Austerlitz: Napoleon and the Eagles of Europe (8 page)

On the same day that he issued this latest offer to Prussia, without waiting for a reply, Napoleon turned from diplomacy to matters of grand strategy. If the strength of the coalition was to be broken before it could combine against him, he needed to strike fast. He accurately assessed the impact of the flanking threats as minimal to the outcome of the coming campaign, and the option of transferring the majority of his army from the Channel to join those already stationed in northern Italy would risk too great a delay. Instead, he entrusted command of the Army of Italy to the reliable Maréchal Masséna. His command amounted to some 65,000 men, although depots, garrisons and hospitals distributed along the lines of communication reduced his effective strength to around 40,000. With these men Napoleon expected Masséna to check and delay the advance of Archduke Charles and the main Austrian army of about 94,000 men. Général de division Gouvion St Cyr marching north from southern Italy with 18,000 men, released by the extraction of a treaty of neutrality from the king of Naples, offered valuable support. Instead, Napoleon targeted the closest enemy formation to La Grande Armée, the Austrians assembling on the Danube. With a rapid advance he hoped to knock them out of the war before Russian reinforcements arrived from the east.

The following day he issued orders for the
cuirassiers
and dragoons to march for the Rhine, where the dragoons were to observe a 100-mile stretch of the river, extending either side of Strasbourg. On 25 August further instructions authorised them to extend their observations beyond the Rhine towards Bavaria, along with Oudinot’s elite Reserve Grenadier Division. Then on 26 August, after two years of intensive training, La Grande Armée received the order to turn their backs on England and march for the Rhine. Maréchal Ney and VI Corps headed for Schlettstadt, 30 miles south of Strasbourg, Soult (IV Corps)
and Lannes (V Corps) for Strasbourg itself, and Davout (III Corps) to Hagenau, roughly 20 miles north of Strasbourg. All destinations suggested Napoleon intended following the traditional invasion route into the Danube Valley through the Black Forest. Further to the north, Marmont (II Corps), in Holland, received orders to march for Mainz, situated at the junction of the Rhine and Main rivers, approximately 115 miles north of Strasbourg. Bernadotte (I Corps) was instructed to evacuate Hanover, except for a garrison left at the town of Hameln, and march for Göttingen, 130 miles to the northeast of Mainz. And far off to the west, Augereau began the long march from Brittany, heading for the Upper Rhine around Basel. Behind them Napoleon left some 30,000 troops to remain on the coast and guard against any British landing.

At this point, Napoleon knew little of Austrian intentions on the Danube, but he believed that by rapid movement he could intercept any Austrian advance into Bavaria somewhere between the rivers Lech and Inn. However, it appears that during the evening of 27 August he received information that Allied preparations were more advanced than he anticipated. An Austrian army assembling at Wels on the Traun river, was only 45 miles from the Bavarian border, and other intelligence indicated that the Russians might have begun to move. A quick consultation of the map revealed the possibility that this Austrian army could concentrate on the Rhine before all his formations arrived. Reacting quickly, Napoleon ordered a general shift of the southern formations northwards the following day. Now only Lannes’ V Corps and Murat’s cavalry would head for Strasbourg, with Ney, Soult and Davout redirecting their line of march between Hagenau and Speyer. These new positions enabled Napoleon to plan an advance targeted on a 30-mile stretch of the Danube lying between the city of Ulm and east towards to Dillingen, one that offered a central position against an Austrian advance into Bavaria or a Russian move from Bohemia.

While the army adjusted to life on the move and set out on the 350-mile journey from the coast to the Rhine, Napoleon sent three trusted men ahead to gather as much intelligence as possible. Murat, disguised as ‘Colonel de Beaumont’ made an extraordinary reconnaissance, taking him from Mainz to Strasbourg via Würzburg, Bamburg, Nuremberg, Regensberg, Passau, the Inn river, Munich, Ulm and the Black Forest, a distance of 600 miles in about three weeks. Général de brigade Bertrand, an aide to the emperor, engaged on an even longer journey. From Munich he made for Passau and the Inn river, which he then followed upstream to Kufstein. From there he moved to Salzburg before returning to Munich and continuing along the Lech to Ingolstadt and Donauwörth on the Danube, then turning north he headed for Bamburg. A return to the Danube at Ulm followed before he headed back to the Rhine via Stuttgart. The third reconnaissance was entrusted to GD Savary, the man who carried out the execution of the duc d’Enghein. Savary undertook to explore the roads from the Rhine, north of the Black Forest, to the Danube. For this purpose he recruited an old contact, Charles Schulmeister, a trader (and highly successful smuggler) who lived in Strasbourg. Because of his extensive
knowledge of the area and numerous contacts, Schulmeister had been of much use to Savary in earlier military campaigns on the Rhine. More recently he had supplied Savary with information on the movements of the duc d’Enghien prior to his abduction. Now, accompanying Savary, and with both men in disguise, they set out to study the roads by which Napoleon’s army would advance. Later, Schulmeister would fulfil a far more pivotal role.

While this intelligence gathering was underway, the Allies were preparing to march. The first Russian army to move formed at Radziwilov in Ukraine close to the border with the former Polish land of Austrian Galicia. On 25 August, the 46,000 men began to cross the border at Brody. Then, having divided into six columns of between 7,000 and 8,000 men each, they began their march towards Moravia at 24-hour intervals. But the man appointed to overall command of the Russian army, Mikhail Kutuzov, had taken no part in determining its plans or strategy.

Mikhail Illarionovich Golenshchev-Kutuzov was rapidly approaching his 60th birthday in August 1805. For the last three years he had lived in exile from St Petersburg, residing on his estate at Goroshki in Ukraine, and it was there that he received a message from the tsar ordering him back to the city. Kutuzov had enjoyed a long, distinguished military and diplomatic career. He first saw action against the Poles as a nineteen-year-old infantry company commander and his bravery under fire drew attention during the war against the Turks in 1768. However, Kutuzov was prone to high spirits and an account of his parody of the army commander reached headquarters. His target, Count Rumyantsev, was not amused and immediately dismissed him, but granted permission for him to transfer to the army operating in the Crimea against the Turks. It brought a change over Kutuzov, who it was said became more self-contained, held back his opinions and distrusted the motives of those around him. During the storming of Alushta in 1773 he received a near fatal wound. The bullet destroyed some of the muscles attached to his right eye, causing great pain and dizziness, but which fortunately did not impair his vision. After an extended period of leave, during which he travelled to Berlin and Holland for medical treatment and visited London and Vienna, Kutuzov returned to the army in 1776. Back in the Crimea he served under the revered Russian military leader, Alexander Suvorov, who greatly influenced his thinking. War broke out against the Turks again in 1787 and at Ochakov Kutuzov received another wound behind his right eye, in almost the same spot as that of fifteen years earlier. Although it was again feared fatal, Kutuzov rapidly recovered, however his vision suffered this time as his eye sat awkwardly twisted in its socket. For the next two years Kutuzov, now a major general, continued to perform great heroic deeds in battle and, despite this physical handicap, further enhanced his reputation as a fierce, energetic and intelligent commander.

In 1793, with the war at an end, Kutuzov exchanged battlefield skills for those of diplomacy, following his unlikely appointment as ambassador to Turkey. But Kutuzov adapted well and created a favourable impression in Constantinople. The following year he received a recall and was sent to command the Russian army in Finland, a task he fulfilled until 1797, when the new tsar, Paul, sent him as ambassador to Berlin. A brief period as governor-general of Vilna followed before he returned to St Petersburg in 1800, as acting governor-general of the city. Yet the intrigues building against the tsar made life extremely difficult and required all Kutuzov’s diplomatic skills to avoid complicity in the plot against the tsar’s life. Following Paul’s murder, Alexander appointed Kutuzov full governor-general of St Petersburg, yet he constantly fretted over whether Kutuzov believed him a party to his father’s death. To rid himself of this constant painful reminder he began to exert mounting pressure on Kutuzov, until, in August 1802, Alexander was able to announce that Kutuzov had been ‘dismissed at his own request’. Now, virtually in exile, Kutuzov retired to his estate in Goroshki to concentrate on farming. His health began to suffer and increasing rheumatism contributed to his aged appearance, then his battered right eye finally failed and he lost his sight. He grew portly but retained his fondness for alcohol and kept his one roving eye for the women. He remained cunning, shrewd, diplomatic and dogged and was still the best commander the army had. When the call came from Alexander to serve his country, Kutuzov responded once more with alacrity. He disapproved of the Allied plans, but as the campaign was already underway, headed off to lead the army into Bavaria to confront the French.

Kutuzov’s greatest fear was that Austria would send her army into Bavaria too early. A marathon 650-mile march from Russia to Braunau lay before the army and uncertainty over Prussia’s stance, combined with delays in preparation meant his army started five days later than planned.
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On 7 August, Alexander wrote to Frederick William, the Prussian king, seeking permission for Russian troops to march through Prussia. While he awaited the king’s response, Buxhöwden’s army marched towards the border at Brest-Litovsk, in readiness to continue across Prussian territory towards Warsaw. Similarly, Bennigsen’s men advanced through Lithuania, awaiting confirming orders to enter Prussia. Russia and Austria agreed (with British consent) that if Prussia refused the request then Russian troops would enter Prussia aggressively. Communications dragged on, and Alexander ordered his two armies to halt at the border, allowing time for Kutuzov to advance far enough to add a further threat from the south to that now presented from the east.

On 4 September, Alexander warned Frederick William that his troops would cross the border into Prussia on 16 September. Then, against the wishes of Czartoryski and the Austrian minister, Cobenzl, Alexander decided he should personally join his armies at the front and share their fortune. Prussia
continued to express her neutrality, leading to an extension of the deadline, while Alexander travelled to Brest-Litovsk, where he arrived on 27 September after a seven-day journey. Here he found a letter waiting from Frederick William and in response sent his aide, Prince Peter Dolgorukov to Berlin, in a final attempt at reasoning with the Prussian king. On 3 October, while awaiting the result of this embassy, Alexander retired to the Czartoryski family estate at Pulawy. Meanwhile, Bennigsen, Buxhöwden and their armies remained on the border, already way behind schedule.

With everything static on the Prussian border, Kutuzov pushed his army on as best he could. There were 46,405 men under his command, but only a few days into Galicia, Kutuzov received an order to detach one of his six columns for service on the Turkish frontier. When the kaiser heard of this weakening of the Russian force he immediately appealed to the tsar. In response, General Leitenant Rosen’s men were recalled, but because of the inherent delays in communication between Vienna, St Petersburg and the army, he trailed far behind Kutuzov’s advance and never reached the Inn, reducing the effective command to around 38,000 men. The leading column reached Teschen, on the border between the Austrian provinces of Galicia and Moravia – the halfway point to Braunau – on 22 September, covering the 320 miles in twenty-nine days. Here Kutuzov received dramatic news: the French had already abandoned their camps on the Channel coast and were heading for the Rhine.

Kutusov’s men had suffered badly on the march – poor roads and bad weather taking their toll – but at Teschen the Austrian authorities urged him to push on with greater speed. For this purpose they provided over 2,000 horse drawn carts to hasten the Russians on their way. Exhausted though his men were, Kutuzov ordered them to abandon all excess baggage and make ready to march on, utilising the carts to transport detachments in relays and reassigning his fittest horses to pull the infantry ammunition carts. The artillery teams could not maintain this accelerated rate, so in order to preserve their battlefield effectiveness, they were allowed to continue at their own pace. Although conscious of the need for speed, Kutuzov insisted on maintaining one day’s rest for every four spent marching, to prevent exhaustion totally destroying his army. As a result of these changes his progress dramatically increased, but despite his caution, cohesion broke down as more and more men struggled to keep up the relentless pace. This endless tramp along bad roads in chilling rain destroyed the soldiers’ shoes, and reduced to marching barefoot, the men suffered greatly. Any unable to keep up were left to come on as best they could.

Kutuzov himself took a detour via Vienna before arriving in Braunau on 9 October. The first column arrived three days later, ahead of schedule, completing the march of 330 miles from Teschen in twenty days. Allowing for three days’ rest, these men progressed at the tremendous pace of almost 19 miles a day. However, another two weeks would pass before the last of Kutusov’s five columns struggled in. By then, momentous events elsewhere had made their prodigious efforts worthless.

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Kutuzov to Alexander, prior to the commencement of the 1805 campaign.