Austerlitz: Napoleon and the Eagles of Europe (17 page)

In accordance with orders, FML Riesch had already started his command marching early that morning, and by 7.00am over half of it was already on the road. The rest remained behind to destroy the bridge, while the road ahead cleared. However, the detachment of 2,000 men from Loudon’s division, sent to destroy the bridge at Leipheim, reported it already held by a large enemy force of 10,000 men (actually Baraguay d’Hilliers’ dismounted dragoon division of around 5,000). Unable to complete their orders, they fell back on Elchingen. The main body of Loudon’s men were recalled when the French appeared opposite the bridge.

The other detachment that left camp early was Mecsery’s advance guard of Hessen-Homberg’s division. His route took him towards Gundelfingen, but near Langenau he encountered Dupont’s division marching on Albeck. After a tentative clash of outposts both sides fell back, Mecsery, following orders from Riesch, and Dupont to the Brenz, to protect his communications across the Danube. With all his men back at Elchingen, Riesch aligned his command along the high ground where the abbey and village of Ober-Elchingen stood and which extended towards Unter-Elchingen. In all, he commanded some 15,000 men – about the same as Ney – with fourteen artillery pieces. However, only two battalions and two guns were in position to defend the broken bridge. Others were earmarked for the defence but matters developed too quickly for them to move into position.

During the night Ney formed a battery with eleven of his guns and positioned them by the main bridge on the southern bank of the river. Then, at about 7.30, he appeared at Napoleon’s headquarters to receive his final instructions. Before he left, Ney turned to Murat, for whom he now felt nothing but disdain, and in front of the assembled luminaries he took him by the arm. During their heated argument a few days earlier Murat had dismissed Ney’s criticism of his strategy by airily stating that he made his plans in the face of the enemy. The two men had almost drawn swords. Stung by this previous insult, Ney now exclaimed loudly, so all could hear: ‘Come with me prince, and make some plans in the presence of the enemy!’ Murat seethed. A few days later he attempted to gain revenge by accusing Ney of making a false requisition for a large sum of money. Knowing the characters of his marshals, the emperor ignored Murat’s letter and concentrated on more pressing matters.

Back at the Danube, Ney gave the order for his artillery to open their bombardment of the Austrian positions. The two Austrian battalions of IR54 Froon defending the river could not hope to stand and face this onslaught of shot and shell and sought what shelter they could. The two Austrian artillery pieces returned fire in what was clearly an uneven contest. Under cover of this heavy concentration of artillery fire, French infantry began to work their way on to the bridge. The Austrian attempts to destroy the bridge meant that, while the beams that ran lengthways across the river connecting the piers were still in place, the cross planking that formed the roadway was missing in places or unsafe. To repair the passage over the river small engineering parties assembled, tasked with laying planks across the beams to form a new roadway. Capitaine Coisel, an aide to Général de division Loison, and a sapper from 6ème Légère carried the first plank. The two men rushed forward but before they could complete their task an Austrian cannon ball smashed the sapper’s leg. However, his brave action spurred on others and gradually, plank by plank, the roadway edged across the river.

While this work inexorably proceeded, Loison formed together the elite companies from the 6ème Légère and 39ème Ligne and ordered them on to the partially repaired bridge, while the French guns kept Austrian opposition to a minimum. The
voltigeurs
,
carabiniers
and grenadiers stormed forward across the bridge until the planks ran out. Then, taking to the open beams, they tottered intrepidly the rest of the way before jumping down into the shallows at the river’s edge. Once across they fanned out to form a resolute bridgehead while the engineer parties completed their work. From his position on the high ground some 1,400 yards away FML Riesch was unable to halt this flow of men across the river. His decision taken the previous evening, to defer the destruction of the bridge until morning, now returned to haunt him. His men, many of them young and inexperienced, others already bloodied at the hands of the French, watched nervously as the enemy poured across the river.

With the bridge complete, GB Villate led forward his brigade of Loison’s division – first the 39ème Ligne, followed by VI Corps cavalry, and then 6ème
Légère. With these 3,300 infantry and 300 light cavalry Ney began to assault the strong Austrian position, while GB Rouget brought his brigade across the river and formed up in support. Although significantly outnumbered, their enthusiasm carried the French troops right up to the foot of the sloping ground on which the Austrians formed their defence before a fierce fire brought them to a halt.

With mounting casualties the 39ème Ligne were forced to fall back, but the 6ème Légère, with Ney at their head, made a ferocious attack on the village and abbey, driving the defenders out. Elsewhere along the line vicious fighting continued. Rouget’s brigade (69ème Ligne and 76ème Ligne – about 3,500 men), now advanced to the right of the abbey, where the Austrian infantry of IR15 and IR35 was drawn up in two lines. To the right of Rouget’s men VI Corps cavalry (3ème Hussards and 10ème Chasseurs à cheval) and Bourcier’s dragoons (18ème, 19ème and 25ème) advanced towards Mecsery’s advance guard (three battalions IR42 and two
cuirassier
squadrons). The Austrians put up a stout resistance for a while in the face of the attacking élan of the French. But with their ammunition running low and no chance of replenishment – many of the wagons were still stuck in the mud from the previous day’s march – and their confidence already low, they began to give way. Many surrendered. Malher’s division of Ney’s Corps had now also made the crossing of the Danube and prepared to enter the battle. After around five hours hard fighting Riesch realised the battle was lost and gave the order to retreat.

Although numerically superior to Ney’s attacking force, morale-wise the Austrians lacked the same level of conviction for the fight. All order broke down during the retreat and when Riesch finally struggled back into Ulm that evening he retained only about 2,500 of the 15,000 men that had marched out the previous day. Although many of the missing eventually made their way back to Ulm, estimates show that Riesch lost about 4,000 men killed and wounded and perhaps 3,000 as prisoners. French losses are difficult to ascertain but they were probably between 1,600 and 3,000 killed and wounded. It was another disastrous engagement for Mack. Loison’s victorious men pursued the fleeing Austrians as far as Haslach before falling back to Albeck, where VI Corps established an advanced position, the main body remaining around Elchingen. Dupont received orders to move his division up towards Albeck. For the moment Ney was unaware of the importance of his victory. Later, in recognition of his remarkable achievement, he received the title ‘duke of Elchingen’: a reward which drew from him the response: ‘Is it not an honour, to be duke of so beautiful a place?’

Ney’s attack across the Danube must have made Mack question the veracity of Schulmeister’s stories of French retreat, but he did not completely discredit them. In the meantime, the defeat of Riesch’s command was not the only bad news. With the French established at Albeck, contact with FML Werneck’s column was broken and his situation unknown. In fact for much of the day
Werneck had remained near to Heidenheim, ensuring the safety of the slow-moving reserve artillery and baggage convoy. He heard the distant sound of battle from Elchingen but was unsure whether to march to the sound of the guns or continue to follow his orders. In fact, the distance was such that he could not have arrived in time to alter the outcome. However, it is interesting to speculate whether Schulmeister, now at Werneck’s headquarters, had influenced this decision. Elsewhere other developments were further undermining Mack’s position.

On the previous morning FML Jella
i
commenced his march south out of Ulm, heading up the Iller towards Memmingen, where he intended reuniting with his detachment under GM Spangen. However, the appearance of Maréchal Soult before Memmingen with IV Corps forced an early surrender by the Austrian commander on 14 October with Jella
i
only a day’s march away. Jella
i
veered away towards Vorarlberg, just avoiding Soult’s men. In the meantime, advanced detachments of IV Corps crossed the Iller and streamed north to cut off Ulm from the west.
³
Of the five army corps that advanced under Mack into Bavaria, little remained under his direct control. Kienmayer, retiring towards the Inn, had remained out of contact since the French pushed him back beyond Munich. Jella
i
was marching for Vorarlberg, Werneck was somewhere north-east of Ulm, Riesch had just struggled back to the city with the remnants of his command, leaving only Schwarzenberg?s corps relatively unaffected. That night tension boiled over in Ulm.