A History of China (40 page)

Although a few officials criticized the court for surrendering to the so-called barbarians, most supported its realism and pragmatism. They concurred with the view that an aggressive foreign policy was deleterious to stability. They also contended that the expenditures on the annual payments to the Khitans would be considerably lower than expenses on repeated military engagements or maintenance of a large army all along the frontiers. Even when the Song signed a second treaty with the Khitans, which increased the annual subsidy to 200,000 taels of silver and 300,000 bolts of silk, the court could generally manage the payments. Silver was somewhat problematic because the Song’s annual production amounted to 300,000–400,000 taels, but the court received sufficient foreign silver in payment for Chinese commodities to sustain the expense. The Khitans, in fact, used most of their gifts of silver to buy Chinese goods. The payments in silk did not burden the court because it received substantial amounts of silk on taxes and bought vast quantities (as many as two million bolts annually) for its army. Sending 200,000 or 300,000 bolts a year to the Khitans did not make a dent on the court’s supply.

This policy of accommodation through the presentation of gifts of silk and ­silver was so effective that the Song used the same tactic to defuse tensions with the Tanguts, who occupied the lands to the west and northwest. Like the Khitans, the Tanguts established a Chinese-style dynasty, the Xia, and institutions resembling those of China. A year after the signing of the Treaty of Shanyuan, the Song began to provide annual gifts of forty thousand bolts of silk to the Xia. However, border disputes and controversies over proper names of address between the Xia ruler and the Song emperor erupted into wars in the mid eleventh century; these culminated in several Tangut victories and the negotiation of an agreement similar to the Treaty of Shanyuan. This agreement increased opportunities for trade for Tangut envoys to the court and pledged the Song to offer annual gifts of tea, silver, and 153,000 bolts of silk. Once again, the financial burdens on the court were relatively light ­compared to the military expenditures it would have incurred with continual warfare. Later in the eleventh century, officials who advocated a more aggressive approach toward the Tanguts gained power, and several wars erupted in which large Song armies with sophisticated logistics were mobilized. Because neither side emerged with overwhelming clear-cut victories, both reverted to the less belligerent policy in which gifts of silk, silver, and tea fostered peace along the border.

The Song rulers also had determined that they needed to curb the powers of the military commanders who had been instrumental in the Tang’s collapse. A centralized and effective government would be undermined without restraints on these military officials. Thus, the court gradually had to restore civilian control over these incipient warlords. Taizu himself initiated such efforts by limiting his own commanders once he had consolidated his authority over much of China. He relegated some of the most successful to relatively minor posts to avert challenges from them. He encouraged or coerced others to retire, providing them with generous gifts for their previous military service. As these military commanders were transferred, retired, or died, he chose civilian replacements. The few obstreperous commanders were summarily dismissed, but Taizu preferred to attain his objectives through compromise and conciliation. Seeking to impose civilian control over the military, he gained the cooperation of military commanders by generosity toward those who acquiesced, as well as toward those who initially resisted but later accepted his overlordship. He frequently deferred to his ministers, he lauded the civil bureaucracy, and he embodied the traits of a sage Confucian ruler. His ­military force and his policy (tempered by moderation and judicious rewards) of ­promoting civilians over the military enabled him to achieve stability.

A shift in the composition of the elite facilitated Taizu’s efforts at ­governance. The major aristocratic families, which had dominated from Han times on, had begun to be challenged during the Tang, as a regular bureaucracy had started to develop. The Song relied on a more merited-based system associated with the civil-service examinations, rather than on appointments based on social rank. Some scholars have assumed that this change presaged the transition from an aristocratic to a more autocratic society. They argue that the pre-Song-era aristocrats had the wealth, status, and influence to challenge the emperors whereas the new merit-based bureaucrats did not have the independence or wherewithal to contest or debate policies with the rulers. Lacking the opposition of a powerful group with equivalent status, the emperors could more readily impose their own will on the ­government. The aristocracy, which earlier restrained or at least counterbalanced the emperors’ authority, was not as dominant a force. Without such countervailing forces, the emperors from this time on bent government to their own needs and were less tolerant of and less threatened by dissent among officials.

There is some merit to this view, but it perhaps overstates the significance of this political transition. Some pre-Song emperors had been autocratic; ­others, who either showed scant interest in government or were not overpowering, had been more willing to accept counsel from their ministers or other officials. Examples abound, on the one hand, of dominant emperors who brooked no criticism, and, on the other hand, of tolerant rulers who fostered active deliberations of court policies. Similarly, some Song and post-Song emperors ran roughshod over the bureaucracy, while others turned over most government affairs to officials. In theory, the post-Song emperors could more readily override opposition from the bureaucracy, but in practice officials were often granted leeway to disagree with the rulers.

The governmental structure reflected the growing emphasis on control, order, and regularity. Assisting the emperors in devising policies was a series of agencies designed to enhance the authority of the central government. The Council of State drafted reports to clarify policies, all of which ultimately required the emperor’s imprimatur. Originally composed of less than ten men who had served in various capacities as academicians or drafters of documents, they consulted with the emperor on policy and then drafted, with the help of the Bureau of Academicians, decisions and proposals. Several agencies, most notably the Censorate, informed the court about local conditions, scrutinized the activities of the bureaucracy, reported on malfeasance and corruption to the emperor, assessed the performance of officials, and even criticized the emperor himself.

Although the Council of State on occasion administered government ­programs, other agencies generally implemented policies. A Finance Commission, eventually composed of the offices of Salt and Iron, Census, and Funds, took charge of the revenues and expenditures of the empire. It collected taxes, devised budgets, and managed commerce and the country’s resources. The Bureau of Military Affairs, often supervised by civilians, planned for the defense of China and attempted to avert the rise of powerful military commanders as in the Tang. Finally, the Secretariat and Chancellery oversaw all civilian matters other than finances. Thus, it supervised the bureaucracy and the judicial system. Civilians predominated in this new ­governmental structure, and the highest government posts went to successful candidates of the civil-service examinations.

Similar emphases on civilian and central-government control prevailed in the Song local administration. The court relied on so-called circuit intendants to act as its representatives in the supervision, though not actual governance, of the prefectures and subprefectures, the principal divisions on the local level. The circuits were roughly equivalent to the contemporary Chinese designation of provinces. Intendants specialized in finances, justice, the military, and, for lack of a better word, commerce. The intendants for commerce actually ­oversaw all transactions involving exchanges, as well as the minting of coins and the transport of grain to the more populous centers in the empire. Prefectural and subprefectural officials really carried out the principal tasks of local ­government. About 1300 subprefectures, each composed of 2500 to 3000 households, were designated as the main government organs with which ­ordinary people dealt. Leaders of the subprefectures, assisted by sheriffs and registrars, collected taxes, ensured peace and safety, managed education, served as moral exemplars, and guided the moral development of their charges.

Prefectural leaders normally supervised ten to twelve prefectures, although a few who governed large cities or industrial centers might oversee only one or two such prefectures. Centered in a town or city, they inspected the work of subprefectural officials, focusing on the judicial system and on the government monopolies. In short, they added still another link between the central government and the local populace and officials. The court thus sought to maintain control over local areas to avert the fragmentation of the late Tang.

It also relied upon the civil-service examinations for recruitment or selection of its officials. Although a few officials received the imperial grace of ­protection (
yin
), enabling them to bring one of their relatives into government without taking an examination, the vast majority of the bureaucracy consisted of successful graduates of the examinations. The highest positions were reserved for those who passed the demanding third level of examinations, which granted one the title of
jinshi
and which, from 1067, were given only once every three years. The examinations, which were administered in law, letters, history, rituals, and classics, generally emphasized rote memorization of texts, which led eventually to criticism of their format and style. Critics pointed out that they did not evaluate ability or ethical character – a prominent failing in a Confucian-based system that emphasized moral worth. Seeking to ensure fairness and avert favoritism, the court devised a system of evaluation that guaranteed the anonymity of the candidates. Examiners did not know the ­candidates and thus could not judge their character.

Simultaneously, the court, seeking to impose civilian control over the ­military, kept increasing the number of successful candidates to enlarge the pool of eligible officials. By the mid eleventh century, the holders of degrees began to outstrip the number of official positions in the bureaucracy. Too many candidates were passing the exams, challenging the families who sought to bring their sons into the bureaucracy through the so-called
yin
, or grace of protection. Yet some in the elite found ways, through the
yin
privilege , to place a son in government without an examination and thus retained their prominence in the Song. These entrenched families, in a disguised attempt to restore patronage or nepotism, initiated more strenuous efforts to ensure successful admission into officialdom for their sons.

One way of reducing the number was to prevent the sons of men in specific occupations from taking the exams. Thus the court, at various times, prohibited the sons of monks, artisans, and merchants from participating in the exams. It also investigated the moral qualifications – particularly, adherence to filial piety and other Confucian virtues – of potential candidates, ruling out some in that way.

The elite identified and sought legitimacy through a new form of Confucianism. This so-called Neo-Confucianism developed beyond Confucianism’s original concerns. Neo-Confucian thinkers became engaged with metaphysical ­questions such as the origins, nature, and composition of the universe, issues that Confucius and his school had avoided. They explored ideas that had been the province of the Buddhists, and these efforts could be said to be responses to Buddhist metaphysics. Neo-Confucianism may have developed without ­reference to Buddhism, but Neo-Confucians were critical of Buddhism as well as Daoism.

A slew of such thinkers contributed in their formulations to the reappraisal, revival, and resurgence of the traditional philosophy. Zhu Xi (1130–1200), also respected as a great calligrapher, summarized their views in his
Reflections on Things at Hand
(
Jinsilu
). Incorporating the ideas of Zhou Dunyi (1017–1073), Zhang Zai (1020–1077), Cheng Hao (1032–1085), and Cheng Yi (1033–1107), Zhu Xi’s text delineated the philosophy’s principles. Following the style of much philosophical discourse in China, it consisted, in part, of commentaries on Confucius’s
Analects
, Mencius’s text, and the
Great Learning
(
Daxue
) and
Doctrine of the Mean
(
Zhongyong
) sections of the
Liji
(
Book of Rites
), which became known as the Four Books and became the standard for the civil-­service examinations. Although the discussions and analyses of these sources may have appeared to be mere scholarly speculation, the texts actually prescribed some of the same applicable tenets as traditional Confucianism. Thus, these thinkers still dwelt upon personal morality, proper relationships within the family, and the individual’s relationship to the state.

However, they now supplemented the original Confucian precepts with analyses of the composition of the universe. Like the polarities between thought and action and
yin
and
yang
, the fundamental underlying forms of the universe were perceived of as a duality, the
qi
and the
li
.
Qi
consisted of matter or energy: the material components of the universe, or what is perceived by the senses. Traditional Confucianism had focused on that aspect of the universe. The Neo-Confucian thinkers added
li
, or the underlying principle or form. Material objects were infused with
li
, but so were values, relationships, and beliefs. Nothing could exist or be conceived of without
li
. Unlike
qi
,
li
could not be perceived by the senses. It constituted the metaphysical element in the new form of Confucianism and had not been integral to the original formulation of Confucianism.