p. 15, quoted in W. Courtland Robinson,
“Something Like Home Again”: The Repatriation of Cambodian Refugees
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1994), p. 13.
11
William Branigin, "U.N. Starts Cambodian Repatriation,”
Washington Post,
March 31, 1992, p. A1.
12
Ron Moreau, “The Perilous Road Home,”
Newsweek,
April 13, 1992, p. 37.
13
Jarat Chopra, “United Nations Authority in Cambodia,” Watson Institute for International Studies Occasional Paper no. 15, 1994, p. 57.
14
UNHCR, “Cambodia: Land Identification for Settlement of Returnees, November 4-December 17, 1991,” PTSS Mission Report 91/33, p. 12, quoted in Robinson,
“Something Like Home Again,”
p. 19.
15
Robinson,
“Something Like Home Again,”
p. 13.
16
In 1991 there were 30,000 Cambodian amputees within the country and an additional 5,000 to 6,000 residing in Thai border camps.“Land Mines in Cambodia: The Coward’s War,”
Asia Watch,
September 1991.
17
Mats Berdal and Michael Liefer, “Cambodia,” in James Mayall, ed.,
The New Interventionism1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 48.
18
Clearing one mine cost between $300 and $1,000, including the cost of training de-miners. John Ryle, “The Invisible Enemy,”
New Yorker,
November 29, 1993, p. 126.
19
Cambodia’s local politics had also been invisible from the skies. As UNHCR representatives traveled the countryside, they realized that while Hun Sen had boasted of the abundance of land his government would cede to the refugees, autonomous provincial and district officials had their own ideas. Many had begun privatizing the land in their districts in order to make a financial killing before the UN attempted to give it away for free.
20
Nicholas Cumming-Bruce, “UN Struggles to Meet Pledge to Refugees,”
Guardian,
May 6, 1992, p. 11.
21
Robinson, “
Something Like Home Again,
” p. 66.
22
Cumming-Bruce, “UN Struggles.”
23
SVDM to Sadako Ogata, March 21, 1992.
24
William Branigin, “Cambodians Launching Offensive; Khmer Rouge Cited as Endangering U.N. Peace Operation,”
Washington Post,
March 30, 1992, p. A1.
25
Nate Thayer, “Phnom Penh Launches Offensive as Cease-Fire Efforts Stall,” Associated Press, March 29, 1992. The UN Charter authorizes two forms of military intervention. In the first, which falls under Chapter 6, a host government invites UN blue helmets to perform a consensual set of tasks. In such a mission the troops are supposed to use force only in self-defense. The other type of UN intervention force, which falls under Chapter 7 of the Charter, can be deployed even without the parties’ consent; it permits blue helmets to “make” peace and not simply keep it. Cambodia was a Chapter 6 deployment.
26
Bruce Wallace, “Death Returns to the Killing Fields,”
Maclean’s,
March 1, 1993, p. 32.
27
Prior to UNTAC, the UN’s most ambitious peacekeeping mission had been the UN Transitional Assistance Group in Namibia. There the UN policing component was seen as a success. But Namibia had begun with a much stronger, more professional indigenous police corps, and English was spoken throughout the country, making it easier for English-speaking police to help local forces carry out police work.
28
SVDM, Statement at Site 2, March 30, 1992.
29
Teresa Poole, “Cambodians Take Road Back to the Future,”
Independent,
March 28, 1992, p. 14.
30
Yuli Ismartono, “Refugees Head Home to Uncertainty and Strife,” Inter Press Service, March 31, 1992; Branigin, "U.N. Starts Cambodian Repatriation.”
31
Philip Shenon,“Peppered with Mines, Awash in Civil War, It Still Is Home for Cambodians,”
New York Times,
March 30, 1992, p. A3.
32
SVDM, Statement at the Sisophon reception center, March 30, 1992.
33
Teresa Poole, “Cambodians Begin New Life,”
Independent,
March 31, 1992, p. 16.
CHAPTER 5. “BLACK BOXING”
1
SVDM, “Philosophical History and Real History: The Relevance of Kant’s Political Thought in Current Times,” Geneva International Peace Research Institute, December 4, 1991.
2
UN Security Council, second progress report of the secretary-general on UNTAC, September 21, 1992, para. 29, p. 7.
3
SVDM to Sadako Ogata, “Visit to Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) Zone—6 to 8 April 1992,” April 12, 1992.
4
SVDM to Ogata and Jamshid Anvar, “Report on Visit to Area Controlled by the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK), 6-8 April 1992,” April 10, 1992.
5
Tiziano Terzani, “An Indecent Peace,”
Far Eastern Economic Review,
June 25, 1992, p. 21.
6
Bruce Wallace, “Death Returns to the Killing Fields,”
Maclean’s,
March 1, 1993, p. 32.
7
Yasushi Akashi to Tetsuo Miyabara, U.S. General Accounting Office, I-32, August 5, 1993, pp. 1-2, cited in Janet E. Heininger,
Peacekeeping in Transition: The United Nations in Cambodia
(New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994), p. 72.
8
Mats Berdal and Michael Liefer, "Cambodia,” in James Mayall, ed.,
The New Interventionism1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia
(New York : Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 42; John Sanderson, “UNTAC: Successes and Failures,” in Hugh Smith, ed.,
International Peacekeeping: Building on the Cambodian Experience
(Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1994), p. 132.
9
Nayan Chanda, “UN Divisions,”
Far Eastern Economic Review
, July 23, 1992, p. 9.
10
SVDM, Reginald Austin, and Dennis McNamara to Akashi, strictly confidential memo, June 15, 1992.
11
SVDM, strictly confidential draft discussion paper on Contingency Repatriation Strategy, July 28, 1992.
12
Jean-Claude Pomonti, “Selon un expert français les capacités militaires des Khmers rouges sont surestimées” (According to a French Expert, the Military Capabilities of the Khmer Rouge Are Overestimated),
Le Monde,
August 22, 1992.
13
SVDM to Christophe Peschoux and Jahanshah Assadi, handwritten note on clipping, September 13, 1992.
14
SVDM to Son Sen, September 3, 1992.
15
SVDM to Ogata and Warren Blatter, “Visit to DK Zone, 30 Sept-1 Oct.”
16
Ibid.
17
SVDM, interview by James S. Sutterlin, May 5, 1998, Yale-UN Oral History, p. 26.
18
W. Courtland Robinson,
“Something Like Home Again”: The Repatriation of Cambodian Refugees
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1994), p. 34.
19
Ibid., p. 37. Robinson, a critic of UNHCR’s failure to disclose all the facts to the returnees, notes: “Good information is both touchstone and cornerstone of safe and voluntary repatriation.”
20
Philip Shenon, “Call of Land Lures Refugees to Khmer Rouge Zone,”
New York Times,
January 31, 1993.
21
Vieira de Mello also bucked the will of the Security Council. In July 1992, when the Khmer Rouge refused to disarm, the Security Council passed a resolution requesting that the secretary-general ensure that “international assistance to the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia from now on only benefits the parties which are fulfilling their obligations under the Paris agreement and cooperating fully with UNTAC.” UN Security Council Resolution 766, quoted in Robinson,
“Something Like Home Again,”
p. 33.
22
Ibid., p. 35.
23
Shenon, “Call of Land.”

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