Austerlitz: Napoleon and the Eagles of Europe (13 page)

When Murat arrived with the rest of the cavalry, the dragoons were unsuccessfully attacking these battalions. Then over to the right of the French position, Lannes arrived at the head of Oudinot’s Reserve Grenadiers, having marched to the sound of the guns. Murat and Lannes quickly resolved to break the Austrian defence before nightfall and devised a plan to outflank Auffenberg’s hill top position. The Austrian general, realising the danger, ordered his four battalions to begin withdrawing in square, while his remaining cavalry prepared to deter any would-be attackers. But vastly outnumbered, the Austrian horsemen could not hope to stem the tide for long, and eventually they were driven off. With Oudinot’s grenadiers rapidly closing on the slow-moving formations and clouds of cavalry hovering all around, the Austrian squares finally broke. Only 1,400 infantry, one cavalry squadron and two artillery pieces made it safely to Zumarshausen and Burgau: although another 1,000 stragglers eventually rejoined their units. The Austrians gave their losses as 101 men killed, 233 wounded, and 1,469 captured. In addition, the French seized three Austrian standards and six artillery pieces. Amongst this haul was the valuable prize of Auffenberg himself. The French gave their losses in killed and wounded as 319 men.

Napoleon was delighted with this overwhelming victory and particularly with the haul of prisoners, the first taken in the campaign. From these he learned that the Austrians were between Memmingen and Ulm with between 60,000 and 70,000 men, and that Mack was at Günzburg where Archduke Ferdinand was about to join him.

Mack and Ferdinand heard of this disastrous encounter at 1.00am on 9 October in Günzburg, the day of the intended concentration of the army. It was obvious that the French were over the Danube in far greater numbers than previously imagined. In response, Mack cancelled the move and recalled those formations already on the road. An intense debate followed as a number of senior officers began to strongly suggest the army should retire on the Tirol. But Mack, having no intention of exposing the Russians to the full might of the
French army, announced a new plan. The army would cross to the north bank of the Danube, clear away any French units remaining there and march east down the river via Donauwörth, Neuburg and Regensburg to link up with Kienmayer and Kutuzov. Mack spent many hours drawing up a detailed plan of operations for the crossing, which included the abandonment of Ulm, and, maintaining some pretence of a chain of command, he submitted it to Archduke Ferdinand at around 4.00pm on 9 October. At the same time the sound of artillery fire north of Günzburg caused renewed alarm.

Following the receipt of Napoleon’s orders, Ney led the three divisions of VI Corps towards Ulm on the morning of 9 October, leaving the temporarily attached divisions of Gazan (V Corps) and Baraguay d’Hilliers (Foot Dragoons – Cavalry Reserve) on the Brenz river at Gundelfingen and Herbrechtingen respectively. It was a miserable day as icy winds blew sleet and snow across the whole area. Dupont’s division approached Albeck, Loison’s men moved towards Langenau and Malher marched his division in the direction of Günzburg, where he hoped to cross the Danube and establish contact with Murat and Lannes. Although the Austrian troops defending the river were instructed to send a detachment across to the north bank to watch for any French movements, this detachment, commanded by Baron d’Aspre, kept too close to the river and were surprised by the sudden appearance of Malher’s men.

The bridge over the Danube at Günzburg crossed a short stretch of river, where it divided into a number of separate arms and islands. Approximately 2 miles to the west another bridge crossed at the village of Leipheim, and three-quarters of a mile to the east a third passed over the river between Günzburg and Reisenburg. Malher decided to split his division to launch simultaneous attacks on all three bridges. Entrusting the attack near Reisenburg to two battalions of the 59ème Ligne, supported by the eight guns of his divisional artillery, he then stripped the elite companies from all his battalions, reforming them into an ad hoc battalion for an attack on the bridge at Leipheim. Finally, he collected together his other six battalions (three battalions 25ème Légère, one battalion 27ème Ligne and two battalions 50ème Ligne), in the centre and prepared to attack Günzburg, holding a battalion of 27ème Ligne in reserve.

To gain time for the main body to organise a defence of the river, Baron d’Aspre advanced with about 200
jäger
to delay the French moving against Günzburg. Almost immediately he discovered a second column approaching Reisenburg. Up until now the bridges remained intact because Mack planned to use them to allow his army to cross the river, but now work commenced in earnest to deny them to the French. Archduke Ferdinand, now in the town, ordered forward three battalions of IR3 Erzherzog Karl and twenty artillery pieces to line the riverbank and defend the Günzburg crossing. Four battalions of IR20 Kaunitz, supported by four squadrons of cavalry, covered the bridge at Reisenburg and three battalions of IR38 Württemberg prepared to deflect any
attack on Leipheim. Here the French attack came to nothing. Struggling through the waterlogged marshy ground the attack bogged down and the combined battalion fell back in some disorder. In the centre, however, Malher’s men made progress. The
jäger
gained a little time for the Austrian engineers to disrupt the bridges, but when the French charged forward it meant there was no escape for d’Aspre and his intrepid little band, only a few evading capture. Malher’s men pressed on to the main island in the Danube but could not proceed across the broken bridge in the face of a fierce fusillade of musketry and artillery fire. A number of volunteers came forward to attempt repairs to the bridge in the face of this storm of fire, but with casualties rapidly mounting, Malher pulled his men back to the tree-lined north bank of the river. The attack on the bridge near Reisenburg also met little success. Now that these attacks appeared to have run their course, the Austrian commander, FML Riesch, prepared to switch over to the offensive as the late afternoon light began to fade. In the gathering gloom he quickly repaired the Reisenburg bridge and formed a column of seven battalions, headed by IR20 Kaunitz, to drive the French back. The French did not attempt to interrupt this work, but as the column crossed they launched a fierce counterattack against the leading battalion of IR20. In the confusion the Austrians broke and poured back, causing disruption in the battalions to the rear, as the two French battalions of 59ème Ligne rushed forward and captured the bridge. Austrian cavalry charged the French, who quickly formed square, but were unable to dislodge them. Malher rushed reinforcements towards this bridgehead from the force opposite Günzburg and consolidated his foothold on the south bank. French troops pursued the Austrians back to Günzburg but were unable to capture the town and drew back. It was clear to both Mack and Ferdinand that it was now impossible to cross the Danube at Günzburg, or to remain where they were. Ferdinand proposed they should either march rapidly back to Elchingen and cross there to evade the French, or give up the Danube and fall back on Tirol. Mack refused either option and ordered a retreat to Ulm, much to Ferdinand’s increasing anger and frustration. The retreat commenced at about 8.00pm. After many days of marching and counter-marching, of appalling weather and lack of food, discipline finally broke down and the army fell back on Ulm in disorder and panic.
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One citizen of Ulm witnessed the arrival of the dishevelled army in the city:

‘As 11.00pm struck the Austrians in the greatest disorder began to arrive in Ulm. Infantry and cavalry mixed up together in small groups and individual soldiers. The confusion was general. The weather was terrible. From 9 October it began to rain and rained continuously up to 14 October. In addition an icy wind blew, causing the rain occasionally to turn to snow. The troops suffered terribly. Their shoes and coats tattered, their weapons covered with thick rust.’
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Malher’s division advanced and occupied Günzburg on the morning of 10 October, the Austrian rearguard having pulled out, leaving some 300 wounded men behind, which the French added to the 1,000 prisoners they had captured in the battle. Maréchal Ney also arrived in Günzburg that day, where he received news that Loison’s division had captured the bridge at Elchingen during the night. Here an audacious attack by 3ème Hussards and 6ème Légère, appearing out of the dark at about 11.00pm on a freezing cold night, smashed into the horrified Austrian outposts on the north bank. Alerted to the attack, the main body of the Austrian battalion defending the bridge opened a heavy fire of musketry and canister from the cover of woods close to the river. A local report breathlessly described the encounter: ‘What a sight! Like a nightmare! They now moved forwards up to the bridge, a terrible fire of muskets mixed with the blast of roaring cannon illuminated the hell-black night with a constant bright light.’
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In response, the 6ème Légère brought up two 8pdrs and overpowered the defenders on the north bank, capturing their single artillery piece and taking fifty-seven prisoners, as the rest poured precariously over the partly disrupted bridge. Attempts to set fire to the southern end failed as the French light infantry followed after them, undeterred by the Austrian fusillade. The Austrian defenders, shaken by the whole experience, fell back towards Leibi and Nersingen, where they joined the retreat to Ulm.

From Günzburg Ney wrote to Napoleon to advise him of his discovery: ‘The enemy is at Ulm in much more strength than we thought, he received a reinforcement of 15,000 men near Günzburg, coming from Schaffhausen; it seems that the left wing of the hostile battle line (facing the east) will form at Ulm.’ Despite Ney’s first-hand experience, Napoleon chose to discount this information, and remained convinced that the main Austrian strength was concentrated well to the south of Ulm. The following day, 11 October, a number of pivotal factors fell into place that brought the campaign to a spectacular close nine days later.

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FML Karl Mack, Freiherr von Leiberach.

Chapter 7

Jealousy and Misunderstanding

‘There existed a degree of jealousy and
misunderstanding among the General Officers
in that army which led to fatal consequences.’
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The early hours of 10 October heralded no improvement in the atrocious weather of the previous few days. A large part of the Austrian army falling back from Günzburg passed through Ulm over to the north bank of the Danube and occupied entrenched positions on the Michelsberg. The men were disillusioned, exhausted, cold and hungry. But the French army fared little better.

Since La Grande Armée crossed the Rhine it needed to find its own supplies, a task which proved extremely difficult to fulfil. On 9 October one general wrote that his division ‘had neither bread nor meat, and only most scanty supplies of forage … The villages I have had to occupy have been completely cleared out by preceding columns.’ On the same day, GD Suchet, commanding an infantry division attached to V Corps thankfully reported that he still had bread to issue to his men, but the rest of the corps was without. Elsewhere, GD Vandamme, commanding a division of IV Corps, also wrote of the exhaustion of his men and their need for food. Such was the general state of exhaustion in IV Corps that it remained at Augsburg for two days to draw rations and recover.

In the face of these desperate shortages the army showed little compassion for the Bavarian population. Davout, commanding III Corps, considered the situation so out of hand by 11 October that he wrote to Berthier, seeking permission to shoot some men guilty of plundering the locals as an example. In his letter he expressed the need ‘to put a stop to marauding and pillaging, which have reached the limits of excess’. He went on to state that the Bavarian villagers were faring worse at the hands of their French allies than they did
when France invaded Bavaria as enemies in 1800. He concluded that ‘terrible examples are necessary to stop this evil’.
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Unfortunately, there appears to be no record of a reply.

Napoleon spent the night of 9–10 October at Zumarshausen. In the morning he determined to ride to Munich, where Bernadotte, with I Corps and the Bavarians – the left wing of the army – were marching from Ingolstadt, hoping to discover the latest news of Kienmayer’s corps and the movements of the Russians. The centre – II, III and IV Corps and two cavalry divisions – was to continue its concentration on the Lech near Augsburg. The emperor placed the right wing of the army – V and VI Corps plus Murat’s cavalry – under the overall command of Murat, while he prepared to head eastwards to the Bavarian capital.

However, this decision clouded the overall picture. Although Murat now commanded this wing, including Ney’s corps, with orders to probe southwards towards Mindelheim where Napoleon expected him to find the main Austrian army, separate instructions issued to Ney required VI Corps to take Ulm. Following his own orders, on the morning of 10 October, Murat ordered Ney to bring the whole of VI Corps to the south bank of the Danube so it could operate with him. Coming under Napoleon’s influence, he believed that other than a small rearguard in Ulm, the Austrian army was south of the city, preparing either to fight or retreat to Tirol, in order to unite with Archduke John’s army. When he received this order Ney objected strongly. Intelligence Ney received from Baron d’Aspre and other prisoners captured the previous day suggested the Austrians intended attacking north of the river. If he moved his whole corps to the south bank, the only French troops remaining to protect their communications and baggage would be a single division of dragoons. The animosity that already existed between the two corps commanders boiled over as the argument dragged on, neither willing to give ground, and as the day drew to a close little had been resolved. Dupont’s division doggedly remained north of the river, supported some way to the rear by the dismounted dragoon division of Baraguey d’Hilliers, while both Malher’s and Loison’s divisions occupied positions on the south bank, close to the river, following their battles the previous day. Loison’s men spent the day making themselves unpopular with the inhabitants of Elchingen by slaughtering all their cattle and seizing their horses.
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